HS 


l*"i)i 


m 


III 


Wmu: 


ii||;is::H::^^^;:::;:;S::':; 


SI;::: 


I'i'vi:';,' 


m-  '''y^iyilHyy  ';  I 


ill  J'Siif: 


'■^^'iv'T' '/ 


f||j;lrai;:::i| 


m^y':yy'ym 

■'V'ii:ii':;'r;- ;■■::: 

i!ftii_:i/'#: ;„:;■;   v; 


BT  1100  .B9  1846 

Butler,  Joseph,  1692-1752. 

The  analogy  of  religion 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 

in  2009  with  funding  from 

Princeton  Theological  Seminary  Library 


http://www.archive.org/details/analogyofrel1846butl 


THE 

ANALOGY  OF  RELIGION, 

NATURAL  AND  REVEALED, 

TO    THE 

CONSTITUTION  AND  COURSE  OF  NATURE. 

TO  WHICH  ARE  ADDKD 

TWO  BRIEF  DISSERTATIONS  : 

I.    ON  PERSONAL   IDENTITY. — II.    ON  THE    NATURE  OF  VIRTUE. 

B  Y 

JOSEPH    BUTLER,   D.C.L. 

LOKD   BISHOP   OF   DURHAM. 

AND 

DANIEL  WILSON,  D.D. 

BISHOP  OF  CALCUTTA. 


Ejus  [.\nalogiieJ  hasc  vis  est,  ut  iil  quoil  iluWiim  est  a:l  aliquid  simile,  de  quo  nou  quaeritur,  referat 
ut  iiicerta  certis  probct. — Q,uintii,.  I.  i.  c  6. 


WITH    AN    ACCOUUT    OF   THE 

CHARACTER  AND   WRITINGS  OF   BISHOP   BUTLER, 

B  Y 

SAMUEL   HALIFAX,   D.D. 

LORD  BISHOP    OF   GLOUCESTEB. 


?fEyv-YORK: 

ROBERT  CARTER,  53  CANAL-STREET. 
PITTSBURG  :  r^Q  MARKET-STREET. 

18  46. 


THE 


ANALOGY  OF  RELIGION, 

NATURAL  AND  REVEALED 

TO  THE 

CONSTITUTION  AND   COURSE   OF  NATURE. 

TO    WHICH    ARE    ADDED, 

TWO  BRIEF  DISSERTATIONS; 

L  ON  PERSONAL  IDENTITY.— II.  ON  THE  NATURE  OF  VIRTUE. 

BY 

JOSEPH  BUTLER,  D.C.L 

LATE    LORD    BISHOP    OF    DURHAM. 


Ejus  [Analogiee]  hsc  vis  est,  ut  id  quod  dubium  est  ad  aliquid  simile,  de  quo  non  queritur, 
referat  ut  incerta  certis  probet. — Q,uintil.  1.  i.  c.  6. 


WITH 
AN   ACCOUNT   OF   THE    CHAEACTER   AND   WRITINGS   OF    THE    AUTHOR, 

BY  SAMUEL  HALIFAX,  D.D. 

LATE  LORD  BISHOP  OF  GLOUCESTER. 


NEW  YORK: 

ROBERT  CARTER  58  CANAL  STREET, 
AND  PITTSBURG,  56   MARKET  STREET. 

1846, 


ADVERTISEMENT 

PREFIXED    TO    THE    FIRST   EDITION. 


If  the  reader  should  meet  here  with  any  thing  which  he 
tiad  not  before  attended  to,  it  will  not  be  in  the  observa- 
tions upon  the  constitution  and  course  of  nature,  these 
being  all  obvious ;  but  in  the  application  of  them :  in 
which,  though  there  is  nothing  but  what  appears  to  me 
of  some  real  weight,  and  therefore  of  great  importance  ; 
yet  he  will  observe  several  things,  which  will  appear  to 
him  of  very  little,  if  he  can  think  things  to  be  of  little 
importance,  which  are  of  any  real  weight  at  all,  upon 
such  a  subject  as  rehgion.  However,  the  proper  force 
of  the  following  Treatise  hes  in  the  whole  general  analogy 
considered  together. 

It  is  come,  I  know  not  how,  to  be  taken  for  granted, 
by  many  persons,  that  Christianity  is  not  so  much  as  a 
subject  of  inquiry;  but  that  it  is,  now  at  length,  dis- 
covered to  be  fictitious.  And  accordingly  they  treat  it, 
as  if,  in  the  present  age,  this  were  an  agreed  point  among 
all  people  of  discernment;  and  nothing  remained,  but  to 
set  it  up  as  a  principal  subject  of  mirth  and  ridicule,  as 
it  were  by  way  of  reprisals,  for  its  having  so  long  inter- 
rupted the  pleasures  of  the  world.  On  the  contrary, 
thus  much,  at  least,  will  be  here  found,  not  taken  for 
granted,  but  proved,  that  any  reasonable  man,  who  will 
thoroughly  consider  the  matter,  may  be  as  much  assured, 
as  he  is  of  his  own  being,  that  it  is  not,  however,  so  clear 
a  case,  that  there  is  nothing  in  it.  There  is,  I  think, 
strong  evidence  of  its  truth ;  but  it  is  certain  no  one  can, 
upon  principles  of  reason,  be  satisfied  of  the  contrary. 
And  the  practical  consequence  to  be  drawn  from  this  is 
not  attended  to  by  every  one  who  is  concerned  in  it. 

Mcy,  1736. 


CONTENTS. 


Vtigt 
INTRODUCTION  ••«••«  48 


PART  I. 

OF  NATURAL    RELIGION. 
Chap.  I. — Of  a  Future  Lifo        .         •         «         .  •         -  57 

Chap.  II. — 'Of  the  Government  of  God  by  Rewards  and  Punishments; 

and  particularly  of  the  latter        .         .         .—      ,         ,  "^S 

Chap.  III. — Of  the  Moral  Government  of  God      ....  83 

Chap.  IV. — Of  a  State  of  Probation,  as  implying  Trial,  Difficulties, 

and  Danger 105 

Chap.  V. — Of  a  State  of  Probation,  as  intended  for  moral  Disciplin 

and  Improvement 112 

Chap.  VI. — Of  the  Opinion  of  Necessity,  considered  as  influencing 

Practice 184 

Chap.  VII. — Of  the  Gorernment  of  God,  considered  as  a  Scheme  or 

Constitution,  imperfectly  comprehended       .         .         .        .         148 

Conclusion      ••  •«•  •••         168 


PART  n. 
OF  REVEALED  RELIGION. 

Chap.  I.— Of  the  Importance  of  Christianity        ,        .        .  165 

Chap.  II. — Of  the  supposed  Presumption  against  a  Revelation,  consid- 
ered as  miraculous     .         .         .         .         .         .         .         •         181 


VI  CONTENTS. 

Chap.  III. — Of  our  incapacity  of  judging,  what  were  to  be  expected  1:1 
a  Revelation;  and  the  Credibility,  from  Analogy,  that  It,  must 
contain  Things  appearing  liable  to  Objections        .         .  187 

Chap.  IV. — Of  Christianity,  considered  as  a  Scheme  or  Constitution, 

imperfectly  comprehended 201 

Chap,  V. — Of  the  particular  System  of  Christianity ;  the  Appointment 

of  a  Mediator,  and  the  Redemption  of  the  World  by  him         .         )iOd 

Chap.  VI. — Of  the  Want  of  Universality  in  Revelation:  and  of  the 

supposed  Deficiency  in  the  Proof  of  it  .         ,         ,         .         225 

Chap.  VII. — Of  the  particular  Evidence  for  Christianity        ,        .         242 

Chap.  VIII. — Of  the  Objections  which  may  be  made  against  arguing 

from  the  Analogy  of  Nature  to  Religion       .         ,         ,         ,         275 

Conclusion     .....,«•,,         286 

Dissertation  I. — Of  Personal  Identity       .        ,  ;        ,        S97 

DrssEBTATioN  II. — Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue        •  •        *        103 


TO 


THE  REVEREND 


DR    THOMAS    BALGUY, 

ARCHDEACON  ASD  PREBENDARY  OF  AMTICHESTEB,  &0. 


Dear  Sir, 
I  TRUST  you  will  excuse  the  liberty  I  have  taken  of 
prefixing  your  name  to  the  following  sheets ;  the  latter 
part  of  which,  I  am  confident,  will  not  be  thought 
undeserving  of  your  approbation ;  and  of  the  former  part 
you  will  commend  the  intention  at  least,  if  not  the 
execution.  In  vindicating  the  character  of  Bishop  Butler 
from  the  aspersions  thrown  upon  it  since  his  death,  I 
bave  but  discharged  a  common  duty  of  humanity,  which 
survivors  owe  to  those  who  have  deserved  well  of  man- 
kind by  their  lives  or  writings,  when  they  are  past  the 
power  of  appearing  in  their  own  defence.  And  if  what 
I  have  added,  by  way  of  opening  the  general  design  of 
the  Works  of  this  great  Prelate,  be  of  use  in  exciting  the 
younger  class  of  Students  in  our  Universities  to  read,  and 
so  to  read  as  to  understand,  the  Two  Volumes  prepared 
and  pablished  by  the  Author  himself;  I  flatter  myself  I 
shall  have  done  no  inconsiderable  service  to  Morality 
and  Religion.  Your  time  and  studies  have  been  long 
successfully  devoted  to  the  support  of  the  same  great 
cause :  and  in  what  you  have  lately  given  to  the  world, 
both  as  an  Author  and  an  Editor,  you  have  largely  con- 
tributed to  the  defence  of  our  common  Christianity,  and 
of  what  was  esteemed  by  One,  who  was  perfectly  com- 
petent to  judge,  its  best  Establishment,  the  Church  of 
England.     In  the  present  pubHcation  I  consider  myself 


•  •• 

VIU 

as  a  fellow  labourer  with  you  in  the  same  design,  and 
tracing  the  path  you  have  trod  before,  but  at  great 
distance,  and  with  unequal  paces.  When,  by  His 
Majesty's  goodness,  I  was  raised  to  that  station  of 
eminence  in  the  Church,  to  which  you  had  been  first 
named,  and  which,  on  account  of  the  infirmity  of  your 
health,  you  had  desired  to  decline ;  it  was  honour  enough 
for  me  on  such  an  occasion  to  have  been  thought  of  next 
to  you :  and  I  know  of  no  better  rule  by  which  to  govern 
my  conduct,  so  as  not  to  discredit  the  Royal  Hand  which 
conferred  on  me  so  signal  and  unmerited  a  favour,  than 
in  cases  of  difficulty  to  put  the  question  to  myself,  How 
you  would  probably  have  acted  in  the  same  situation. 
You  see.  Sir,  I  still  look  up  to  you,  as  I  have  been  wont, 
both  as  my  Superior  and  my  Example.  That  I  niay  long 
reap  the  benefit  of  your  advice  and  friendship;  and  that 
such  a  measure  of  health  and  strength  may  be  continued 
to  you,  as  may  enable  you  to  pass  the  evening  of  your 
days  with  comfort,  and  enjoy  the  blessings  of  the  life  you 
love ;  is  the  cordial  wish  of, 

Dear  Sir, 

Your  very  afi'ectionate 

and  faithful  Servant, 

S.  GLOUCESTER 

Dartmouth  Street,  Westminster 
12'Ailf<7y,  1780 


PREFACE  BY  THE  EDITOR . 


**  When  I  consider  how  light  a  matter  very  often  subjects  the  best  established 
characters  to  the  suspicions  of  posterity,  posterity  often  as  malignant  to  virtue  as 
the  age  that  saw  it  was  envious  of  its  glory ;  and  how  ready  a  remote  age  is  to  catch 
at  a  low  revived  slander,  which  the  times  that  brought  it  forth  saw  despised  and 
forgotten  almost  in  its  birth ;  I  cannot  but  think  it  a  matter  that  deserves  atten- 
tion."— Letter  to  the  Editor  of  the  Letters  on  the  Spirit  of  Patriotism,  &c.,  by  Bishop 
Wabburton.     See  his  Works,  vol.  vii.  p.  547. 

The  Charge  to  the  Clergy  of  the  Diocese  of  Durham 
was  printed  and  pubhshed  in  the  year  1751,  by  the 
learned  Prelate  whose  name  it  bears  ;  and,  together 
with  the  Sermons  and  Analogy  of  the  same  writer,  both 
too  well  known  to  need  a  more  particular  description, 
completes  the  collection  of  his  Works.  It  has  long 
been  considered  as  a  matter  of  curiosity,  on  account  of 
its  scarceness  ;  and  it  is  equally  curious  on  other  ac- 
counts— its  subject,  and  the  calumny  to  which  it  gave 
occasion,  of  representing  the  Author  as  addicted  to  super- 
stition^ as  inclined  to  popery,  and  as  dying  in  the  com- 
munion of  the  Church  of  Rome.  The  improved  edition 
of  the  Biographia  Britannica,  published  under  the  care 
of  Dr  Kippis,  having  unavoidably  brought  this  calumny 
again  into  notice,  it  may  not  be  unseasonable  to  oifer  a 
few  reflections  in  this  place,  by  way  of  obviating  any 
impressions  that  may  hence  arise  to  the  disadvantage 
of  so  great  a  character  as  that  of  the  late  Bishop  Butler ; 
referring  those  who  desire  a  more  particular  account  of 
his  hfe,  to  the  third  volume  of  the  same  entertaining 
work,  printed  in  1784.  art  Butler  (Joseph).* 

I.  The  principal  design  of  the  Bishop  in  his  Charge 
is,  to  exhort  his  Clergy  to  "do  their  part  towards  reviv- 
ing a  practical  sense  of  religion  amongst  the  people 
committed  to  their  care ;"  and,  as  one  way  of  effecting 
this,  to  "instruct  them  in  the  Importance  of  External 
Religion"  or  the  usefulness  of  outward  observances  in 
promoting   inward   piety.     Now,  from   the   compound 

*  The  account  here  alluded  to  is  subjoined  to  this  Preface. 


X  PREFACE 

nature  of  man,  consisting  of  two  parts,  the  body  and  the 
mind,  together  with  the  influence  which  these  are  found 
to  have  on  one  another,  it  follows,  that  the  religious  re- 
gards o£  such  a  creature  ought  to  be  so  framed,  as  to  be 
in  some  way  properly  accommodated  to  both.     A  reli- 
gion which  is  purely  spiritual,  stripped  of  every  thing 
that  may  affect  the  senses,  and  considered  only  as  a 
divine  philosophy  of  the  mind,  if  it  do  not  mount  up  into 
enthusiasm,  as  has  frequently  been  the  case,  often  sinks, 
after  a  few  short  fervours,  into  indifference :  an  abstracted 
invisible  object,  like  that  which  natural  religion  offers, 
ceases  to  move  or  interest  the  heart ;  and  something 
further  is  wanting  to  bring  it  nearer,  and  render  it  more 
present  to  our  view,  than  merely  an  intellectual  contem- 
plation.    On  the  other  hand,  when,  in  order  to  remedy 
this  inconvenience,  recourse  is  had  to  instituted  forms 
and  ritual  injunctions,  there  is  always  danger  lest  men 
be   tempted   to  rest   entirely   on   these,   and   persuade 
themselves  that  a  painful  attention  to  such  observances 
will  atone  for  the  want  of  genuine  piety  and  virtue. 
Yet  surely  there  is  a  way  of  steering  safely  between 
these  two  extremes ;  of  so  consulting  both  the  parts  of 
our  constitution,  that  the  body  and  the  mind  may  concur 
in  rendering  our  religious  services  acceptable  to  God, 
and  at  the  same  time  useful  to  ourselves.     And  what 
way  can  this  be,  but  precisely  that  which  is  recommend- 
ed in  the  Charge ;  such  a  cultivation  of  outward  as  well 
as  inward  religion,  that  from  both  may  result,  what  is 
the  point  chiefly  to  be  laboured,  and  at  all  events  to  be 
secured,  a  correspondent  temper  and  behaviour ;  or,  in 
other  words,  such  an  application  of  the  forms  of  godli- 
ness, as  may  be  subservient  in  promoting  the  power  and 
spirit  of  it.^     No  man,  who  believes  the  Scriptures  of 
the  Old  and  New  Testament,  and  understands  what  he 
believes,  but  must  know,  that  external  religion  is  as  much 
enjoined,  and  constitutes  as  real  a  part  of  revelation,  as 
that  which  is  internal.     The  many  ceremonies  in  use 
among  the  Jews,  in  consequence  of  a  divine  command ; 
the  baptism  of  water,  as  an  emblem  of  moral  purity ;  the 
eating  and  drinking  of  bread  and  wine,  as  symbols  and 
representations  of  the  body  and  blood  of  Christ,  required 


BY  THE  EDITOR.  XI 

of  Christians,  are  proofs  of  this.     On  comparing  these 
two  parts  of  rehgion  together,  one,  it  is  immediately 
seen,  is  of  much  greater  importance  than  the  other ;  and, 
whenever  they  happen  to  interfere,  is  always  to  be  pre- 
ferred :  but  does  it  follow  from  hence,  that  therefore  that 
other  is  of  little  or  no  importance,  and,  in  cases  where 
there  is  no  competition,  may  entirely  be  neglected  ?    Or 
rather  is  not  the  legitimate  conclusion  directly  the  re- 
verse, that  nothing  is  to  be  looked  upon  as  of  little  im- 
portance, which  is  of  any  use  at  all  in  preserving  upon 
our  minds  a  sense  of  the  Divine  authority,  which  recalls 
to  our  remembrance  the  obligations  we  are  under,  and 
helps  to  keep  us,  as  the  Scripture  expresses  it,  "  in  the 
fear  of  the  Lord  all  the  day  long?"*     If,  to  adopt  the 
instance  mentioned  in  the  Charge,  the  sight  of  a  church 
should  remind  a  man  of  some  sentiment  of  piety  ;  if, 
from  the  view  of  a  material  building  dedicated,  to  the 
service  of  God,  he  should  be  led  to  regard  himself,  his 
own  body,  as  a  living  "temple  of  the  Holy  Ghost,"t  and 
therefore  no  more  than  the  other  to  be  profaned  or  dese- 
crated by  any  thing  that  defileth  or  is  impure  ;  could  it 
be  truly  said  of  such  a  one,  that  he  was  superstitious,  or 
mistook  the  means  of  religion  for  the  end?     If,  to  use 
another,  and  what  has  been  thought  a  more  obnoxious 
instance,  taken  from  the  Bishop's  practice,  a  cross,  erect- 
ed in  a  place  of  public  worship,  f  should  cause  us  to  re- 
flect on  Him  who  died  on  a  cross  for  our  salvation,  and 
on  the  necessity  of  our  "  own  dying  to  sin,"  §  and  of 
*' crucifying  the  flesh  with  its  aff"ection  and  lusts  ;"ll  would 
any  worse  consequences  follow  from  such  sentiments  so 
excited,  than  if  the  same  sentiments  had  been  excited  by 
the  view  of  a  picture,  of  the  crucifixion  suppose,  such 
as  is  commonly  placed,  and  with  this  very  design,  in 
foreign  churches,  and  indeed  in  many  of  our  own  ?    Both 
the  instances  here  adduced,  it  is  very  possible,  may  be 

*  Prov.  xxiii.  17.  t  I  Cor.  vi.  19. 

X  Dr  Butler,  when  Bishop  of  Bristol,  put  up  a  cross,  a  plain  piece  of  marble  inlaid, 
in  the  chapel  of  his  episcopal  house.  This,  which  was  intended  by  the  blameless 
Prelate  merely  as  a  sign  or  memorial,  that  true  Christians  are  to  bear  their  cross,  and 
not  to  be  ashamed  of  following  a  crucified  Master,  was  considered  as  affording  a 
presumption  that  he  was  secretly  inclined  to  Popish  forms  and  ceremonies,  and  had 
no  great  dislike  to  Popery  itself.  And,  on  account  of  the  offence  it  occasioned,  both 
Rt  the  time  and  since,  it  were  to  be  wisljed,  in  prudence,  it  had  not  been  doue. 
§Roin.  vi.  11.  II  Gal.  v.  24. 


Xll  PREFACE 

far  from  being  approved,  even  by  those  who  are  under 
the  most  sincere  convictions  of  the  importance  of  true 
rehgion :  and  it  is  easy  to  conceive  how  open  to  scorn 
and  censure  they  must  be  from  others,  who  think  they 
have  a  talent  for  ridicule,  and  have  accustomed  them- 
selves to  regard  all  pretensions  to  piety  as  hypocritical 
or  superstitious.  But  "  Wisdom  is  justified  of  her  chil- 
dren."* Religion  is  what  it  is,  "whether  men  will  hear, 
or  whether  they  will  forbear;"!  and  whatever  in  the 
smallest  degree  promotes  its  interests^  and  assists  us  in 
performing  its  commands,  whether  that  assistance  be 
derived  from  the  medium  of  the  body  or  the  mind,  ought 
to  be  esteemed  of  great  weight,  and  deserving  of  our 
most  serious  attention. 

However,  be  the  danger  of  superstition  what  it  may, 
no  one  was  more  sensible  of  that  danger,  or  more  in 
earnest  in  maintaining,  that  external  acts  of  themselves 
are  nothing,  and  that  moral  holiness,  as  distinguished 
from  bodily  observances  of  every  kind,  is  that  which 
constitutes  the  essence  of  religion^  than  Bishop  Butler. 
Not  only  the  Charge  itself,  the  whole  intention  of  which 
is  plainly  nothing  more  than  to  enforce  the  necessity  of 
practical  religion,  the  reality  as  well  as  form,  is  a  de- 
monstration of  this,  but  many  passages  besides  to  the 
same  purpose,  selected  from  his  other  writings.  Take 
the  two  following  as  specimens.  In  his  Analogy  he  ob- 
serves thus :  "  Though  mankind  have,  in  all  ages^  been 
greatly  prone  to  place  their  religion  in  peculiar  positive 
rites,  by  way  of  equivalent  for  obedience  to  moral  pre- 
cepts; yet,  without  making  any  comparison  at  all  be- 
tween them,  and  consequently  without  determining 
which  is  to  have  the  preference,  the  nature  of  the  thing 
abundantly  shows  all  notions  of  that  kind  to  be  utterly 
subversive  of  true  religion :  as  they  are,  moreover,  con- 
trary to  the  whole  tenor  of  Scripture ;  and  likewise  to 
the  most  express  particular  declarations  of  it,  that  no- 
thing can  render  us  accepted  of  God,  without  moral 
virtue."!  And  to  the  same  purpose  in  his  Sermon, 
preached  before  the  Society  for  the  Propagation  of  the 
Gospel,  in  February,  1738-9.    "Indeed,  amongst  crea- 

*  Malt.  xi.  19i  t  Ezek.  ii.  5  J  Analogy,  Part  11.  Chap.  1 


BY  THE  EDITOR.  Xlll 

tures  naturally  formed  for  religion,  yet  so  much  under 
the  power  of  imagination  as  men  are,  superstition  is  an 
evil,  which  can  never  be  out  of  sight.     But  even  against 
this,  true  religion  is  a  great  security,  and  the  only  one. 
True  rehgion  takes  up  that  place  in  the  mind,  wliich 
superstition  would  usurp,  and  so  leaves  little  room  for 
ti]  and  likewise  lays  us  under  the  strongest  obligations 
to  oppose  it.     On  the  contrary,  the  danger  of  supersti- 
tion cannot  but  be  increased  by  the  prevalence  of  irre- 
ligion ;  and,  by  its  general  prevalence,  the  evil  will  be 
unavoidable.     For  the  common  people,  wanting  a  reli- 
gion, will  of  course  take  up  with  almost  any  superstition 
which  is  thrown  in  their  way:  and  in  process  of  time, 
amidst  the  infinite  vicissitudes  of  the  political  world,  the 
leaders  of  parties  will  certainly  be  able  to  serve  them- 
selves of  that  superstition,  whatever  it  be,  which  is  get- 
ting ground;  and  will  not  fail  to  carry  it  to  the  utmost 
length  their  occasions  require.     The  general  nature  of 
the  thing  shows  this;  and  history  and  fact  confirm  it. 
It  is  therefore  wonderful,  those   people    who  seem  to 
think  there  is  but  one  evil  in  life,  that  of  superstition, 
should  not  see  that  atheism  and  profaneness  must  be  the 
introduction  of  it."* 

He  who  can  think  and  write  in  such  a  manner,  can 
never  be  said  to  mistake  the  nature  of  real  religion :  and 
he,  who,  after  such  proofs  to  the  contrary,  can  persist  in 
asserting  of  so  discreet  and  learned  a  person,  that  he 
was  addicted  to  superstition,  must  himself  be  much  a 
stranger  both  to  truth  and  charity. 

And  here  it  may  be  worth  our  while  to  observe,  that 
the  same  excellent  Prelate,  who  bv  one  set  of  men  was 
suspected  of  superstition,  on  account  of  his  Charge,  has 
by  another  been  represented  as  leaning  to  the  opposite 
extreme  of  enthusiasm,  on  account  of  his  two  discourses 
On  the  Love  of  God.  But  both  opinions  are  equally 
without  foundation.  He  was  neither  superstitious,  nor 
an  enthusiast:  his  mind  was  much  too  strong,  and  his 
habits  of  thinking  and  reasoning  much  too  strict  and  se- 
vere, to  suffer  him  to  descend  to  the  weaknesses  of  either 
character.     His  piety  was  at  once  fervent  and  rational. 

*  Ser.  xvi. 


XIV  PREFACE 

When  impressed  with  a  generous  concern  for  the  de- 
clining cause  of  rehgion,  he  laboured  to  revive  its  dying 
interests  ;  nothing  he  judged  would  be  more  effectual  to 
that  end,  among  creatures  so  much  engaged  with  bodily 
things,  and  so  apt  to  be  affected  with  whatever  strongly 
solicits  the  senses,  as  men  are,  than  a  religion  of  such  a 
frame  as  should  in  its  exercise  require  the  joint  exertions 
of  the  body  and  the  mind.  On  the  other  hand,  when 
penetrated  with  the  dignity  and  importance  of  "the  first 
and  great  commandment,"*  love  to  God,  he  set  himself 
to  inquire,  what  those  movements  of  the  heart  are, 
which  are  due  to  Him,  the  Author  and  Cause  of  all 
things ;  he  found,  in  the  coolest  way  of  consideration, 
that  God  is  the  natural  object  of  the  same  affections  of 
gratitude,  reverence,  fear,  desire  of  approbation,  trust, 
and  dependence,  the  same  affections  in  kind,  though 
doubtless  in  a  very  disproportionate  degree,  which  any 
one  would  feel  from  contemplating  a  perfect  character 
in  a  creature,  in  which  goodness,  with  wisdom  and 
power,  are  supposed  to  be  the  predominant  qualities, 
Avith  the  further  circumstance,  that  this  creature  was 
also  his  governor  and  friend.  This  subject  is  manifestly 
a  real  one ;  there  is  nothing  in  it  fanciful  or  unreason- 
able :  this  way  of  being  affected  towards  God  is  piety,  in 
the  strictest  sense  :  this  is  religion,  considered  as  a  habit 
of  mind ;  a  religion,  suited  to  the  nature  and  condition 
of  man.  t 

II.  From  superstition  to  Popery,  the  transition  is  easy: 
no  wonder  then,  that,  in  the  progress  of  detraction,  the 
simple  imputation  of  the  former  of  these,  with  which  the 
attack  on  the  character  of  our  Author  was  opened, 
should  be  followed  by  the  more  aggravated  imputation 
of  the  latter.  Nothing,  I  think,  can  fairly  be  gathered 
in  support  of  such  a  suggestion  from  the  Charge,  in 
which   Popery   is   barely   mentioned,  and  occasionally 

♦  Matt,  xxii,  38. 
■f-  Many  of  the  sentiments,  in  these  Two  Discourses  of  Bishop  Butler,  containing 
the  sovereign  good  of  man  ;  the  impossibility  of  procuring  it  in  the  present  hfe ;  the 
rnsatisfactoriness  of  earthly  enjoyments ;  together  with  the  somewhat  beyond  and 
above  them  all,  whicli  once  attained,  there  will  rest  nothing  furtiier  to  be  wished  or 
hoped  ;  and  which  is  then  only  to  be  expected,  when  we  shall  have  put  off  this 
mortal  body,  and  our  union  with  God  shall  be  complete ;  occur  in  Hooker's  Eccle- 
siastical Polity.  Book  I.  §.  11. 

\ 


BY  THE  EDITOR.  XV 

only,  and  in  a  sentence  or  two ;  yet  even  there,  it  should 
be  remarked,  the  Bishop  takes  care  to  describe  the  pe- 
culiar observances  required  by  it,  "some  as  in  them- 
selves wrong  and  superstitious,  and  others  of  them  as 
being  made  subservient  to  the  purposes  of  superstition." 
With  respect  to  his  other  writings,  any  one  at  all  con- 
versant with  them  needs  not  to  be  told,  that  the  matters 
treated  of  both  in  his  Sermons  and  his  Analogy  did  none 
of  them  directly  lead  him  to  consider,  and  much  less  to 
combat,  the  opinions,  whether  relating  to  faith  or  wor- 
ship, which  are  peculiar  to  the  Church  of  Rome:  it 
might  therefore  have  happened,  yet  without  any  just 
conclusion  arising  from  thence,  of  being  himself  inclined 
to  favour  those  opinions,  that  he  had  never  mentioned, 
so  much  as  incidentally,  the  subject  of  Popery  at  all. 
But  fortunately  for  the  reputation  of  the  Bishop,  and  to 
the  eternal  disgrace  of  his  calumniators,  even  this  poor 
resource  is  wanting  to  support  their  malevolence.  In 
his  Sermon  at  St  Bride's  before  the  Lord  Mayor  in 
1740,  after  having  said  that  "our  laws  and  whole  consti- 
tution go  more  upon  supposition  of  an  equality  amongst 
mankind,  than  the  constitution  and  laws  of  other  coun- 
tries;" he  goes  on  to  observe,  that  "this  plainly  requires, 
that  more  particular  regard  should  be  had  to  the  educa- 
tion of  the  lower  people  here,  than  in  places  where  they 
are  born  slaves  of  power,  and  to  be  made  slaves  of  su- 
perstition* meaning  evidently  in  this  place,  by  the  gen- 
eral term  superstition,  the  particular  errors  of  the  Ro- 
manists. This  is  something:  but  we  have  a  still  plainer 
indication  what  his  sentiments  concerning  Popery  really 
were,  from  another  of  his  additional  Sermons,  1  mean 
that  iDefore  the  House  of  Lords  on  June  the  11th,  1747, 
the  anniversary  of  his  late  Majesty's  accession.  The 
passage  alluded  to  is  as  follows;  and  my  readers  will 
not  be  displeased  that  I  give  it  them  at  length.  "  The 
value  of  our  leligious  Establishment  ought  to  be  very 
much  heightened  in  our  esteem,  by  considering  what  it 
is  a  security  from;  I  mean  that  great  corruption  of 
Christianity,  Popery,  which  is  ever  hard  at  work  to  bring 
us  again  under  its  yoke.     Whoever  will  consider  tlie  Po- 

*  Sei'in.  xvii. 


XVI  PREFACE 

pish  claims,  to  the  disposal  of  the  whole  earth,  as  of 
divine  right,  to  dispense  with  the  most  sacred  engage- 
ments, the  claims  to  supreme  absolute  authority  in  reli- 
gion; in  short,  the  general  claims  which  the  Canonists 
express  by  the  words,  plenitude  of  power — whoever,  I 
say,  will  consider  Popery  as  it  is  professed  at  Rome, 
may  see,  that  it  is  manifest,  open  usurpation  of  all  hu- 
man and  divine  authority.  But  even  in  those  Roman 
Catholic  countries  where  these  monstrous  claims  are 
not  admitted,  and  the  civil  power  does,  in  many  respects, 
restrain  the  papal;  yet  persecution  is  professed,  as  it  is 
absolutely  enjoined  by  what  is  acknowledged  to  be  their 
highest  authority,  a  general  council,  so  called,  with  the 
Pope  at  the  head  of  it ;  and  is  practised  in  all  of  them, 
I  think,  without  exception,  where  it  can  be  done  safely. 
Thus  they  go  on  to  substitute  force  instead  of  argument; 
and  external  profession  made  by  force,  instead  of  rea- 
sonable conviction.  And  thus  corruptions  of  the  gros- 
sest sort  have  been  in  vogue,  for  many  generations,  in 
many  parts  of  Christendom;  and  are  so  still,  even  where 
Popery  obtains  in  its  least  absurd  form  :  and  their  anti- 
quity and  wide  extent  are  insisted  upon  as  proofs  of 
their  truth  ;  a  kind  of  proof,  which  at  best  can  only  be 
presumptive,  but  which  loses  all  its  little  weight,  in  pro- 
portion as  the  long  and  large  prevalence  of  such  cor- 
ruptions have  been  obtained  by  force,"*  In  another 
part  of  the  same  Sermon,  where  he  is  again  speaking  of 
our  ecclesiastical  constitution,  he  reminds  his  audience 
that  it  is  to  be  valued,  "  not  because  it  leaves  us  at 
liberty  to  have  as  little  religion  as  we  please,  without 
being  accountable  to  human  judicatories  ;  but  because 
it  exhibits  to  our  view,  and  enforces  upon  our  con- 
sciences, genuine  Christianity,  free  from  the  supersti- 
tions with  which  it  is  defiled  in  other  countries  ;  which 
superstitions,  he  observes,  "naturally  tend  to  abate  its 
force."  The  date  of  this  Sermon  should  here  be  attend- 
ed to.  It  was  preached  in  June,  1747;  that  is,  four 
years  before  the  delivery  and  publication  of  the  Charge, 
which  was  in  the  year  1751;  and  exactly  five  years 
before  the  Author  died,  which  was  in  June,  1752.     We 

*  Scrm.  XX. 


BY  THE  EDITOR,  X\U 

have  then,  in  the  passages  now  laid  before  the  reader,  a 
clear  and  unequivocal  proof,  brought  down  to  within  a 
few  years  of  Bishop  Butler's  death,  that  Popery  ^vas 
held  by  him  in  the  utmost  abhorrence,  and  that  he  re- 
garded it  in  no  other  light,  than  as  the  great  corrupt  ion 
of  Christianity,  and  a  manifest,  open  usurpation  of  all  h  iiman 
and  divine  authority.  The  argument  is  decisive  ;  nor 
will  any  thing  be  of  force  to  invalidate  it,  unless  from 
some  after-ad  during  the  short  remainder  of  the  Bishop's 
life,  besides  that  of  delivering  and  printing  his  Charge 
(which,  after  what  I  have  said  here,  and  in  the  ?\^ott:s 
added  to  this  Preface  .and  to  the  Charge  I  must  have 
leave  to  consider  as  aifording  no  evidence  at  all  of  his 
inclination  to  Papistical  doctrines  or  ceremonies),  the 
contrary  shall  incontrovertibly  appear. 

III.  One  such  after-act,  however,  has  been  alleged, 
which  would  effectually  demolish  all  that  we  have  urged 
in  behalf  of  our  Prelate,  were  it  true,  as  is  pretended, 
that  he  died  in  the  coinmunion  of  the  Church  of  Rome. 
Had  a  story  of  this  sort  been  invented  and  propagated 
by  Papists,  the  wonder  might  have  been  less  : 

Hoc  Ilhacus  velit,  et  magno  mercentur  Atridce. 

But  to  the  reproach  of  Protestantism,  the  fabrication  of 
this  calumny,  for  such  we  shall  find  it,  originated  from 
among  ourselves.  It  is  pretty  remarkable,  that  a  cir- 
cumstance so  extraordinary  should  never  have  been  di- 
vadged  till  the  year  1767,  fifteen  years  after  the  Bishop's 
decease.  At  that  time  Dr  Thomas  Seeker  was  Arch- 
bishop of  Canterbury ;  who  of  all  others  v/as  the  most 
likely  to  know  the  truth  or  falsehood  of  the  fact  asserted, 
having  been  educated  with  our  Author  in  his  early  youth, 
and  having  lived  in  a  constant  habit  of  intimacy  with 
him  to  the  very  time  of  his  death.  The  good  Arch- 
bishop was  not  silent  on  this  occasion  :  with  a  virtuous 
mdignation  he  stood  forth  to  protect  the  posthumous  cha- 
racter of  his  friend  ;  and  in  a  public  newspaper,  under  the 
signature  of  Blisopseudes,  called  upon  his  accuser  to  sup- 
port what  he  had  advanced,  by  whatever  proofs  he  could. 
No  proof,  however,  nor  any  thing  like  a  proof,  appeared 
in  reply ;  and  every  man  of  sense  and  candour  at  that 


Xviii  PREFACE 

time  was  perfectly  convinced  the  assertion  was  entireif 
groundless.*      As  a  further  confirmation  of  the  rectitude 

*  When  the  first  edition  of  this  Preface  was  published,  I  had  in  vain  endeavoured 
to  procure  a  sigiit  of  the  papers,  in  which  Bishop  Butler  was  accused  of  having  died 
a  Piipist,  and  Archbishop  Seeker's  replies  to  them;  though  I  well  remembered  to 
have  read  both,  when  they  first  appeared  in  tlie  puljlic  prints.  But  a  learned  Pro- 
fessor in  the  University  of  Oxford  has  furnished  me  with  the  whole  controversy  in  it? 
original  form ;  a  brief  history  of  which  it  may  not  be  unacceptable  to  offer  here  to  the 
curious  reader. 

The  attack  was  opened  in  the  year  17S7,  in  an  anonymous  pamphlet,  entitled^ 
*'  The  Root  of  Protestant  Errors  examined  ;"  in  which  the  author  asserted,  that,  "  by 
an  anecdote  lately  given  him,  that  same  Prelate"  (who  at  the  bottom  of  the  page  is 
ealhd  B— p  of  D — m)  "is  said  to  have  died  in  the  communion  of  a  Church,  that 
makes  much  use  of  saints,  saints'  days,  and  all  the  trutiipery  of '•aint  worahip."  When 
this  remarkable  fact,  now  first  divulged,  came  to  be  generally  knovm,  it  occasioned, 
ns  might  be  expected,  no  little  alarm  ;  and  intelligence  of  it  was  no  sooner  conveyed 
to  Aiciibishop  Seeker,  tlian  in  a  short  letter,  signed  Misopsetafes,  and  printed  in  the 
St  James's  Chronicle  of  May  9,  he  called  upon  the  writer  to  produce  his  authority 
for  publishii>g  "  so  gross  and  scandalous  a  falsehood."  To  this  challenge  an  ininie- 
fliate  answer  was  returned  by  the  author  of  the  pamphlet,  who,  now  assuming  the 
name  of  Philelenitheros,  informed  Misopseiideg,  through  the  channel  of  the  same  paper, 
tliat  "  such  anecdote  had  been  given  him;  and  that  he  was  yet  of  opinion,  that  there 
was  nothing  improbable  in  it,  when  it  is  considered  that  the  same  Prelate  put  up  tiie 
Popish  insignia  of  the  cross  in  his  chapel,  when  at  Bristol ;  and  in  his  last  Episcopa) 
Charge  has  squinted  very  much  towards  tliat  superstition."  Here  we  find  the  accusa- 
tion not  OTily  repeated,  but  supported  by  reasons,  such  as  they  are,  of  whicli  it  seemed 
necessary  that  some  notice  should  be  taken  :  nor  did  the  Arciibishop  conseite  it  un- 
becoming his  own  dignity  to  stand  up  on  this  occasion,  as  the  vindicator  of  innocence 
against  the  calumniator  of  the  helpless  dead.  Accordingly,  in  a  second  letter  in  the 
•same  newspaper  of  May  23,  and  subscribed  Misopseudss  as  before  ;  after  reciting 
from  Bishop  Butler's  Sermon  before  the  Lords  the  very  passage  here  priivted  in  tlie 
Preface,  and  observing,  that  "  there  are,  in  the  same  Sermon,  declarations  as  strong 
as  can  he.  made  against  temporal  punishments  for  heresy,  schism,  or  even  for  idola- 
try ;"  his  Grace  expresses  himself  thus:  "Now  he  (Bishop  "Butler)  was  vmiver.-ally 
esteemed  tiiroughout  his  life,  a  man  of  strict  piety  and  honesty,  as  well  as  nnconunon 
aljilities.  He  gave  all  the  proofs,  public  and  prirate,  which  his  station  led  him  lo 
give,  and  they  were  decisive  and  daily,  of  his  continuing  to  the  last  a  sincere  member 
of  tile  Church  of  England.  Nc?r  had  ever  any  of  his  actjtiaintance,  or  most  iiitimati? 
friends,  nor  have  they  to  thfs  day,  tlie  least  donlit  of  it."  As  to  putting  np  a  cross  in 
hiscliapel,  the  Archbishop  frankly  owns,  that  for  himself  he  wishes  he  hud  not ;  and 
thinks  that  in  ro  doing  the  Bishop  did  amiss.  But  then  he  aaks,  "  Can  tiiat  be  oppos- 
ed, as  any  proof  of  Popery,  to  all  the  evidence  on  the  other  side;  or  even  to  the 
single  (evidence  of  the  above-mentioned  Sermon?  Most  of  onr  churches  have  crosses 
upon  them :  are  they  therefore  Polish  churches?  The  Lutherans  have  more  than 
crosses  in  theirs:  are  the  Lutherans  tlierefore  Papists?"  And  as  to  the  Charge,  no 
Papist,  his  Grace  remarks,  v/ould  have  spoken  as  Bislc^  Buthr  thtre  does,  of  the 
observances  peculiar  to  Roman  Catholics,  some  of  which  he  expressly  censures  as 
wrong  and  superstitious,  and  others,  as  made  sub-^ervient  to  the  pur,  oses  of  sivpersii- 
tion,  and,  on  these  accounts,  abolished  at  the  Reformation.  After  the  ptililication  o? 
this  letter  PhiU-ladheros  replied  in  a  short  defence  of  his  own  conduct,  but  wiihouS 
protlucing  any  thing  new  in  confirmation  of  what  he  had  advanced.  And  here  the 
controversy,  so  far  as  the  two  principals  were  concerned,  seems  to  have  ended. 

But  the  dispute  was  not  suffered  to  die  away  quite  so  soon.  For  in  the  same  year, 
and  in  the  same  newspaper  of  July  21,  another  letter  appeared  ;  in  which  the  author 
not  only  contended  that  the  cross  in  the  Episcopal  chapel  at  Bristol,  and  the  Chai'ge 
to  the  Clergy  of  Durham  in  1761,  amount  to  full  proof  of  a  strong  attaciiment  to  thp 
idolatrous  communion  of  the  Church  of  Rome,  but,  with  the  reader's  leave,  he  would 
fiiiu  account  for  the  Bishops  "  tendency  this  way.'  And  this  hip  attempted  to  do, 
•' irom  the  natural  melancholy  and  gloominess  of  Dr  Butler's  disposition;  from  his 
great  fondness  for  the  lives  of  Romish  saints,  and  their  books  of  mystic  piety  ;  frocn 
sis  drawing  his  notions  of  teaching  men  FeligioK,  i:ot  from  the  New  Testament,  bu! 


BY  THE  EDITOR.  XL% 

of  this  judgment,  it  may  not  be  amiss  to  mention,  there 
is  yet  in  existence  a  strong  presumptive  argument  at  least 
in  its  favour,  drawn  from  the  testimony  of  those  who  at- 
tended our  Author  in  the  sickness  of  which  he  died. 
The  last  days  of  this  excellent  Prelate  were  passed  at 
Bath ;  Dr  Nathanael  Forster,  his  chaplain,  being  con- 
tinually with  him ;  and  for  one  day,  and  at  the  very  end 
of  his  illness,  Dr  Martin  Benson  also,  the  then  Bishop 
of  Gloucester,  who  shortened  his  own  life  in  his  pious 
haste  to  visit  his  dying  friend.  Both  these  persons  con- 
stantly wrote  letters  to  Dr  Seeker,  then  Bishop  of  Ox- 
ford, containing  accounts  of  Bishop  Butler's  declining 
health,  and  of  the  symptoms  and  progress  of  his  disorder, 
which,  as  was  conjectured,  soon  terminated  in  his  death. 

from  philosophical  and  pditical  opinions  of  his  own ;  and  above  all,  from  his  transi- 
tion from  a  strict  Dissenter  amongst  the  Presbyierians  to  a  rigid  Churchman,  and  liis 
sudden  and  unexpected  elevation  to  great  wealth  and  dignity  in  the  Church."  The 
attack,  thus  renewed,  excited  the  Archbishop's  attention  a  second  time,  and  drew 
from  him  a  fresh  answer,  subscribed  also  Misopsendes,  in  the  St  James's  Chronicle  of 
August  4.  In  this  letter,  our  excellent  Metropolitan,  first  of  all  obliquely  hinting  at 
the  unfairness  of  sitting  in  judgment  on  the  character  of  a  man  who  had  been  dead 
fifteen  years ;  and  then  reminding  his  correspondent,  that  "full  proof  had  been  al- 
ready  published,  that  Bisliop  Butler  abhorred  Popery  as  a  vile  corruption  of  Chris- 
tianity, and  that  it  might  be  proved,  if  needful,  that  he  held  the  Pope  to  be  Anti- 
christ;" (to  which  decisive  testimonies  of  undoubted  aversion  from  the  Romish 
Ciiurcii,  anotlier  is  also  added  in  the  Postscript,  his  taking,  wlien  promoted  to  the  see 
■<jf  Durham,  fur  his  domestic  Chaplain,  Dr  Nath.  Forster,  v/ho  had  pul)lishwl,  not  tour 
years  before,  a  Sermon,  entitled,  Popery  destructive  of  the  Evidence  of  Christianity ;) 
.proceeds  to  observe,  "  tliat  the  natunil  melancholy  of  tiie  Bisiiop's  temper  would  rather 
have  fixed  him  amongst  his  first  friends,  than  prompted  him  to  the  cliange  he  made : 
that  he  read  books  of  all  sorts,  as  well  as  books  of  mystic  piety,  and  knew  hew  to 
pick  tlie  good  tliat  was  in  them  out  of  the  bad:  that  his  opinions  were  exposed  with- 
out reserve  in  Ills  Analogy  and  his  Sermtjas,  and  if  tlie  doctrine  of  either  be  Popish 
or  unscripLural,  the  learned  world  hatli  mistakt'fi  strangely  in  admiring  both  :  that, 
instead  of  i)eing  a  strict  Dissenter,  he  never  v/as  a  comniuiiieant  in  any  Dissenting  as- 
sembly ;  on  the  contrary,  that  he  went  occasionally,  from  liis  early  years,  to  tlie  es- 
tablished worship,  and  became  a  constant  conformist  to  it  when  he  was  barely  of  age, 
and  entered  himself,  in  I7i4,  of  Oriel  College  :  that  iiis  elevation  to  great  ilignity  in 
the  Church,  far  from  being  sudden  and  unexpeCLed,  v.as  a  gradual  and  natural  rise, 
through  a  variety  of  preferments,  and  a  periud  of  thirty-two  years  :  that,  as  Bishop  of 
Durban'.,  he  had  very  little  authority  beyond  his  brethrtn,  and  in  (xiclesiastical  mat- 
Jters,  had  none  beyond  them  ;  a  larger  income  than  most  of  them  he  had ;  but  this 
lie  employed,  not,  as  v/as  insinuated,  in  augmenting  the  pomp  of  woi'ship  ia  his  ca- 
thedral, where  indeed  it  is  no  greater  than  ia  others,  b:it  for  Uie  purposes  of  charity, 
and  in  the  repairing  of  his  houses."  After  these  remarks,  the  letter  closes  with  the 
following  words:  "  Upon  the  whole,  few  accusations,  so  entirely  gitiiuidless,  have 
been  so  pertinaciously,  1  am  unwilling  to  say  maliciously,  carried  on,  as  the  present: 
and  surely  it  is  high  time  for  the  authors  and  abettors  of  it,  in  mere  common  prudence, 
to  show  some  regard,  if  not  to  truth,  at  least  to  sl.ame." 

it  only  remains  to  be  mentioned,  that  the  above  letters  of  Archbishop  Seeker  had 
such  an  effect  on  a  writer,  who  signed  liimself  in  the  St  James's  Chronicle  of  August 
25,  A  Dissenting  Minister,  that  he  declared  it  as  his  opinion,  that  "  the  author  of  the 
pamphlet,  called,  '  The  Root  of  Protestant  Errors  examined,'  and  his  I'riends,  wera 
obliged  in  candour,  in  justice,  and  in  honour  to  retract  their  charge,  unless  they 
could  establish  it  on  much  better  grounds  than,  had  hitherto  appeared  :"  and  he  ex 

132 


XX  PREFACE 

These  letters,  -whicli  are  still  preserved  in  the  Lambctli 
library,*    I  have  read ;  and  not  the  slenderest  argument 
can   be    collected    from-  them,    in    justification    of  the 
ridiculous  slander  we  are  here  considering.     If  at  that 
awful  season  the  Bishop  was  not  known  to  have  ex- 
pressed  any    opinion    tending   to    show  his   dislike   to 
Popery,  neither  was  he  known  to  have  said  any  thing, 
that  could  at  all  be  construed  in  approbation  of  it ;  and 
the  natural  presumption  is. that  whatever  sentiments  he 
had  formerly  entertained  concerning  that  corrupt  system 
of  religion,  he  continued  to  entertain  them  to  the  last. 
The  truth  is,  neither  the  word  nor  the  idea  of  Popery 
seems  once  to  have  occurred  either  to  the  Bishop  him- 
self,  or    to    those  who  watched  his  parting  moments  : 
their  thoughts  were  otherwise  engaged.     His  disorder 
had  reduced  him  to  such  debility,  as  to  render  him  in- 
capable of  speaking  much  or  long  on  any  subject :  the 
few  bright  intervals  that  occurred  were  passed  in  a  state 
of  the  utmost  tranquillity  and  composure ;   and  in  that 
composure  he  expired.     "  Mark  the  perfect  man,  and 
behold  the  upright:  for  the  end  of  that  man  is  peace."! 
"  Let  me  die  the  death  of  the  righteous,  and  let  my  last 
end  be  like  his  V't 

Out  of  pure  respect  for  the  virtues  of  a  man,  whom  I 

pressed  his  "  hopes,  that  it  would  be  understood  that  tlie  Disspnters  in  general  had 
jio  linjid  in  tlie  accusation,  and  that  it  had  only  been  the  act  of  two  or  three  mistaken 
ni"n."  Anotlier  person  also,  "  a  foreigner  by  birth,"  as  he  says  of  iiiiuself,  who  had 
been  long  an  admirer  of  Bishop  Butler,  and  had  perused  with  great  attention  all  that 
had  l)een  written  on  both  sides  in  the  present  controversy,  confesses  he  had  been 
'•  wonderfully  ])leased  \yitli  observinc;,  witli  what  candour  and  temper,  as  well  as 
ciianiess  and  solidity,  he  was  vindicated  from  the  aspersions  laid  aj»-ain>>l  him."  All 
tiie  adversaries  of  our  Prelate,  however,  had  not  tlie  virtue  or  sense  to  be  thus  con- 
viueed  ;  some  of  whom  still  continued,  uuier  tlie  signaturrs  of  Oli/  Martin,  Latimer^ 
Jh  Imvartial  Protestant,  J'au/inus,  Misonothos,  to  repeat  their  confuted  tiilselioods  in 
the  public  prints ;  as  if  the  curse  of  cahuuniators  liad  fallen  upon  tiiem,  and  tlieir 
menioi7,  by  being  long  a  traitor  to  trivtli,  iiad  taken  at  last  a  severe  revenge,  and 
compelled  them  to  credit  their  own  lie.  The  first  of  these  gentlemen.  Old  Martin, 
who  dates  from  Newcastle,  May  2d,  horn  th»!  rancour  and  malignity  with  which  his 
letter  abounds,  and  from  the  particular  virulence  lie  discovers  towards  the  characters 
of  Bishop  Butler  and  his  defender,  I  conjecture  to  be  no  other  than  the  very  person 
who  iiad  already  figured  in  this  dispute,  so  early  as  the  ytar  1752  ;  of  wiiose  work, 
entitled,  "  A  Serious  Inquiry  into  the  Use  and  ImportJince  of  External  Religion,"  the 
reader  will  find  some  account  in  the  notes  subjoined  to  the  Bishop's  Cliarge  in  the 
volume  of  Sermons. 

*  The  letters,  with  a  sight  of  which  I  was  indulged  by  the  favour  of  our  present 
most  worthy  Metropolitan,  are  all,  as  I  remeniijer,  wrapped  together  under  one 
cover;  on  the  back  of  which  is  written,  in  Archbishop  Seeker's  ovn\  liand,  the  fol- 
lowing words,  or  words  to  this  effect :  "Presumptive  Aiguments  that  Bishop  Butlcf 
did  not  die  a  Papist." 

f  Psalm  xxxvii.  37.  %  Numb,  xxiii.  10, 


BY  THE  EDITOR,  XXI 

had  never  the  happiness  of  knowing,  or  even  of  seeing, 
but  from  whose  writings  I  have  received  tiie  greatest 
benefit  and  illumination,  and  which  I  have  reason  to  be 
thankful  to  Providence  for  having  early  thrown  in  my 
way,  I  have  adventured,  in  what  I  have  now  offered  to 
the  public,  to  step  forth  in  his  defence,  and  to  vindicate 
his  honest  fame  from  the  attacks  of  those,  who,  with  the 
vain  hope  of  bringing  down  superior  characters  to  their 
own  level,  are  for  ever  at  work  in  detracting  from  their 
just  praise.  For  the  literary  reputation  of  Bishop 
Butler,  it  stands  too  high  in  the  opinion  of  the  world,  to 
incur  the  danger  of  any  diminution  ;  but  this  in  truth  is 
the  least  of  his  excellences.  He  was  more  than  a  good 
writer,  he  was  a  good  man ;  and  what  is  an  addition 
even  to  this  eulogy,  he  was  a  sincere  Christian.  His 
whole  study  was  directed  to  the  knowledge  and  practice 
of  sound  morality  and  true  religion  :  these  he  adorned 
by  his  life,  and  has  recommended  to  future  ages  in  his 
writings  ;  in  which,  if  my  judgment  be  of  any  avail,  he 
has  done  essential  service  to  both,  as  much,  perhaps,  as 
any  single  person,  since  the  extraordinary  gifts  of  "  the 
word  of  wisdom  and  the  word  of  knowledge  "*  have 
been  withdrawn. 

In  what  follows  I  propose  to  give  a  short  account  of 
the  Bishop's  moral  and  religious  systems,  as  these  are 
collected  from  his  Works. 

I.  His  way  of  treating  the  subject  of  morals  is  to  be 
gathered  from  the  volume  of  his  Sermons,  and  particu- 
larly from  the  three  first,  and  from  the  preface  to  that 
volume. 

"  There  is,"  as  our  Author  with  singular  sagacity  has 
observed,  "  a  much  more  exact  correspondence  betweeii 
the  natural  and  moral  world,  than  we  are  apt  to  take  no- 
tice of."t  The  inward  frame  of  man  answers  to  his  out- 
ward condition  ;  the  several  propensities,  passions,  and 
affections,  implanted  in  our  hearts  by  the  Author  of  na- 
ture, are  in  a  pecuhar  manner  adapted  to  the  circum- 
stances of  life  in  which  he  hath  placed  us.  This  gene- 
ral observation,  properly  pursued,  leads  to  several  im- 

*  1  Cor.  xii.  8.  t  Serin,  vi. 


XXll  PREFACE 

poitant  conclusions.  The  original  internal  constitution 
of  man,  compared  with  his  external  condition,  enables 
us  to  discern  what  course  of  action  and  behaviour  that 
constitution  leads  to,  what  is  our  duty  respecting  that 
condition,  and  furnishes  us  besides  with  the  most  power- 
ful arguments  to  the  practice  of  it. 

What  the  inward  frame  and  constitution  of  man  is,  is  a 
question  of  fact;  to  be  determined,  as  other  facts  are,. 
from  experience,  from  our  internal  feelings  and  exter- 
nal senses,  and  fi^om  the  testimony  of  others.  Whether 
human  nature,  and  the  cu'cumstances  in  which  it  is  plac- 
ed, might  not  have  been  ordered  otherwise,  is  foreign  to 
our  inquiry,  and  none  of  our  concern :  our  province  is^ 
taking  both  of  these  as  they  are,  and  viewing  the  con- 
nexion between  them,  frwn  that  connexion  to  discover 
if  we  can,  what  course  of  action  is  fitted  to  that  nature 
and  those  circumstances.  From  contemplating  the  bod- 
ily senses,  and  the  organs  or  instruments  adapted  to 
them,  we  learn  that  the  eye  was  given  to  see  with,  the 
ear  to  hear  with.  In  like  manner,  from  considering  our 
inv>' ard  perceptions  and  the  final  causes  of  them,  we  col- 
lect tiiptt  the  feeling  of  shame,  for  instance,  was  given  to 
prevent  the  doing  of  things  sham.eful ;  compassion,  to 
carry  us  to  relieve  others  in  distress;  anger,  to  resist 
sudden  violence  offered  to  ourselves.  If,  continuing  our 
inquiries  in  this  way,  it  should  at  length  appear,  that  the 
nature,  the  whole  nature,  of  man  leads  him  to  and  is  fit- 
ted for  that  particular  course  of  behaviour  which  we  usu- 
ally distinguish  by  the  name  of  virtue,  we  are  authoriz- 
ed to  conclude,  that  virtue  is  the  law  we  are  born  under, 
that  it  was  so  intended  by  the  Author  of  our  being ;  and 
we  are  bound  by  the  most  intimate  of  all  obligations,  a 
regard  to  our  own  highest  interest  and  happiness,  to 
conform  to  it  in  all  situations  and  events. 

Human  nature  is  not  simple  and  uniform,  but  made  up 
of  several  parts  ;  and  we  can  have  no  just  idea  of  it  cis  a 
system  or  constitution,  unless  we  take  into  our  view  the 
respects  and  relations  which  these  parts  have  to  each 
other.  As  the  body  is  not  one  member,  but  many ;  so 
our  inward  structure  consists  of  various  instincts,  appe- 
tites, and  propensions.     Thus  far  there  is  no  difference 


EY  THE  EDITOR.  XXlil 

between  human  creatures  and  brutes.  But  besides  these 
common  passions  and  affections,  there  is  another  princi- 
ple, pecuHar  to  mankind,  that  of  conscience,  moral  sense, 
reflection,  call  it  what  you  please,  by  which  they  are  en- 
abled to  review  their  whole  conduct,  to  approve  of  some 
actions  in  themselves,  and  to  disapprove  of  others. 
That  this  principle  will  of  course  have  some  influence  on 
our  behaviour,  at  least  at  times,  will  hardly  be  disputed : 
but  the  particular  influence  which  it  ought  to  have,  the  pre- 
cise degree  of  power  in  the  regulating  of  our  internal  frame 
that  is  assigned  it  by  Him  who  placed  it  there,  is  a  point 
of  the  utmost  consequence  in  itself,  and  on  the  deter- 
mination of  which  the  very  hinge  of  our  Author's  Moral 
System  turns.  If  the  faculty  here  spoken  of  be,  indeed, 
what  it  is  asserted  to  be,  in  nature  and  kind  superior  to 
every  other  passion  and  affection ;  if  it  be  given,  not 
merely  that  it  may  exert  its  force  occasionally,  or  as  our 
present  humour  or  fancy  may  dispo  ie  us,  but  that  it  may 
at  all  times  exercise  an  uncontrollable  authority  and  go- 
vernment over  all  the  rest ;  it  will  then  follow,  that,  in  or- 
der to  complete  the  idea  of  human  nature,  as  a  system, 
we  must  not  only  take  in  each  particular  bias,  propen- 
sion,  instinct,  which  are  seen  to  belong  to  it,  but  we 
must  add  besides  the  principle  of  conscience,  together 
with  the  subjection  that  is  due  to  it  from  all  the  other 
appetites  and  passions:  just  as  the  idea  of  a  civil  consti- 
tution is  formed,  not  barely  from  enumerating  the  seve- 
ral members  and  ranks  of  which  it  is  composed,  but 
from  these  considered  as  acting  in  various  degrees  of 
subordination  to  each  other,  and  all  under  the  direction 
of  the  same  supreme  authority,  whether  that  authority 
be  vested  in  one  person  or  more. 

The  view  here  given  of  the  internal  constitution  of  man, 
and  of  the  supremacy  of  conscience,  agreeably  to  the 
conceptions  of  Bishop  Butler,  enables  us  to  comprehend 
the  force  of  that  expression,  common  to  him  and  the  an- 
cient moralists,  that  virtue  consists  in  foUoioing  nature. 
The  meaning  cannot  be,  that  it  consists  in  acting  agree- 
ably to  that  propensity  of  our  nature  which  happens  to 
be  the  strongest;  or  which  propels  us  towards  certain 
objects,  wiiliuiit  any  regard   to   the   methods   by   which 


XXIV  PREFACE 

they  are  to  be  obtained  :  but  the  meaning  must  he,  thai 
virtue  consists  in  the  due  regulation  and  subjection  of  alJ 
the  other  appetites  and  affections  to  the  superior  faculty 
of  conscience ;  from  a  conformity  to  which  alone  our  ac- 
tions are  properly  natural,  or  correspondent  to  the  na- 
ture, to  the  whole  nature,  of  such  an  agent  as  man. 
From  hence  too  it  appears,  that  the  author  of  our  frame 
is  by  no  means  indifferent  to  virtue  and  vice,  or  has  left 
us  at  liberty  to  act  at  random,  as  humour  or  appetite 
may  prompt  us ;  but  that  every  man  has  the  rule  of  right 
within  him;  a  rule  attended  in  the  very  notion  of  it  with 
authority,  and  such  as  has  the  force  of  a  direction  and  a 
command  from  Him  who  made  us  what  we  are,  what 
course  of  behaviour  is  suited  to  our  nature,  and  which 
he  expects  that  we  should  follow.  This  moral  faculty 
implies  also  a  presentiment  and  apprehension,  that  the 
judgment  which  it  passes  on  our  actions,  considered  as 
of  good  or  ill  desert,  will  hereafter  be  confirmed  by  the 
unerring  judgment  of  God;  when  virtue  and  happiness, 
vice  and  misery,  whose  ideas  are  now  so  closely  connect- 
ed, shall  be  indissolubly  united,  and  the  divine  govern- 
ment be  found  to  correspond  in  the  most  exact  propor- 
tion to  the  nature  he  has  given  us.  Lastly,  this  just 
prerogative  or  supremacy  of  conscience  it  is,  which  Mr 
Pope  has  described  in  his  Universal  Prayer,  though 
perhaps  he  may  have  expressed  it  rather  too  strongl}^ 
where  he  says, 

"  Wliat  conscience  dictates  to  be  done, 

Of  warns  me  not  to  do, 
This  teach  me  7nore  than  hell  to  shun, 

Tliat  more  than  heaven  pursue." 

The  reader  will  observe,  that  this  way  of  treating  the 
subject  of  morals,  by  an  appeal  to  facts,  does  not  at  all 
interfere  with  that  other  way,  adopted  by  Dr  Samuel 
Clarke  and  others,  which  begins  with  inquiring  into  the 
relations  ?indi  fitnesses  of  things,  but  rather  illustrates  and 
confirms  it.  That  there  are  essential  differences  in  the 
qualities  of  human  actions,  established  by  nature,  and 
that  this  natural  difference  of  things,  prior  to  and  inde- 
pendent of  all  will,  creates  a  natural  ^7ne5s  in  the  agent 
to  act  agreeably  to  it,  seems  as  little  to  be  denied,  as 
that  there  is  the  moral  difference  before  explained^  from 


BY  THE  EDITOR.  XXV 

which  we  approve  and  feel  a  pleasure  in  what  is  right, 
and  conceive  a  distaste  to  what  is  wrong.  Still,  how- 
ever, when  we  are  endeavouring  to  establish  either  this 
moral  or  that  natural  difference,  it  ought  never  to  be 
forgotten,  or  rather  it  will  require  to  be  distinctly  shown, 
that  both  of  these,  when  traced  up  to  their  source,  sup- 
pose an  intelligent  Author  of  nature  and  moral  Ruler  of 
the  world ;  who  originally  appointed  these  differences, 
and  by  such  an  appointment  has  signified  his  will  that 
we  should  conform  to  them,  as  the  only  effectual  method 
of  securing  our  happiness  on  the  whole  under  his  govern- 
ment* And  of  this  consideration  our  Prelate  himself 
was  not  unmindful ;  as  may  be  collected  from  many  ex- 
pressions in  different  parts  of  his  writings,  and  particu- 
larly from  the  following  passages  in  his  eleventh  Ser- 
mon. "  It  may  be  allowed,  without  any  prejudice  to 
the  cause  of  virtue  and  religion,  that  our  ideas  of  happi- 
ness and  misery  are  of  all  our  ideas  the  nearest  and 
most  important  to  us  ;  that  they  will,  nay  if  you  please, 
they  ought  to  prevail  over  thoseof  order,  and  beauty,  ni  d 
harmony,  and  proportion,  if  there  should  ever  be,  as  it  is 
impossible  there  ever  should  be,  any  inconsistence  be- 
tween them."  And  again,  "  Though  virtue  or  moral 
rectitude  does  indeed  consist  in  affection  to  and  pursuit 
of  what  is  right  and  good,  as  such ;  yet,  v/hen  we  sit 
down  in  a  cool  hour,  we  can  neither  justify  to  ourselves 
this  or  any  other  pursuit,  till  we  are  convinced  that  it 
will  be  for  our  happiness,  or  at  least  not  contrary  to 

It.      t 

Besides  the  general  system  of  morality  opened  above, 
our  Author  in  his  volume  of  Sermons  has  stated  with  ac- 
curacy the  difference  between  self-love  and  benevolence ; 

*  "  Far  be  it  from  me,"  says  the  excellent  Dr  T.  Ealguy  (Discourse  ix.)  "to  dis- 
pute the  reality  of  a  moral  principle  in  the  human  htart.  \  feel  its  existence:  I 
eknirly  discern  its  use  and  importance.  But  in  no  respect  is  it  more  important,  tlian 
«s  it  snj^gests  the  idea  of  a  moral  Governor.  Let  this  idea  be  once  effaced,  and  the 
principle  of  conscience  will  soon  be  found  weak,  and  ineffectual.  Its  influence  on 
men's  conduct  has,  indeed,  been  too  much  imd  rvalued  by  some  philosophical  in- 
«l«irers.  But  be  that  influence,  while  it  lasts,  more  or  less,  it  is  not  a  steady  and 
leri/taxant  principle  of  action.  Unhappily  we  always  have  it  in  our  power  lo  lay  it 
asleep. — Neglect  alone  will  suppress  and  stifle  it,  and  brinp;  it  almost  into  a  slate  ot 
stupefaction.  Nor  can  any  thing,  less  tlian  the  terrors  of  religion,  awaken  our  minds 
from  this  dangerous  and  deadly  "sleep.  It  can  never  be  a  matter  of  indifference  to  a 
thinking  vm.i\,  whether  he  is  to  be  happy  or  miserable  beyond  the  grave." 

+  Serm.  xi. 


XXVI  PREFACE 

in  opposition  to  those  who,  on  the  one  hand,  make  the 
whole  of  virtue  to  consist  in  benevolence,*  and  to  those 
who,  on  the  other,  assert  that  every  particular  affection 
and  action  is  resolvable  into  self-love.  In  combating 
these  opinions,  he  has  shown,  I  think  unansw^erably, 
that  there  are  the  same  kind  of  indications  in  human 
nature,  that  we  were  made  to  promote  the  happiness  of 
others,  as  that  we  were  made  to  promote  our  own :  that 
it  is  no  just  objection  to  this,  that  we  have  dispositions 
to  do  evil  to  others  as  well  as  good ;  for  we  have  also 
dispositions  to  do  evil  as  well  as  good  to  ourselves,  to  our 
own  most  important  interests  even  in  this  life,  for  the 
sake  of  gratifying  a  present  passion  :  that  the  thing  to 
be  lamented  is,  not  that  men  have  too  great  a  regard  to 
their  own  real  good,  but  that  they  have  not  enough  : 
that  benevolence  is  not  more  at  variance  with  or  un- 
friendly to  self-love,  than  any  other  particular  affection 
is  :  and  that  by  consulting  the  happiness  of  others  a 
man  is  so  far  from  lessening  his  own,  that  the  very  en- 
deavour to  do  so,  though  he  should  fail  in  the  accom- 
plishment, is  a  source  of  the  highest  satisfaction  and 
peace  of  mind.t  He  has  also,  in  passing,  animadverted 
on  the  philosopher  of  Malmsbury,  who,  in  his  book  "Of 
Human  Nature,"  has  advanced,  as  discoveries  in  moral 
science,  that  benevolence  is  only  the  love  of  power,  and 
compassion  the  fear  of  future  calamity  to  ourselves.  And 
this  our  Author  has  done,  not  so  much  with  the  design  of 
exposing  the  false  reasoning  of  Mr  Hobbes,  but  because 
on  so  perverse  an  account  of  human  nature  he  has  rais- 
ed a  system,  subversive  of  all  justice  and  honesty,  J 

II.  The  religious  system  of  Bishop  Butler  is  chiefly 
to  be  collected  from  the  treatise,  entitled,  "  The  Analogy 
of  Religion,  Natural  and  Revealed,  to  the  Constitution 
and  Course  of  Nature." 

"All  things  are  double  one  against  another,  and  God 
hath  made  nothing  imperfect."§  On  this  single  observa- 
tion of  the  son  of  Sirach,  the  whole  fabric  of  our  Prelate's 
defence  of  religion,  in  his  Analogy,  is  raised.     Instead 

*  See  the  second  Dissertation  "  On  the  Nature  of  Virtue,"  at  the  end  of  the 
Analog. 
•j"  See  Serm.  i.  and  xi.  and  the  preface  to  the  volume  of  Scmions. 

X  See  the  Notes  to  Serm.  i.  and  v.  §  Eccles.  xlii.'  24. 


BY  THE  EDITOR.  XXVU 

of  indulging  in  idle  speculations,  how  the  world  might 
possibly  have  been  better  than  it  is;  or,  forgetful  of  the 
difference  between  hypothesis  and  fact,  attempting  to  ex- 
plain the  divine  economy  with  respect  to  intelligent  crea- 
tures, from  preconceived  notions  of  his  own ;  he  first  in- 
quires what  the  constitution  of  nature,  as  made  known 
to  us  in  the  way  of  experiment,  actually  is ;  and  from 
this,  now  seen  and  acknowledged,  he  endeavours  to  form 
a  judgment  of  that  larger  constitution,  wiiich  religion  dis- 
covers to  us.  If  the  dispensation  of  Providence  we  are 
now  under,  considered  as  inhabitants  of  this  world,  and 
having  a  temporal  interest  to  secure  in  it,  be  found,  on 
examination,  to  be  analogous  to,  and  of  a  piece  with, 
that  further  dispensation,  which  relates  to  us  as  designed 
for  another  world,  in  which  we  have  an  eternal  interest, 
depending  on  our  behaviour  here ;  if  both  may  be  traced 
up  to  the  same  general  laws,  and  appear  to  be  carried  on 
according  to  the  same  plan  of  administration ;  the  fair 
presumption  is,  that  both  proceed  from  one  and  the  same 
Author.  And  if  the  principal  parts  objected  to  in  this 
latter  dispensation  be  similar  to  and  of  the  same  kind 
with  what  we  certainly  experience  under  the  former;  the 
objections,  being  clearly  inconclusive  in  one  case,  be- 
cause contradicted  by  plain  fact,  must,  in  all  reason,  be 
a-llowed  to  be  inconclusive  also  in  the  other. 

This  way  of  arguing  from  what  is  acknowledged  to 
what  is  disputed,  from  things  known  to  other  things  that 
resemble  them,  from  that  part  of  the  divine  establish- 
ment which  is  exposed  to  our  view  to  that  more  impor- 
tant one  which  lies  beyond  it,  is  on  all  hands  confessed 
to  be  just.  By  this  method  Sir  Isaac  Newton  has  un- 
folded the  system  of  nature ;  by  the  same  method  Bishop 
Butler  has  explained  the  system  of  grace ;  and  thus,  to 
use  the  words  of  a  writer,  whom  I  quote  with  pleasure, 
"  has  formed  and  concluded  a  happy  alliance  between 
faith  and  philosophy."* 

And  although  the  argument  from  analogy  be  allowed 
to  be  imperfect,  and  by  no  means  sufficient  to  solve  all 
difficulties  respecting  the  government  of  God,  and  the 
designs  of  his  Providence  with  regard  to  mankind  (a 

*  Mr  Mainwaring's  Dissertation,  prefixed  to  his  volume  of  Sermons. 


XXVm  PREFACE 

degree  of  knowledge,  .vhich  we  are  not  turnished  with 
faculties  for  attaining,  at  least  in  the  present  state) ;  yet 
surely  it  is  of  importance  to  learn  from  it,  that  the  natu- 
ral and  moral  world  are  intimately  connected,  and  parts 
of  one  stupendous  whole  or  system  ;  and  that  the  chief 
objections  which  are  brought  against  religion  may  be 
urged  with  equal  force  against  the  constitution  and  course 
of  nature,  where  they  are  certainly  false  in  fact.  And 
this  information  we  may  derive  from  the  work  before 
us;  the  proper  design  of  which,  it  may  be  of  use  to  ob- 
serve, is  not  to  prove  the  truth  of  religion,  either  natural 
or  revealed,  but  to  confirm  that  proof,  already  known, 
by  considerations  from  analogy. 

After  this  account  of  the  method  of  reasoning  employ- 
ed by  our  Author,  let  us  now  advert  to  his  manner  of 
applying  it,  first  to  the  subject  of  Natural  Religion,  and 
secondly  to  that  of  Revealed. 

1.  The  foundation  of  all  our  hopes  and  fears  is  a  fu- 
ture life;  and  with  this  the  treatise  begins.  Neither  the 
reason  of  the  thing,  nor  the  analogy  of  nature,  according 
to  Bishop  Butler,  give  ground  for  imagining,  that  the 
unknown  event,  death,  will  be  our  destruction.  The 
states  in  which  we  have  formerly  existed,  in  the  womb 
and  in  infancy,  are  not  more  different  from  each  other 
than  from  that  of  mature  age  in  which  we  now  exist : 
therefore,  that  we  shall  continue  to  exist  hereafter,  in  a 
state  as  different  from  the  present  as  the  present  is  from 
those  through  which  we  have  passed  already,  is  a  pre- 
sumption favoured  by  the  analogy  of  nature.  All  that 
we  know  from  reason  concerning  death,  is  the  effects  it 
has  upon  animal  bodies :  and  the  frequent  instances 
among  men  of  the  intellectual  powers  continuing  in  high 
health  and  vigour,  at  the  very  time  when  a  mortal  disease 
is  on  the  point  of  putting  an  end  to  all  the  powers  of 
sensation,  induce  us  to  hope  that  it  may  have  no  effect 
at  all  on  the  human  soul,  not  even  so  much  as  to  sus- 
pend the  exercise  of  its  faculties  ;  though,  if  it  have,  the 
suspension  of  a  power  by  no  means  implies  its  ex- 
tinction, as  sleep  or  a  swoon  may  convince  us.* 

The  probability  of  a  future  state  once  granted,  an  im- 


*  Part  I.  chap.  i. 


Bt  THE  EDITOR.  %%{% 

portant  question  arises,  How  best  to  secure  out  interest 
in  that  state.  We  find  from  what  passes  daily  before  us, 
that  the  constitution  of  nature  admits  of  misery  as  well 
as  happiness;  that  both  of  these  are  the  consequences  of 
our  own  actions;  and  these  consequences  v/e  are  enabled 
to  foresee.  Therefore,  that  our  happiness  or  misery  in 
a  future  world  may  depend  on  our  own  actions  also,  and 
that  rewards  or  punishments  hereafter  may  follow  our 
good  or  ill  behaviour  here,  is  but  an  appointment  of  the 
same  sort  with  what  we  experience  under  the  divine 
government,  according  to  the  regular  course  of  nature.* 

This  supposition  is  confirmed  from  another  circum- 
stance, that  the  natural  government  of  God,  under  which 
we  now  live,  is  also  moral;  in  which  rewards  and  pun- 
ishments are  the  consequences  of  actions,  considered  as 
virtuous  and  vicious.  Not  that  every  man  is  rewarded 
or  punished  here  in  exact  proportion  to  his  desert ;  for 
the  essential  tendencies  of  virtue  and  vice,  to  produce 
happiness  and  the  contrary,  are  often  hindered  from  tak- 
ing effect  from  accidental  causes.  However,  there  are 
plainly  the  rudiments  and  beginnings  of  a  righteous  ad- 
ministration to  be  discerned  in  the  constitution  of  nature : 
from  whence  we  are  led  to  expect,  that  these  accidental 
hindrances  will  one  day  be  removed,  and  the  rule  of  dis- 
tributive justice  obtain  completely  in  a  more  perfect 
state. f 

The  moral  government  of  God,  thus  established,  im- 
plies in  the  notion  of  it  some  sort  of  trial,  or  a  moral 
possibility  of  acting  wrong  as  well  as  right,  in  those  who 
are  the  subjects  of  it.  And  the  doctrine  of  religion,  that 
the  present  life  is  in  fact  a  state  of  probation  for  a  future 
one,  is  rendered  credible,  from  its  being  analogous 
throughout  to  the  general  conduct  of  Providence  towards 
us  with  respect  to  this  world ;  in  which  prudence  is  ne- 
cessary to  secure  our  temporal  interest,  just  as  we  are 
taught  that  virtue  is  necessary  to  secure  our  eternal  in- 
terest; and  both  are  trusted  to  ourselves.t 

But  the  present  life  is  not  merely  a  state  of  probation, 
implying  in  it  difficulties  and  danger;  it  is  also  a  state  of 
discipline  and  improvement;  and  that  both  in  our  tem- 

*  Chap.  ii.  f  Chap.  iii.  $  Chap.  iv. 


XXX  PREFACE 

poral  and  religious  capacity.  Thus  childhood  is  a  state 
of  discipline  for  youth;  youth  for  manhood;  and  that  for 
old  age.  Strength  of  body,  and  maturity  of  understand- 
ing, are  acquired  by  degrees ;  and  neither  of  them  with- 
out continual  exercise  and  attention  on  our  part,  not  on- 
ly in  the  beginning  of  hfe,  but  through  the  whole  course 
of  it.  So  again  with  respect  to  our  religious  concerns, 
the  present  world  is  fitted  to  be,  and  to  good  men  is  in 
event,  a  state  of  discipline  and  improvement  for  a  future 
one.  The  several  passions  and  propensions  implanted 
in  our  hearts  incline  us,  in  a  multitude  of  instances,  to 
forbidden  pleasures:  this  inward  infirmity  is  increased 
by  various  snares  and  temptations,  perpetually  occurring 
from  without:  hence  arises  the  necessity  of  recollection 
and  self-government,  of  withstanding  the  calls  of  appetite, 
and  forming  our  minds  to  habits  of  piety  and  virtue ; 
habits,  of  which  we  are  capable,  and  which,  to  creatures 
in  a  state  of  moral  imperfection,  and  fallen  from  their 
original  integrity,  must  be  of  the  greatest  use,  as  an.  ad- 
ditional security,  over  and  above  the  principle  of  con- 
science, from  the  dangers  to  which  we  are  exposed.* 

Nor  is  the  credibility  here  given,  by  the  analogy  of 
nature,  to  the  general  doctrine  of  religion,  destroyed  or 
weakened  by  any  notions  concerning  necessity.  Of  it- 
self it  is  a  mere  word,  the  sign  of  an  abstract  idea ;  and 
as  much  requires  an  agent,  that  is,  a  necessary  agent,  in 
order  to  effect  any  thing,  as  freedom  requires  a  free 
agent.  Admitting  it  to  be  speculatively  true,  if  consid- 
ered as  influencing  practice,  it  is  the  same  as  false :  for  it 
is  matter  of  experience,  that,  with  regard  to  our  present 
interest,  and  as  inhabitants  of  this  world,  we  are  treated 
as  if  we  were  free ;  and  therefore  the  analogy  of  nature 
leads  us  to  conclude,  that,  with  regard  to  our  future  in- 
terest, and  as  designed  for  another  world,  we  shall  be 
treated  as  free  also.  Nor  does  the  opinion  of  necessity, 
supposing  it  possible,  at  all  ai!ect  either  the  general  proof 
of  religion,  or  its  external  evidence.t 

Still  objections  may  be  made  against  the  wisdom  and 
goodness  of  the  divine  government,  to  which  analogy, 
which  can  only  show  the  truth  or  credibility  of  facts, 

*  Part  I.  cha^.  7.  f  Cliap.  vi» 


BY  tHE    EDITOR.  XXXi 

affords  no  answer.  Yet  even  here  analogy  is  of  use,  it 
it  suggest  that  the  divine  government  is  a  scheme  or 
system,  and  not  a  number  of  unconnected  acts,  and  that 
this  system  is  also  above  our  comprehension.  Now  the 
government  of  the  natural  world  appears  to  be  a  system 
of  this  kind;  with  parts,  related  to  each  other,  and  to- 
gether composing  a  whole:  in  which  system  ends  are 
brought  about  by  the  use  of  means,  many  of  which  means, 
before  experience,  would  have  been  suspected  to  have; 
had  a  quite  contrary  tendency ;  which  is  carried  on  by 
general  laws,  similar  causes  uniformly  producing  simi- 
lar effects :  the  utility  of  which  general  laws,  and  the  in- 
conveniences which  would  probably  arise  from  the  oc- 
casional or  even  secret  suspension  of  them,  we  are  in 
some  sort  enabled  to  discern;*  but  of  the  whole  we  are 
incompetent  judges,  because  of  the  small  part  which 
comes  within  our  view.  Reasoning  then  from  what  we 
know,  it  is  highly  credible,  that  the  government  of  the 
moral  world  is  a  system  also,  carried  on  by  general  laws, 
and  in  which  ends  are  accomplished  by  the  intervention 
of  means;  and  that  both  constitutions,  the  natural  and 
the  moral,  are  so  ccnnectedj  as  to  form  together  but  one 
scheme.  But  of  this  sclieme,  as  of  that  of  the  natural 
world  taken  alone,  we  are  not  qualified  to  judge,  on  ac- 
count of  the  mutual  respect  of  the  several  parts  to  each 
other  and  to  the  whole,  and  our  own  incapacity  to  sur- 
vey the  whole,  or,  with  accuracy,  any  single  part.  All 
objections  therefore  to  the  wisdom  and  goodness  of  the 
divine  government  may  be  founded  merely  on  our  ig- 
norance;! and  to  such  objections  our  ignorance  is  the 
proper,  and  a  satisfactory  answer.:}: 

2.  The  chief  difficulties  concerning  Natural  Rehgion 
being  now  removed,  our  Author  proceeds,  in  the  next 
place,  to  that  which  is  Revealed;  and  as  an  Introduction 
to  an  inquiry  into  the  Credibility  of  Christianity,  begins 
with  the  consideration  of  its  Importance. 

*  Spe  a  treatise  on  Divine  Benevol- lire,  by  Dr  Thomas  Balguy,  part  iJ. 
t  The  ignorance  of  man,  is  a  favourite  ili>ci,riiie  with  Bishop  Butler,     It  occurs  in 
the  ^•ec()nd  Part  of  the  Analogy  ;  it  makes  tlie  subject  of  his  Fifteenth  Sermon ;  and 
we  meet  with  it  npain  in  his  Charge.     Whether 'sometimes  it  be  not  carried  ton 
length  whick  is  excessive,  usay  admit  of  doubt. 

%  I'art  1.  chap.  vii. 


The  importance  of  Christianity  appears  in  two  re* 
spects.  First,  in  its  being  a  repubiication  of  Natural  Re- 
ligion, in  its  native  simplicity,  with  authority,  and  with 
circumstances  of  advantage ;  ascertaining  in  many  in- 
stances of  moment,  what  before  was  only  probable,  and 
particularly  confirming  the  doctrine  of  a  future  state  of 
rewards  and  punishments.*  Secondly,  as  revealing  a 
new  dispensation  of  Providence,  originating  from  the 
I<ure  love  and  mercy  of  God,  and  conducted  by  the  me- 
diation of  his  Son,  and  the  guidance  of  his  Spirit  for  the 
recovery  and  salvation  of  mankind,  represented  in  a 
state  of  apostasy  and  ruin.  This  account  of  Christianity 
being  admitted  to  be  just,  and  the  distinct  offices  of  these 
three  divine  Persons  being  once  discovered  to  us,  we 
are  as  much  obliged  in  point  of  duty  to  acknowledge  the 
relations  we  stand  in  to  the  Son  and  Holv  Ghost,  as  our 
Mediator  and  Sanctifier,  as  we  are  obhged  in  point  oJ 
duty  to  acknowledge  the  relation  we  stand  in  to  God  the 
Father;  although  the  two  former  of  these  relations  be 
learnt  from  Revelation  onlv,  and  in  the  last  we  are  in- 
structed  by  the  light  of  nature;  the  obligation  in  either 
case  arising  from  the  offices  themselves,  and  not  at  all 
depending  on  the  manner  in  which  they  are  made 
known  to  us.  t 

The  presumptions  against  Revelation  in  general  are, 
that  it  is  not  discoverable  by  reason,  that  it  is  unlike  to 
wiiat  is  so  discovered,  and  that  it  was  introduced  and 
supported  by  miracles.     But  in  a  scheme  so  large  as 

*  Admirable  to  this  purpose  are  the  words  of  Br  T.  Balgiiy,  in  the  Ninth  of  his 
Discourse's  already  referred  to,  p.  xxv.  "  The  doctrine  of  a  ///e  to  come,  some  per- 
sons will  say,  is  a  doctrine  of  ««^/^ra/ religion  ;  and  can  never  therefore  be  properly 
alleged  to  show  the  importance  of  revelation.  They  Judge  perhaps  from  the  frtinie 
ot  the  world,  that  the  present  system  is  imperfect;  they  see  designs  in  it,  not  yet 
completed;  and  they  think  they  have  grounds  for  expecting  another  state,  in  which 
the.^-e  designs  shrdl  he  fart/ier  ciirried  on,  and  brought  to  a  conclusion,  worthy  of  in 
finite  wisdom.  I  am  not  concerned  to  di^pllte  i\\v  justness  of  this  reasoning  ;  nor  do 
I  wish  to  dispute  it.  But  how  far  will  it  reach?  Will  it  lead  us  to  the  Christiu7i 
doctrine  of  a  Judgment  to  come?  Will  it  give  us  the  prospect  of  an  eternity  of  iiaj'- 
piness?  Nothing  of  all  this.  It  shows  us  only,  that  death  is  not  the  end  of  our  be- 
ing ;  that  we  are  likely  to  pass  hereafur  into  other  systems,  more  favourable  than  the 
present  to  the  great  ends  of  God's  providence,  the  virtue  and  the  happiitess  of  his  in- 
telligent creatures.  But  into  ^vhat  systems  we  are  to  be  removed  ;  what  new  scenes 
are  to  be  presented  to  us,  either  of  pleasure  or  jiain  ;  what  new  parts  we  shall  have 
to  act,  and  to  what  tiials  and  temptations  we  may  yet  be  exposed  ;  on  all  these  sub- 
jects We  know  just  notliing.  That  our  ji;)ppiness  for  ever  depends  on  our  conduct 
/i<?re,  is  a  most  important  proposition,  whicn  we  learn  OM/y  from  rvcdation.': 

+  Part  II.  chap,  i. 


BY  THE  EDITOR.  XXXUl 

that  of  tlie  miiverse,  unbounded  in  extent  and  everlast- 
ing in  duration,  there  must  of  necessity  be  numberless 
circumstances  v/liich  are  beyond  the  reach  of  our  faculties 
to  discern,  and  which  can  only  be  known  by  divine  illu- 
mination.     And  both  in  the  natural  and  moral  govern- 
ment of  the  world,  under  which  we  live,  we  find  many 
things  unlike  one  to  another,  and  therefore  ought  not  to 
wonder  if  the   same  unliktness  obtain  between   things 
visible  and  invisible  ;  although  it  be  far  from  true,  that 
revealed  religion  is   entirely  unlike   the   constitution  of 
nature,  as  analogy  may  teach  us.     Nor  is  there  any  thing 
incredible  in  Revelation,  considered  as  miraculous ;  whe- 
ther   miracles   be    supposed  to    have    been    performed 
at  the  besinnins:  of  the  world,  or  after  a  course  of  nature 
has  been  established.     Not  at  the  beginning  of  the  world; 
for  then  there  was  either  no  course  of  nature  at  all,  or  a 
power  must  have  been   exerted  totally   different  from 
what  that  course  is  at  present :  all  men  and  animals  can- 
not have  been  born,  as  they  are  now  ;  but  a  pair  of  each 
sort  must  have  been  produced  at  first,  in  a  way  alto- 
gether unlike  to  that  in  which  they  have  been  since  pro- 
duced ;  unless  we  affirm,  that  men  and  animals  have  ex- 
isted from  eternity  in  an  endless  succession ;  one  miracle 
therefore  at  least  there  must  have  been  at  the  beginning 
of  the  world,  or  at  the  time  of  man's  creation.     Not  af- 
ter the  settlement  of  a  course  of  nature,  on  account  of  mir- 
acles being  contrary  to  that  course,  or,  in  other  words, 
contrary  to  experience;  for,  in  order  to  know  whether 
miracles,  worked  in  attestation  of  a  divine  religion,  be 
contrary  to  experience  or  not,  we  ought  to  be  acquainted 
with  other  cases,  similar  or  parallel  to  those,  in  which 
miracles  are  alleged  to  have  been  wrought.     But  where 
shall  we  find  such  similar  or  parallel  cases  .^^    The  world 
which  we  inhabit  affords  none:  we  know  of  no  extraor- 
dinary revelations  from  God  to  man,  but  those  recorded 
in  the  Old  and  New  Testament;  all  of  w^hich  w^ere  es- 
tablished by  miracles ;  it  cannot  therefore  be  said,  that 
miracles  are  incredible,  because  contrary  to  experience, 
when  all  the  experience  we  have  is  in  favour  of  miracles, 
and  on  the  side  of  rehgion.*     Besides,  in  reasoning  con- 

•  **  In  the  common  affiiirs  of  life,  common  experience  is  sufficient  to  dii-ect  us.    Bat 

C 


XXXIV  PREFACE 

cerning  miracles,  they  ought  not  to  be  compared  with 
common  natural  events,  but  with  uncommon  appear- 
ances, such  as  comets,  magnetism,  electricity;  which,  to 
one  acquainted  only  with  the  usual  phenomena  of  nature, 
and  the  common  powers  of  matter,  must,  before  proof  of 

*  their  actual  existence,  be  thought  incredible.* 

The  presumption  against  Revelation  in  general  being 
dispatched,  objections  against  the  Christian  Revelation 
in  particular,  against  the  scheme  of  it,  as  distinguished 
from  objections  against  its  evidence,  are  considered 
next.  Now  supposing  a  revelation  to  be  really  given,  it 
is  highly  probable  beforehand,  that  it  must  contain  ma- 
ny things  appearing  to  us  liable  to  objections.  The  ac- 
knowledged dispensation  of  nature  is  very  different  from 
vv^hat  we  should  have  expected :  reasoning  then  from  an- 
alogy, the  revealed  dispensation,  it  is  credible,  would  be 
also  different.  Nor  are  we  in  any  sort  judges  at  what 
time,  or  in  w'hat  degree,  or  manner,  it  is  fit  or  expedient 
for  God  to  instruct  us,  in  things  confessedly  of  the  great- 
est use,  either  by  natural  reason,  or  by  supernatural  in- 
formation. Thus,  arguing  on  speculation  only,  and 
without  experience,  it  would  seem  very  unlikely  that  so 
important  a  remedy  as  that  provided  by  Christianity,  for 
the  recovery  of  mankind  from  ruin,  should  have  been  for 

/  so  many  ages  withheld;  and,  when  at  last  vouchsafed, 
should  be  imparted  to  so  few ;  and,  after  it  has  been  im- 
parted, should  be  attended  with  obscurity  and  doubt. 
And  just  so  we  might  have  argued,  before  experience, 
concerning  the  remedies  provided  in  nature  for  bodily 
diseases,  to  which  by  nature  we  are  exposed:  for  many 
of  these  were  unknown  to  mankind  for  a  number  of  ages ; 

will  commnri  rxperienre  sprvf  to  giiulr  ourjtidg'inpnt  concpminj;  the  fn /I  am]  redewp. 
tion  ofmankiiiti  ?  From  what  we  si  e  every  i)ay,ciii  we  «xi.iiaiii  the  commencement, 
or  foretell  the  dissolution  of  the  world?  To  jiuiee  of  events  l;ke  these,  we  shouitj 
be  conversant  in  the  history  ot  other  ]i];)nets;  shoukl  he  <li>tincily  iiiforiiieil  ol  God's 
various  dispen-^ations  lo  all  the  differtnt  ord<Ts  of  rcitional  beings.  Instead  then  of 
gronnding-  oin-  relijjioiis  opinions  on  what  we  call  cvperience,  h't  us  apply  to  a  more 
certain  gnide,  let  us  hearken  to  the  testimorit/  of  (iod  himself.  The  credibility  of 
Aumun  testimony,  and  the  conduct  of  hunian  agents,  are  sulij'Cis  perfectly  within  the 
reach  of  our  natural  facidties  ;  and  we  oiioht  to  desire  no  firmei*  foTuidation  for  oup 
belitf  of  religion,  than  for  the  judgments  \»  e  form  in  the  eoninion  atfairs  of  life : 
where  we  see  a  little  plain  testimony  easily  o'.it\«'eij;hs  the  most  spi  cious  conjectures, 
and  not  si'ldom  even  strongf  j<rr)!i;iliilities."  I')r  liilgny's  Fourth  Charge.  See  also 
an  excellent  pamphlet,  eniitieil  "  Rrmark^  nn  Mr  liiime's  F.ssny  «)n  the  KBliiral 
History  of  Religion,"  sect.  5  ,  and  tl  >'  S  x:;i  of  Vv  roiNcUs  Discourses., 


BY  THE  EDITOR.  XXXV 

are  known  but  to  few  now;  some  important  ones  prob- 
ably not  discovered  yet;  and  those  wliich  are,  neither 
certain  in  their  apphcation,  nor  universal  in  their  use: 
and  the  same  mode  of  reasoning  that  would  lead  us  to 
expect  they  should  have  been  so,  would  lead  us  to  ex- 
pect that  the  necessity  of  them  should  have  been  super- 
seded, by  there  being  no  diseases ;  as  the  necessity  of  the 
Christian  scheme,  it  may  be  thought,  might  also  have 
been  superseded,  by  preventing  the  fall  of  man,  so  tliat 
he  should  not  have  stood  in  need  of  a  Redeemer  at  all.* 

As  to  objections  against  the  wisdom  and  goodness  of 
Christianity,  the  same  answer  may  be  applied  to  them 
as  was  to  the  like  objections  against  the  constitution  of 
nature.  For  here  also,  Christianity  is  a  scheme  or  econ- 
omy, composed  of  various  parts,  forming  a  whole;  in 
which  scheme  means  are  used  for  the  accomplishing  of 
ends;  and  which  is  conducted  by  general  laws,  of  all  of 
which  we  know  as  little  as  we  do  of  the  constitution  of 
nature.  And  the  seeming  want  of  wisdom  or  goodness 
in  this  svstem  is  to  be  ascribed  to  the  same  cause,  as  the 
like  appearances  of  defects  in  the  natural  system;  our 
inability  to  discern  the  whole  scheme,  and  our  ignorance 
of  the  relation  of  those  parts  which  are  discernible  to 
others  beyond  our  view. 

The  objections  against  Christianity  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
and  against  the  wisdom  and  goodness  of  it,  having  been 
obviated  together,  the  chief  of  them  are  now  to  be  con- 
sidered distinctly.  One  of  these,  which  is  levelled 
against  the  entire  system  itself,  is  of  this  sort:  the  re- 
storation of  mankind,  represented  in  Scripture  as  the 
great  design  of  the  Gospel,  is  described  as  requiring  a 
long  series  of  means,  and  persons,  and  dispensations, 
before  it  can  be  brought  to  its  completion;  whereas  the 
whole  ought  to  have  been  effected  at  once.  Now  every 
thing  we  see  in  the  course  of  nature  shows  the  folly  of 
this  objection.  For  in  the  natural  course  of  Providence^ 
ends  are  brought  about  by  means,  not  operating  imme- 
diately and  at  once,  but  deliberately,  and  in'a  way  of  pro- 
gression; one  thing  being  subservient  to  another,  this  to 
somewhat  further.     I'he  change  of  seasons,  the  ripening 

*  Clihp.  iii. 
C2 


XXXVl  PREFACE 

of  fruits,  the  growth  of  vegetable  and  animal  bodies,  are 
instances  of  this.  And  therefore,  that  the  same  pro- 
gressive method  should  be  followed  in  the  dispensation 
of  Christianity,  as  is  observed  in  the  common  dispensa- 
tion of  Providence,  is  a  reasonable  expectation,  justified 
by  the  analogy  of  nature.* 

Another  circumstance  objected  to  in  the  Christian 
scheme  is  the  appointment  of  a  Mediator,  and  the  sav- 
ing of  the  world  through  him.  But  the  visible  govern- 
ment of  God  beino;  actually  administered  in  this  wav,  or 
by  the  mediation  and  instrumentality  of  others,  there 
can  be  no  general  presumption  against  an  appointment 
of  this  kind,  against  his  invisible  government  being  ex- 
ercised in  the  same  manner.  "We  have  seen  already, 
that  with  regard  to  ourselves  this  visible  government  is 
carried  on  by  rewards  and  punishments;  for  happiness 
and  misery  are  the  consequences  of  our  own  actions, 
considered  as  virtuous  and  vicious ;  and  these  conse- 
quences we  are  enabled  to  foresee.  It  might  have  been 
imagined,  before  consulting  experience,  that  after  we 
had  rendered  ourselves  hable  to  misery  by  our  own  ill 
conduct,  sorrow  for  what  was  past,  and  behaving  well 
for  the  future,  would,  alone  and  of  themselves,  have  ex- 
empted us  from  deserved  punishment,  and  restored  us  to 
the  divine  favour.  But  the  fact  is  otherwise;  and  r^  al 
reformation  is  often  found  to  be  of  no  avail,  so  as  to  se- 
cure the  criminal  from  poverty,  sickness,  infamy,  and 
death,  the  never-failing  attendants  on  vice  and  extrava- 
gance, exceeding  a  certain  degree.  By  the  course  of 
nature  then  it  appears,  God  does  not  always  pardon  a 
sinner  on  his  repentance.  Yet  there  is  provision  made, 
oven  in  nature,  that  the  miseries,  which  men  bring  on 
themselves  by  unlawful  indulgences,  may  in  many  cases 
be  mitigated,  and  in  some  removed  ;  partly  by  extraor- 
dinary exertions  of  the  offender  himself,  but  more  es- 
pecially and  frequently  by  the  intervention  of  others, 
who  voluntarily,  and  from  motives  of  compassion,  submit 
to  labour  and  sorrow,  such  as  produce  long  and  lasting 
inconveniences  to  themselves,  as  the  means  of  rescuing 
another  from  the  wretched  effects  of  former  imprudences. 

*  Chap.  iv. 


BY  THE  EDITOR.  XXXVIl 

Vicarious  punishment,  therefore,  or  one  person's  suffer- 
ings contributing  to  the  rchef  of  another,  is  a  providential 
disposition  in  tlie  economy  of  nature  :*'  and  it  ought  not 
to  be  matter  of  surprise,  if  by  a  method  analogous  to  this 
we  be  redeemed  from  sin  and  misery,  in  the  economy 
of  grace.  That  mankind  at  present  are  in  a  state  of  de- 
gradation, different  from  that  in  which  they  were  origi-- 
nally  created,  is  the  very  ground  of  the  Christian  reve- 
lation, as  contained  in  the  Scriptures.  Whether  we  ac- 
quiesce in  the  account,  that  our  being  placed  in  such  a 
state  is  owing  to  the  crime  of  our  first  parents,  or  choose 
to  ascribe  it  to  any  other  cause,  it  makes  no  difference 
as  to  our  condition:  the  vice  and  unhappiness  of  the 
world  are  still  there,  notwithstanding  all  our  supposi- 
tions: nor  is  it  Christianity  that  hath  put  us  into  this 
state.  We  learn  also  from  the  same  Scriptures,  what 
experience  and  the  use  of  expiatory  sacrifices  from  the 
most  early  times  might  have  taught  us,  that  repentance 
alone  is  not  sufficient  to  prevent  the  fatal  consequences 
of  past  transgressions:  but  that  still  there  is  room  for 
mercy,  and  that  repentance  shall  be  available,  though 
not  of  itself,  yet  through  the  mediation  of  a  divine  Per- 
son, the  Messiah;  who,  from  the  sublimest  principles  of 
compassion,  when  we  were  dead  in  trespasses  and  sins^t 
suffered  and  died,  the  innocent  for  the  guilty,  the  just  for 
the  unjusi^X  that  we  might  have  redemption  through  his 
blood,  even  the  forgiveness  of  sins.%  In  what  way  tha 
death  of  Christ  was  of  that  efficacy  it  is  said  to  be,  in 
procuring  the  reconciliation  of  sinners,  the  Scriptures 
have  not  explained;  it  is  enough  that  the  doctrine  is  re- 
vealed; that  it  is  not  contrary  to  any  truths  which 
reason  and  experience  teach  us;  and  that  it  accords  in 

•  Dr  Artliur  Ashley  Sykrs,  from  whose  writings  some  pfood  may  be  coHectrd  out  oj 
a  mulLiuuV  of  Uiiiiffs  of  a  coiitriiiy  tendency,  in  what  lie  is  pleased  to  call  "Tin! 
Scripture  Doctrine  of  Redemption,"  (see  the  observations  on  llie  texts  cited  in  liis 
fiist  ciiapler,  and  aUo  in  chapters  the  fifth  and  s  xtii,)  opposes  what  is  here  advanced 
by  Bishop  Butler  ;  quoting  his  words,  but  without  mentionin<v  his  name.  If  wliat  is 
said  above  be  not  tliou<jhL  a  sufficient  answer  to  the  objections  of  tliis  author,  the 
readvr  mp.y  do  well  to  consult  a  Chnrge  "  On  the  Use  and  Abuse  of  Philosophy  iii 
the  Study  of  Reli->ion,"  by  tlie  late  Dr  Powell;  who  seems  to  me  to  have  liad  the 
observations  ot  Dr  Sykes  in  his  view,  where  he  is  CDrfitir.f.;  the  lefsoniiif^s  of  certain 
philosophizins'  Divines  against  the  docuine  of  the  Atom ment.  Powell's  Discourse, 
CbargfAU.  p.  3i2~'Ua. 

f  Epiies  ii.  1.  i  I  Pet.  iii.  18.  $  Colos.  i.  14. 


XXXVIU  PREFACE 

perfect  harmony  with  the  usual  metliod  of  the  divine 
conduct  in  the  aovernment  of  the  world.* 

Again,  it  tiath  been  said,  that  if  the  Christian  revela- 
tion were  true,  it  must  have  been  universal,  and  could 
not  have  been  left  upon  doubtful  evidence.  Buc  God, 
in  his  natural  providence,  dispenses  his  gifts  in  great 
variety,  not  only  among  creatures  of  the  same  species, 
Out  to  the  same  individuals  also  at  different  times.  Had 
the  Christian  revelation  been  universal  at  first,  yet,  from 
the  diversity  of  men's  abilities,  both  of  mind  and  body, 
their  various  means  of  improvement,  and  other  external 
advantages,  some  persons  must  soon  have  been  in  a  si- 
tuation, with  respect  to  religious  knowledge,  much  supe- 
rior to  that  of  others,  as  much  perhaps  as  they  are  at 
present :  and  all  men  will  be  equitably  dealt  with  at  last ; 
and  to  whom  little  is  given,  of  him  little  will  be  required. 
Then  as  to  the  evidence  for  religion  being  left  doubtful, 
difficulties  of  this  sort,  like  difficulties  in  practice,  afford 
scope  and  opportunity  for  a  virtuous  exercise  of  the  un- 
derstanding, and  dispose  the  mind  to  acquiesce  and  rest 
satisfied  with  any  evidence  that  is  real.  In  the  daily 
commerce  of  life,  men  are  obliged  to  act  upon  great  un- 
certainties, with  regard  to  success  in  their  temporal  pur- 
suits :  and  the  case  with  regard  to  religion  is  parallel. 
However,  though  religion  be  not  intuitively  true,  the 
proofs  of  it  which  we  have  are  amply  sufficient  in  reason 
to  induce  us  to  embrace  it ;  and  dissatisfaction  with  those 
proofs  may  possibly  be  men's  own  fault,  f 

Nothing  remains  but  to  attend  to  the  positive  evidence 
there  is  for  the  truth  of  Christianity.  Now,  besides  its  di- 
rect and  fundamental  proofs,  which  are  miracles  and  pro- 
phecies, there  are  many  collateral  circumstances,  which 
may  be  united  into  one  view,  and  all  together  niay  be  con- 
sidered as  making  up  one  argument.  In  this  way  o) 
treating  the  subject,  the  revelation,  v/hether  real  or  other- 
wise, may  be  supposed  to  be  wholly  historical :  the  de- 
sign of  which  appears  to  be,  to  give*  an  account  of  the 
condition  of  religion,  and  its  professors,  with  a  concise 
narration  of  the  pulitical  state  of  things,  as  far  as  religion 
is  aftected  oy  ir,  during  a  great  length  of  time,  near  six 

*  Cliap.  V.  f  Chap.  vL 


BY  THE  EDITOR.  XXXIX 

thousand  years  of  which  are  already  past.  More  parti- 
cularly it  comprehends  an  account  of  God's  entering  into 
covenant  with  ov.o  iiutioD,  the  Jewp,  ft.-it  he  would  be 
their  God,  and  that  they  should  be  his  people ;  of  his 
often  interposing  in  their  affairs;  giving  t'iiem  the  pro- 
mise, and  afterwards  the  possession,  of  a  flourishing 
country;  assuring  them  of  the  greatest  national  prosper- 
ity, in  case  of  their  obedience,  and  threatening  the  sever- 
est national  punishment,  in  case  they  forsook  him,  and 
joined  in  the  idolatry  of  their  Pagan  neighbours.  It 
contains  also  a  prediction  of  a  particular  person  to  ap- 
pear in  the  fulness  of  time,  in  whom  all  the  promises  of 
God  to  the  Jews  were  to  be  fulfilled :  and  it  relates,  that, 
at  the  time  expected,  a  person  did  actually  appear,  as- 
suming to  be  the  Saviour  foretold  ;  that  he  worked  vari- 
ous miracles  among  them,  in  confirmation  of  his  divine 
authority ;  and,  as  was  foretold  also,  was  rejected  and 
put  to  death  by  the  very  people  who  had  long-  desired 
and  waited  for  his  coming  ;  but  that  his  religion,  in  spite 
of  all  opposition,  was  established  in  the  world  by  his  dis- 
ciples, invested  with  supernatural  powers  for  that  pur- 
pose ;  of  the  fate  and  fortunes  of  which  religion  there  is 
a  prophetical  description,  carried  down  to  the  end  of 
time.  Let  any  one  now,  after  reading  the  above  history, 
and  not  knowing  whether  the  whole  were  not  a  fiction, 
be  supposed  to  ask.  Whether  all  that  is  here  related  be 
true  ?  and  instead  of  a  direct  answer,  let  him  be  inform- 
ed of  the  several  acknowledged  facts,  which  are  found 
to  correspond  to  it  in  real  life ;  and  then  let  him  com- 
pare the  history  and  facts  together,  and  observe  the  as- 
tonishing coincidence  of  both  :  such  a  joint  review  must 
appear  to  him  of  very  great  weight,  and  to  amount  to 
evidence  somev.iiat  more  than  human.  And  unless  the 
whole  series,  and  every  particular  circumstance  contained 
in  it,  can  be  thought  to  have  arisen  from  accident,  the 
truth  of  Christianity  is  proved.* 

The  view  here  given  of  the  moral  and  religious  sys- 

*  Chap.  vii.    To  tlie  Analogy  are  suhjo;ned  two  Dis^erlalionr,  boHi  origiiially  in 
seried  in  the  Ixitly  of  the  work.     One  On   Personal  Identity,  In  which  are  c-ont'^ineu 
some  striclurcs  on  Mr  Locke,  wlio  asserts  thai  consciousness   makes  or  consiiuitcs 
personal  identity  ;  \vherens,  as  onr  Antl.or  oliserves,  conscionsn»'Ss  makes  only  per- 
sonality, or  is  ntcessary  to  Llie  iiha  of  a  person,  /.  e.  a  thinlvui^  intelligent  being,  but 


xl 


pheface  by  the  eoitor. 


terns  of  BisjJiop  Butler,  it  will  immediately  be  perceived, 
is  chiefly  intended  for  younger  students,  especially  for 
students  in  Divinity ;  to  whom  it  is  hoped  it  may  be  of 
use,  so  as  to  encourage  them  to  peruse,  with  proper  dili- 
gence, the  original  works  of  the  Author  himself.  For  it 
may  be  necessary  to  observe,  that  neither  of  the  volumes 
of  this  excellent  Prelate  are  addressed  to  those  who 
read  for  amusement,  or  curiosity,  or  to  get  rid  of  time. 
All  subjects  are  not  to  be  comprehended  with  the  same 
ease ;  and  morality  and  religion,  when  treated  as  sciences, 
each  accompanied  with  ditiiculties  of  its  own,  can  neither 
of  them  be  understood  as  they  ought  without  a  very 
peculiar  attention.  But  morality  and  religion  are  not 
merely  to  be  studied  as  sciences,  or  as  being  speculatively 
true  ;  thev  are  to  be  regarded  in  another  and  higher 
light,  as  the  rule  of  life  and  manners,  as  containing 
authoritative  directions  by  which  to  regulate  our  faith 
and  practice.  And  in  thi«  view,  the  infinite  importance 
of  them,  considered,  it  can  never  be  an  indifferent  matter 
whether  they  be  received  or  rejected.  For  both  claim  to 
be  the  voice  of  God;  and  whether  they  be  so  or  not, 
cannot  be  known,  till  their  claims  be  impartially  examin- 
ed. If  they  indeed  come  from  Him,  we  are  bound  to 
conform  to  them  at  our  peril ;  nor  is  it  left  to  our  choice, 
whether  we  will  submit  to  the  obligations  they  impose 
upon  us  or  not ;  for  submit  to  them  we  must,  in  such  a 
sense,  as  to  incur  the  punishments  denounced  by  both 
against  wilful  disobedience  to  their  irjunctions. 

presupposes,  and  therefore  cannot  constitute,  per>ona!  identity:  just  ns  knowledjje 
jresiipposes  truth,  hut  does  not  constitute  it.  Consciousness  of  past  actions  does  in- 
deed siiow  us  the  identity  oF  ourselves,  or  gives  us  a  certain  assurance  tliat  u  e  are 
liie  siuiie  persons  or  livini>'  agents  now,  whicli  we  were  at  the  time  to  whicli  our  re- 
iiteiidjrauce  Ciin  [iMk  liack  :  but  still  we  should  be  the  same  persons  as  we  wbtp, 
liiouoh  this  conscious:!!  ss  of  what  is  past  were  wanting,  tiiough  all  that  had  l)een  d-ouo- 
by  us  lornii  rly  were  f(.rf,'i)!,tf'ii  ;  ur.lfss  it  be  true,  that  no  person  has  existed  a  single 
monienl  beyond  what  he  can  remember.  Tiie  otiier  Dissertation  is  On  the  Natun 
«/■ /'/W«f,  which  proper]/ htlongs  to  Llic  iirjr^l  sy.steiu  (;f  our  Author  already  ex- 
plained. 


THE 

lalFjfi   OF   DR  BUT1.ER. 


Dr  Joseph  Butler,  a  Prelate  of  the  most  distinguished 
character  and  abiUties,  was  born  at  Wantage,  in  Berk- 
shire, in  the  year  1692.  His  father,  Mr  Thomas  But- 
Ijr,  who  was  a  substantial  and  reputable  shopkeeper  in 
that  town,  observing  in  his  son  Joseph*  an  excellent 
genius  and  inclination  for  learning,  determined  to  edu- 
cate him  for  the  ministry,  among  the  Protestant  Dissen- 
ters of  the  Presbyterian  denomination.  For  this  pur- 
pose, after  he  had  gone  through  a  proper  course  of 
grammatical  literature,  at  the  free  grammar  school  of  his 
native  place,  under  the  care  of  the  Rev.  Mr  Phihp  Bar- 
ton, a  Clergyman  of  the  Church  of  England,  he  was  sent 
to  a  Dissenting  academy,  then  kept  at  Gloucester,  but 
which  was  soon  afterwards  removed  to  Tewkesbury. 
The  principal  tutor  of  this  academy  was  Mr  Jones,  a 
man  of  uncommon  abilities  and  knowledge,  who  had  the 
honour  of  training  up  several  scholars,  who  became  of 
great  eminence,  both  in  the  Established  Church  and 
among  the  Dissenters.  At  Tewkesbury  Mr  Butler 
made  an  extraordinary  progress  in  the  study  of  Divinity  ; 
of  which  he  gave  a  remarkable  proof,  in  the  letters  ad- 
dressed by  him,  while  he  resided  at  Tewkesbury,  to  Dr 
Samuel  Clarke,  laying  before  him  the  doubts  that  had 
arisen  in  his  mind,  concerning  the  conclusiveness  of 
some  arguments  in  the  Doctor's  demonstration  of  the 
being  and  attributes  of  God.  The  first  of  these  letters 
was  dated  the  4th  of  November,  1713;  and  the  sagacity 
and  depth  of  thought  displayed  in  it,  immediately  excit- 
ed Dr  Clarke's  particular  notice.  This  condescension 
encouraged  Mr  Butler  to  address  the  Doctor  again  upon 
the  same  subject,  which  likewise  was  answered  by  him  ; 
and  the  correspondence  being  carried  on  in  three  other 

♦  Ke  was  the  youngest  of  eight  children. 


Xlii  THE  LIFE  OP 

letters,  the  whole  was  annexed  to  the  celebrated  treatise 
before  mentioned,  and  the  collection  has  been  retained 
in  all  the  subsequent  editions  of  that  work.  The  man- 
agement of  ihis  correspondence  was  entrusied  by  Mr 
Butler  to  his  friend  and  fellow-pupil,  Mr  Seeker,  who, 
in  order  to  conceal  the  affair,  undertook  to  convey  the 
letters  to  the  post-ofhce  at  Gloucc  ster,  and  to  bring  back 
Dr  Clarke's  answers.  When  Mr  Butler's  name  was  dis- 
covered to  the  Doctor,  the  candour,  modesty,  and  good 
sense,  with  which  he  had  written,  immediately  procured 
him  the  friendship  of  that  eminent  and  excellent  man. 
Our  young  student  was  not,  however,  during  his  contin- 
uance at  Tewkesbury,  solely  employed  in  metaphysical 
speculations  and  inquiries.  Another  subject  of  his  seri- 
ous consideration  was,  the  propriety  of  his  becoming  a 
Dissenting  minister.  Accordingly,  he  entered  into  an 
examination  of  the  principles  of  non-conformity  ;  the  re- 
sult of  which  was,  such  a  dissatisfaction  with  them,  as 
determined  him  to  conform  to  the  Established  Church. 
This  intention  was,  at  first,  disagreeable  to  his  father, 
who  endeavoured  to  divert  him  from  his  purpose  ;  and, 
with  that  view,  called  in  the  assistance  of  some  eminent 
Presbyterian  Divines  ;  but  finding  his  son's  resolution  to 
be  fixed,  he  at  length  suffered  him  to  be  removed  to  Ox- 
ford, where  he  was  admitted  a  commoner  of  Oriel  Col- 
lege, on  the  17th  of  March,  1714.  At  what  time  he  took 
Orders  doth  not  appear,  nor  who  the  Bishop  was  by 
whom  he  was  ordained;  but  it  is  certain  that  he  entered 
into  the  Church  soon  after  his  admission  at  Oxford,  if 
it  be  true,  as  is  asserted,  that  he  sometimes  assisted  Mr 
Edward  Talbot  in  the  divine  service,  at  his  living  of 
Hendred,  near  Wantage.  With  this  gentleman,  who 
was  the  second  son  of  Dr  William  Talbot,  successively 
Bishop  of  Oxford,  Salisbury,  and  Durham,  Mr  Butler 
formed  an  intimate  friendF;hip  at  Oriel  College ;  which 
friendship  laid  the  foundation  of  all  his  subsequent  pre- 
ferments, and  procured  for  him  a  very  honourable  situa- 
tion, when  he  was  only  twenty-six  years  of  asre.  For  it 
was  in  1718  that,  at  the  recommendation  of  Mr  Talbot, 
in  conjunction  with  that  of  Dr  Clarke,  he  was  appointed 
by  Sir  Joseph  Jekyll  tc  be  preacher  at  the  Rolls.     This 


dk  butler.  xliii 

was  three  years  before  he  had  taken  any  degree  at  the 
University,  where  he  did  not  go  out  Bachtlor  of  Law- 
till  the  idth  of  June,  1721,  which,  however,  was  as  soon 
as  that  degree  could  suitably  be  conferred  upon  him. 
Mr  Buthr  continued  at  the  Rolls  till  1726  ;  in  the  be- 
ginning of  which  year  he  published,  in  one  volume,  oc- 
tavo, "  Fifteen  S;:rmons  preached  at  that  Chapel."  In 
the  mean  while,  by  the  patronage  of  Dr  Talbot,  Bishop 
of  Durham,  to  whose  notice  he  had  been  recommended 
(together  with  Mr  Benson  and  Mr  Seeker)  by  Mr  Ed- 
w^ard  Talbot,  on  his  death-bed,  our  Author  had  been 
presented  first  to  the  rectory  of  Haughton,  near  Darlington, 
and  afterwards  to  that  of  Stanhope,  in  the  same  diocese. 
The  benefice  of  Haughton  was  given  to  him  in  1722,  and 
that  of  Stanhope  in  1725.  At  Haughton  there  was  a 
necessity  for  rebuilding  a  great  part  of  the  parsonage- 
house,  and  Mr  Butler  had  neither  money  nor  talents  for 
that  work.  Mr  Seeker,  therefore,  who  had  always  the  in- 
terest of  his  friends  at  heart,  and  had  acquired  a  very  con- 
siderable influence  with  Bishop  Talbot,  persuaded  that 
Prelate  to  give  Mr  Butler,  in  exchange  for  Haughton, 
the  rectory  of  Stanhope,  which  was  not  only  free  from 
any  such  incumbrance,  but  was  likewise  of  much  supe- 
jior  value,  being  indeed  one  of  the  richest  parsonages  in 
England.  Whilst  our  Author  continued  preacher  at  the 
Rolls  Chapel,  he  divided  his  time  between  his  duty  in 
town  and  country  ;  but  when  he  quitted  the  Rolls,  he 
resided  during  seven  years,  wholly  at  Stanhope,  in  the 
conscientious  discharge  of  every  obligation  appertaining 
to  a  good  parish  priest.  This  retirement,  however,  was 
too  solitary  for  his  disposition,  which  had  in  it  a  natural 
cast  of  gloominess.  And  though  his  recluse  hours  were 
by  no  means  lost,  either  to  private  improvement  or  pul?- 
lic  utility,  yet  he  felt  at  times,  very  painfully,  the  want 
of  that  select  society  of  friends  to  which  he  had  been  ac- 
customed, and  which  could  inspire  him  with  the  greatest 
cheerfulness.  Mr  Seeker,  therefore,  who  knew  this,  was 
extremely  anxious  to  draw  him  out  into  a  more  active 
and  conspicuous  scene,  and  omitted  no  opportunity  of 
expressing  this  desire  to  such  as  he  thought  capable  of 
promoting  it.     Having  himself  been   appointed   King's 


Xliv  THE  LIFE  OF 

Chaplain  in  1732,  he  took  occasion,  in  a  conversation 
which  he  had  the  honour  of  holding  with  Queen  Caro- 
line, to  mention  to  her  his  friend  Mr  Butler.  The 
Queen  said  she  thought  he  had  been  dead.  Mr  Seeker 
assured  her  he  was  not.  Yet  her  Majesty  afterwards 
asked  Archbishop  Blackburn,  if  he  was  not  dead  :  his 
answer  was,  "  No,  madam ;  but  he  is  buried."  Mr  Seek- 
er continuing  his  purpose  of  endeavouring  to  bring  his 
friend  out  of  his  retirement,  found  means,  upon  Mr 
Charles  Talbot's  being  made  Lord  Chancellor,  to  have 
Mr  Butler  recommended  to  him  for  his  Chaplain.  His 
Lordship  accepted,  and  sent  for  him  ;  and  this  promo- 
tion calling  him  to  Town,  he  took  Oxford  in  his  wa}^,  and 
was  admitted  there  to  the  degree  of  Doctor  of  Law,  on 
the  8th  of  December,  1733.  The  Lord  Chancellor,  who 
gave  him  also  a  prebend  in  the  church  of  Rochester,  had 
consented  that  he  should  reside  at  his  parish  of  Stanhope 
one  half  of  the  year. 

Dr  Butler  being  thus  brought  back  into  the  world,  his 
merit  and  his  talents  soon  introduced  him  to  particular 
notice,  and  paved  the  way  for  his  rising  to  those  high 
dignities  which  he  afterwards  enjoyed.  In  1736  he  was 
appointed  Clerk  of  the  Closet  to  Queen  Caroline  ;  and, 
in  the  same  year,  he  presented  to  her  Majesty  a  copy  oi 
his  excellent  Treatise,  entitled,  "  The  Analogy  of  Reli- 
gion, Natural  and  Revealed,  to  the  Constitution  and 
Course  of  Nature."  His  attendance  upon  his  Royal 
Mistress,  by  her  especial  command,  was  from  seven  to 
nine  in  the  evening  every  day  :  and  though  this  particu- 
lar relation  to  that  excellent  and  learned  Queen  was  soon 
determined  by  her  death,  in  1737,  yet  he  had  been  so 
effectually  recommended  by  her,  as  well  as  by  the  late 
Lord  Chancellor  Talbot,  to  his  Majesty's  favour,  that  in 
t!ie  next  year  he  was  raised  to  the  highest  order  of  the 
Clmrch,  by  a  nomination  to  the  bishopric  of  Bristol  ;  to 
wliich  see  he  was  consecrated  on  the  3d  of  Decemler 
1738.  King  George  II.  not  being  satisfied  with  this 
proof  of  his  regard  to  Dr  Butler,  promiotcd  him,  in  1740, 
to  the  Deanery  of  St  Paul's,  London,  into  which  he  was 
installed  on  the  24th  of  May  in  that  year.  Finding  the 
demands  of  this  dignity  to  be  incompatible  with  his  pa- 


DR  BUTLEft.  XlV 

risli  duty  at  Stanliope,  he  immediately  resigned  that  rich 
benefice.  Besides  our  Prelate's  unremitted  attention  to 
his  peculiar  obligations,  he  was  called  upon  to  preach 
several  discourses  on  public  occasions,  which  were  af- 
terwards separately  printed,  and  have  since  been  annex- 
ed to  the  latter  editions  of  the  Sermons  at  the  Rolls  Cha- 
pel. In  1746,  upon  the  death  of  Dr  Egerton,  Bishop  of 
Hereford,  Dr  Butler  was  made  Clerk  of  the  Closet  to  the 
King  ;  and,  on  the  16th  of  October  1750,  he  received  an- 
other distinguished  mark  of  his  Majesty's  favour,  by  be- 
ing translated  to  the  see  of  Durham.  This  was  on  the 
16th  of  October  in  that  year,  upon  the  decease  of  Dr  Ed- 
ward Chandler.  Our  Prelate  being  thus  appointed  to 
preside  over  a  diocese  with  wliich  he  had  long  been  con- 
nected, delivered  his  first,  and  indeed  his  last  Charge  to 
his  Clergy,  at  bis  primary  visitation  in  1751.  The  prin- 
cipal object  of  it  was  "  External  Religion."  The  Bishop 
ha.ving  observed,  with  deep  concern,  tlie  great  and  grow- 
ing neglect  of  serious  piety  in  the  kingdom,  insisted 
strongly  on  the  usefulness  of  outward  forms  and  institu- 
tions, in  fixing  and  preserving  a  sense  of  devotion  and 
duty  in  the  minds  of  men.  In  doing  this,  he  was  thought 
by  several  persons  to  speak  too  favourably  of  Pagan  and 
Popish  ceremonies,  and  to  countenance,  in  a  certain  de- 
gree, the  cause  of  superstition.  Under  that  apprehension, 
an  able  and  spirited  writer,  who  was  understood  to  be  a 
Clergyman  of  the  Church  of  England,  published,  in  1752, 
a  pamphlet,  entitled,  "  A  Serious  Inquiry  into  the  Use 
and  Importance  of  External  Religion ;  occasioned  by 
some  Passages  in  the  Right  Rev.  the  Lord  Bishop  of 
Durham's  Charge  to  the  Clergy  of  that  Diocese  ; — Hum- 
bly addressed  to  his  Lordship."  Many  persons,  how- 
ever, and  we  believe  the  greater  part  of  the  Clergy  of  the 
diocese,  did  not  think  our  Prelate's  Charge  so  exception- 
able as  it  appeared  to  this  author.  The  Charge,  being 
printed  at  Durham,  and  having  never  been  annexed  to 
any  of  Dr  Butler's  other  works,  is  now  become  extreme- 
ly scarce  ;  and  it  is  observable,  that  it  is  the  only  one 
of  his  publications  which  ever  produced  him  a  direct  hter- 


ary  antagonist. 


By  this  promotion,  our  worthy  Bishop  was  furnished 


Xlvi  THE  LIFE  OP 

With  ample  means  of  exerting  the  virtue  of  charity ;  a 
virtue  which  emineniiy  abounded  in  him,  and  the  exer- 
cise of  which  was  his  highest  dehght.  But  this  gratifica- 
tion he  did  not  long  enjoy.  He  had  been  but  a  short  time 
seated  in  his  new  bishopric,  when  his  health  began  visi- 
bly to  dechne;  and  having  been  complimented,  during  his 
indisposition,  upon  account  of  his  great  resignation  to  the 
Divine  will,  he  is  said  to  have  expressed  some  regret, 
that  he  should  be  taken  from  the  present  world  so  soon 
after  he  had  been  rendered  capable  of  becoming  much 
more  useful  in  it.  In  his  illness  he  was  carried  to  Bris- 
tol, to  try  the  waters  of  that  place  ;  but  these  proving  in- 
effectual, he  removed  to  Bath,  where,  being  past  recovery, 
he  died  on  the  16th  of  June,  1752.  His  corpse  was  con- 
veyed to  Bristol,  and  interred  in  the  cathedral  there, 
where  a  monument,  with  an  inscription,  is  erected  to  his 
memorv. 

On  the  greatness  of  Bishop  Butler's  character  we  need 
not  enlarge;  for  his  profound  knowledge,  and  the  prodi- 
gious strength  of  his  mind,  are  amply  displayed  in  his 
incomparable  writings.  His  piety  was  of  the  most  seri- 
ous and  fervent,  and,  perhaps,  somewhat  of  the  ascetic 
kind.  His  benevolence  was  warm,  generous,  and  diffu- 
sive. Whilst  he  was  Bishop  of  Bristol,  he  expended,  in 
repairing  and  improving  the  episcopal  palace,  four  thou- 
sand pounds,  which  is  said  to  have  been  more  than  the 
whole  jrevenues  of  the  bishopric  amounted  to,  during  his 
continuance  in  that  see.  Besides  his  private  benefactions, 
he  was  a  contributor  to  the  infirmary  at  Bristol,  and  a 
subscriber  to  three  of  the  hospitals  at  London.  He  was 
likewise  a  principal  promoter,  though  not  the  first  found- 
er, of  the  infirmary  at  Newcastle,  in  Northumberland. # 
In  supporting  the  hospitahty  and  dignity  of  the  rich  and 
powerful  diocese  of  Durham,  he  was  desirous  of  imitating 
the  spirit  of  his  patron.  Bishop  Talbot.  In  this  spirit  he 
set  apart  three  days  every  week  for  the  reception  and  en- 
tertainment of  the  principal  gentry  of  the  country.  Nor 
were  even  the  Clergy  who  had  the  poorest  benefices  ne- 
glected by  him.  He  not  only  occasionally  invited  them 
to  dine  with  him,  but  condescended  to  visit  them  at  their 
respective  pari.shes.     By  his  will  he  left  five  hundred 


DR  RUTLER.  Xlvii 

pounds  to  the  Society  for  propagating  the  Gospel  in  Fo- 
reign Parts,  and  some  legacies  to  his  friends  and  domes- 
tics. His  executor  and  residuary  legatee  was  his  chap- 
lain, the  Rev.  Or  Nachanael  Forster,  a  divme  of  distm- 
guished  hterature.  Bishop  Butler  'vvas  never  married. 
Soon  after  his  decease,  the  following  hnes,  by  way  of 
epitaph,  were  written  concerning  him;  and  were  printed 
first,  if  we  recollect  aright,  in  the  London  Magazine. 

Benf'ath  this  marble  Butler  lies  entomb'd, 
Who,  Willi  a  boiil  inflamed  by  love  divine, 

His  lile  in  presence  olhis  God  consumed, 
Like  the  bright  lamps  before  the  holy  sliriiie. 

His  aspect  pleasing,  mind  with  learning  fraugiit 
His  eloquence  wus  like  a  chain  of  gold, 
That  the  wild  passions  of  mankind  controll'd  ; 

Merit,  wherever  to  be  found,  he  sought. 

Desire  of  transient  riciies  he  iiad  none  ; 

These  he,  with  bounteous  liMud,  did  well  dispense; 
Bent  to  fulfill  the  ends  of  Providence; 

His  heart  still  fix'd  on  an  immortal  crown. 
His  heart  a  mirror  was,  of  |)urest  kind, 
Where  the  bright  imiige  of  his  Maker  sliined; 

Reflecting  faithful  to  the  tlirone  above, 

Th'  Irradiant  glories  of  the  Mystic  Dove. 

The  following  Epitaph,  said  to  be  written  by  Dr  Na- 
thanaei  Forster,  is  inscribed  on  a  flat  marble  stone,  in  the 
cathedral  church  of  Bristol,  placed  over  the  spot  where 
the  remains  of  Bishop  Butler  are  deposited;  and  which, 
as  it  is  now  ahnost  obliterated,  it  may  be  worth  while  here 
to  preserve. 

H.  S, 

Revererdus  admodum  in  Christo  Pater 
JOSEPIIUS  BUTLER,  LL.D. 

nujusce  prn:o  Dioec  seos 
Deinde  Dni.elmensis  Ef  iscopus. 
Quali'  quantusque  Vir  erat 
.    Sua  lihenlissime  agnovit  a!tas: 
Et  si  quid  Prtesuli  aut  Scrijjton  ad  fiamam  valert 
Mens  altissirr.a, 
Ingenii  pprspicacis  et  suhacti  Vis, 
4niinusi]ue  pins,  s:m[  lex,  candi  Ins,  liberalft, 
Mortui  hand  (arile  evar.escet  memoria. 
Obiit  Bathoni.T  IG  Kalend.  Julii, 
A.  P.  1752 
Annos  natus  60. 


INTRODUCTION. 


Probable  eviJonce  is  essentially  distinguished  from  de- 
monstrative by  tliis,  that  it  admits  of  degrees  ;  and  of  all 
variety  of  them,  from  the  highest  moral  certainty,  to  the 
very  lowest  presumption.  We  cannot  indeed  say  a  thing 
is  probably  true  upon  one  very  slight  presumption  for 
it ;  because,  as  there  may  be  probabilities  on  both  sides 
of  a  question,  there  may  be  some  against  it ;  and  though 
there  be  not,  yet  a  slight  presumption  does  not  beget 
that  degree  of  conviction,  which  is  implied  in  saying  a 
thing  is  probably  true.  But  that  the  slightest  possible 
presumption  is  of  the  nature  of  a  probability,  appears 
from  hence  ;  that  such  low  presumption  often  repeated, 
will  amount  even  to  moral  certainty.  Thus  a  man's  hav- 
ing observed  the  ebb  and  flow  of  the  tide  to-day,  affords 
some  sort  of  presumption,  though  the  lowest  imaginable, 
that  it  may  happen  again  to-morrow :  but  the  observa- 
tion of  this  event  for  so  many  days,  and  months,  and 
ages  together,  as  it  has  been  observed  by  mankind,  gives 
us  a  full  assurance  that  it  will. 

That  which  chiefly  constitutes  Probability  is  expressed 
in  the  word  Likely,  i.  e.  hkesome  truth,*  or  true  event; 
like  it,  in  itself,  in  its  evidence,  in  some  more  or  fewer 
of  its  circumstances.  For  w^ien  Vv'e  determine  a  thing 
to  be  probably  true,  suppose  that  an  event  has  or  will 
come  to  pass,  it  is  from  the  mind's  remarking  in  it  a 
likeness  to  some  other  event,  which  we  have  observed 
has  come  to  pass.  And  this  observation  forms,  in  num- 
berless daily  instances,  a  presumption,  opinion,  or  full 
conviction,  that  such  event  has  or  will  come  to  pass ;  ac- 
cording as  the  observation  is,  that  the  like  event  has 
sometimes,  most  commonly,  or  always,  so  far  as  our  ob- 
servation reaches,  come  to  pass  at  like  distances  of  time, 
or  place,  or  upon  like  occasions.  Hence  arises  the  be- 
lief, that  a  child,  if  it  lives  twenty  years,  will  grow  up  to 

*  Ycrisimile. 


INTRODUCTION.  xllX 

tiie  stature  and  strength  of  a  man ;  that  food  will  contri- 
bute to  the  preservation  of  its  life,  and  the  want  of  it  for 
such  a  number  of  days,  be  its  certain  destruction.  So 
likewise  the  rule  and  measure  of  our  hopes  and  fears 
concerning  the  success  of  our  pursuits ;  our  expectations 
that  others  will  act  so  and  so  in  such  circumstances  ;  and 
our  judgment  that  such  actions  proceed  from  such  prin- 
ciples ;  all  these  rely  upon  our  having  observed  the  like 
to  what  we  hope,  fear,  expect,  judge;  I  say,  upon  our 
having  observed  the  like,  either  with  respect  to  others 
or  ourselves.  And  thus,  whereas  the  prince*  who  had 
always  lived  in  a  warm  climate,  naturally  concluded  in 
the  way  of  analogy,  that  there  was  no  such  thing  as 
water's  becoming  hard,  because  he  had  always  observed 
it  to  be  fluid  and  yielding :  we,  on  the  contrary,  from 
analogy  conclude,  that  there  is  no  presumption  at  all 
against  this :  that  it  is  supposable  there  may  be  frost  in 
England  any  given  day  in  January  next ;  probable  that 
there  will  on  some  day  of  the  month ;  and  that  there  is 
a  moral  certainty,  i.  e.  ground  for  an  expectation  without 
any  doubt  of  it,  in  some  part  or  other  of  the  winter. 

Probable  evidence,  in  its  very  nature,  affords  but  an 
Imperfect  kind  of  information ;  and  is  to  be  considered 
as  relative  only  to  beings  of  limited  capacities.  For  no- 
thing which  is  the  possible  object  of  knowledge,  whether 
past,  present,  or  future,  can  be  probable  to  an  infinite 
Intelhgence  ;  since  it  cannot  but  be  discerned  absolutely 
as  it  is  in  itself,  certainly  true,  or  certainly  false.  But 
to  us,  probability  is  the  very  guide  of  life. 

From  these  things  it  follows,  that  m  questions  of  dif- 
ficulty, or  such  as  are  thought  so,  where  more  satisfac- 
tory evidence  cannot  be  had,  or  is  not  seen ;  if  the  result 
of  examination  be,  that  there  appaars  upon  the  whole, 
any  the  lowest  presumption  on  one  side,  and  none  on 
the  other,  or  a  greater  presumption  on  one  side,  though 
in  the  lowest  degree  greater ;  this  determines  the  ques- 
tion, even  in  m.atters  of  speculation ;  and  in  matters  of 
practice,  will  lay  us  undej-  an  absolute  and  formal  obli- 
gation, iii  point  of  prudence  and  of  interest,  to  act  upon 
that  presumption  or  low  proba];iiity,  though  it  be  so  low 

*  The  story  is  told  by  Mr  Locke  in  the  Chapter  of  Probability. 

li 


1 


INTRODUCTION. 


as  to  leave  the  mind  in  very  great  doubt  which  is  the 
truth,  tor  sui-ely  a  man  is  as  really  bound  in  prudence 
to  do  what  upon  the  whole  appears,  according  to  the 
best  of  his  judgment,  to  be  for  his  happiness,  as  what 
LUd^  certainly  knows  to  be  so.  Nay  further,  in  questions 
of  great  consequenge,  a  reasonable  man  will  think  it  con- 
cerns him  to  remark  lower  probabilities  and  presump- 
tions than  these  ;  such  as  amount  to  no  more  than  show- 
ing one  side  of  a  question  to  be  as  supposable  and  cred- 
ible as  the  other  :  nay,  such  as  but  amount  to  much  less 
even  than  this.  For  numberless  instances  might  be 
mentioned  respecting  the  common  pursuits  of  life,  where 
a  man  would  be  thought,  in  a  literal  sense,  distracted^ 
who  would  not  act,  and  with  great  application  too,  not 
only  upon  an  even  chance,  but  upon  much  less,  and 
where  the  probability  or  chance  was  greatly  against  his 
succeeding.* 

It  is  not  my  design  to  inquire  further  into  the  nature, 
the  foundation,  and  measure  of  probability ;  or  whence 
it  proceeds  that  likeness  should  beget  that  presumption, 
opinion,  and  full  conviction,  which  the  human  mind  is 
formed  to  receive  from  it,  and  which  it  does  necessarily 
produce  in  every  one  ;  or  to  guard  against  the  errors,  to 
which  reasoning  from  analogy  is  liable.  This  belongs  to 
the  subject  of  Logic  ;  and  is  a  part  of  that  subject  which 
has  not  yet  been  thoroughly  considered.  Indeed  I  shal] 
not  take  upon  me  to  say,  how  far  the  extent,  compass, 
and  force,  of  analogical  reasoning,  can  be  reduced  to 
general  heads  and  rules;  and  the  whole  be  formed  into 
a  system.  But  thou^'h  so  little  in  this  way  has  bee!> 
attempted  by  those  who  have  treated  of  our  intellectua, 
powers,  and  the  exercise  of  them ;  this  does  not  hinder 
but  that  we  may  be,  as  we  unquestionably  are,  assured^, 
that  analogy  is  of  weight,  in  various  degrees,  toward* 
determining  our  judgment  and  our  practice.  Nor  does 
it  in  any  wise  cease  to  be  of  weight  in  those  cases,  because 
persons,  either  given  to  dispute,  or  w^ho  require  things 
to  be  stated  with  greater  exactness  than  our  faculties  ap- 
pear to  admit  of  in  practical  matters,  may  find  other 
cases  in  which  it  is  not  easy  to  say,  whether  it  be,  or  be 

*  See  Part  II.  Chap.  vi. 


INTRODUCTION.  U 

not,  of  any  weight ;  or  instances  of  seeming  analogies, 
which  are  really  of  none.  It  is  enough  to  the  present 
purpose  to  observe,  that  this  general  way  of  arguing  is 
evidently  natural,  just,  and  conclusive.  For  there  is  no 
man  can  make  a  question  but  that  the  sun  will  rise  to- 
morrow, and  be  seen,  where  it  is  seen  at  all,  in  the  figure 
of  a  circle,  and  not  in  that  of  a  square. 

Hence,  namely  from  analogical  reasoning,  Origen*  has 
with  singular  sagacity  observed,  that  he  who  believes  the 
Scripture  to  have  proceeded  from  him  who  is  the  Author  of 
Nature,  may  well  expect  to  find  the  same  sort  of  difficulties 
in  it,  as  are  found  in  the  constitution  of  Nature.  And  in 
a  like  way  of  reflection  it  may  be  added,  that  he  who 
denies  the  Scripture  to  have  been  from  God  upon  ac- 
count of  these  difficulties,  may,  for  the  very  same  reason, 
deny  the  world  to  have  been  formed  by  him.  On  the 
other  hand,  if  there  be  an  analogy  or  likeness  between 
that  system  of  things  and  dispensation  of  Providence, 
which  Revelation  informs  us  of,  and  that  system  of  things 
and  dispensation  of  Providence,  vv-hich  Experience  to- 
gether with  Reason  informs  us  of,  ^.  e.  the  known  course 
of  Nature ;  this  is  a  presumption,  that  they  have  both 
the  same  author  and  Cciuse ;  at  least  so  far  as  to  answer 
objections  against  the  former's  being  from  God,  drawn 
from  any  thing  which  is  analogical  or  similar  to  what  is  in 
the  latter,  which  is  acknowledged  to  be  from  him  ;  for  an 
Author  of  Nature  is  here  supposed. 

Forming  our  notions  of  the  constitution  and  govern- 
ment of  the  world  upon  reasoning,  without  foundation 
for  the  principles  which  we  assume,  whether  from  the  at- 
tributes of  God,  or  any  thing  else,  is  building  a  world  upon 
hypothesis,  like  Des  Cartes.  Forming  our  notions  upon 
reasoning  from  principles  wliich  are  certain,  but  applied 
to  cases  to  which  we  have  no  ground  to  apply  them  (like 
those  who  explain  the  structure  of  the  human  body,  and 
the  nature  of  diseases  and  medicines  fi'om  mere  mathe- 
matics without  sufficient  data.)  is  an  error  much  akin  to 
the  former :  since  what  is  assumed  in  order  to  make  the 

*  Xf^  ft.iy  Til  <yt  rif  u-rir^  w«.«a5:?jr/t«!»J»  Cti  xrar,'^»;"iij  Ton  xcatitv  Mai  rmurai  rat  y»a*«r 
mirt7rBai,  en  oVa  Ttii  rr,;  xTiriu;  aTaorS  raTs  ^s\T»vri  t»»  irtji  Kvrn!  Xiycf,  rxirct  «<w 
fft^t  rut  y^aipat.     Piiilocal.  p.  2^.  Ed.  Cant, 

D2  ^ 


Ill  INTRODUCTION. 

reasoning  applicable,  is  Hypothesis.  But  it  must  be  al- 
lowed just,  to  join  abstract  reasonings  with  the  observa- 
tion of  facts,  and  argue  from  such  facts  as  are  known,  to 
others  that  are  like  them ;  from  that  part  of  the  Divine 
government  over  intelligent  creatures  which  comes  under 
our  view,  to  that  larger  and  more  general  government 
over  them  which  is  beyond  it ;  and  from  what  is  present, 
to  collect  what  is  likely,  credible,  or  not  incredible,  will 
be  hereafter. 

This  method  then  of  concluding  and  determ.ining  be- 
ing practical,  and  what,  if  we  will  act  at  all,  we  cannot 
but  act  upon  in  the  common  pursuits  of  life ;  being  evi- 
dently conclusive,  in  various  degrees,  proportionable  to 
the  degree  and  exactness  of  the  whole  analogy  or  like- 
ness ;  and  having  so  great  authority  for  its  introduction 
into  the  subject  of  religion,  even  revealed  religion ;  my 
design  is  to  apply  it  to  that  subject  in  general,  both  na- 
tural and  revealed:  taking  for  proved,  that  there  is  an  in- 
telligent Author  of  Nature,  and  natural  Governor  of  the 
world.  For  as  there  is  no  presumption  against  this  prior 
to  the  proof  of  it :  so  it  has  been  often  proved  with  ac- 
cumulated evidence ;  from  this  argument  of  analogy  and 
linal  causes ;  from  abstract  reasonings  ;  from  the  most 
ancient  tradition  and  testimony ;  and  from  the  general 
consent  of  mankind.  Nor  does  it  appear,  so  far  as  I  can 
find,  to  be  denied  by  the  generality  of  those  who  profess 
themselves  dissatisfied  with  the  evidence  of  religion. 

As  there  are  some,  Avho,  instead  of  thus  attending  t! 
what  is  in  fact  the  constitution  of  Nature,  form  their  no- 
tions of  God's  government  upon  hypothesis:  so  there 
are  others,  wiio  indulge  themselves  in  vain  and  idle  spec- 
ulations, how  the  world  might  possibly  have  been  framed 
otherwise  than  it  is ;  and  upon  supposition  that  things 
might,  in  imagining  that  they  should,  have  been  disposed 
and  carried  on  after  a  better  model,  than  what  appears, 
in  the  present  disposition  and  conduct  of  them.  Sup* 
pose  now  a  person  of  such  a  turn  of  mind,  to  go  on  with 
his  r  j'^eries,  till  he  had  at  length  fixed  upon  some  parti- 
cular plan  of  Nature,  as  appearing  to  him  the  best  — 
C'le  shall  scarce  be  thou^rht  e;uiltv  of  detraction  against 
human  understanding,  if  one  should" say,   even  before- 


INTRODUCTION.  Hu 

hand,  that  the  plan  which  this  speculative  person  would 
fix  upon,  though  he  were  the  wisest  of  the  sons  of  men, 
probably  would  not  be  the  very  best,  even  according  to 
his  own  notions  of  best ;  whether  he  thought  that  to  be 
so,  which  afforded  occasions  and  motives  for  the  exer- 
cise of  the  greatest  virtue,  or  which  was  productive  of 
the  greatest  happiness,  or  tliat  these  two  were  neces- 
sarily connected,  and  run  up  into  one  and  the  same  plan. 
However,  it  may  not  be  amiss,  once  for  all,  to  see  what 
would  be  the  amount  of  these  emendations  and  imagin- 
ary improvements  upon  the  system  of  nature,  or  how  far 
they  would  mislead  us.  And  it  seems  there  could  be  no 
stopping,  till  we  came  to  some  such  conclusions  as  these  : 
that  all  creatures  should  at  first  be  made  as  perfect  and 
as  happy  as  they  were  capable  of  ever  being:  that  no- 
thing, to  be  sure,  of  hazard  or  danger  should  be  put  upon 
them  to  do  ;  some  indolent  persons  would  perhaps  think 
nothing  at  all:  or  certainly,  that  effectual  care  should  be 
taken,  that  they  should,  whether  necessarily  or  not,  yet' 
eventually  and  in  fact,  always  do  what  was  right  and 
most  conducive  to  happiness,  which  would  be  thought 
easy  for  infinite  power  to  effect ;  either  by  not  giving 
them  any  principles  which  would  endanger  their  going 
wrong ;  or  by  laying  the  right  motive  of  action  in  every 
instance  before  their  minds  continually  in  so  strong  a 
manner,  as  would  never  fail  of  inducing  them  to  act 
conformably  to  it :  and  that  the  whole  method  of  govern- 
ment by  punishments  should  be  rejected  as  absurd;  as  an 
awkward  round-about  method  of  carrying  things  on  ; 
nay,  as  contrary  to  a  principal  purpose,  for  which  it 
would  be  supposed  creatures  were  made,  namely,  hap- 
piness. 

Now,  without  considering  what  \s  to  be  said  in  parti- 
cular to  the  several  parts  of  this  train  of  folly  and  extra- 
vagance ;  what  has  been  above  intimated,  is  a  full  direct 
general  answer  to  it,  namely,  that  we  may  see  beforehand 
that  we  have  not  faculties  for  this  kind  of  speculation. 
For  though  it  be  admitted  that,  from  the  first  principles 
of  our  nature,  we  unavoidably  judge  or  determine  some 
ends  to  be  absolutely  in  themselves  preferable  to  others, 
and  that  the  ends    now  mentioned,  or  if  they  run  up 


IIv  INTRODUCTION. 

into  one,  that  this  one  is  absoUitely  the  best;  and  conse- 
quently that  we  must  conclude  the  ultimate  end  design- 
ed, in  the  constitution  of  Nature  and  conduct  of  Provi- 
dence, is  the  most  virtue  and  happiness  possible;  yet 
we  are  far  from  being  able  to  judge  what  particular 
disposition  of  things  would  be  most  friendly  and  assist- 
ant to  virtue ;  or  what  means  might  be  absolutely  neces  - 
sary  to  produce  the  most  happiness  in  a  system  of  such 
extent  as  our  own  world  may  be,  taking  in  all  that  is 
past  and  to  come,  though  we  should  suppose  it  detached 
from  the  whole  of  things.  Indeed  we  are  so  far  from 
being  able  to  judge  of  this,  that  we  are  not  judges  what 
may  be  the  necessary  means  of  raising  and  conducting 
one  person  to  the  highest  perfection  and  happiness  of 
his  nature.  Nay,  even  in  the  little  affairs  of  the  present 
life,  we  find  men  of  different  educations  and  ranks  are 
not  competent  judges  of  the  conduct  of  each  other.  Our 
whole  nature  leads  us  to  ascribe  all  moral  perfection  to 
God,  and  to  deny  all  imperfection  of  him.  And  this  will, 
for  ever  be  a  practical  proof  of  his  moral  character,  to 
such  as  will  consider  what  a  practical  proof  is ;  because 
it  js  the  voice  of  God  speaking  in  us.  And  from  hence 
we  conclude,  that  virtue  must  be  the  happiness,  and  vice 
the  misery,  of  every  creature;  and  that  regularity  and 
order  and  right  cannot  but  prevail  finally  in  a  universe 
under  his  government.  But  we  are  in  no  sort  judges, 
what  are  the  necessary  means  of  accomplishing  this  end. 
Let  us  then,  instead  of  that  idle  and  not  very  innocent 
employment  of  forming  imaginary  models  of  a  world, 
and  schemes  of  governing  it,  turn  our  thoughts  to  what 
we  experience  to  be  the  conduct  of  Nature  with  respect 
to  intelligent  creatures  ;  which  may  be  resolved  into 
general  laws  or  rules  of  administration,  in  the  same  way 
as  many  of  the  lav\^s  of  Nature  respecting  inanimate 
matter  may  be  collected  from  experiments.  And  let  us 
compare  the  known  constipation  and  course  of  things 
with  what  is  said  to  be  the  moral  system  of  Nature ; 
the  acknowledged  dispensations  of  Providence,  or  thai 
government  which  we  find  ourselves  under,  with  what 
religion  teaches  us  to  believe  and  expect;  and  see  whether 
th^y  are  not  analogous  and  of  a  piece.     And  upon  such 


INTRODUCTION.  Iv 

a  comparison  it  will,  I  think,  be  found  that  they  are  very 
much  so :  that  both  may  be  traced  up  to  the  same  gene- 
ral laws,  and  resolved  into  the  same  principles  of  di- 
vine conduct. 

The  analogy  here  proposed  to  be  considered  is  of  pretty 
large  extent,  and  consists  of  several  parts  ;  in  some  more, 
in  others  less  exact.  In  some  few  instances  perhaps 
it  may  amount  to  a  real  practical  proof;  in  others  not  so. 
Yet  in  these  it  is  a  confirmation  of  what  is  proved  other- 
wise. It  will  undeniably  show,  what  too  many  want  to 
have  shown  them,  that  the  system  of  Religion,  both 
natural  and  revealed,  considered  only  as  a  system,  and 
prior  to  the  proof  of  it,  is  not  a  subject  of  ridicule,  unless 
that  of  Nature  be  so  too.  And  it  will  afford  an  answer  to 
almost  all  objections  against  the  system  both  of  natural 
and  revealed  Religion  ;  though  not  perhaps  an  answer  in 
so  great  a  degree,  yet  in  a  very  considerable  degree  an 
answer  to  the  objections  against  the  evidence  of  it :  for  ob- 
jections against  a  proof,  and  objections  against  what  is  said 
to  be  proved,  the  reader  will  observe  are  different  things. 

Now  the  divine  government  of  the  world,  implied  in 
the  notion  of  religion  in  general  and  of  Christianity,  con- 
tains in  it ;  that  mankind  is  appointed  to  live  in  a  future 
state ;  *  that  there  every  one  shall  be  rewarded  or  punish- 
ed;! rewarded  or  punished  respectively  for  all  tha 
behaviour  here,  which  we  comprehend  under  the  words, 
virtuous  or  vicious,  morally  good  or  evil :+  that  our  pre- 
sent life  is  a  probation,  a  state  of  trial,  §  and  of  disci- 
pline, II  for  that  future  one;  notwithstanding  the  objec- 
tions, which  men  may  fancy  they  have,  from  notions  of 
Necessity,  against  there  being  any  such  moral  plan  as 
this  at  all ;  ^  and  whatever  objections  may  appear  to  lie 
against  the  wisdom  and  goodness  of  it,  as  it  stands  so 
imperfectly  made  known  to  us  at  present;**  that  this 
world  being  in  a  state  of  apostasy  and  wickedness,  and 
consequently  of  ruin,  and  the  sense  both  of  their  condi- 
tion and  duty  being  greatly  corrupted  amongst  men,  this 
gave  occasion  for  an  additional  dispensation  of  Provi- 
dence ;  of  the  utmost  importance  ;tt  proved  by  miracles ;++ 

•  Ch,  i.        t  Ch.  ii         ^  Ch.  iii.        J  Ch,  iv.        ||  Ch.  v.        %  Ch.  vi. 
»*  Ch.  vii,  ft  Part  II.  Cii.  i.  U  Ch.  ii. 


/vi 


JNTRODUCTIOV. 


but  containing  in  it  many  tilings  appearing  to  us  strange, 
and  not  to  have  been  expected;  *  a  dispensation  of  Provi- 
dence, which  is  a  scheme  or  system  of  things  ;t  carried 
on  by  the  mediation  of  a  divine  person,  the  Messiah,  in 
order  to  the  recovery  of  the  world ;  t  yet  not  revealed 
to  all  men,  nor  proved  with  the  strongest  possible  evi- 
dence to  all  those  to  whom  it  is  revealed ;  but  only  to 
such  a  part  of  mankind,  and  with  such  particular  evi- 
dence, as  the  wisdom  of  God  thought  fit.  §  The  design 
then  of  the  following  Treatise  will  be  to  show,  that  the 
several  parts  principally  objected  against  in  this  moral 
and  Christian  dispensation,  including  its  scheme,  its  publi- 
cation, and  the  proof  which  God  has  affordedus  of  its  truth; 
that  the  particular  parts  principally  objected  against  in  this 
whole  dispensation,  are  analogous  to  what  is  experienced 
in  the  constitution  and  course  of  Nature,  or  Providence  ; 
that  the  chief  objections  themselves  which  are  alleged 
against  the  former,  are  no  other  than  what  may  be  alleged 
with  like  justness  against  the  latter,  where  they  are  found 
in  fact  to  be  inconclusive  ;  and  that  this  argument  from 
analogy  is  in  general  unanswerable,  and  undoubtedly  of 
weight  on  the  side  of  religion, II  notwithstanding  the 
abjections  which  may  seem  to  lie  against  it,  and  the  real 
ground  which  there  may  be  for  difference  of  opinion,  as 
to  the  particular  degree  of  weight  which  is  to  be  laid 
upon  it.  This  is  a  general  account  of  what  may  be 
looked  for  in  the  following  Treatise.  And  I  shall  begin  it 
with  that  which  is  the  foundation  of  all  our  hopes  and 
of  all  our  fears ;  all  our  hopes  and  fears,  which  are  of 
anv  consideration ;  I  mean  a  Future  Life. 

*  rh.  liL  ^^  Ch.  iv.        J:  f 'U.  v.  €  Ck  vj.  ra.  H  Ch.  wL 


THE 


ANALOGY  OF  RELIGION. 


PART  1. 
OF  NATURAL   RELIGION. 


CHAP.  I. 
OF  A  FUTURE  LIFE. 


Strange  difficulties  have  been  raised  by  some  concern- 
ing personal  identity,  or  the  sameness  of  living  agents, 
implied  in  the  notion  of  our  existing  now  and  hereafter,  or 
in  anv  two  successive  moments:  which  whoever  thinks  it 
worth  while,  may  see  considered  in  the  first  Dissertation 
at  the  end  of  this  Treatise.  But  without  regard  to  any 
of  them  here,  let  us  consider  wlmtjlie^  analogy  of  nature, 
and  the  several  changes  which  we  have  undergone,  and 
those  which  we  know  we  riiay  undergo  without  being 
destroyed,  suggest,  as  to  the  effect  which  death  may^^or 
may  not,  have  upon  us;  and  whether  it  be  not  from 
thence  probable,  that  we  may  survive  this  change,  and 
exist  in  a  future  state  of  life  and  perception. 

I.  From  our  being  born  into  the  present  world  in  the 
helpless  imperfect  state  of  infancy,  and  having  arrived 
from  thence  to  mature  age,  we  find  it  to  be  a  general  law 
of  nature  in  our  own  species,  that  the  same  creatures,  the 
same  individuals,  should  exist  in  degrees  of  life  and  per- 
ception, with  capacities  of  action,  of  enjoyment  and  suffer- 
ing, in  one  period  of  their  being,  greatly  different  from 
those  appointed  them  in  another  period  of  it.  And  in 
other  creatures  the  same  law  holds.  For  the  difference  of 
tt'eir  capacities  and  states  of  life  at  their  birth  (to  go  no 
lii<laer)andin  maturity;  the  change  of  worms  into  flies,  and 
the  vast  enlargement  of  their  locomotive  powers  by  such 


i 


58  %     OF  A  FUTURE  LIFE.  [Tart  L 

change :  and  birds  and  insects  bursting  the  shell  of  their 
habitation,  and  by  this  means  entering  into  a  new  world, 
furnished  with  new  accommodations  for  them,  and  finding 
a  new  sphere  of  action  assigned  them ;  these  are  instances 
of  this  general  law  of  nature.  Thus  all  the  various  and 
wonderful  transformations  of  animals  are  to  be  taken  into 
consideration  here.  But  the  states  of  life  in  which  we 
ourselves  existed  formerly  in  the  womb  and  in  our  infancy, 
are  almost  as  different  from  our  present  in  mature  age,  as 
it  is  possible  to  conceive  any  two  states  or  degrees  of  hfe  r 
can  be.  [^Therefore  that  we  are  to  exist  hereafter,  in  a! 

\  state  as  different  (suppose)  from  our  present,  as  this  is 
from  our  former,  is  but  according  to  the  analogy  of  na- 
ture ;  according  to  a  natural  order  or  appointment  of  the, 
very  same  kind,  with  what  we  have  already  experienced! ) 

II.  We  know  we  are  endued  with  capacities  of  action, 
of  happiness  and  misery:  for  we  are  conscious  of  acting,  of 
enjoying  pleasure  and  suffering  pain.  Now  that  we  have 
these  powers  and  capacities  before  death,  is  a  presumption 
that  we  shall  retain  them  through  and  after  death;  indeed  a 
probability  of  it  abundantly  sufficient  to  act  upon,  unless 
there  be  some  positive  reason  to  think  that  death  is  the 
destruction  of  those  living  powers:  because  there  is  in 

bevery  case  a  probability,  that  all  things  will  continue  as 
we  experience  they  are,  in  all  respects,  except  those  in 

(which  we  have  some  reason  to  think  they  will  be  altered. 

I  This  is  that  kind*  of  presumption  or  probabiUty  from  ana- 
logy, expressed  in  the  very  word  continuance,  which  seems 
our  only  natural  reason  for  believing  the  course  of  the  world 
will  continue  to-morrow,  as  it  has  done  so  far  as  our  expe- 
rience or  knowledge  of  history  can  carry  us  back.  Nay 
it  seems  our  only  reason  for  believing,  that  any  one  sub- 
stance now  existmgwill  continue  to  exist  a  moment  longer ; 
the  self-existent  substance  only  excepted.  Thus  if  men 
were  assured  that  the  unknown  event,  death,  was  not  the 
destruction  of  our  faculties  of  perception  and  of  action, 
there  would  be  no  apprehension,  that  any  other  power  oi 
event,  unconnected  with  this  of  death,  would  destroy  these 

*  I  sny  yt?wrf  of  presumption  cr  probability  ;  for  1  do  not  mean  to  affirm  that  there 
is  the  same  degree  of  conviction,  that  our  living  powers  will  continue  after  dtatli,  as 
there  is,  that  our  substances  will. 


Chap.  L]  OF  A  FUTURE  LIFE.  59 

faculties  just  at  the  instant  of  each  creature's  death;  and 
therefore  no  doubt  but  that  they  would  remain  after  it ; 
which  shows  the  high  probability  that  our  living  powers 
v.ill  continue  after  death,  unless  there  be  some  ground  to 
think  that  death  is  their  destruction.*     For,  if  it  would  be 
in  a  manner  certain  that  we  should  survive  death,  pro- 
vided it  were  certain  that  death  would  not  be  our  destruc- 
tion, it  must  be  highly  probable  we  shall  survive  it,  if  there 
be  no  ground  to  think  death  will  be  our  destruction. 
'^Np\y,  though  I  think  it  must  be  acknowledged,  that 
prior  to  the  natural  and  moral  proofs  of  a  future  life 
commonly  insisted   upon,  there  would  arise  a  general 
confused  susfiicion.  that  in  the  great  shock^nd  alteration 
which  we  shall  undergo  by  death,  we,  i.  e.  our  living    ^ 
powers,  might  be  wholly  jdestroyed  ;V  yet^  ?j^n  prior  to 
those  proofs,\|there_is  really jiojparticular  distinct  ground 
or  reason  for  this~^^pprehehsioii  at  all^so  Tar  as  I  can" 
findr    Tf  there  be,  it  must  arise  either  from  the  reason 
\of  the  tll^jjH)  or  h'oni  the  analogy  of  nature. 
h  .    But  we  cannot  argue  from  the  reason  of  the  thing,  that 
/death  is  the  destruction  of  living   agents,  because  we.rlJ 
lkjiow_not_at3lJLjd^  but  only  some 

fof  its  effects,  such  as  the^dissolution  of  flesh,  skin,  and 
bones.  And  these  effects  do  in  no  wise  appear  to  imply 
the  destruction  of  a  living  agent.  And  besides,  as  we  f'-rj  > 
are  greatly  in  the  dark,  upon  what  the  exercise  of  our 
living  powers  depends,  so  we  are  wholly  ignorant  what 
the  powers  themselves  depend  upon;/;the  powers  them- 
selves as  distinguished,  not  only  from  their  actual  exer- 
cise, but  also  from  the  present  capacity  of  exercising 
them ;  and  as  opposed  to  their  destruction :  for  sleep, 
or  however  a  swoon,  shows  us,  not  only  that  these 
powers  exist  when  they  are  not  exercised,  as  the  passive 
power  of  motion  does  in  inanimate  matter ;  but  shows 

*  Destruction  of  living  powers,  is  a  manner  of  expression  unavoidably  ambiguous; 
and  may  signify  either  the  destruction  of  a  living  being,  so  as  that  the  same  living 
being  shall  be  uncupable  of  ever  perceiving  or  of/inff  ugain  at  all ;  or  the  destriiction  of 
those  means  and  instruments  by  which  it  is  vapuoto  of  its  present  life,  of  its  present 
state  of  perception  and  of  action.  It  is  here  used  in  the  former  sense.  When  it  is 
used  in  tlie  latter,  the  epithet  present  is  added.  The  loss  of  a  man's  eye  is  a  destnio- 
tion  of  livinjT  powers  in  the  latter  sense.  But  we  have  no  reason  to  think  the  de- 
struction of  living  powers,  in  the  former  sense,  to  be  possible.  We  liave  no  more 
reason  to  think  a  being  endtied  with  living  powers,  ever  loses  them  during  its  whole 
CKistence,  than  to  believe  that  a  stone  ever  acquires  them. 


60  OF  A  FUTURE  LIFE.  |-p.iHT.  I. 

also  that  tuey  exist,  when  there  is  no  present  capacity 
of  exercising  them  :  or  that  the  capacities  of  exercising 
them  for  the  present,  as  well  as  the  actual  exercise  of 
them,  maybe  suspended,  and  yet  the  powers  themselves 
remain  undestroyed.  ))  Since  then  we  know  not  at  all 
kipon  what  the  existence  of  our  living  powers  depends, 
this  shows  farther,  there  can  no  probability  be  collected 
from  the  reason  of  the  thing,  that  death  will  be  their 
destruction :  because  their  existence  may  depend  upon 
somewhat  in  no  degree  affected  by  death  f/  upon  some- 
what quite  out  of  the  reach  of  this  king  of  terrors.  So 
that  there  is  nothing  more  certain,  than  that  the  reason 
of  the  thing  shows  us  no  connexion  between  death 
^  and  the  destruction  of  living  agents.  Nor  can  we  find 
any  thing  throughout  the  whole  analogy,  of  nature,  to 
afford  us  even  the  slightest  presumption,  that  animals 
ever  lose  their  living  powers;  much  less  if  it  were  pos- 
sible, that  they  lose  them  by  death :  for  we  have  no 
faculties  wherewith  to  trace  any  beyond  or  through  it, 
so  as  to  see  what  becomes  of  them.  This  event  removes 
them  from  our  view. /(  It  destroys  the  sensible  proof, 
I  which  we  had  before  their  death,  of  their  being  possessed 
/  of  living  powers,  but  does  not  appear  to  afford  the  least 
reason  to  believe  that  they  are,  then,  or  by  that  event, 
\  deprived  of  them^i] 

And  our  knowing,  that  they  w^ere  possessed  of  these 
powers,  up  to  the  very  period  to  which  we  have  faculties 
capable  of  tracing  them,  is  itself  a  probability  of  their 
retaining  them  beyond  it.  And  this  is  confirmed,  and  a 
sensible  credibility  is  given  to  it,  by  observing  the  very 
great  and  astonishing  changes  wliich  Ave  have  experi- 
enced; so  great,  that  our  existence  in  another  state  of 
hfe,  of  perception  and  of  action,  will  be  but  according 
to  a  method  of  providential  conduct,  the  like  to  which 
has  been  already  exercised  even  with  regard  to  our- 
selves ;  according  to  a  course  of  nature,  the  like  to  whicb 
we  have  already  gone  through. 

However,  as  one  cannot  but  be  greatly  sensible,  how 
difficult  it  is  to  silence  imagination  enough  to  make  the 
voice  of  reason  even  distinctly  heard  in  this  case ;  as  we 
are  accustomed,  from  our  youth  up,  to  indulge  that  for- 


Chap.  I.]  OF  A  FUTURE  LIFE.  61 

ward,  delusive  faculty,  ever  obtruding  beyond  its  sphere  ; 
of  some  assistance  indeed  to  apprehension,  but  the 
author  of  all  error:  as  we  plainly  lose  ourselves  in  gross 
and  crude  conceptions  of  things,  taking  for  granted  that 
we  are  acquainted  with  what  indeed  we  are  wholly 
ignorant  of:  it  may  be  proper  to  consider  the  imaginary 
presumptions,  that  death  will  be  our  destruction,  arising 
from  these^kinds  of  early^and  lastmgprejudices ;  and  to 
show  how  little  they  can  really  amount  to,  even  though 
we  cannot  wholly  divest  ourselves  of  them.     And, 

I,  All  presumption  of  death's  being  the  destruction 
of  living  beings,  must  go  upon  supposition  that  they  are 
compounded;  and  so,  discerptible.  VBut  since  conscious- 

(ness  is  a  single  and  indivisible  power,  it  should  seem 
that  the  subject  in.  which  it  resides  must  be  so  too.K  For 
were  the  motion  of  any  particle  of  matter  absolutely  one 
and  indivisible,  so  as  that  it  should  imply  a  contradiction 
to  suppose  part  of  this  motion  to  exist,  and  part  not  to 
exist,  i.  e.  part  of  this  matter  to  move,  and  part  to  be  at 
rest ;  then  its  power  of  motion  would  be  indivisible ; 
and  so  also  would  the  subject  in  which  the  power  inheres, 
namely,  the  particle  of  m.atter:  for  if  this  could  be  de- 
vided  into  two,  one  part  might  be  moved  and  the  other 
at  rest,  which  is  contrary  to  the  supposition.  In  like 
manner  it  has  been  argued,*  and,  for  any  thing  appear- 
ing to  the  contrary,  justly,  that  since  the  perception  or 
consciousness,  which  we  have  of  our  own  existence,  is 
indivisible,  so  as  th?>.t  it  is  a  contradiction  to  suppose 
one  part  of  it  should  be  here  and  the  other  there;  the 
perceptive  power,  or  the  power  of  consciousness,  is  in- 
divisible too:  and  consequently  the  subject  in  which  it 
^resides;  i.  e.  the  conscious  Being.  //Now  upon  supposi- 
tion that  living  agent  each  man  calls  himself,  is  thus  a 
single  being,  which  there  is  at  least  no  more  difficulty 
in  conceiving  than  in  conceiving  it  to  be  a  compound, 
and  of  which  there  is  the  proof  now  mentioned ;  it  fol- 
lows, that  our  organized  bodies  are  no  more  ourselves 
or  part  of  ourselves,  than  any  other  matter  around  us.  ^ 
And  it  is  as  easy  to  conceive,  how  matter,  which  is  no 
part  of  ourselves,  may  be  appropriated  to  us  in  the 

*  See  Dr  Clarke's  Letter  to  Mr  Dodwell,  and  the  defences  of  iU 


62  OF  A  FUTURE  LIFE.  L^art  I. 

manner  which  our  present  bodies  are ;  as  how  we  can 
receive  impressions  from,  and  have  power  over,  any 
matter.  It  is  as  easy  to  conceive,  that  we  may  exist 
out  of  bodies,  as  in  them ;  that  we  might  have  animated 
bodies  of  any  other  organs  and  senses  wholly  different 
from  these  now  given  us,  and  that  we  may  hereafter 
animate  these  same  or  new  bodies  variously  modified 
and  organized;  as  to  conceive  how  we  can  animate  such 
bodies  as  our  present.  And  lastly,  the  dissolution  of 
all  these  several  organized  bodies,  supposing  ourselves 
to  have  successively  animated  them,  would  have  no 
more  conceivable  tendency  to  destroy  the  living  beings 
ourselves,  or  deprive  us  of  living  faculties,  the  faculties 
of  perception  and  of  action,  than  the  dissolution  of  any 
foreign  matter,  which  we  are  capable  of  receiving  im- 
pressions from,  and  making  use  of,  for  the  common 
occasions  of  life. 

II.  The  simplicity  and  absolute  oneness  of  a  living 
agent  cannot  indeed,  from  the  nature  of  the  thing,  be 
properly  proved  by  experimental  observations.  But 
as  these  fall  in  with  the  supposition  of  its  unity,  so  they 
plainly  lead  us  to  conclude  certainly,  that  our  gross 
organized  bodies,  with  which  we  perceive  the  objects  of 
sense,  and  with  which  we  act,  are  no  part  of  ourselves ; 
and  therefore  show  us,  that  we  have  no  reason  to  believe 
their  destruction  to  be  ours:  even  without  determining 
whether  our  living  substances  be  material  or  immaterial. 
For  we  see  by  experience,  that  men  may  lose  their 
limbs,  their  organs  of  sense,  and  even  the  greatest  part 
of  these  bodies,  and  yet  remain  the  same  living  agents. 
And  persons  can  trace  up  the  existence  of  themselves 
to  a  time,  when  the  bulk  of  their  bodies  was  extremely 
small,  in  comparison  of  what  it  is  in  mature  age:  and 
we  cannot  but  think,  that  they  might  then  have  lost  a 
considerable  part  of  that  small  body,  and  yet  have  re- 
mained the  same  living  agents;  as  they  may  now  lose 
great  part  of  their  present  body,  and  remain  so.  '/And/ 
it  is  certain,  that  the  bodies  of  all  animals  are  in  a  con-  ^ 
stant  flux,  from  that  never-ceasing  attrition,  which  there 
is  in  every  part  of  them.  Now  things  of  this  kind  un-  \ 
avoidably  teach  us  to  distinguish,  between  these  living  '' 


Chap.  1.3  OF  A  FUTURE  LIFE.  63 

\  agents  ourselves,  and  large  quantities  of  matter,  in 
which  we  are  very  nearly  interested:  since  these  may 
be  alienated,  and  actually  are  in  a  daily  course  of  suc- 
cession, and  changing  their  owners ;  whilst  we  are 
assured,  that  each  living  agent  remains  one  and  the  same 
permanent  being.  *}J  And  this  general  observation  leads 
us  on  to  the  following  ones. 

Firstj  That  we  have  no  way  of  determining  by  ex- 
perience, what  is  the  certain  bulk  of  the  living  being 
each  man  calls  himself  7  and  yet,  till  it  be  determined 
that  it  is  larger  in  bulk  than  the  solid  elementary  parti- 
cles of  matter,  which  there  is  no  ground  to  think  any 
natural  power  can  dissolve,  there  is  no  sort  of  reason  to 
think  death  to  be  the  dissolution  of  it^^of  the  living  being, 
even  though  it  should  not  be  absolutely  indiscerptible. 

Secondly,  From  our  being  so  nearly  related  to  and 
interested  in  certain  systems  of  matter,  suppose  our 
flesh  and  bones,  and  afterwards  ceasing  to  be  at  all  re- 
lated to  them,  the  living  agents  ourselves  remaining  all 
this  while  undestroyed  notwithstanding  such  alienation  ; 
and  consequently  these  systems  of  matter  not  being 
ourselves  :  it  follows  further,  that  we  have  no  ground 
to  conclude  any  other,  suppose  internal  systems  of 
matter,  to  be  the  living  agents  ourselves  ;  because  we 
Jean  have  no  ground  to  conclude  this,  but  from  our  re- 
lation to  and  interest  in  such  other  systems  of  matter : 
and  therefore  we  can  have  no  reason  to  conclude,  what 
befalls  those  systems  of  matter  at  death,  to  be  the  de- 
struction of  the  living  agents.  We  have  already  several 
times  over  lost  a  great  part  or  perhaps  the  whole  of  our 
body,  according  to  certain  common  established  laws  of 
nature ;  yet  we  remain  the  same  living  agents :  when  j 
we  shall  lose  as  great  a  part,  or  the  whole,  by  another  | 
common  established  law  of  nature,  death ;  why  may  we  I 
not  also  remain  the  same  ?  That  the  alienation  has  * 
been  gradual  in  one  case,  and  in  the  other  will  be  more 
at  once,  does  not  prove  any  thing  to  the  contrary.  We 
have  passed  undestroyed  through  those  many  and  great 
revolutions  of  matter,  so  peculiarly  appropriated  to  us 
ourselves ;    why    should  we   imagine  death  will  be  so 

•  See  Dissertation  I. 


64  OF  A  FUTURE  LIFE.  [Part  I.    ' 

fatal  to  us  ?  Nor  can  it  be  objected,  that  what  is  thus 
aUenated  or  loSt,  is  no  part  of  our  original  solid  body, 
but  only  adventitious  matter ;  because  we  may  lose 
entire  limbs,  which  must  have  contained  many  solid 
parts  and  vessels  of  the  original  body ;  or  if  this  be  not 
admitted,  we  have  no  proof,  that  any  of  these  solid  parts 
are  di^olved  or  alienated  by  death.  Though,  by  the 
way,  we  are  very  nearly  related  to  that  extraneous^  or 
adventitious  matter,  whilst  it  continues  united  to  and 
distending  the  several  parts  of  our  solid  body.  But 
after  all ;  th'^  relation  a  person  bears  to  those  parts  of 
his  body,  to  which  he  is  the  most  nearly  related ;  what 
does  it  appear  to  amount  to  but  this,  that  the  living 
agent,  and  those  parts  of  the  body,  mutually  affect  each 
other?  And  the  same  thing,  the  same  thing  in  kind 
though  not  in  degree,  may  be  said  of  all  foreign  matter, 
which  gives  us  ideas,  and  which  we  have  any  power 
over.  From  these  observations  the  whole  ground  of 
tlie  imagination  is  removed,  that  the  dissolution  of  any 
matter,  is  the  destruction  of  a  living  agent,  from  the 
interest  he  once  had  in  such  matter. 

Thirdly,  Jf  we    consider   our  body  somewhat  more 
distinctly,    as    made   up  of  organs  and  instruments  of 
perception  and  of  motion,  it  will  bring  us  to  the  same 
conclusion.     Thus   the    common    optical    experiments 
show,  and  even  the  observation  how  sight  is  assisted  by 
glasses  shows,  that  w^e  see  with  our  eyes  in  the  same 
sense  as  we  see  with  glasses.     Nor  is  there  any  reason 
to  believe,  that  we  see  with  them  in  any  other  sense  ; 
any  other,  I  mean,  w^hich  would  lead  us  to  think  the 
eye  itself  a  percipient.     The  like  is  to  be  said  of  hearing  • 
and  our  feehng  distant  solid  matter  by  means  of  some- 
wdiat  in  our  hand  seems  an  instance  of  the  like  kind, 
as  to  the  subject  v/e  are  considering.     All  these  are  in- 
stances of  foreign  matter,  or  such  as  is  no  part  of  our 
body,  being  instrumental  in  preparing  objects  for,  and 
conveying  them  to,  the  perceiving  power,  in  a  manner 
similar  or  like  to  the  manner  in  which  our  organs  of 
sense  prepare  and  convey  them.     Both  are  in  a  like 
way  instruments  of  our  receiving  such  ideas  from  ex- 
ternal objects,  as  the  Author  of  nature  appointed  those 


Chap.  I.]  CF  A  FUTURE  LIFE.  G5 

external  objects  to  be  the  occasions  cf  exciting  in  us. 
However,  glasses  are  evidently  instances  of  this  ;  name 
ly  of  matter  which  is  no  part  of  our  body,  preparing 
objects  for  and  conveying  them  towards  the  perceiving 
power,  in  like  manner  as  our  bodily  organs  do.  And 
if  we  see  with  our  eyes  only  in  the  same  manner  as  we 
do  with  glasses,  the  like  may  justly  be  concluded,  from 
analogy,  of  all  our  other  senses.  It  is  not  intended,  by 
any  thing  here  said,  to  affirm,  that  the  whole  apparatus 
of  vision,  or  of  perception  by  any  other  of  our  senses, 
can  be  traced  through  all  its  steps,  quite  up  to  the  living 
power  of  seeing,  or  perceiving :  but  that  so  far  as  it  can 
be  traced  by  experimental  observations,  so  far  it  appears, 
that  our  organs  of  sense  prepare  and  convey  on  objects, 
in  order  to  their  being  perceived,  in  like  manner  as 
foreign  matter  does,  without  affording  any  shadow  of 
appearance,  that  they  themselves  perceive.  And  that 
we  have  no  reason  to  think  our  organs  of  sense  perci- 
pients, is  confirmed  by  instances  of  personsjosing^-some 
ojjhem,  theTivingBemgs  themselves,  their  former  oc- 
cupiers, remaining  unimpaired.  It  is  confirmed  also  by 
the  experience  of  dreams  ;  by  which  we  find  we  are  at 
present  possessed  of  a  latent,  and  what  would  otherwise 
be,  an  unimagined  unknown  power  of  perceiving  sensi- 
ble objects,  in  as  strong  and  lively  a  manner  without  our 
external  organs  of  sense  as  with  them. 

So  also  with  regard  to,  our  power  of  moving,  or  direct- 
ing  motiogJbyLJviil  and  choice  ;  upon  Uie^destruction  of 
ajimb^this  active  power  remains,  as  it  evidently  seems, 
unlessened  ;  so  as  that  the  living  being,  who  has  suffer- 
ed this  loss,  would  be  capable  of  moving  as  before,  if  it 
had  another  limb  to  move  with.  It  can  walk  by  the 
help  of  an  artificial  leg  ;  just  as  it  can  make  use  of  a 
pole  or  a  lever,  to  reach  towards  itself  and  to  move 
things,  beyond  the  length  and  the  power  of  its  natural 
arm;  and  this  last  it  does  in  the  same  manner  as  it 
reaches  and  moves,  with  its  natural  arm,  things  nearer 
and  of  less  weight.  Nor  is  there  so  much  as  any  ap- 
pearance of  oar  limbs  being  endued  with  a  power  of 
moving  or  directing  themselves  ;  though  they  are  adapt- 
ed, hke  the  several  pa:  ti;  o'i  a  machine,  to  be  the  instru- 

E 


66  OF  A  FUTURE  LIFE.  [PAax  I.     , 

merits  of  motion  to  each  other ;  and  some  parts  of  the 
same  hmb,  to  be  instruments  of  motion  to  other  parts 
of  it. 

Thus  a  man  determines,  that  he  will  look  at  such  an 
object  through  a  microscope ;  or  being  lame  suppose, 
that  he  will  walk  to  such  a  place  with  a  staif  a  week 
hence.  His  eyes  and  his  feet  no  more  determine  in 
these  cases,  than  the  microscope  and  the  staff.  Nor  is 
there  any  ground  to  think  they  any  more  put  the  deter- 
mination in  practice  ;  or  that  his  eyes  are  the  seers  or 
his  feet  the  movers,  in  any  other  sense  than  as  the  mi- 
croscope and  the  staff  are.  Upon  the  whole  then,  our 
organs  of  sense  and  our  limbs  are  certainly  instruments, 
which  the  living  persons  ourselves  make  use  of  to  per- 
ceive and  move  with  :  there  is  not  any  probability,  that 
they  are  any  more ;  nor  consequently,  that  we  have  any 
other  kind  of  relation  to  them,  than  what  we  have  to  any 
other  foreign  matter  formed  into  instruments  of  percep- 
tion and  motion,  suppose  into  a  microscope  or  a  staff  (I 
say  any  other  kind  of  relation,  for  I  am  not  speaking  of 
the  degree  of  it)  ;  nor  consequently  is  there  any  proba- 
bilitv,  that  the  alienation  or  dissolution  of  these  instru- 
ments  is  the  destruction  of  the  perceiving  and  moving 
agent. 

And  thus  our  finding,  that  the  dissolution  of  matter, 
in  which  living  beings  were  most  nearly  interested,  is 
not  their  dissolution  ;  and  that  the  destruction  of  several 
of  the  organs  and  instruments  of  perception  and  of  mo- 
tion belonging  to  them,  is  not  their  destruction  ;  shows 
demonstratively,  that  there  is  no  ground  to  think  that 
the  dissohition  of  any  other  matter,  or  destruction  of  any 
other  organs  and  instruments,  will  be  the  dissolution  or 
destruction  of  living  agents,  from  the  like  kind  of  rela- 
tion. And  we  have  no  reason  to  think  we  stand  in  any 
other  kind  of  relation  to  any  tiling  which  we  find 
dissolved  by  death. 

But  it  is  said  these  observations  are  equally  applicable 
to  brutes  :  and  it  is  thought  an  insuperable  difficulty,  that 
they  should  be  immortal,  and  by  consequence  capable  of 
everlasting  happiness.  Now  this  manner  of  expression 
is  both  invidious  and  weak  :  but  the  thing  intended  by 


Chap.  I.]  OF  A  FUTURE  LIFE.  67 

it,  is  really  no  difficulty  at  all,  either  in  clie  way  of  na- 
tural or  moral  consideration.  For  1st,  Suppose  the  in- 
vidious thing,  designed  in  such  a  manner  of  expression, 
"were  really  implied,  as  it  is  not  in  the  least,  in  the  na- 
tural immortality  of  brutes  :  namely,  that  they  must  ar- 
rive at  great  attainments,  and  become  rational  and 
moral  agents;  even  this  would  be  no  difficulty:  since  we 
know  not  what  latent  powers  and  capacities  they  may 
be  endued  with.  There  was  once,  prior  to  experience, 
as  great  presumption  against  human  creatures  as  there 
is  against  the  brute  creatures,  arriving  at  that  degree 
of  understanding,  w^hich  we  have  in  mature  age.  For 
we  can  trace  up  our  own  existence  to  the  same  original 
with  theirs.  And  we  find  it  to  be  a  general  lav/  of  na- 
ture, that  creatures  endued  w^ith  capacities  of  virtue  and 
religion  should  be  placed  in  a  condition  of  being,  in  vrhich 
they  are  altogether  without  the  use  of  them,  for  a  con- 
siderable length  of  their  duration ;  as  m  infancy  and 
childhood.  And  great  part  of  the  human  species  go  out 
of  the  present  world,  before  they  come  to  the  exercise  of 
these  capacities  in  any  degree  at  all.  But  then,  2dly, 
(he  natural  immortality  of  brutes  does  not  in  the  least 
imply,  that  they  are  endued  with  any  latent  capacities  of 
a  rational  or  moral  nature.  And  the  economy  of  the 
imiverse  might  require,  that  there  should  be  living 
creatures  without  any  capacities  of  this  kind.  And  all 
difficulties  as  to  the  manner  how  they  are  to  be  disposed 
of  are  so  apparently  and  wholly  founded  in  our  ignorance, 
that  it  is  wonderful  they  should  be  insisted  upon  by  any, 
but  such  as  are  weak  enough  to  think  they  are  acquainted 
wdth  the  whole  system  of  things.  There  is  then  absolutely 
nothing  at  all  in  this  objection,  which  is  so  rhetorically 
urged,  against  the  greatest  part  of  the  natural  proofs  or 
presumptions  of  the  immortality  of  human  minds  ;  I  say 
the  greatest  part;  for  it  is  less  applicable  to  the  following 
observation,  which  is  more  peculiar  to  mankind: 

III.  That  asjtjs  evident  omy  jjresent  powers  and  ca- 
j^acities  of  reason,  memory,  and^ffection,  do  not  depend 
upon  our  gross  body  in  the  manner  in  which  perception 
^  our  organs  of  sense_doesx^  so  they  do  not  appear  to 
depend  upon  it  at  all  in  any  such  manner,  as  to  give 


E2 


68         V  .  OF  A  FUTURE  LIFE.  [Part  I. 

ground  to  think,  that  the  dissolution  of  this  body  will  be 
the  destruction  of  these  our  present  powers  of  reflection, 
as  it  will  of  our  powers  of  sensation  ;  or  to  give  ground 
to  conclude,  even  that  it  will  be  so  much  as  a  suspension 
of  the  former. 

Human  creatures  exist  at  present  m-twQ_states  oLIiie 
and  perception,  greatly  different  from  each  other;  each 
of  which  has  its  own  peculiar  laws  and  its  own  peculiar 
enjoyments  and  sufferings.     When  any  of  our  senses 
are    affected  or  appetites  gratified  with  the  objects  of 
them,  we  may  be  said  to  exist  or  live  in  a  state  of  sen- 
sation.    When  none  of  our  senses  are  affected  or  ap- 
petites gratified,  and  yet  we  perceive,  and  reason,  and 
act;  we  may  be  said  to  exist  or  live  in  a  state  of  re- 
flection.    Now  it  is  by  no  means  certain,  that  any  thing 
which  is  dissolved  by  death,  is  any  way  necessary  to  the 
living  being  in  this  its  state  of  reflection,  after  ideas  are 
gained.     For,  though,  from  our  present  constitution  and 
condition  of  being,  our  external  organs  of  sense  are  ne- 
cessary for  conveying  in  ideas  to  our  reflecting  powers, 
as  carriages,  and  levers,  and  scaffolds  are  in  architec- 
ture :  yet  when  these  ideas  are  brought  in,  we  are  capa- 
])le  of  reflecting  in  the  most  intense  degree,  and  of  en- 
joying the  greatest  pleasure,   and  feeling  the  greatest 
pain,  by  means  of  that  reflection,  without  any  assistance 
from  our  senses  ;  and  without  any  at  all,  which  we  know 
of,  from  that  body  which  will  be  dissolved  by  death.     It 
does  not  appear  then,  that  the  relation  of  this  gross  body 
to  the  reflecting  being  is,  in  any  degree,  necessary  to 
thinking  ;  to  our  intellectual  enjoyments  or  sufferings : 
nor,  consequently,  that  the  dissolution  or  alienation  of 
the  former  by  death,  will  be  the  destruction  of  those  pre- 
sent powers,  which  render  us  capable  of  this  state  of  re- 
flection.    Further,  there  are  instances  of  mortal  diseases, 
Vliich  do  not  at  all  affect  our  present  intellectual  powers  ; 
and  this  affords  a  presumption,  that  those  diseases  will 
not  destroy  these  present  powers.     Indeed,  from  the  ob- 
servations made  above,  *  it  appears,  that  there  is  no  pre- 
sumption, from  their  mutuaPy  affecting  each  other,  that 
the  dissolution  of  the  body  is  the  destruction  of  the  Uv- 

♦  Pp.  64,65. 


Chap.  I.]  OF  A  FUTURE  LIFE.  69 

ing  agent.  And  b}^  the  same  reasoning,  it  must  appear 
too,  that  there  is  no  presumption,  from  their  mutually 
affecting  each  other,  that  the  dissolution  of  the  body  is 
the  destruction  of  our  present  reflecting  powers  :  but  in- 
stances of  their  not  affecting  each  other,  afford  a  pre- 
sumption of  the  contrary.  Instances  of  mortal  diseases 
not  impairing  our  present  reflecting  powers,  evidently 
turn  our  thoughts  even  from  imagining  such  diseases  to 
be  the  destruction  of  them.  Several  things  indeed 
greatly  affect  all  our  living  powers,  and  at  length  sus- 
pend the  exercise  of  them  ;  as  for  instance  drowsiness, 
increasing  till  it  ends  in  sound  sleep  :  and  from  hence 
we  might  have  imagined  it  would  destroy  them,  till  we 
found  by  experience  the  weakness  of  this  way  of  judg- 
ing. But  in  the  diseases  now  mentioned,  there  is  not 
so  much  as  this  shadow  of  probability,  to  lead  us  to  any 
such  conclusion,  as  to  the  reflecting  powers  which  we 
have  at  present.  For  in  those  diseases,  persons  the 
moment  before  death  appear  to  be  in  the  highest  vigour 
of  hfe.  They  discover  apprehension,  memory,  reason, 
all  entire ;  with  the  utmost  force  of  affection  ;  sense  of  a 
character,  of  shame  and  honour  ;  and  the  highest  mental 
enjoyments  and  sufferings,  even  to  the  last  gasp  :  and 
these  surely  prove  even  greater  vigour  of  life  than  bodily 
strength  does.  Now  what  pretence  is  there  for  think- 
ing, that  a  progressive  disease  when  arrived  to  such  a 
degree,  I  mean  that  degree  which  is  mortal,  v/ill  destroy 
those  powers,  which  were  not  impaired,  which  were  not 
affected  by  it,  during  its  whole  progress  quite  up  to 
that  degree  ?  And  if  death  by  diseases  of  this  kind 
is  not  the  destruction  of  our  present  reflecting  powers, 
it  will  scarce  be  thought  that  death  by  any  other 
means  is. 

It  is  obvious  that  this  general  observation  may  be  car- 
ried on  further:  and  there  appears  so  little  connexion 
between  our  bodily  powers  of  sensation,  and  our  pre- 
sent powers  of  reflection,  that  there  is  no  reason  to  con- 
clude, that  death/  which  destroys  the  former,  does  so 
much  as  suspend  the  exercise  of  the  htter,  or  interrupt 
our  continuing  to  exist  in  the  like  state  of  reflection  which 
we  do  now.     For  suspension  of  reason,  memory,  and 


70  OF  A  FUTURE  LIFE.  [Part  I. 

the  affections  whicli  they  excite,  is  no  part  of  the  idea  of 
death,  nor  is  irnphed  in  our  notion  of  it.  And  our  daily- 
experiencing  these  powers  to  be  exercised,  without  any 
assistance,  that  we  know  of,  from  those  bodies,  which 
will  be  dissolved  by  death ;  and  our  finding  often,  that 
the  exercise  of  them  is  so  lively  to  the  last ;  these  things 
afford  a  sensible  apprehension,  that  death  may  not  per- 
haps be  so  much  as  a  discontinuance  of  the  exercise  oi 
these  powers,  nor  of  the  enjoyments  and  sufferings  which 
it  implies.*  So  that  our  posthumous  life,  whatever  there 
may  be  in  it  additional  to  our  present,  yet  may  not  be 
entirely  beginning  anew ;  but  going  on.  Death  may, 
in  some  sort  and  in  some  respects,  answer  to  our 
birth  ;  which  is  not  a  suspension  of  the  faculties  which 
we  had  before  it,  or  a  total  change  of  the  state  of 
life  in  which  w^e  existed  when  in  the  womb ;  but 
a  continuation  of  both,  with  such  and  such  great  al- 
terations. 

Nay,  for  ought  we  know  of  ourselves,  of  our  present 
life  and  of  death  ;  death  may  immediately,  in  the  natural 
course  of  things,  put  us  into  a  higher  and  more  enlarged 
state  of  life,  as  our  birth  does;t  a  state  in  which  our 
capacities,  and  sphere  of  perception  and  of  action,  may 
be  much  greater  than  at  present.  |  For  as  our  relation 
to  our  external  organs  of  sense,  renders  us  capable  of  ex- 
isjing  in  our  present  state  of  sensation;  so  it  may  be  the 
only  natural  hinderance  to  our  existing,  immediately,  and 
of  course,  in  a  higher  state  of  reflection.^  The  truth  is, 
reason  does  not  at  all  show  us,  in  what  state  death  na- 
turally leaves  us.  But  were  we  sure,  that  it  would  sus- 
pend all  our  perceptive  and  active  powers;  yet  the  sus- 
pension of  a  power  and  the  destruction  of  it,  are  effects 

*  Thi>re  are  tliree  distinct  questions,  rclatine-  to  a  future  life,  here  considered: 
V»''lietiier  dtatli  be  the  destnicLion  of  livini;'  jipeiils  ;  if  noi,,  Whether  it  he  the 
deslrnciion  of  their  present  powers  of  reflection,  fis  it  cert;ui,ly  is  the  destruction  of 
tlit'lr  present  powers  of  sensation  ;  and  if  not,  \\'lu'ther  it  be  tlie  suspension,  or  dis- 
i;ontinui)nce  of  tlie  «'xernise  of  tliese  present  n  i^efJiin"'  pown-s.  Now,  if  there  be  no 
reason  to  believe  tlie  last,  there  will  be,  il  lljat  were  possible,  less  for  the  next,  &lu^ 
less  still  for  th(^  first. 

•j-  This,  according-  to  Strabo,  was  the  opinion  of  the  Brachmans,  vd/lu^uv  /itt  yk^  Sij 

Toy  f/Xv  (y^adt  /3/9V,  ui  c»  u.M.f/,in  xaifiliioiv  tiyar    Tfly   bi  Say«iro»,  ■ji.vty/v  ii(  to>  ivru;  jiiov,   xai 

Tov  tiSa(|K«ya  To^i  (fiXtrntyc^rt-  Lib.  XV.  p.  lOoS,  Ed.  Amst.   1707.    To  which  opinion 
perhaps  Antoninus  may  allude  in  these  words,  u;  »i/y  ^i^i/xinis,  ■rirs  i/^li^uav  i»  <r?g 

yafTfit  cijs  yuvxixi;  irou  t^lX^r,.  o'Jras  LxiSi^'tre'aj,  T»:y  aiomv  ty   ^  to    i^t/;^ajio«  <rou  tov  tii/Tg«S» 
raureu  Itc-T'imTTai.      Lib,  ix.  C,  u.. 


Chap.  1.]  OF  A  FUTURE  LIFE.  71 

SO  totally  different  in  kind,  as  we  experience  from  sleep 
and  a  swoon,  that  we  cannot  in  any  wise  argue  from  one 
to  the  other ;  or  conclude  even  to  the  lowest  degree  of  pro- 
bability, that  the  same  kind  of  force  which  is  sufficient 
to  suspend  our  faculties,  though  it  be  increased  ever  so 
much,  will  be  sufficient  to  destroy  them. 

These  observations  together  may  be  sufficient  to  show, 
how  little  presumption  there  is,  that  death  is  the  destruc- 
tion of  human  creatures.  However,  there  is  the  shadow 
of  an  analogy,  which  may  lead  us  to  imagine  it  is  the 
supposed  likeness^whichis_ observed  betweeiLihe  decay 
of  vegetables,  and  of  living  creatures.  And  this  likeness 
is'lndeed  sufficient  to  afford  the  poets  very  apt  allusions 
to  the  flowers  of  the  field,  in  their  pictures  of  the  frailty 
of  our  present  life.  .Butjn  reason,  the^nalogy  is  so  far 
from  holding,  that  there  appears  no  ground  even  for  the 
companson,_as_to  Jhe^presen^  because  one  of 

the  two  subjecLS^conip^areiLis_jvhplly  void  of  that,  which 
is  the  principal  and  chief  thing  in  the  other,  the  power  of 
perception  and  of  ^ction^  and  which  is  the  only  thing  we 
are  inquiring  about  the  continuance  of  So  that  the  de- 
struction of  a  vegetable,  is  an  event  not  similar  or  analo- 
gous to  the  destruction  of  a  living  agent. 

But  if,  as  was  above  intimated,  leaving  off  the  delusive 
custom  of  substituting  imagination  in  the  room  of  expe- 
rience, we  would  confine  ourselves  to  what  we  do  know 
and  understand ;  if  we  would  argue  only  from  that,  and 
from  that  form  our  expectations  ;  it  would  appear  at  first 
sight,  that  as  no  probability  of  living  beings  ever  ceasing 
to  be  so,  can  be  concluded  from  the  reason  of  the  thino-; 
so  none  can  be  collected  from  the  analogy  of  Nature  ; 
because  we  cannot  trace  any  living  beings  beyond  death. 
But  as  we  are  conscious  that  we  are  endued  with  capaci- 
ties of  perception  and  of  action,  and  are  living  persons ; 
what  we  are  to  go  upon  is,  that  we  shall  continue  so,  till 
we  foresee  some  accident  or  event,  which  will  endanoer 
those  capacities,  or  be  likely  to  destroy  us:  which  death 
does  in  no  wise  appear  to  be. 

And  thus,  when  we  go  out  of  this  world,  we  may 
pass  into  new  scenes,  and  a  new  state  of  hfe  and  action, 
just  as  naturally  as  we  came  into  the  present.     And  this 


72  OF  A  FUTURE   LIFE.  Part  I. 

new  state  may  naturally  be  a  social  one.  And  the  advan- 
tages of  it,  advantages  of  every  kind,  may  naturally  be  be- 
stowed, according  to  some  fixed  general  laws  of  wisdom, 
upon  every  one  in  proportion  to  the  degrees  of  his  virtue. 
And  though  the  advantages  of  that  future  natural  state 
should  not  be  bestowed,  as  these  of  the  present  in  ^ome 
measure  are,  by  the  will  of  the  society;  but  entirely  by 
his  more  immediate  action,  upon  whom  the  whole  frame 
of  nature  depends:  yet  this  distribution  may  be  just  as 
natural,  as  their  being  distributed  here  by  the  instru- 
mentality of  men.  And  indeed,  though  one  were  to  al- 
low any  confused  undetermined  sense,  Avhich  people 
please  to  put  upon  the  word  natural,  it  would  be  a  short- 
ness of  thought  scarce  credible,  to  imagine,  that  no  sys- 
tem or  course  of  things  can  be  so,  but  only  what  we  see 
at  present:*  especially  whilst  the  probability  of  a  future 
.  life,  or  the  natural  immortality  of  the  soul,  is  admitted 
upon  the  evidence  of  reason ;  because  this  is  really  both 
admitting  and  denying  at  once,  a  state  of  being  different 
from  the  present  to  be  natural.  But  the  only  distinct 
meaning  of  that  word  is,  stated,  fixed,  or  settled:  since 
tjwhat  is  natural  as  much  requires  and  presupposes  an 
[intelligent  agent  to  render  it  so,^.  e.  to  effect  it  continual- 
ly, or  at  stated  times;  as  what  is  supernatural  or  miracu- 
lous does  to  effect  it  for  once.  |^.  And  from  hence  it  must 
follow,  that  persons'  notion  of  what  is  natural,  will  be 
enlarged  in  proportion  to  their  greater  knowledge  of  the 
works  of  God,  and  the  dispensations  of  his  Providence. 
Nor  is  there  any  absurdity  in  supposing,  that  there  may 
be  beings  in  the  universe,  whose  capacities,  and  know- 
ledge, and  views,  may  be  so  extensive,  as  that  the  whole 
Christian  dispensation  may  to  them  appear  natural,  i.  e, 
analogous  or  conformable  to  God's  dealings  with  other 
parts  of  his  creation ;  as  natural  as  the  visible  known 
course  of  things  appears  to  us.  For  there  seems  scarce 
any  other  possible  sense  to  be  put  upon  the  word,  but 
that  only  in  which  it  is  here  used ;  similar,  stated,  or  uni- 
form. 

This  credibility  of  a  future  life,  which  has  been  here  in- 
sisted upon,  how  little  soever  it  may  satisfy  our  curiosity, 

*  See  Part  11.  Chap.  ii.  and  Part  II.  Chap.  iv. 


Chap.  I.]  OF  A  FUTURE  LIFE.  7^ 

seems  to  answer  all  the  purposes  of  religion,  in  like 
manner  as  a  demonstrative  proof  would.  Indeed  a  proof, 
even  a  demonstrative  one,  of  a  future  life,  wou^d  not  be 
a  proof  of  religion.  For,  that  we  are  to  Jive  hereafter, 
is  just  as  reconcilable  with  the  scheme  of  atheism,  and 
as  well  to  be  accounted  for  by  it,  as  that  we  are  now  ahve 
is:  and  therefore  nothing  can  be  more  absurd  than  to 
argue  from  that  scheme,  that  there  can  be  no  future  state. 
But  as  rehgion  implies  a  future  state,  any  presumption 
against  such  a  state,  is  a  presumption  against  religion. 
And  the  foregoing  ob^rvations  remove  all  presumptions 
of  that  sort,  and  prove,  to  a  very  considerable  degree  of 
probability,  one  fundamental  doctrine  of  religion;  which, 
if  believed,  would  greatly  open  and  dispose  the  mind 
seriously  to  attend  to  the  general  evidence  of  the  whole. 

CHAP.    II. 

OF  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD  BY  REWARDS  AND  PUNISH- 
MENTS ;  AND  PARTICULARLY  OF  THE  LATTER. 

That  which  makes  the  question  concerning  a  futurs  life 
to  be  of  so  great  importance  to  us,  is  our  capacity  of  hap- 
piness and  misery.  And  that  which  makes  the  consi- 
deration of  it  to  be  of  so  great  importance  to  us,  is  the 
supposition  of  our  happiness  and  misery  hereafter  de- 
pending upon  our  actions  here.  Without  this  indeed, 
curiosity  could  not  but  sometimes  bring  a  subject,  in 
which  we  may  be  so  highly  interested,  to  our  thoughts; 
especially  upon  the  mortality  of  others,  or  the  near  pro- 
spect of  our  own.  But  reasonable  men  would  not  take 
any  further  thought  about  hereafter,  than  what  should 
happen  thus  occasionally  to  rise  in  their  minds,  if  it  were 
certain  that  our  future  interest  no  way  depended  upon 
our  present  behaviour ;  whereas,  on  the  contrary,  if  there 
be  ground,  either  from  analogy  or  any  thing  else,  to  think 
it  does ;  then  there  is  reason  also  for  the  most  active 
thought  and  solicitude,  to  secure  that  interest;  to  behave 
so  as  that  we  may  escape  that  misery,  and  obtain  that 
happiness,  in  another  life,  which  we  not  only  suppose 
ourselves  capable  of,  but  which  we  apprehend  also  is 


74         ~  OP  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD  t^*"  ^ 

put  in  our  own  power.  And  whetlier  there  be  ground 
for  this  last  apprehension,  certainly  would  deserve  to  be 
most  seriously  considered,  were  there  no  other  proof  of 
a  future  life  and  interest,  than  that  presumptive  one, 
which  the  foregoing  observations  amount  to. 

Now  in  the  present  state,  all  which  we  enjoy,  and  a 
great  part  of  what  we  suffer,  is  put  in  our  oion  power. 
For  pleasure  and  pain  are  the  consequences  of  our  ac- 
tions ;  and  we  are  endued  by  the  Author  of  our  nature 
with  capacities  of  foreseeing  these  consequences.  We 
find  by  experience  he  does  not  so  much  as  preserve 
our  lives,  exclusively  of  our  own  care  and  attention,  to 
provide  ourselves  with,  and  to  make  use  of,  that  suste- 
nance, by  which  he  has  appointed  our  lives  shall  be  pre- 
served; and  without  which,  he  has  appointed,  they  shall 
not  be  preserved  at  all.  And  in  general  we  foresee,  that 
the  external  things,  which  are  the  objects  of  our  various 
passions,  can  neither  be  obtained  nor  enjoyed,  without 
exerting  ourselves  in  such  and  such  manners  :  but  by  thus 
exerting  ourselves,  we  obtain  and  enjoy  these  objects,  in 
which  our  natural  good  consists ;  or  by  this  means  God 
gives  us  the  possession  and  enjoyment  of  them.  I  know 
not,  that  we  have  any  one  kind  or  degree  of  enjoyment,  but 
by  the  means  of  our  own  actions.  And  by  prudence  and 
care,  we  may,  for  the  most  part,  pass  our  days  in  tolera- 
ble ease  and  quiet :  or,  on  the  contrary,  we  may,  by  rash- 
ness, ungoverned  passion,  wilfulness,  or  even  by  negli- 
gence, make  ourselves  as  miserable  as  ever  we  please. 
And  many  do  please  to  make  themselves  extremely  mis- 
erable, i.  e.  to  do  what  they  know  beforehand  will  render 
them  so.  They  follow  those  ways,  the  fruit  of  which 
they  know,  by  instruction,  example,  experience,  will  be 
disgrace,  and  poverty,  and  sickness,  and  untimely  death. 
This  every  one  observes  to  be  the  general  course  of 
things  ;  though  it  is  to  be  allowed,  we  cannot  find  by  ex- 
perience, that  all  our  sufferings  are  owing  to  our  own 
follies. 

Why  the  Author  of  Nature  does  not  give  his  crea- 
tures promiscuously  such  and  such  perceptions,  without 
regard  to  their  behaviour ;  why  he  does  not  make  them 
happy  without  the  iriStrimentality  of  their  own  actions, 


"Cbap.  ILl  BY  REWARDS  AND  PUNISHMENTS.  "'  75 

and  prevent  their  bringing  any  sufferings  upon  them- 
selves ;  is  another  matter.  Perhaps  there  may  be  some 
impossibihties  in  the  nature  of  things,  which  we  are  un- 
acquainted with.*  Or  less  happiness,  it  may  be,  would 
upon  the  whole  be  produced  by  such  a  method  of  con- 
duct, than  is  by  the  present.  Or  perhaps  divine  good- 
ness, Avith  which,  if  I  mistake  not,  we  make  very  free  in 
our  speculations,  may  not  be  a  bare  single  disposition  to 
produce  happiness;  but  a  disposition  to  make  the  good, 
the  faithful,  the  honest  man  happy.  Perhaps  an  infi- 
nitely perfect  Mind  may  be  pleased  with  seeing  his 
creatures  behave  suitably  to  the  nature  which  he  has 
given  them ;  to  the  relations  which  he  has  placed  them 
m  to  each  other ;  and  to  that  which  they  stand  in  to 
himself:  that  relation  to  himself,  which,  during  their  ex- 
istence, is  even  necessarv,  and  which  is  the  most  im- 
portant  one  of  all :  perhaps,  I  say,  an  infinitely  perfect 
Mind  may  be  pleased  with  this  moral  piety  of  moral 
agents,  in  and  for  itself;  as  well  as  upon  account  of  its 
being  essentially  conducive  to  the  happiness  of  his  crea- 
tion. Or  the  whole  end,  for  which  God  made,  and  thus 
governs  the  world,  may  be  utterly  beyond  the  reach  of 
our  faculties:  there  may  be  somewhat  in  it  as  impossible 
for  us  to  have  any  conception  of,  as  for  a  blind  man  to 
have  a  conception  of  colours.  But  however  this  be,  it 
is  certain  matter  of  universal  experience,  that  the  gene- 
ral method  of  divine  administration  is,  forewarning  us, 
or  giving  us  capacities  to  foresee,  with  more  or  less  clear- 
ness, that  if  we  act  so  and  so,  we  shall  have  such  enjoy- 
ments, if  so  and  so,  such  sufferings ;  and  giving  us  those 
enjoyments,  and  making  us  feel  those  sufferings,  in  con- 
sequence of  our  actions. 

"  But  all  this  is  to  be  ascribed  to  the  general  course 
of  nature."  True.  This  is  the  very  thing  which  I  am 
observing.  It  is  to  be  ascribed  to  the  general  course  of 
nature :  i.  e.  not  surely  to  the  words  or  ideas,  course  of 
nature ;  but  to  him  who  appointed  it,  and  put  things  into 
it:  or  to  a  course  of  operation,  from  its  uniformity  or 
constancy,  called  natural;!  and  which  necessarily  im- 
plies an  operating  agent.     For  when  men  find  them- 

*  Part  I.  CbajB.  vii.  f  P.  72.  .    „ 


76  OF  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD  fP.viiT.  I. 

selves  necessitated  to  confess  an  Author  of  Nature,  or 
that  God  is  the  natural  governor  of  the  world;  they 
must  not  deny  this  again,  because  his  government  is  uni- 
form ;  they  must  not  deny  that  he  does  things  at  all,  be- 
cause he  does  them  constantly;  because  the  effects  of  his 
acting  are  permanent,  whether  his  acting  be  so  or  not ; 
though  there  is  no  reason  to  think  it  is  not.  In  short, 
every  man,  in  every  thing  he  does,  naturally  acts  upon 
the  forethought  and  apprehension  of  avoiding  evil  or  ob- 
taining good:  and  if  the  natural  course  of  things  be  the 
appointment  of  God,  and  our  natural  faculties  of  know- 
ledge and  experience  are  given  us  by  him;  then  the 
good  and  bad  consequences  which  follow  our  actions, 
are  his  appointment,  and  our  foresight  of  those  conse- 
quences, is  a  warning  given  us  by  him,  how  we  are  to 
act. 

"  Is  the  pleasure  then,  naturally  accompanying  every 
particular  gratification  of  passion,  intended  to  put  us  up- 
on gratifying  ourselves  in  every  such  particular  instance, 
and  as  a  reward  to  us  for  so  doing  .P"  No  certainly. 
Nor  is  it  to  be  said,  that  our  eyes  were  naturally  intend- 
ed to  give  us  the  sight  of  each  particular  object,  to  which 
they  do  or  can  extend;  objects  which  are  destructive  of 
them,  or  which,  for  any  other  reason,  it  may  become  us 
to  turn  our  eyes  from.  Yet  there  is  no  doubt,  but  that 
our  eyes  were  intended  for  us  to  see  with.  So  neither 
is  there  any  doubt,  but  that  the  foreseen  pleasures  and 
pains  belonging  to  tlie  passions,  were  nitended,  in  general, 
to  induce  mankind  to  act  in  such  and  such  manners. 

Now  from  this  general  observation,  obvious  to  every 
one,  that  God  has  given  us  to  understand,  he  has  appoint- 
ed satisfaction  and  delight  to  be  the  consequence  of  our 
acting  in  one  manner,  and  pain  and  uneasiness  of  our 
acting  in  another,  and  of  our  not  acting  at  all ;  and  that 
we  find  the  consequences,  which  we  were  beforehand 
informed  of,  uniformly  to  follow ;  we  may  learn,  that  we 
are  at  present  actually  under  his  government  in  the 
strictest  and  most  proper  sense ;  in  such  a  sense,  as  that 
he  rewards  and  punishes  us  for  our  actions  An  Author 
of  nature  being  supposed,  it  is  not  so  much  a  deduction 
of  reason,  as  a  matter  of  experience,  that  we  are  thus 


chap.h.]         by  rewards  and  punishments.  77 

under  his  government;  under  his  government,  in  the 
same  sense,  as  we  are  under  the  government  of  civil 
magistrates.  Because  the  annexing  pleasure  to  some 
actions,  and  pain  to  others,  in  our  power  to  do  or  for- 
bear, and  giving  notice  of  this  appointment  beforehand 
vO  those  whom  it  concerns;  is  the  proper  formal  notion 
of  government.  Whether  the  pleasure  or  pain  which 
thus  follows  upon  our  behaviour,  be  owing  to  the  Author 
of  Nature's  acting  upon  us  every  moment  which  we  feel 
it;  or  to  his  having  at  once  contrived  and  executed  his 
own  part  in  the  plan  of  the  world;  makes  no  alteration 
as  to  the  matter  before  us.  For  if  civil  magistrates 
could  make  the  sanctions  of  their  laws  take  place,  with- 
out interposing  at  all,  after  they  had  passed  them;  with- 
out a  trial,  and  the  formalities  of  an  execution:  if  they 
were  able  to  make  their  laws  execute  themselves,  or 
every  offender  to  execute  them  upon  himself;  we  should 
be  just  in  the  same  sense  under  their  government  then, 
as  we  are  now;  but  in  a  much  higher  degree,  and  more 
perfect  manner.  Vain  is  the  ridicule,  with  which  one 
foresees  some  persons  will  divert  themselves,  upon  find- 
ing lesser  pains  considered  as  instances  of  divine  pun- 
ishment. There  is  no  possibility  of  answering  or  evad- 
ing the  general  thing  here  intended,  without  denying  all 
final  causes.  For  final  causes  being  admitted,  the  plea- 
sures and  pains  now  mentioned  must  be  admitted  too 
as  instances  of  them.  And  if  they  are;  if  God  annexes 
delight  to  some  actions,  and  uneasiness  to  others,  with 
an  apparent  design  to  induce  us  to  act  so  and  so :  then  he 
not  only  dispenses  happiness  and  misery,  but  also  re- 
wards and  punishes  actions.  If,  for  example,  the  pain 
which  we  feel,  upon  doing  what  tends  to  the  destruction 
of  our  bodies,  suppose  upon  too  near  approaches  to  fire, 
or  upon  wounding  ourselves,  be  appointed  by  the  Author 
of  Nature  to  prevent  our  doing  what  thus  tends  to  our 
destruction;  this  is  altogether  as  much  an  instance  of 
his  punishing  our  actions,  and  consequently  of  our  be- 
ing under  his  government,  as  declaring  by  a  voice  from 
heaven,  that  if  wo  acted  so,  he  would  inflict  such  pain 
upon  us,  and  inflicting  it,  whether  it  be  greater  or  less. 
Thus  we  find,  thr.t  the  true  notion  ci'  c  )nccption  of 


78  OF  THE  GOVIRNMENT  OF  GOD  [Part  I. 

the  Author  of  Nature,  is  that  of  a  master  or  governor, 
prior  to  the  consideration  of  his  moral  attributes.  The 
fact  of  our  case,  which  we  find  by  experience,  is,  that 
he  actually  exercises  dominion  or  government  over  us 
at  present,  by  rewarding  and  punishing  us  for  our  ac- 
tions, in  as  strict  and  proper  a  sense  of  these  words, 
and  even  in  the  same  sense,  as  children,  servants,  sub- 
jects, are  rewarded  and  punished  by  those  who  govern 
them. 

1  And  thus  the  whole  analogy  of  Nature,  the  w^hole  pre- 
sent course  of  things,  most  fully  shows,  that  there  is 
nothing  incredible  in  the  general  doctrine  of  religion, 

i  that  God  will  reward  and  punish  men  for  their  actions 
hereafter:  nothing  incredible,  I  mean,  arising  out  of  the 
notion  of  rewarding  and  punishing.  For  the  whole 
course  of  nature  is  a  present  instance  of  his  exercising 
that  government  over  us,  which  implies  in  it  rewarding 
and  punishing. 

But  as  divine  punishment  is  what  men  chiefly  object 
against,  and  are  most  unwilling  to  allow;  it  may  be  pro- 
per to  mention  some  circumstances  in  the  natural  course 
of  punishments  at  present,  which  are  analogous  to  what 
religion  teaches  us  concerning  a  future  state  of  punish- 
ment; indeed  so  analogous,  that  as  they  add  a  further 
credibility  to  it,  so  they  cannot  but  raise  a  most  serious 
apprehension  of  it  in  those  who  will  attend  to  them. 

It  has  been  now  observed,  that  such  and  such  mise- 
ries naturally  follow  such  and  such  actions  of  imprudence 
and  wilfulness,  as  well  as  actions  more  commonly  and 
more  distinctly  considered  as  vicious;  and  that  these 
consequences,  when  they  may  be  foreseen,  are  properly 
natural  punishments  annexed  to  such  actions.  For  the 
general  thing  here  insisted  upon,  is,  not  that  we  see  a 
great  deal  of  misery  in  the  world,  but  a  great  deal  which 
men  bring  upon  themselves  by  their  own  behaviour, 
which  they  might  have  foreseen  and  avoided.  Now  the 
circumstances  of  these  natural  punishments,  particularly 
deserving  our  attention,  are  such  as  these ;  That  often- 
times they  follow,  or  are  inflicted  in  consequence  of,  ac- 
tions whicli  procure  many  present  advantages,  and  are 


Obat.  II.,  BY  PUNISHMENTS.  79 

accompanied  with  much  present  pleasure ;  for  instance, 
sickness  and  untimely  death  are  the  consequence  of  intem- 
perance, though  accompanied  with  the  highest  mirth  and 
joIUty:  that  these  punishments  are  often  much  greater, 
than  the  advantages  or  pleasures  obtained  by  the  actions, 
of  which  they  are  the  punishments   or   consequences : 
that  though  we  may  imagine  a  constitution  of  nature,  in 
which  these  natural  punishments,  which  are  in  fact  to 
follow,  would  follow,  immediately  upon  such  actions  be- 
ing done,  or  very  soon  after  ;  we  find  on  the  contrary  in 
our  world,  that  they  are   often  delayed  a  great  while, 
sometimes   even  till  long  after  the  actions  occasioning 
them  are  forgot ;  so  that  the  constitution  of  nature  is  such, 
that  delay  of  punishment  is  no  sort  nor  degree  of  pre- 
sumption of  final  impunity:  that  after  such  delay,  these 
natural  punishments  or  miseries  often  come,  not  by  de- 
grees, but  suddenly,  with  violence,  and  at  once ;  however, 
the  chief  misery  often  does:  that  as  certainty  of  such  dis- 
tant misery  following  such  actions,  is  never  afforded  per- 
sons ;  so  perhaps  during  the  actions,  they  have  seldom  a 
distinct, full  expectation  of  its  following:*  and  many  times 
the  case  is  only  thus,  that  they  see  in  general,  or  may  see, 
the  credibility,  that   intemperance,  suppose,  will  bring 
after  it  diseases ;  civil  crimes,  civil  punishments ;  when  yet 
the  real  probability  often  is,  that  they  shall  escape;  but 
things  notwithstanding  take  their  destined  course,  and 
the  misery  inevitably  follows  at  its  appointed  time,  in  very 
many  of  these  cases.     Thus  also  though  youth  may  be  al- 
leged as  an  excuse  for  rashness  and  folly,  as  being  na- 
turally thoughtless,  and  not  clearly  foreseeing  all  the  con- 
sequences of  being  untractable  and  profligate ;  this  does 
not  hinder,  but  that  these  consequences  follow;  and  are 
grievously  felt,  throughout  the  whole  course  of  mature 
life.     Habits  contracted  even  in  that  age,  are  often  utter 
ruin:  and  men's  success  in  the  world,  not  only  in  the 
common  sense  of  worldly  success,  but  their  real  happi- 
ness and  misery,  depends,  in  a  great  degree,  and  in  va- 
rious ways,  upon  the  manner  in  which  they  pass  their 
youth ;  which  consequences  they  for  the  most  part  ne- 

*  See  Fart  IT.  Cliap.  vi. 


80  OF  THE  GOTERNMENTOF  GOD  [PartT* 

gleet  to  consider,  and  perhaps  seldom  can  properly  be 
said  to  believe,  beforehand.  It  requires  also  to  be  men- 
tioned, that,  in  numberless  cases,  the  natural  course  of 
things  affords  us  opportunities  for  procuring  advantages 
to  ourselves  at  certain  times,  which  we  cannot  procure 
when  we  will;  nor  ever  recall  the  opportunities,  if  we 
have  neglected  them.  Indeed  the  general  course  of  na- 
ture is  an  example  of  this.  If,  during  the  opportunity  ol 
youth,  persons  are  indocile  and  self-willed;  they  inevita- 
bly suffer  in  their  future  life,  for  want  of  those  acquire- 
ments, which  they  neglected  the  natural  season  of  attain- 
ing. If  the  husbandman  lets  his  seedtime  pass  without 
sowing,  the  whole  year  is  lost  to  him  beyond  recovery. 
In  like  manner,  though  after  men  have  been  guilty  of 
folly  and  extravagance  up  to  a  certain  degree,  it  is  often  in 
their  power,  for  instance,  to  retrieve  their  affairs,  to  recov- 
er their  health  and  character;  at  least  in  good  measure; 
yet  real  reformation  is  in  many  cases,  of  no  avail  at  all  to- 
wards preventing  the  miseries,  poverty,  sickness,  in- 
famy, naturally  annexed  to  folly  and  extravagance  exceed- 
ing t/icd  degree.  There  is  a  certain  bound  to  imprudence  / 
and  misbehaviour,  which  being  transgressed,  there  re-  I 
mains  no  place  for  repentance  in  the  natural  course  of 
things.  It  is  further  very  much  to  be  remarked,  that 
neglects  from  inconsiderateness,  want  of  attention,*  not 
looking  about  us  to  see  what  we  have  to  do,  are  often  at- 
tended with  consequences  altogether  as  dreadful,  as  any 
active  misbehaviour,  from  the  most  extravagant  passion. 
And  lastly,  civil  government  being  natural,  the  punish- 
ments of  it  are  so  too :  and  some  of  these  punishments 
are  capital ;  as  the  effects  of  a  dissolute  course  of  pleasure 
are  often  mortal.  So  that  many  natural  punishments  are 
final  t  to  him  who  incurs  them,  if  considered  only  in  his 

*  Part  n.  Clmp.  vi. 

f  Thr  jjenpml  consideration  of  a  future  stnte  of  punishment,  most  evklently  he- 
louas  lo  Llie  sulijcct  of  natural  Rrligion.  But  if  any  of  tliese  reflections  should  be 
tlioiir.lit  lo  rclaie  more  peculiarly  to  tl'is  doctrine,  as  tnuj^ht  in  Scripture  ;  the  r<  ad- 
rr  is  desired  to  observe,  that  Gentile  wriur.s,  boih  morahsis  and  poets,  speak  of  ihe 
fuure  punislinient  of  the  wiektd,  boih  as  to  tlie  duniiion  and  decree  of  it,  in  a  Ike 
•iianniT  of  exi'ression  an(i  of  descrii'tion,  as  tlie  Scripture  does.  So  that  all  which 
can  positively  l)e  ysseried  lo  l)e  n\iilu  r  of  iiit  re  Revelaiit'u,  wilh  reji'ard  io  this  <ii  c- 
'.riiie,  seems  to  be,  that  tin-  {jrcaL  <lis  incli(Mi  between  tlir  rijihtecus  and  the  wickfd, 
shall  bu  made  at  the  end  of  this  world ;  ihat  e-icli  shall  (Aen  receive  according  to  hs 


Chap.  II.]  BY  PUNISHMENTS.  81 

temporal  capacity:  and  seem  inflicted  by  natural  ap- 
pointment,  either  to  remove  the  offender  out  of  the  way 
of  being  further  mischievous  ;  or  as  an  example,  though 
frequently  a  disregarded  one,  to  those  who  are  left  be- 
hind. 

These  things  are  not  what  we  call  accidental,  or  to 
be  met  with  only  now  and  then ;  but  they  are  things  of 
every  day's  experience:  they  proceed  from  general  laws, 
very   general  ones,  by  which  God  governs  the  world, 
in    the    natural    course   of  his   providence.    And   they 
are  so  analogous,  to  what  Religion  teaches  us  concern- 
ing the  future  punishment  of  the  wicked,  so  much  of 
a  piece  with  it,  that  both  would  naturally  be  expressed  in 
the  very  same  words,  and  manner  of  description.     In 
the  book  of  Proverbs,*  for  instance.  Wisdom  is  intro- 
duced, as  frequenting  the  most  public  places  of  resort,  and 
as  rejected  when  she  offers  herself  as  the  natural  appoint- 
ed guide  of  human  life.     How  long,  speaking  to  those  who 
are  passing  through  it,  how  long,  ye  simple  o-ne^,  will  ye  love 
folly,  and  the  scorners  delight  in  their  scorning,  and  Jooi^ 
hate  knowledge  ?     Turn  ye  at  my  reproof.     Behotd,  I  will 
four  out  my  spirit  upon  you,  I  will  make  known  my  icord.-^ 
unto  you.     But  upon  being  neglected,   Because  I  have 
called,  and  ye  refused,  I  have  stretched  out  my  hand,  and 
710  man  i^egarded  ;  but  ye  have  set  at  nought  all  my  counsel, 
and  would  none  of  my  reproof :  I  also  tcill  laugh  at  your 
calamity,  I  will  mock  ichen  your  jear  cometh  ;  when  your 
fear  cometh  as  desolation,  and  your  destruction  cometh  as  a 
whirlwind ;  when  distress  and  anguish  cometh  upon  you. 
Then  shall  they  call  upon  me,  hut  I  will  not  ansiver  ;  theg 
shall  seek  me  early,  hut  they  shall  not  find  me.     This  pas- 
sage, every  one  sees,  is  poetical,  and  some  parts  of  it  are 
highly  figurative ;  but  their  meaning  is    obvious.     And 

dpserts.  Rpason  did,  as  it  well  mij^ht,  conclude  that  it  slioiild,  finally  and  upon  tl.e 
wholi',  be  well  wiiii  the  righteous,  and  ill  with  the  wicked :  but  it  could  liot 
he -deterrniiied  upon  any  principles  of  reason,  whetli<:r  human  creatures  might  net 
\fwe  been  appointed  to  pass  through  other  states  of  life  and  being,  before  tliat  distri- 
l)utive  justice  siiould  finally  and  effectually  tiike  place.  Revelation  teaches  us,  tli;;t 
t'le  next  state  of  things  alter  the  present  is  appointed  for  tlie  execution  of  this  justice  ; 
(hat  it  shall  be  no  longer  delayed  ;  but  the  ivyatery  of  God,  the  great  mystery  of  liis 
suffering  vice  and  confusion  to  ]irv\-d'A.  shall  then  be  Jinishcd ;  and  he  will  take  to  him 
hit  great  power  and  will  re!£n  by  rendering  to  every  one  according  to  his  works. 

*  Chap.  i. 
F 


82  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD  BY  PUNISHMENTS.  [PartL 

the  thing  intended  is  expressed  more  literally  in  the  fol- 
lowing words;  For  that  they  hated  knowledge,  and  did  not 

choose  the  fear  of  the  Lord therefore  shall  they  eat  of 

the  fruit  of  their  own  loay,  and  he  filled  with  their  own  de- 
vices. For  the  security  of  the  simple  shall  slay  them,  and 
the  prosperity  of  fools  shall  destroy  them.  And  the  whole 
passage  is  so  equally  applicable  to  what  we  experience 
in  the  present  world,  concerning  the  consequences  of 
men's  actions^  and  to  what  Religion  teaches  us  is  to  be 
expected  in  another,  that  it  may  be  questioned  which  of 
the  two  was  principally  intended. 

Indeed  when  one  has  been  recollecting  the  proper 
proofs  of  a  future  state  of  rewards  and  punishments,  no- 
thing methinks  can  give  one  so  sensible  an  apprehen- 
sion of  the  latter,  or  representation  of  it  to  the  mind;  as 
observing,  that  after  the  many  disregarded  checks,  ad- 
monitions, and  warnings,  which  people  meet  with  in  the 
ways  of  vice  and  folly  and  extravagance :  warnings  from 
their  very  nature;  from  the  examples  of  others;  from  the 
lesser  inconveniences  W'hich  they  bring  upon  themselves ; 
from  the  instructions  of  wise  and  virtuous  men:  after 
these  have  been  long  despised,  scorned,  ridiculed:  after 
the  chief  bad  consequences,  temporal  consequences,  of 
their  follies,  have  been  delayed  for  a  great  while;  at 
length  they  break  in  irresistibly,  like  an  armed  force:  re- 
pentance is  too  late  to  relieve,  and  can  serve  only  to  ag- 
gravate their  distress,  the  case  is  become  desperate:  and 
poverty  and  sickness,  remorse  and  anguish,  infamy  and 
death,  the  effects  of  their  own  doings,  overwhelm  them 
beyond  possibility  of  remedy  or  escape.  This  is  an 
account  of  what  is  in  fact  the  general  constitution  of  na- 
ture. 

It  is  not  in  any  sort  meant,  that,  according  to  what  ap- 
pears at  present  of  the  natural  course  of  things,  men  are 
always  uniformly  punished  in  proportion  to  their  misbe- 
haviour: but  that  there  are  very  many  instances  of  mis- 
behaviour punished  in  the  several  ways  now  mentioned, 
and  very  dreadful  instances  too;  sufficient  to  show  what 
the  laws  of  the  universe  may  admit;  and,  if  thoroughly 
considered,  sufficient  fully  to  answer  all  objections  against 
the  credibility  of  a  future  st?.te  of  punishments,  from  any 


Chi?,  hi.]  OF  THE  MORAL  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.  83 

imaginations,  that  the  frailty  of  our  nature  and  external 
temptations,  almost  annihilate  the  guilt  of  human  vices: 
as  well  as  objections  of  another  sort;  from  necessity; 
from  suppositions,  that  the  will  of  an  infinite  Being  can- 
not be  contradicted;  or  that  he  must  be  incapable  of  of- 
fence and  provocation.* 

Reflections  of  this  kind  are  not  v/ithout  their  terrors 
to  serious  persons,  the  most  free  from  enthusiasm,  and 
of  the  greatest  strength  of  mind;  but  it  is  fit  things  be 
stated  and  considered  as  they  really  are.  And  there  is, 
in  the  present  age,  a  certain  fearlessness,  with  regard  to 
what  may  be  hereafter  under  the  government  of  God, 
which  nothing  but  an  universally  acknowledged  demon- 
stration on  the  side  of  atheism  can  justify;  and  which 
makes  it  quite  necessary,  that  men  be  reminded,  and  if 
possible  made  to  feel,  "that  there  is  no  sort  of  ground  for 
being  thus  presumptuous,  even  upon  the  most  sceptical 
principles.  For,  may  it  not  be  said  of  any  person  upon 
his  being  born  into  the  world,  he  may  behave  so,  as  to 
be  of  no  service  to  it,  but  by  being  made  an  example  of 
the  woeful  effects  of  vice  and  folly  P  That  he  may,  as 
any  one  may,  if  he  will,  incur  an  infamous  execution, 
from  the  hands  of  civil  iustice;  or  in  some  other  course 
of  extravagance  shorten  his  days;  or  bring  upon  himself 
infamy  and  diseases  worse  than  death  .f'  So  that  it  had 
been  better  for  him,  even  with  regard  to  the  present 
world,  that  he  had  never  been  born.  And  is  there  any 
pretence  of  reason,  for  people  to  think  themselves  secure, 
and  talk  as  if  they  had  certain  proof,  tha4;,  let  them  act  as 
licentiously  as  they  will,  there  can  be  nothing  analo- 
gous to  this,  with  regard  to  a  future  and  more  general  in- 
terest, under  the  providence  and  government  of  the  same 
God.P 

CHAP.  III. 

OF  THE  MORAL  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD. 

As   the  manifold  appearances  of  design  and  of  final 
causes,  in  the  constitution  of  the  world,  prove  it  to  be  the 

*  See  Chap.  iv.  and  vi. 
F  2 


84  OF  THE  MORAL  [Part  I. 

work  of  an  intelligent  Mind ;  so  the  particular  final 
causes  of  pleasure  and  pain  distributed  amongst  his  crea- 
tures, prove  that  they  are  under  his  government ;  what 
may  be  called  his  natural  government  of  creatures  endued 
with  sense  and  reason.  This,  however,  implies  somewhat 
more  than  seems  usually  attended  to,  when  we  speak  of 
God's  natural  government  of  the  world.  It  implies 
government  of  the  very  same  kind  with  that  which  a 
master  exercises  over  his  servants,  or  a  civil  magistrate 
over  his  subjects.  These  latter  instances  of  final  causes, 
as  really  prove  an  intelhgent  Governor  of  the  world,  in 
the  sense  now  mentioned,  and  before*  distinctly  treated 
of;  as  any  other  instances  of  final  causes  prove  an 
intelligent  Maker  of  it. 

But  this  alone  does  not  appear  at  first  sight  to  de- 
termine any  thing  certainly,  concerning  the  moral  cha- 
racter of  the  Author  of  Nature,  considered  in  this  relation 
of  governor ;  does  not  ascertain  his  government  to  be 
moral,  or  prove  that  he  is  the  righteous  judge  of  the  world. 
JNIoral  governm.ent  consists,  not  barely  in  rewarding  and 
punishing  men  for  their  actions,  which  the  most  tyranni- 
cal person  may  do  :  but  in  rewarding  the  righteous,  and 
punishing  the  wicked :  in  rendering  to  men  according 
to  their  actions,  considered  as  good  or  evil.  And  the 
perfection  of  moral  government  consists  in  doing  this, 
Avith  regard  to  all  intelligent  creatures,  in  an  exact 
proportion  to  their  personal  merits  or  demerits. 

Some  men  seem  to  think  the  only  character  of  the 
Author  of  Nature  to  be  that  of  simple  absolute  benevo- 
lence. This,  considered  as  a  principle  of  action  and 
infinite  in  degree,  is  a  disposition  to  produce  the  greatest 
possible  happiness,  without  regard  to  persons'  behaviour, 
otherwise  than  as  such  regard  would  produce  higher  de- 
grees of  it.  And  supposing  this  to  be  the  only  character 
of  God,  veracity  and  justice  in  him  would  be  nothing 
but  benevolence  conducted  bv  wisdom.  Now  surelv  this 
ought  not  to  be  asserted,  unless  it  can  be  proved  ;  for  we 
should  speak  with  cautious  reverence  upon  such  a  subject. 
And  whether  it  can  be  proved  or  no,  is  not  the  thins 
tiere  to  be  inquired  into  ;  but  whether  in  the  constitution 

*  Chap.  ii. 


Chap.  III.]  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.  85 

and  conduct  of  the  world,  a  righteous  government  be 
not  discernibly  planned  out:  which  necessarily  mipiies  a  . 
righteous  governor.  There  may  possibly  be  in  the  crea- 
tion beings,  to  whom  the  Author  of  Nature  manifests 
himself  under  this  most  amiable  of  all  characters,  this 
of  infinite  absolute  benevolence;  for  it  is  the  most  ami- 
able, supposing  it  not,  as  perhaps  it  is  not,  incompatible 
with  justice;  but  he  manifests  himself  to  us  under  the 
character  of  a  righteous  governor.  He  may,  consistently 
with  this,  be  simply  and  absolutely  benevolent,  in  the 
sense  now  explained:  but  he  is  (for  he  has  given  us  a 
proof  in  the  constitution  and  conduct  of  the  world  that  he 
is)  a  governor  over  servants,  as  he  rewards  and  punishes 
us  for  our  actions.  And  in  the  constitution  and  conduct 
of  it,  he  may  also  have  given,  besides  the  reason  of  the 
thing,  and  the  natural  presciges  of  conscience,  clear  and 
distinct  intimations,  that  his  government  is  righteous  or 
moral:  clear  to  such  as  think  the  nature  of  it  deserving 
their  attention ;  and  yet  not  to  every  careless  person,  Avho 
casts  a  transient  reflection  upon  the  subject.* 

But  it  is  particularly  to  be  observed,  that  the  divine 
government,  which  we  experience  ourselves  under  in  the 
present  state,  taken  alone,  is  allowed  not  to  be  the  perfec- 
tion of  moral  government  And  yet  this  by  no  means 
hinders,  but  that  there  may  be  somewhat,  be  it  more  or 
less,  truly  moral  in  it.  A  righteous  government  may 
plainly  appear  to  be  carried  on  to  some  degree:  enough 
to  give  us  the  apprehension  that  it  shall  be  completed,  or 
carried  on  to  that  degree  of  perfection  which  religion 
teaches  us  it  shall;  but  which  cannot  appear,  till  much 
more  of  the  divine  administration  be  seen,  than  can  in  th^ 
present  life.  And  the  design  of  this  Chapter  is  to  inquire 
how  far  this  is  the  case :  how  far,  over  and  above  the  moral 
nature t  which  God  has  given  us,  and  our  natural  notion 

*  The  objections  against  religion,  from  the  evidence  of  it  not  being  universal,  nor 
go  strong  as  niiglit  possibly  have  been,  may  be  urged  against  natural  religion,  as  well 
as  against  revealed.  And  tlierefore  the  consideration  of  them  belongs  to  the  firsC 
fjart  of  this  Treatise,  as  well  as  tiie  second.  But  as  these  objections  are  chiefly  urgul 
against  revealetl  religion,  I  choose  to  consider  them  in  the  second  part.  And  the 
answer  to  them  tliere,  Cii.  vi.,as  urged  against  Christianity,  being  almost  equally 
applicable  to  then>  as  urged  iigainst  the  Religion  of  Nature;  to  avoid  repetition,  the 
reader  is  referred  lo  tliat  chapter. 

f  Dissertation  II. 


86  OF  THE  MORAL  [Part  1. 

of  liim  as  righteous  governor  of  those  his  creatures,  to 
whom  he  has  given  this  nature  ;*  I  say  how  far  besides 
this,  the  principles  and  beginnings  of  a  moral  government 
over  the  world  may  be  discerned,  notwithstanding  and 
amidst  all  the  confusion  and  disorder  of  it. 

Now  one  might  mention  here,  what  has  been  often 
urged  with  great  force,  that,  in  general,  less  uneasiness 
and  more  satisfaction,  are  the  natural  consequences!  of 
a  virtuous  than  of  a  vicious  course  of  life,  in  the  present 
state,  as  an  instance  of  a  moral  government  established 
in  nature ;  an  instance  of  it  collected  from  experience 
and  present  matter  of  fact.  But  it  must  be  owned  a 
thing  of  difficulty  to  weigh  and  balance  pleasures  and 
uneasinesses,  each  amongst  themselves,  and  also  against 
each  other,  so  as  to  make  an  estimate  with  any  exactness, 
of  the  overplus  of  happiness  on  the  side  of  virtue.  And  it 
is  not  impossible,  that,  amidst  the  infinite  disorders  of 
the  world,  there  may  be  exceptions  to  the  happiness  of 
virtue ;  even  with  regard  to  those  persons,  whose  course 
of  life  from  their  youth  up  has  been  blameless:  and 
more  with  regard  to  those  who  have  gone  on  for  some 
time  in  the  ways  of  vice,  and  have  afterwards  reformed. 
For  suppose  an  instance  of  the  latter  case  ;  a  person  with 
his  passions  inflamed,  his  natural  faculty  of  self-govern- 
ment impaired  by  habits  of  indulgence,  and  with  all  his 
vices  about  him,  like  so  many  harpies,  craving  for  their 
accustomed  gratification  :  who  can  say  how  long  it  might 
be,  before  such  a  person  would  find  more  satisfaction 
in  the  reasonableness  and  present  good  consequences 
of  virtue,  than  difficulties  and  self-denial  in  the  restraints 
of  it?  Experience  also  shows,  that  men  can  to  a  great 
degree,  get  over  their  sense  of  shame,  so  as  that  by  pro- 
fessing themselves  to  be  without  principle,  and  avow- 
ing even  direct  villany,  they  can  support  themselves 
against  the  infamy  of  it.  But  as  the  ill  actions  of  any 
one  will  probably  be  more  talked  of,  and  oftener  thrown 
in  his  way,  upon  his  reformation ;  so  the  infamy  of  them 
will  be  much  more  felt,  after  the  natural  sense  of  virtue 
and  of  honour  is  recovered.     Uneasinesses  of  this  kind 

*  Chap.  vi. 
f  See  Lord  SIiaftes>bury's  Ir.quiry  conconrlng  Virtue,  Part  II. 


Chap.  III.]  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.  87 

ought  indeed  to  be  Dut  to  the  account  of  former  vices :  yet  it 
will  be  said  they  are  in  part  the  consequences  of  reforma- 
tion. Still  I  am  far  from  allowing  it  doubtful,  whether 
virtue,  upon  the  whole,  be  happier  than  vice  in  the  pre- 
sent world.  But  if  it  were,  yet  the  beginnings  of  a 
righteous  administration  may,  beyond  all  question,  be 
found  in  nature,  if  we  will  attentively  inquire  after  them. 
"And, 

I.  In  whatever  manner  the  notion  of  God's  moral 
government  over  the  world  might  be  treated,  if  it  did 
not  appear,  whether  he  were  in  a  proper  sense  our 
governor  at  all;  yet  when  it  is  certain  matter  of  experience, 
that  he  does  manifest  himself  to  us  under  the  character  of 
a  governor  in  the  sense  explained  ;*  it  must  deserve  to 
be  considered,  whether  there  be  not  reason  to  apprehend, 
that  he  may  be  a  righteous  or  moral  governor.  Since 
it  appears  to  be  fact,  that  God  does  govern  mankind 
by  the  method  of  rewards  and  punishments,  according 
to  some  settled  rules  of  distribution;  it  is  surely  a  question 
to  be  asked,  what  presumption  is  there  against  his  fi- 
nally rewarding  and  punishing  them  according  to  this 
particular  rule,  namely,  as  they  act  reasonably,  or  un- 
reasonably, virtuously  or  viciously?  since  rendering  men 
happy  or  miserable  by  this  rule,  certainly  falls  in,  much 
more  falls  in,  with  our  natural  apprehensions  and  sense  of 
things,  than  doing  so  by  any  other  rule  whatever ;  since 
rewarding  and  punishing  actions  by  any  other  rule,  would 
appear  much  harder  to  be  accounted  for,  by  minds  formed 
as  he  has  formed  ours.  Be  the  evidence  of  religion  then 
more  or  less  clear,  the  expectation  which  it  raises  in  us, 
that  the  righteous  shall,  upon  the  whole,  be  happy,  and 
the  wicked  miserable,  cannot  however  possibly  be  con- 
sidered as  absurd  or  chimerical ;  because  it  is  no  more 
than  an  expectation,  that  a  method  of  government  already 
begun,  shall  be  carried  on,  the  method  of  rewarding  and 
punishing  actions;  and  shall  be  carried  on  by  a  par- 
ticular rule,  which  unavoidably  appears  to  us  at  first 
sight  more  natural  than  any  other,  the  rule  which  we 
call  distributive  justice.     Nor, 

II.  Ought  it  to  be  entirely  passed  over,  that  tranquilhty 

*  Chap.  ii. 


88  ■ OF  THE  MORAL  [Part  I. 

satisfaction,  and  external  advantages,  being  the  natural 
consequences  of  prudent  management  of  ourselves,  and 
our  affairs;  and  rashness,  profligate  negligence,  and  wil- 
ful folly,  bringing  after  them  many  inconveniences  and 
sufferings ;  these  afford  instances  of  a  right  constitution  of 
nature:  as  the  correction  of  children,  for  their  own  sakes, 
and  by  way  of  example,  when  they  run  into  danger  or 
hurt  themselves,  is  a  part  of  right  education  ?  And  thus, 
that  God  governs  the  world  by  general  fixed  laws,  that 
he  has  endued  us  with  capacities  of  reflecting  upon  this 
constitution  of  things,  and  foreseeing  the  good  and  bad 
consequences  of  our  behaviour;  plainly  implies  some  sort 
of  moral  government;  since  from  such  a  constitution  of 
things  it  cannot  but  follow,  that  prudence  and  impru- 
dence, which  are  of  the  nature  of  virtue  and  vice,*  must 
be,  as  they  are,  respectively  rewarded  and  punished. 

III.  From  the  natural  course  of  things,  vicious  actions 
are,  to  a  great  degree,  actually  punished  as  mischievous 
to  society;  and  besides  punishment  actually  inflicted  upon 
this  account,  there  is  also  the  fear  and  apprehension  of 
it  in  those  persons,  whose  crimes  have  rendered  them 
obnoxious  to  it,  in  case  of  a  discovery ;  this  state  of  fear 
being  itself  often  a  very  considerable  punishment.  The 
natural  fear  and  apprehension  of  it  too,  which  restrains 
from  such  crimes,  is  a  declaration  of  nature  against  them. 
It  is  necessary  to  the  very  being  of  society,  that  vices, 
destructive  of  it,  should  be  punished  as  being  so;  the  vices 
of  falsehood,  injustice,  cruelty :  which  punishment  there- 
fore is  as  natural  as  society;  and  so  is  an  instance  of  a 
kind  of  moral  government,  naturally  established,  and  ac- 
tually taking  place.  And,  since  the  certain  natural  course 
of  things  is  the  conduct  of  Providence  or  the  government 
of  God,  though  carried  on  by  the  instrumentality  of  men; 
the  observation  here  made  amounts  to  this,  that  mankind 
find  themselves  placed  by  him  in  such  circumstances, 
as  that  they  are  unavoidably  accountable  for  their  beha- 
viour, and  are  often  punished,  and  sometimes  rewarded, 
under  his  government,  in  the  view  of  their  being  mis- 
chievous, or  eminently  beneficial  to  society. 

If  it  be  objected  that  good  actions  and  such  as  are  bene- 

*  Stt  Dibstrt..  II. 


Chap,  III.]  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.  89 

ficial  to  society,  are  often  punished,  as  in  the  case  of  per- 
secution and  in  other  cases ;  and  that  ill  and  mischievous 
actions  are  often  rewarded:  it  may  be  answered  dis- 
tinctly ;  first,  that  this  is  in  no  sort  necessary,  and  conse- 
quently not  natural,  in  the  sense  in  which  it  is  necessary, 
and  therefore  natural,  that  ill  or  mischievous  actions 
should  be  punished:  and  in  the  next  place,  that  good 
actions  are  never  punished,  considered  as  beneficial  to 
society,  nor  ill  actions  rewarded,  under  the  view  of  their 
being  hurtful  to  it.  So  that  it  stands  good,  without  any 
thing  on  the  side  of  vice  to  be  set  over  against  it,  that 
the  Author  of  Nature  has  as  truly  directed,  that  vicious 
actions,  considered  as  mischievous  to  society,  should  be 
punished,  and  put  mankind  under  a  necessity  of  thus 
punishing  them;  as  he  has  directed  and  necessitated  us 
to  preserve  our  lives  by  food. 

IV.  In  the  natural  course  of  things,  virtue  as  such  is 
actually  rewarded,  and  vice  as  such  punished:  which 
seems  to  afford  an  instance  or  example,  not  only  of 
government,  but  of  moral  government  begun  and  esta- 
bhshed;  moral  in  the  strictest  sense;  though  not  in  that 
perfection  of  decree,  which  religion  teaches  us  to  expect. 
In  order  to  see  this  more  clearly,  we  must  distinguish 
between  actions  themselves,  and  that  quality  ascribed  to 
them,  which  we  call  virtuous  or  vicious.  The  gratifica- 
tion itself  of  every  natural  passion,  must  be  attended 
with  deiigiit:  and  acquisitions  of  fortune,  however  made, 
are  acquisitions  of  the  means  or  materials  of  enjoyment. 
An  action  then,  by  which  any  natural  passion  is  gratified 
or  fortune  acquired,  procures  delight  or  advantage;  ab- 
stracted from  all  consideration  of  the  morality  of  such 
action.  Consequently,  the  pleasure  or  advantage  in  this 
case,  is  gained  by  the  action  itself,  not  by  the  morality, 
the  virtuousness  or  viciousness  of  it ;  though  it  be,  per- 
haps, virtuous  or  vicious.  Thus,  to  say  such  an  action  or 
course  of  behaviour,  procured  such  pleasure  or  advan- 
tage, or  brought  on  such  inconvenience  and  pain,  is  quite 
a  different  thing  from  saying,  that  such  good  or  bad 
effect  was  owing  to  the  virtue  or  vice  of  such  action  or 
behaviour.  In  one  case,  an  action  abstracted  from  all 
moral  consideration,  produced  its  effect:  in  the  other  case, 


90  OF  THE  MORAL  [Part  I. 

for  it  will  appear  that  there  are  such  cases,  the  morality 
of  the  action  under  a  moral  consideration,  i.  e.  the  vir- 
tuousness  or  viciousness  of  it,  produced  the  effect.  Now 
I  say  virtue  as  such,  naturally  procures  considerable  ad- 
vantages to  the  virtuous,  and  vice  as  such,  naturally  oc- 
casions great  inconvenience  and  even  misery  to  the 
vicious,  in  very  many  instances.  The  immediate  effects 
of  virtue  and  vice  upon  the  mind  and  temper,  are  to 
be  mentioned  as  instances  of  it.  Vice  as  such  is  na- 
turally attended  with  some  sort  of  uneasiness,  and,  not 
uncommonly,  with  great  disturbance  and  apprehension. 
That  inward  feeling,  which,  respecting  lesser  matters, 
and  in  familiar  speech,  we  call  being  vexed  with  oneself, 
and  in  matters  of  importance  and  in  more  serious  lan- 
guage, remorse;  is  an  uneasiness  naturally  arising  from 
an  action  of  a  man's  own,  reflected  upon  by  himself  as 
wrong,  unreasonable,  faulty,  i.  e.  vicious  in  greater  or 
less  degrees:  and  this  manifestly  is  a  different  feeling 
from  that  uneasiness,  which  arises  from  a  sense  of  mere 
loss  or  harm.     What  is  more  common,  than  to  hear  a 

man  lamenting  an  accident  or  event,  and  adding but 

however  he  lias  the  satisfaction  that  he  cannot  blame  him- 
self for  it;  or  on  the  contrary,  that  he  has  the  uneasiness 
of  being  sensible  it  was  his  own  doing?  Thus  also  the 
disturbance  and  fear,  which  often  follow  upon  a  man's 
having  done  an  injury,  arise  from  a  sense  of  his  being 
blame-worthy ;  otherwise  there  would,  in  many  cases,  be 
no  ground  of  disturbance,  nor  any  reason  to  fear  resent- 
ment or  shame.  On  the  other  hand,  inward  security  and 
peace,  and  a  mind  open  to  the  several  gratifications  of 
life,  are  the  natural  attendants  of  innocence  and  virtue. 
To  which  must  be  added  the  complacency,  satisfaction, 
and  even  joy  of  heart,  which  accompany  the  exercise, 
the  real  exercise  of  gratitude,  friendship,  benevolence. 

And  here,  I  think,  ought  to  be  mentioned,  the  fears  oi 
future  punishment,  and  peaceful  hopes  of  a  better  life,  in 
those  who  fully  believe,  or  have  any  serious  apprehension 
of  religion:  because  these  hopes  and  fears  are  present  un- 
easiness and  satisfaction  to  the  mind  ;  and  cannot  be  got 
rid  of  by  great  part  of  the  world,  even  by  men  who  have 
thought  most  thoroughly  upon  that  subject  of  religion. 


Chap.  III.]  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.  91 

And  no  one  can  say,  how  consideralble  tliis  uneasiness 
and  satisfaction  may  be,  or  what  upon  the  whole  it  may 
amount  to. 

In  the  next  place  comes  in  the  consideration,  that  all 
honest  and  good  men  are  disposed  to  befriend  honest 
good  men  as  such,  and  to  discountenance  the  vicious  as 
such,  and  do  so  in  some  degree ;  indeed  in  a  considera- 
ble degree:  from  which  favour  and  discouragement  can- 
not but  arise  considerable  advantage  and  inconvenience. 
And  though  the  generality  of  the  world  have  little  regard 
to  the  morality  of  their  own  actions,  and  may  be  sup- 
posed to  have  less  to  that  of  others,  when  they  them- 
selves are  not  concerned ;  yet  let  any  one  be  known  to 
be  a  man  of  virtue,  some  how  or  other  he  will  be  favour- 
ed and  good  offices  will  be  done  him,  from  regard  to  his 
character,  without  remote  views,  occasionally,  and  in 
some  low  degree,  I  think,  by  the  generality  of  the  world, 
as  it  happens  to  come  in  their  way.  Public  honours  too 
and  advantages  are  the  natural  consequences,  are  some- 
times at  least  the  consequences  in  fact,  of  virtuous  ac- 
tions; of  eminent  justice,  fidehty,  charity,  love  to  our 
country,  considered  in  the  view  of  being  virtuous.  And 
sometimes  even  death  itself,  often  infamy  and  external  in- 
conveniences, are  the  public  consequences  of  vice  as  vice. 
For  instance,  the  sense  which  mankind  have  of  tyranny, 
injustice,  oppression,  additional  to  the  mere  feeling  or 
fear  of  misery,  has  doubtless  been  instrumental  in  bring- 
ing about  revolutions,  which  make  a  figure  even  in  the 
history  of  the  world.  For  it  is  plain,  men  resent  inju- 
ries as  implying  faultiness,  and  retaliate,  not  merely  under 
the  notion  of  having  received  harm,  but  of  having  re- 
ceived wrong;  and  they  have  this  resentment  in  behalf 
of  others,  as  well  as  of  themselves.  So  likewise  even 
the  generality  are,  in  some  degree,  grateful  and  disposed 
to  return  good  offices,  not  merely  because  such  a  one 
has  been  the  occasion  of  good  to  thehi,  but  under  the 
view,  that  such  good  offices  implied  kind  intention  and 
good  desert  in  the  doer.  To  all  this  may  be  added  two 
or  three  particular  things,  which  many  persons  will  think 
frivolous;  but  to  me  nothing  appears  so,  which  at  all 
comes  in  towards  determining  a  question  of  such  import- 


92  OF  THE  MORAL  [Pari  I. 

ance,  as,  whether  there  be,  or  be  not,  a  moral  institution 
of  government,  in  the  strictest  sense  moral,  visibly  esta- 
blished and  begun  in  nature.  The  particular  tilings  are 
these:  That  in  domestic  government,  which  is  doubtless 
natural,  children  and  others  also  are  very  generally  pun- 
ished for  falsehood  and  injustice  and  ill-behaviour,  as 
such,  and  rewarded  for  the  contrary:  which  are  instances 
where  veracity  and  justice  and  right  behaviour,  as  such, 
are  naturally  enforced  by  rewards  and  punishments,  whe- 
ther more  or  less  considerable  in  degree:  that,  though 
civil  government  be  supposed  to  take  cognizance  of  ac- 
tions in  no  other  view  than  as  prejudicial  to  society,  with- 
out respe(*t  to  the  immorality  of  them  ;  yet  as  such  ac- 
tions are  immoral,  so  the  sense  which  men  have  of  the 
immorality  of  them,  very  greatly  contributes,  in  different 
ways,  to  bring  offenders  to  justice:  and  that  entire  ab- 
sence of  all  crime  and  guilt  in  the  moral  sense,  when 
plainly  appearing,  Vvill  almost  of  course  procure,  and  cir- 
cumstances of  aggravated  guilt  prevent,  a  remission  of 
the  penalties  annexed  to  civil  crimes,  in  many  cases, 
though  by  no  means  in  all. 

Upon  the  whole  then,  besides  the  good  and  bad  effects 
of  virtue  and  vice  upon  men's  own  m.inds,  the  course  of 
the  world  does,  in  some  measure,  turn  upon  the  appro- 
bation and  disapprobation  of  them  as  such  in  others. 
The  sense  of  well  and  ill  doing,  the  presages  of  con- 
science, the  love  of  good  characters  and  dislike  of  bad 
ones,  honour,  shame,  resentment,  gratitude;  all  these, 
considered  in  themselves,  and  in  their  effects,  do  afford 
manifest  real  instances  of  virtue  as  such  naturally  fa- 
voured, and  of  vice  as  such  discountenanced,  more  or 
less,  in  the  daily  course  of  human  life ;  in  every  age,  in 
every  relation,  in  every  general  circumstance  of  it. 
That  God  has  given  us  a  moral  nature,*  may  most  justly 
be  urged  as  a  proof  of  our  being  under  his  moral  go- 
vernment: but  that  he  has  placed  us  in  a  condition,  which 
gives  this  nature,  as  one  may  speak,  scope  to  operate,  and 
in  which  it  does  unavoidably  operate;  i.  e.  influence  man- 
kind to  act,  so  as  thus  to  favour  and  reward  virtue,  and 
discountenan«fe  and  punish  vice ;  this  is  not  the  same,  but 

*See  Dissert.  II. 


Chap.  III.]  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.  93 

a  further,  additional  proof  of  his  moral  governinent:  for 
it  is  an  instance  of  it.  The  first  is  a  proof,  that  he  will 
finally  favour  and  support  virtue  eii'ectually:  the  second 
is  an  example  of  his  favouring  and  supporting  it  at  pre- 
sent, in  some  degree. 

If  a  more  distinct  inquiry  be  made,  whence  it  arises, 
that  virtue  as  such  is  often  rewarded,  and  vice  as  such 
is  punished,  and  this  rule  never  inverted:  it  will  be 
found  to  proceed,  in  part,  immediately  from  the  moral 
nature  itself,  which  God  has  given  us;  and  also  in  part, 
from  his  having  given  us,  together  with  this  nature,  so 
great  a  power  over  each  other's  happiness  and  misery. 
For,  first,  it  is  certain,  that  peace  and  delight,  in  some 
degree  and  upon  some  occasions,  is  the  necessary  and 
present  effect  of  virtuous  practice;  an  effect  arising 
immediately  from  that  constitution  of  our  nature.  We 
are  so  made,  that  well-doing  as  such  gives  us  satisfaction, 
at  least,  in  some  instances  ;  ill-doing  as  such,  in  none. 
And,  secondly,  from  our  moral  nature,  joined  with  God's 
having  put  our  happiness  and  misery  in  many  respects 
in  each  other's  power,  it  cannot  but  be,  that  vice  as  such, 
some  kinds  and  instances  of  it  at  least,  will  be  infamous, 
and  men  will  be  disposed  to  punish  it  as  in  itself  detest- 
able; and  the  villain  v/ill  by  no  mtans  be  able  always  to 
avoid  feeling  that  infam.y,  any  more  than  he  will  be  able 
to  escape  this  further  punishment,  which  mankind  will 
be  disposed  to  inflict  upon  him,  under  the  notion  of  his 
deserving  it.  But  tliere  can  be  nothing  on  the  side  of 
vice,  to  answer  this  ;  because  there  is  nothing  in  the  hu- 
man mind  contradictory,  as  the  logicians  speak,  to  vir- 
tue. For  virtue  consists  in  a  regard  to  what  is  right 
and  reasonable,  as  being  so  ;  in  a  regard  to  veracity,  jus- 
tice, charity,  in  themselves:  and  there  is  surely  no  such 
tiling,  as  a  like  natural  regard  to  falsehood,  injustice, 
cruelty.  If  it  be  thought,  that  there  are  instances  of  an 
approbation  of  vice,  as  such,  in  itself,  and  for  its  own 
sake  (though  it  does  not  appear  to  me,  that  there  is  any 
such  thing  at  all;  but  supposing  there  be).,  it  is  evident- 
ly monstrous:  as  much  so,  as  the  most  acknowledged 
perversion  of  any  passion  whatever.  Such  instances  of 
perversion  then  being  left  out,  as  merely  im.aginary,  or, 


94  OF  THE  MORAL  •  [Part  i. 

however,  unnatural;  it  must  follow,  from  the  frame  of  our 
nature,  and  from  our  condition,  in  the  respects  now  de- 
scribed, that  vice  cannot  at  all  be,  and  virtue  cannot  but 
be,  favoured  as  such  by  others,  upon  some  occasions, 
and  happy  in  itself,  in  some  degree.  For  what  is  here 
insisted  upon,  is  not  the  degree  in  which  virtue  and  vice 
are  thus  distinguished,  but  only  the  thing  itself,  that 
they  are  so  in  some  degree;  though  the  whole  good  and 
bad  effect  of  virtue  and  vice  as  such,  is  not  inconsidera- 
ble in  degree.  But  that  they  must  be  thus  distinguished 
in  some  degree,  is  in  a  manner  necessary:  it  is  matter  of 
fact  of  daily  experience,  even  in  the  greatest  confusion 
of  human  affairs.  >^  < 

It  is  not  pretended  but  that,  in  the  natural  course  of 
things,  happiness  and  misery  appear  to  be  distributed  by 
other  rules,  than  only  the  personal  merit  and  demerit  of 
characters.  They  may  sometimes  be  distributed  by  way 
of  mere  discipline.  There  may  be  the  wisest  and  best 
reasons,  why  the  world  should  be  governed  by  general 
laws,  from  whence  such  promiscuous  distribution  perhaps 
must  follow;  and  also  why  our  happiness  and  misery 
should  be  put  in  each  other's  power,  in  the  degree  which 
they  are.  And  these  things,  as  in  general  they  contri- 
bute to  the  rewarding  virtue  and  punishing  vice,  as  such  : 
so  they  often  contribute  also,  not  to  the  inversion  of  this, 
which  is  impossible;  but  to  the  rendering  persons  pros- 
perous, though  wicked ;  afflicted,  though  righteous ;  and, 
which  is  worse,  to  the  r'cwarding  some  actions,  though  vi- 
cious, and  punishwg  other  actions,  though  virtuous.  But 
all  this  cannot  drown  the  voice  of  Nature  in  the  conduct 
of  Providence,  plainly  declaring  itself  for  virtue,  by  way 
of  distinction  from  vice,  and  preference  to  it.  For  our 
being  so  constituted  as  that  virtue  and  vice  are  thus  na- 
turally favoured  and  discountenanced,  rewarded  and  pun- 
ished, respectively  as  such,  is  an  intuitive  proof  of  the  in- 
tent of  Nature,  that  it  should  be  so  ;  otherwise  the  con- 
stitution of  our  mind,  from  which  it  thus  immediately  and 
directly  proceeds,  would  be  absurd.  But  it  cannot  be 
said,  because  virtuous  actions  are  sometimes  punished, 
and  vicious  actions  rewarded,  that  Nature  intended  it. 
For,  though  this  great  disorder  is  brought  about,  as  all 


Chap.  UI.]  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.  95 

actions  are  done,  by  means  of  some  natural  passion  ;  yet 
this  may  be,  as  it  undoubtedly  is,  brought  about  by  the 
perversion  of  such  passion,  implanted  in  us  for  other, 
and  those  very  good  purposes.  And  indeed  these  other 
and  good  purposes,  even  of  every  passion,  may  be  clear- 
ly seen. 

We  have  then  a  declaration,  in  some  degree  of  pre- 
sent effect,  from  Him  who  is  supreme  in  Nature,  which 
side  he  is  of,  or  what  part  he  takes ;  a  declaration  for 
virtue,  and  against  vice.  So  far  therefore  as  a  man  is 
true  to  virtue,  to  veracity  and  justice,  to  equity  and  cha- 
rity, and  the  right  of  the  case,  in  whatever  he  is  concern- 
ed ;  so  far  he  is  on  the  side  of  the  divine  administration, 
and  co-operates  with  it:  and  from  hence,  to  such  a  man, 
arises  naturally  a  secret  satisfaction  and  sense  of  secu- 
rity, and  implicit  hope  of  somewhat  further.  And,  ^ 
^  V.  This  hope  is  confirmed  by  the  necessary  tenden- 
cies of  virtue,  which,  though  not  of  present  effect,  yet 
are  at  present  discernible  in  nature;  and  so  afford  an  in- 
stance of  somewhat  moral  in  the  essential  constitution  of 
it.  There  is,  in  the  nature  of  things,  a  tendency  in  vir- 
tue and  vice  to  produce  the  good  and  bad  effects  now 
mentioned,  in  a  greater  degree  than  they  do  in  fact  pro- 
duce them.  For  instance ;  good  and  bad  men  would  be 
much  more  rewarded  and  punished  as  such,  were  it  not, 
that  justice  is  often  artificially  eluded,  that  characters  are 
not  known,  and  many,  who  would  thus  favour  virtue  and 
discourage  vice,  are  hindered  from  doing  so  by  acciden- 
tal causes.  These  tendencies  of  virtue  and  vice  are  ob- 
vious with  regard  to  individuals.  But  it  may  require 
more  particularly  to  be  considered,  that  power  in  a  socie- 
ty, by  being  under  the  direction  of  virtue,  naturally 
increases,  and  has  a  necessary  tendency  to  prevail  over 
opposite  power,  not  under  the  direction  of  it;  in  like 
manner,  as  power,  by  being  under  the  direction  of  reason, 
increases,  and  has  a  tendency  to  prevail  over  brute  force. 
There  are  several  brute  creatures  of  equal,  and  several 
of  superior  strength,  to  that  of  men;  and  possibly  the 
sum  of  the  whole  strength  of  brutes  may  be  greater  than 
that  of  mankind ;  but  reason  gives  us  the  advantage  and 
superiority  over  them ;  and  thus  man  is  the  acknowledged 


96  OF  THE  MORAL  [Part I. 

governing  animal  npon  the  earth.  Nor  is  this  supe- 
riority considered  by  any  as  accidental ;  but  as  what 
reason  has  a  tendency,  in  the  nature  of  the  thing,  to  ob- 
tain. And  yet  perhaps  difficulties  may  be  raised  about 
the  meaning,  as  well  as  the  truth,  of  the  assertion,  that 
virtue  has  the  like  tendency. 

To  obviate  these  difficulties,  let  us  see  more  distinct- 
ly, how  the  case  stands  with  regard  to  reason  ;  which  is 
so  readily  acknowledged  to  have  this  advantageous  tend- 
ency. Suppose  then  two  or  three  men,  of  the  best  and 
most  improved  understanding,  in  a  desolate  open  plain, 
attacked  by  ten  times  the  number  of  beasts  of  prey : 
would  their  reason  secure  them  the  victory  in  this  une- 
qual combat  ?  Power  then,  though  joined  with  reason, 
and  under  its  direction,  cannot  be  expected  to  prevail 
over  opposite  power,  though  merely  brutal,  unless  the 
one  bears  some  proportion  to  the  other.  Again  :  put 
the  imaginary  case,  that  rational  and  irrational  creatures 
were  of  like  external  shape  and  manner :  it  is  certain,  be- 
fore there  were  opportunities  for  the  first  to  distinguish 
each  other,  to  separate  from  their  adversaries,  and  to 
form  a  union  among  themselves,  they  might  be  upon  a 
level,  or  in  several  respects  upon  great  disadvantage; 
though  united  they  might  be  vastly  superior ;  since  union 
is  of  such  efficacy,  that  ten  men  united,  might  be  able  to 
accom.plish,  what  ttn  thousand  of  the  same  natural 
strength  and  understanding  wholly  ununited,  could  not. 
In  this  case  then,  brute  force  might  more  than  maintain 
its  ground  against  reason,  for  want  of  union  among  the 
rational  creatures.  Or  suppose  a  number  of  men  to 
land  upon  an  island  inhabited  only  by  wild  beasts  ;  a  num- 
ber of  men  who,  by  the  regulations  of  civil  government, 
the  inventions  of  art,  and  the  experience  of  some  years, 
could  they  be  preserved  so  long,  would  be  really  suffi- 
cient to  subdue  the  wild  beasts,  and  to  preserve  themselves 
in  security  from  them:  yet  a  conjuncture  of  accidents 
might  give  such  advantage  to  the  irrational  animals  as 
that  they  might  at  once  overpower,  and  even  extirpate, 
the  whole  species  of  rational  ones.  Length  of  time  then. 
proper  scope  and  opportunities,  for  reason  to  exert  it- 
self, may  be  absolutely  necessary  to  its  prevailing  ov 


Crap.  TII.J  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.  97 

brute  force.  Further  still:  there  are  many  instances  of 
brutes  succeeding  in  attempts,  which  they  could  not  have 
undertaken,  had  not  their  irrational  nature  rendered  them 
incapable  of  foreseeing  the  danger  of  such  attempt,  or 
the  fury  of  passion  hindered  their  attending  to  it:  and 
tliere  are  instances  of  reason  and  real  prudence  prevent- 
ing men's  undertaking  what,  it  hath  appeared  afterwards, 
they  might  have  succeeded  in  by  a  lucky  rashness.  And 
in  certain  conjunctures,  ignorance  and  folly,  weakness 
and  discord,  may  have  their  advantages.  So  that  ration- 
al animals  have  not  necessarily  the  superiority  over  irra- 
tional ones  ;  but,  how  improbable  soever  it  may  be,  it  is 
evidently  possible,  that  in  some  globes  the  latter  may 
be  superior.  And  were  the  former  wholly  at  variance 
and  disunited,  by  false  self-interest  and  envy,  by  treach- 
ery and  injustice,  and  consequent  rage  and  malice  against 
each  other,  whilst  the  latter  were  firmly  united  among 
themselves  by  instinct ;  this  might  greatly  contribute  to 
the  introducing  such  an  inverted  order  of  things.  For 
every  one  would  consider  it  as  inverted  :  since  reason 
has,  in  the  nature  of  it,  a  tendency  to  prevail  over  brute 
force  ;  notwithstanding  the  possibility  it  may  not  prevail, 
and  the  necessity,  which  there  is,  of  many  concurring  cir- 
cumstances to  render  it  prevalent. 

Now  I  say,  virtue  in  a  society  has  a  like  tendency  to 
procure  superiority  and  additional  power:  whether  this 
power  be  considered  as  the  means  of  security  from  op- 
posite power,  or  of  obtaining  other  advantages.  And  it 
has  this  tendency,  by  rendering  public  good,  an  object 
and  end,  to  every  member  of  the  society;  by  putting 
every  one  upon  consideration  and  diligence,  recollection 
and  self-government,  both  in  order  to  see  what  is  the 
most  effectual  method,  and  also  in  order  to  perform  their 
proper  part,  for  obtaining  and  preserving  it ;  by  uniting 
a  society  within  itself,  and  so  increasing  its  strength;  and, 
which  is  particularly  to  be  mentioned,  uniting  it  by 
means  of  veracity  and  justice.  For  as  these  last  are 
principal  bonds  of  union,  so  benevolence  or  public  spi- 
rit, undirected,  unrestrained  by  them,  is,  nobody  knows 
what. 

And  suppose  the  invisible  world,  and  the  invisible 

G 


98  pF   THE    MORAL  [Part  I. 

dispensations  of  Providence,  to  be,  in  any  sort,  analogous 
to  what  appears:  or  that  both  together  make  up  one  uni- 
form scheme,  the  two  parts  of  which,  the  part  which  we 
see,  and  that  which  is  beyond  our  observation,  are  ana- 
lo2;ous  to  each  other:  then,  there  must  be  a  Uke  natural 
tendency  in  the  derived  power,  throughout  the  universe, 
under  the  direction  of  virtue,  to  prevail  in  general  over 
that  which  is  not  under  its  direction ;  as  there  is  in  rea- 
son, derived  reason  in  the  universe,  to  prevail  over  brute 
force.     But  then,  in  order  to  the  prevalence  of  virtue, 
or  that  it  may  actually  produce,  what  it  has  a  tendency 
to  produce;  the  like  concurrences  are  necessary,  as  are, 
to  the  prevalence  of  reason.     There  must  be  some  pro- 
portion, between  the  natural  power  or  force  which  is,  and 
that  which  is  not,  under  the  direction  of  virtue :  there 
must  be  sufficient  length  of  time  ;  for  the  complete  suc- 
cess of  virtue,  as  of  reason,  cannot,  from  the  nature  of 
the  thing,  be  otherwise  than  gradual :  there  must  be,  as 
one  may  speak,  a  fair  field  of  trial,  a  stage  large  and  ex- 
tensive enough,  proper  occasions  and  opportunities,  for 
the  virtuous  to  join  together,  to  exert  themselves  against 
lawless  force,  and  to  reap  the  fruit  of  their  imited  labours. 
Now  indeed  it  is  to  be  hoped,  that  the  disproportion  be- 
tween the  good  and  bad,  even  here  on  earth,  is  not  so 
great,  but  that  the  former  have  natural  power  sufficient 
to  their  prevailing  to  a  considerable  degree,  if  circumstan- 
ces would  permit  this  power  to  be  united.     For,  much 
less,  very  much  less,  power  under  the  direction  of  virtue, 
would  prevail  over  much  greater  not  under  the  direction 
of  it.     However,  good  men  over  the  face  of  the  earth  can- 
not unite ;  as  for  other  reasons,  so  because  they  cannot 
be  sufficiently  ascertained  of   each   other's    characters. 
And  the  known  course  of  human  things,  the  scene  we 
are  now  passing  through,  particularly  the  shortness  of 
life,  denies  to  virtue  its  full  scope  in  several  other  re- 
spects.    The  natural  tendency  which  we  have  been  con* 
sidering,  though  real,  is  hindered  from  being  carried  into 
effect  in  the  present  state  :  but  these  hinderances  may  be 
removed  in  a  future  one.     Virtue,  to  borrow  the  Chris- 
tian allusion,  is  militant  here  ;  and  various  untoward  ac- 
cidents contribute  to  its  being  often  overborne :  but  it 


Chap.  III.]  GOVERNMENT  OP  GOD.  99 

may  combat  with  greater  advantage  hereafter,  and  pre- 
vail completely,  and  enjoy  its  consequent  rewards,  in 
some  future  states.  Neglected  as  it  is,  perhaps  unknown, 
perhaps  despised  and  oppressed  here  ;  there  may  be 
scenes  in  eternity,  lasting  enough,  and  in  every  other 
way  adapted,  to  afford  it  a  sufficient  sphere  of  action ; 
and  a  sufficient  sphere  for  the  natural  consequences  of  it 
to  follow  in  fact.  If  the  soul  be  naturally  immortal,  and 
this  state  be  a  progress  towards  a  future  one,  as  child- 
hood is  towards  mature  age  ;  good  men  may  naturally 
unite,  not  only  amongst  themselves,  but  also  with  other 
orders  of  virtuous  creatures,  in  that  future  state.  For 
virtue,  from  the  very  nature  of  it,  is  a  principle  and  bond 
of  union,  in  some  degree,  amongst  all  who  are  endued 
with  it,  and  known  to  each  other ;  so  as  that  by  it,  a  good 
man  cannot  but  recommend  himself  to  the  favour  and 
protection  of  all  virtuous  beings,  throughout  the  whole 
universe,  who  can  be  acquainted  with  his  character,  and 
can  any  way  interpose  in  his  behalf  in  any  part  of  his 
duration.  And  one  might  add,  that  suppose  all  this  ad- 
vantageous tendency  of  virtue  to  become  effect,  amongst 
one  or  more  orders  of  creatures,  in  an)^  distant  scenes 
and  periods,  and  to  be  seen  by  any  orders  of  vicious 
creatures,  throughout  the  universal  kingdom  of  God ; 
this  happy  effect  of  virtue  would  have  a  tendency,  byway 
of  example,  and  possibly  in  other  ways,  to  amend  those 
of  them  who  are  capable  of  amendment,  and  being  re- 
covered to  a  just  sense  of  virtue.  If  our  notions  of  the 
plan  of  Providence  were  enlarged  in  any  sort  proportion- 
able to  what  late  discoveries  have  enlarged  our  views 
with  respect  to  the  material  world ;  representatioiis  of 
this  kind  would  not  appear  absurd  or  extravagant.  How- 
ever, they  are  not  to  be  taken  as  intended  for  a  literal 
delineation  of  what  is  in  fact  the  particular  scheme  of  thx^ 
universe,  which  cannot  be  known  without  revelation:  for 
suppositions  are  not  to  be  looked  on  as  true,  because  net 
incredible :  but  they  are  mentioned  to  show,  that  our 
finding  virtue  to  be  hindered  from  procuring  to  itself  such 
superiority  and  advantages,  is  no  objection  against  its 
having,  in  the  essential  nature  of  the  thing,  a  tendency 
to  procure  them.     And  tlie  suppositions  now  mentioned 


02 


100  OF  THE  MORAL  [Part  I. 

do  plainly  show  this  :  for  they  show,  that  these  hinder- 
ances  are  so  far  from  being  necessary,  that  we  ourselves 
can  easily  conceive,  how  they  may  be  removed  in  future 
states,  and  full  scope  be  granted  to  virtue.  And  all  these 
advantageous  tendencies  of  it  are  to  be  considered  as  de- 
clarations of  God  in  its  favour.  This  however  is  taking 
a  pretty  large  compass:  though  it  is  certain,  that,  as  the 
material  world  appears  to  be,  in  a  manner,  boundless  and 
immense ;  there  must  be  some  scheme  of  Providence  vast 
in  proportion  to  it. 

But  let  us  return  to  the  earth  our  habitation ;  and  we 
shall  see  this  happy  tendency  of  virtue,  by  imagining  an 
instance  not  so  vast  and  remote :  by  supposing  a  king- 
dom or  society  of  men  upon  it,  perfectly  virtuous,  for  a 
succession  of  many  ages ;  to  which,  if  you  please,  may 
be  given  a  situation  advantageous  for  universal  monar- 
chy. In  such  a  state,  there  would  be  no  such  thing  as 
faction  :  but  men  of  the  greatest  capacity  would  of  course, 
all  along,  have  the  chief  direction  of  affairs  willingly 
yielded  to  them  ;  and  they  would  share  it  among  them- 
selves without  envy.  Each  of  these  would  have  the  part 
assigned  him,  to  which  his  genius  was  peculiarly  adapt- 
ed :  and  others,  who  had  not  any  distinguished  genius, 
would  be  safe,  and  think  themselves  very  happy,  by  be- 
ing under  the  protection  and  guidance  of  those  who  had. 
Public  determinations  would  really  be  the  result  of  the 
united  wisdom  of  the  community  :  and  they  v/ould  faith- 
fully be  executed,  by  the  united  strength  of  it.  Some 
would  in  a  higher  way  contribute,  but  all  Avould  in  some 
way  contribute,  to  the  public  prosperity  :  and  in  it,  each 
would  enjoy  the  fruits  of  his  own  virtue.  And  as  injus- 
tice, whether  by  fraud  or  force,  would  be  unknown 
among  themselves  ;  so  they  would  be  sufficiently  secured 
from  it  in  their  neighbours.  For  cunning  and  false  self- 
interest,  confederacies  in  injustice,  ever  slight,  and  ac- 
companied with  faction  and  intestine  treachery ;  these  on 
one  hand  would  be  found  mere  childish  folly  and  weak- 
ness, when  set  in  opposition  against  wisdom,  pubHc  spi- 
rit, union  inviolable,  and  fidelity  on  the  other :  allowing 
both  a  sufficient  length  of  vears  to  trv  their  force.  Add 
the  general  influence,  which  such  a  kingdom  would  have 


Chav.  III.]  GOVERNMENT    OF    GOD.  101 

over  the  face  of  the  earth,  by  way  of  example  particular- 
ly, and  the  reverence  which  would  be  paid  it.  It  would 
plainly  be  superior  to  all  others,  and  the  world  must 
gradually  come  under  its  empire  ;  not  by  means  of  law- 
less violence ;  but  partly  by  what  must  be  allowed  to  be 
just  conquest;  and  partly  by  other  kingdoms  submitting 
themselves  voluntarily  to  it,  throughout  a  course  of  ages, 
and  claiming  its  protection,  one  after  another,  in  succes- 
sive exigencies.  The  head  of  it  would  be  an  universal 
monarch,  in  another  sense  than  any  mortal  has  yet  been  ; 
and  the  eastern  style  would  be  literally  applicable  to  him, 
that  all  people,  nations,  and  languages  should  serve  him. 
And  though  indeed  our  knowledge  of  human  nature,  and 
the  whole  history  of  mankind,  show  the  impossibility, 
without  some  miraculous  interposition,  that  a  number  of 
men,  here  on  earth,  should  unite  in  one  society  or  go- 
vernment, in  the  fear  of  God  and  universal  practice  of 
virtue ;  and  that  such  a  government  should  continue  so 
united  for  a  succession  of  ages :  yet  admitting  or  sup- 
posing this,  the  effect  would  be  as  now  drawn  out.  And 
thus  for  instance,  the  wonderful  power  and  prosperity 
promised  to  the.  Jewish  nation  in  the  Scripture,  would 
be,  in  a  great  measure,  the  consequence  of  what  is  pre- 
dicted of  them  ;  that  the  people  should  be  all  righteous, 
and  inherit  the  land  for  ever  ;*  were  we  to  understand 
the  latter  phrase  of  a  long  continuance  only,  sufficient 
to  give  things  time  to  work.  The  predictions  of  this  kind, 
for  there  are  many  of  them,  cannot  come  to  pass,  in  the 
present  known  course  of  nature  ;  but  suppose  them  come 
to  pass,  and  then,  the  dominion  and  pre-eminence  pro- 
mised must  naturally  follow,  to  a  very  considerable  degree. 
Consider  now  the  general  system  of  religion;  that  the 
government  of  the  world  is  uniform,  and  one, and  moral; 
that  virtue  and  right  shall  finally  have  the  advantage,  and 
prevail  over  fraud  and  lawless  force,  over  the  deceits  as 
well  as  the  violence  of  wickedness,  under  the  conduct  of 
one  supreme  governor  :  and  from  the  observations  above 
made,  it  will  appear,  that  God  has,  by  our  reason,  given 
us  to  see  a  peculiar  connexion  in  the  several  parts  of  this 
scheme,  and  a  tendency  towards  the  completion  of  it, 

*  Isa.  he.  21. 


102  OF  THE  7*I0RAL  [PartL 

arising  o.it  of  the  very  nature  of  virtue:  which  tendency 
is  to  be  considered  as  somewhat  n^orai  in  the  essential 
constitution  of  things.  If  any  one  should  think  all  this 
to  be  of  little  importance  ;  I  desire  him  to  consider,  what 
tie  would  think,  if  vice  had,  essentially  and  in  its  nature^ 
these  advantageous  tendencies  ;  or  if  virtue  had  essential- 
ly the  direct  contrary  ones. 

But  it  mav  be  objected,  that  notwithstanding  all  these 
natural  effects  and  these  natural  tendencies  of  virtue;  yet 
things  may  be  now  going  on  throughout  the  universe, 
and  may  go  on  hereafter,  in  the  same  mixed  way  as 
here  at  present  upon  earth:  virtue  sometimes  pros- 
perous, sometimes  depressed ;  vice  sometimes  punished, 
sometimes  successful.  The  answer  to  which  is,  that  it 
is  not  the  purpose  of  this  chapter,  nor  of  this  treatise,, 
properly  to  prove  God's  perfect  moral  government  over 
the  w^orld,  or  the  truth  of  Religion  ;  but  to  observe  what 
there  is  in  the  constitution  and  course  of  nature,  to  con- 
firm the  proper  proof  of  it,  supposed  to  be  known:  and 
that  the  weight  of  the  foregoing  observations  to  this  pur- 
pose may  be  thus  distinctly  proved.  Pleasure  and  pain 
are  indeed  to  a  certain  degree,  say  to  a  very  high  degree, 
distributed  amongst  us  without  any  apparent  regard  to 
*he  merit  or  demerit  of  characters.  And  were  there  no- 
thing else  concerning  this  matter  discernible  in  the  con- 
stitution and  course  of  nature;  there  would  be  no  ground 
from  the  constitution  and  course  of  nature  to  hope  or  to 
fear,  that  men  W'ould  be  rewarded  or  punished  hereafter 
according  to  their  deserts  :  which,  however,  it  is  to  be 
remarked,  imphes,  that  even  then  there  would  be  no 
ground  from  appearances  to  think,  that  vice  upon  the 
whole  would  have  the  advantage,  rather  than  that  virtue 
would.  And  thus  the  proof  of  a  future  state  of  retribu- 
tion would  rest  upon  the  usual  known  arguments  for  it : 
which  are  I  think  plainly  unanswerable  ;  and  would  be 
so,  though  there  were  no  additional  confirmation  of  them 
from  the  things  above  insisted  on.  But  these  things  are 
a  very  strong  confirmation  of  them.     For, 

First,  They  show  that  the  Author  of  Nature  is  not 
indifferent  to  virtue  and  vice.  They  amount  to  a 
declaration,  from  him,  determinate  and  not  to  be  evaded^ 


> 


tHAP.  Ill,]  GOVERNMENT    OF    GOD.  103 

in  favour  of  one,  and  against  the  other;  such  a  declaration, 
as  there  is  nothing  to  be  set  over  against  or  answer,  on 
the  part  of  vice.  So  that  were  a  man,  laying  aside  the 
proper  proof  of  Religion,  to  determine  from  the  course 
of  nature  only,  whether  it  were  most  probable,  that  the 
righteous  or  the  wicked  would  have  the  advantage  in  a 
future  life ;  there  can  be  no  doubt,  but  that  he  would 
determine  the  probability  to  be,  that  the  former  would. 
The  course  of  nature  then,  in  the  view  of  it  now  given 
furnishes  us  with  a  real  practical  proof  of  the  obligations 
of  Religion. 

Secondly,  When,  conformably  to  what  Religion  teaches 
us,  God  shall  reward  and  punish  virtue  and  vice  as  such, 
so  as  that  every  one  shall,  upon  the  whole,  have  his 
deserts ;  this  distributive  justice  will  not  be  a  thing 
different  in  kind,  but  only  in  degree,  from  what  we  ex- 
perience in  his  present  government.  It  will  be  that  in 
effect,  toward  which  we  now  see  a  tendency.  It  will 
be  no  more  than  the  completion  of  that  moral  govern- 
ment, the  principles  and  beginning  of  which  have  been 
shown,  beyond  all  dispute,  discernible  in  the  present 
constitution  and  course  of  nature.  And  from  hence 
it  follows, 

Thirdly,  That,  as  under  the  natural  government  of  God, 
our  experience  of  those  kinds  and  degrees  of  happiness 
and  misery,  which  we  do  experience  at  present,  gives 
just  ground  to  hope  for,  and  to  fear,  higher  degrees 
and  other  kinds  of  both  in  a  future  state,  supposing  a 
future  state  admitted  :  so  under  his  moral  government  our 
experience,  that  virtue  and  vice  are,  in  the  manners  above 
mentioned,  actually  rewarded  and  punished  at  present, 
in  a  certain  degree,  gives  just  ground  to  hope  and  to 
fear,  that  they  may  be  rewarded  and  punished  in  a  higher 
degree  hereafter.  It  is  acknowledged  indeed  that  this 
alone  is  not  sufficient  ground  to  think,  that  they  actually 
will  be  rewarded  and  punished  in  a  higher  degree,  rather 
than  in  a  lower :  but  then. 

Lastly,  There  is  sufficient  ground  to  think  so,  frOm  the 
good  and  bad  tendencies  of  virtue  and  vice.  For  these 
tendencies  are  essential,  and  founded  in  the  nature  of 
things :  whereas  the  hinderances  to  their  becoming  effect 


104  MOPwAL  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.  [P^rt  1. 

are,  in  numberless  cases,  not  necessary,  but  artificial 
only.  Now  it  may  be  much  more  strongly  argued,  that 
these  tendencies,  as  well  as  the  actual  rewards  and 
punishments,  of  virtue  and  vice,  which  arise  directly  out 
of  the  nature  of  things,  will  remain  hereafter,  than  that 
Ihe  accidental  hinderances  of  them  will.  And  if  these 
ninderances  do  not  remain ;  those  rewards  and  punish- 
ments cannot  but  be  carried  on  much  farther  towards  the 
perfection  of  moral  government :  i.  e.  the  tendencies  of 
virtue  and  vice  will  become  effect ;  but  when,  or  where, 
or  in  what  particular  way,  cannot  be  known  at  all,  but  by 
revelation. 

Upon  the  whole  :  there  is  a  kind  of  moral  government 
imphed  in  God's  natural  government:*  virtue  and  vice 
are  naturally  rewarded  and  punished  as  beneficial  and 
mischievous  to  society  ;f  and  rewarded  and  punished  di- 
rectly as  virtue  and  vice.t  The  notion  then  of  a  moral 
scheme  of  government  is  not  fictitious,  but  natural ;  for 
it  is  suggested  to  our  thoughts  by  the  constitution  and 
course  of  nature :  and  the  execution  of  this  scheme  is 
actually  begun,  in  the  instances  here  mentioned.  And 
these  things  are  to  be  considered  as  a  declaration  of  the 
Author  of  Nature,  for  virtue,  and  against  vice  :  they  give 
a  credibility  to  the  supposition  of  their  being  rewarded 
and  punished  hereafter ;  and  also  ground  to  hope  and  to 
fear,  that  they  may  be  rewarded  and  punished  in  higher 
degrees  than  they  are  here.  And  as  all  this  is  confirm- 
ed, so  the  argument  for  Religion,  from  the  constitution 
and  course  of  nature,  is  carried  on  farther,  by  observing, 
that  there  are  natural  tendencies,  and,  in  innumerable 
cases,  only  artificial  hinderances,  to  this  moral  scheme's 
being  carried  on  much  farther  towards  perfection,  than 
it  is  at  present. §  The  notion  then  of  a  moral  scheme 
of  government,  much  more  perfect  than  what  is  seen,  is 
not  a  fictitious,  but  a  natural  notion ;  for  it  is  suggested 
to  our  thoughts,  by  the  essential  tendencies  of  virtue  and 
vice.  And  these  tendencies  are  to  be  considered  as  in- 
timations, as  implicit  promises  and  threatenings,  from  the 
Author  of  Nature,  of  much  greater  rewards  and  punish- 
ments to  follow  virtue  and  vice,  than  do  at  present.  And 

*  P.  87.  t  P.  88.  %  P.  81),  &c.  J  P.  95,  he. 


Chap.  IV.]  OF  A  STATE  OF  TRIAL.  105 

indeed,  every  natural  tendency,  which  is  to  continue,  but 
which  is  hindered  from  becoming  effect  bv  only  acciden- 
tal  causes,  affords  a  presumption,  that  such  tendency 
will,  some  time  or  other,  become  effect:  a  presumption 
in  degree  proportionable  to  the  length  of  the  duration, 
through  which  such  tendency  will  continue.  And  from 
these  things  together,  arises  a  real  presumption,  that  the 
moral  scheme  of  government  estabUshed  in  nature,  shall 
be  carried  on  much  farther  towards  perfection  hereafter ; 
and,  I  think,  a  presumption  that  it  will  be  absolutely 
completed.  But  from  these  things,  joined  with  the  moral 
nature  which  God  has  given  us,  considered  as  given  us 
by  him,  arises  a  practical  proof*  that  it  will  be  completed : 
a  proof  from  fact ;  and  therefore  a  distinct  one  from  that 
which  is  deduced  from  the  eternal  and  unalterable  rela- 
tions, the  fitness  and  unfitness  of  actions. 


CHAP.  IV.*^ 


OF  A  STATE  OF  PROBATION,  AS  IMPLYING  TRIAL, 
DIFFICULTIES,  AND  DANGER. 

The  general  doctrine  of  Religion,  that  our  present  life  is 
a  state  of  probation  for  a  future  one,  comprehends  under  | 
it   several  particular  things,   distinct  from  each   other,  | 
But  the  first  and  most  common  meaning  of  it  seems  tc 
be,  that  our  future  interest  is  now  depending,  and  de- 
pending upon  ourselves  ;  that  we  have  scope  and  oppor-    "X 
tunities  here,  for   that  good  and  bad  behaviour,  which 
God  will  reward  and  punish  hereafter ;  together  with 
temptations  to  one,  as  well  as  inducements  of  reason  to 
the  other.     And  this  is,  in  a  great  measure,  the  same 
with  saying,  that  we  are  under  the  moral  government  of 
God,  and  to  give  an  account  of  our  actions  to  him.     For 
the  notion   of  a  future  account  and  general  righteous 
judgment,  implies  some  sort  of  temptations  to  what  is 
wrong  :  otherwise  there  would  be  no  moral  possibility  of 
doing  wrong,  nor  ground  for  judgment,  or  discrimination. 
But  there  is  this  difference,  that  the  word  probation  is 

*  See  this  proof  drawn  out  briefly,  Ch.  vi. 


106  OF  A  STATE  OF  TRIAL.  P>art  £ 

more  distinctly  and  particularly  expressive  of  allurements 
to  wrong,  or  difficulties  in  adhering  uniformly  to  what  is 
right,  and  of  the  danger  of  miscarrying  by  such  tempta- 
tions, than  the  words  moral  government.  A  state  of  pro- 
bation then,  as  thus  particularly  implying  in  it  trial,  dif- 
ficulties, and  danger,  may  require  to  be  considered  dis- 
tinctly by  itself. 
I  And  as  the  moral  government  of  God,  which  Religion 
I  teaches  us,  implies,  that  we  are  in  a  state  of  trial  with 
i  regard  to  a  future  world :  so  also  his  natural  Jjovernment 
I  over  us  implies,  that  we  are  in  a  state  of  trial,  in  the  like 
\  sense,  with  regard  to  the  present  world.  IS^atural  go- 
'  vernment  by  rewards  and  punishments,  as  much  implies 
natural  trial,  as  moral  government  does  moral  trial. 
The  natural  government  of  God  here  meant*  consists 
in  his  annexing  pleasure  to  some  actions,  and  pain  to 
others,  which  are  in  our  power  to  do  or  forbear,  and  in 
tiiving  us  notice  of  such  appointment  beforehand.  This 
necessarily  implies,  that  he  has  made  our  happiness  and 
misery,  or  our  interest,  to  depend  in  part  upon  ourselves. 
And  so  \Ar  as  men  have  temptations  to  any  course  of 
actitm,  which  will  probably  occasion  them  greater  tem- 
poral inconvenience  and  uneasiness,  than  satisfaction; 
so  far  their  temporal  interest  is  in  danger  from  them- 
selves, or  they  are  in  a  state  of  trial  with  respect  to  it. 
Now  people  often  blame  others,  and  even  themselves, 
for  their  misconduct  in  their  temporal  concerns.  And 
we  find  many  are  greatly  wanting  to  themselves,  and 
miss  of  tiiat  natural  happiness,  which  they  might  have 
obtained  in  the  present  life :  perhaps  every  one  does  in 
some  degree.  I3ut  many  run  themselves  into  great  in- 
convenience, and  into  extreme  distress  and  misery:  not 
through  incapacity  of  knowing  better,  and  doing  better, 
for  themselves,  which  would  be  nothing  to  the  present 
i  purpose ;  but  through  their  own  fault.  And  these  things 
necessarily  imply  temptation,  and  danger  of  miscarry- 
ing, in  a  greater  or  less  degree  with  respect  to  oui 
worldly  interest  or  happiness.  Every  one  too,  without 
having  Rehgion  in  his  thoughts,  speaks  of  the  hazards 
which  young  people  run,  upon  their  setting  out  in  the 

*  Ch.  ii. 


Ch^p.  IV.]  OF  A  STATE  OF  TRIAL.  ]07 

world :  hazards  from  other  causes,  than  merely  their  ig- 
norance, and  unavoidable  accidents.  And  some  courses 
of  vice,  at  least,  being  contrary  to  men's  worldly  interest 
or  good;  temptations  to  these  must  at  the  same  time  be 
temptations  to  forego  our  present  and  our  future  inter- 
est. Thus  in  our  natural  or  temporal  capacity,  we  are 
in  a  state  of  trial,  i.  e.  of  difficulty  and  danger,  analo- 
gous, or  like  to  our  moral  and  religious  trial. 

This  win  more  distinctly  appear  to  any  one,  who 
thinks  it  worth  while,  more  distinctly,  to  consider,  what 
it  is  which  constitutes  our  trial  in  both  capacities,  and  to 
observe,  how  mankind  behave  under  it. 

And  that  which  constitutes  this  our  trial,  in  both  these 
capacities,  must  be  somewhat  either  in  our  external  cir- 
cumstances, or  in  our  nature.  For,  on  the  one  hand, 
persons  may  be  betrayed  into  wrong  behaviour  upon  sur- 
prise, or  overcome  upon  any  other  very  singular  and  ex- 
traordinary external  occasions;  who  would,  otherwise, 
have  preserved  their  character  of  prudence  and  of  virtue : 
in  which  cases,  every  one,  in  speaking  of  the  wrong  be- 
haviour of  these  persons,  would  impute  it  to  such  parti- 
cular external  circumstances.  And  on  the  other  hand, 
men  who  have  contracted  habits  of  vice  and  folly  of  any 
kind,  or  have  some  particular  passions  in  excess,  will 
seek  opportunities,  and,  as  it  were,  go  out  of  their  way, 
to  gratify  themselves  in  these  respects,  at  the  expense  of 
their  wisdom  and  their  virtue ;  led  to  it,  as  every  one 
would  say,  not  by  external  temptations,  but  by  such 
habits  and  passions.  And  the  account  of  this  last  case 
is,  that  particular  passions  are  no  more  coincident  with 
orudence,  or  that  reasonable  self-love,  the  end  of  which 
is  our  worldly  interest,  than  they  are  with  the  principle 
of  virtue  and  religion ;  but  often  draw  contrary  ways  to 
one,  as  well  as  to  the  other:  and  so  such  particular  pas- 
sions are  as  much  temptations,  to  act  imprudently  with 
regard  to  our  world'iy  interest,  as  to  act  viciously.* 
However,  as  wlten  we  say,  men  are  misled  by  external 
circumstances  of  temptation  ;  it  cannot  but  be  understood, 
that  there  is  somewhat  within  themselves,  to  render  those 

*  See  Sennons  preached  at  the  Rolls,  1726.  2d  ed.  p.  205,  &c.  Pret  p,  25.  &C 
Seim,  p.  2J ,  &c. 


108  OF  A  STATE  OF  TRIAL.  [Paut  I 

circiimstanc:is  temptations,  or  to  render  tliem  susceptible 
of  impressions  from  them ;  so  when  we  say,  they  are 
misled  by  passions;  it  is  ahvays  supposed,  that  there  are 
occasions,  circumstances,  and  objects,  exciting  these  pas- 
sions, and  affording  means  for  gratifying  them.  And 
therefore,  temptations  from  within,  and  from  w^ithout, 
coincide,  and  mutually  imply  each  other.  Now  the  se- 
veral external  objects  of  the  appetites,  passions,  and  af- 
fections, being  present  to  the  senses,  or  offering  them- 
selves to  the  mind,  and  so  exciting  emotions  suitable  to 
their  nature  ;  not  only  in  cases  where  they  can  be  grati- 
fied consistently  with  innocence  and  prudence,  but  also 
in  cases  where  they  cannot,  and  yet  can  be  gratified  im- 
prudently and  viciously  :  tliis  as  really  puts  them  in  dan- 
\  ger  of  voluntarily  foregoing  their  present  interest  or 
good,  as  their  future  ;  and  as  really  renders  self-denial 
necessary  to  secure  one,  as  the  other :  ^.  e.  we  are  in  a 
/  like  state  of  trial  with  respect  to  both,  by  the  very  same 
'  passions,  excited  by  the  very  same  means.  Thus  man- 
kind having  a  temporal  interest  depending  upon  them- 
selves, and  a  prudent  course  of  behaviour  being  neces- 
sary to  secure  it ;  passions  inordinately  excited,  whether 
by  means  of  example,  or  by  any  other  external  circum- 
stance, towards  such  objects,  at  such  times,  or  in  such 
degrees,  as  that  they  cannot  be  gratified  consistently  with 
w^orldly  prudence ;  are  temptations,  dangerous,  and  too 
often  successful  temptations,  to  forego  a  greater  tem- 
poral good  for  a  less ;  i.  e.  to  forego  what  is,  upon  the 
whole,  our  temporal  interest,  for  the  sake  of  a  present 
gratification.  This  is  a  description  of  our  state  of  trial 
I  in  our  temporal  capacity.  Substitute  now  the  word 
/  future  for  temporal,  and  virtue  for  prudence  ;  and  it  will 
(  be  just  as  proper  a  description  of  our  state  of  trial  in  our 
religious  capacity;  so  analogous  are  they  to  each  other. 
If,  from  consideration  of  this  our  like  state  of  trial 
in  both  capacities,  w^e  go  on  to  observe  farther,  how  man- 
kind behave  under  it;  w'e  shall  find  there  are  some,  who 
have  so  little  sense  of  it,  that  they  scarce  look  beyond 
the  passing  day:  they  are  so  taken  up  with  present  grati- 
fications, as  to  have,  in  a  manner,  no  feeling  of  conse- 
quences, no  regard  to  their  future  case  or  fortune  in  this 


chap.iv.j  of  a  state  of  trial.  1C.9 

life  ;  any  more  than  to  their  happiness  in  another.  Some 
appear  to  be  bhnded  and  deceived  by  inordinate  passion, 
in  their  worldly  concerns,  as  much  as  in  Religion. 
Others  are,  not  deceived,  but,  as  it  were,  forcibly  carried 
away  by  the  like  passions,  against  their  better  judgment, 
and  feeble  resolutions  too  of  acting  better.  And  there  *^ 
are  men,  and  truly  they  are  not  a  few,  who  shamelessly  | 
avow,  not  their  interest,  but  their  mere  will  and  pleasure,  / 
to  be  their  law  of  life :  and  who,  in  open  defiance  of 
every  thing  that  is  reasonable,  will  go  on  in  a  course  of 
vicious  extravagance,  foreseeing,  with  no  remorse  and 
little  fear,  that  it  will  be  their  temporal  ruin ;  and  some 
of  them,  under  the  apprehension  of  the  consequences  of 
wickedness  in  another  state.  And  to  speak  in  the  most 
moderate  way,  human  creatures  are  not  only  continually 
liable  to  go  wrong  voluntarily,  but  we  see  likewise  that 
they  often  actually  do  so,  with  respect  to  their  temporal 
interests,  as  well  as  with  respect  to  Religion. 

Thus  our  difficulties  and  dangers,  or  our  trials,  in  our 
temporal  and  our  rehgious  capacity,  as  they  proceed 
from  the  same  causes,  and  have  the  same  effect  upon 
men's  behaviour,  are  evidently  analogous,  and  of  the  same 
kind. 

It  may  be  added,  that  as  the  difficulties  and  dangers 
of  miscarrying  in  our  rehgious  state  of  trial,  are  greatly 
increased,  and  one  is  ready  to  think,  in  a  manner  wholly 
made,  by  the  ill  behaviour  of  others ;  by  a  wrong  educa- 
tion, wrong  in  a  moral  sense,  sometimes  positively  vici- 
ous ;  by  general  bad  example  ;  by  the  dishonest  artifices 
which  are  got  into  business  of  all  kinds ;  and,  in  very 
many  parts  of  the  world,  by  religion's  being  corrupted 
into  superstitions,  which  indulge  men  in  their  vices  :  so 
in  like  manner,  the  difficulties  of  conducting  ourselves 
prudently  in  respect  to  our  present  interest,  and  our  dan- 
ger of  being  led  aside  from  pursuing  it,  are  greatly  in- 
creased, by  a  foolish  education;  and,  after  we  come  to 
mature  age,  by  the  extravagance  and  carelessness  of 
others,  whom  we  have  intercourse  with :  and  by  mistaken 
notions,  very  generally  prevalent,  and  taken  up  from  com- 
mon opinion,  concerning  temporal  happiness,  and  where- 
in it  consists.     And  persons,  by  their  own  negligence 


J  10  OF  A  STATE  OF  TRIAL.  [Parti. 

and  folly  in  their  temporal  affairs,  no  less  than  by  a  course 
of  vice,  bring  themselves  into  new  difficulties  ;  and,  by 
habits  of  indulgence,  become  less  qualified  to  go  through 
them :  and  one  irregularitv  after  another,  embarrasses 
things  to  such  a  degree,  that  they  know  not  whereabout 
they  are;  and  often  makes  the  path  of  conduct  so  intri- 
cate and  perplexed,  that  it  is  difficult  to  trace  it  out;  dif- 
ficult even  to  determine  what  is  the  prudent  or  the  moral 
part.  Thus,  for  instance,  wrong  behaviour  in  one  stage 
of  life,  youth;  wrong,  I  mean,  considering  ourselves  only 
in  our  temporal  capacity,  without  taking  in  religion; 
this,  in  several  ways,  increases  the  difficulties  of  right 
behaviour  in  mature  age;  i.e.  puts  us  into  a  more  dis- 
advantageous state  of  trial  in  our  temporal  capacity. 

We  are  an  inferior  part  of  the  creation  of  God.  There 
are  natural  appearances  of  our  being  in  a  state  of  degra- 
dation.* And  we  certainlv  are  in  a  condition,  which 
[  does  not  seem,  by  any  means,  the  most  advantageous  we 
could  imagine  or  desire,  either  in  our  natural  or  moral 
capacity,  for  securing  either  our  present  or  future  inter- 
est. However,  this  condition,  low  and  careful  and  un- 
certain as  it  is,  does  not  afford  any  just  ground  of  com- 
pl-aint.  For,  as  men  may  manage  their  temporal  affairs 
with  prudence,  and  so  pass  their  days  here  on  earth  in 
tolerable  ease  and  satisfaction,  by  a  moderate  degree  of 
I  care:  so  likewise  with  regard  to  religion,  there  is  no 
1  more  required  than  what  they  are  well  able  to  do,  and 
What  they  must  be  greatly  wanting  to  themselves,  if  they 
neglect.  And  for  persons  to  have  that  put  upon  them, 
which  they  are  well  able 'to  go  through,  and  no  more, 
we  naturally  consider  as  an  equitable  thing ;  supposing 
it  done  by  proper  authority.  Nor  have  we  any  more 
reason  to  complain  of  it,  with  regard  to  the  Author  oi 
Nature,  than  of  his  not  having  given  us  other  advantages, 
belonging  to  other  orders  of  creatures. 

But  the  thing  here  insisted  upon  is,  that  the  state  oi 
trial,  which  Religion  teaches  us  we  are  in,  is  rendered 
credible,  by  its  being  throughout  uniform  and  of  a  piece 
with  the  general  conduct  of  Providence  towards  us,  in  all 
othcF  respects  within  tlie  compass  of  our  knowledge. 

Part  II.  Chap.  v. 


Chap  IV.]  '^"^  A  STATE  OF  TRIAL.  Ill 

Indeed  if  mankind,  considered  in  their  natural  capacity, 
as  inhabitants  of  this  world  only,  found  themselves,  from 
their  birth  to  their  death,  in  a  settled  state  of  securitv 
and  happiness,  without  any  solicitude  or  thought  of  their 
own  :  or  if  they  were  in  no  danger  of  being  brought  in- 
to inconveniences  and  distress,  by  carelessness,  or  the 
folly  of  passion,  through  bad  example,  the  treachery  of 
others,  or  the  deceitful  appearances  of  things  :  Avere  this 
our  natural  condition,  then  it  might  seem  strange,  and 
be  some  presumption  against  the  truth  of  Religion,  that 
it  represents  our  future  and  more  general  interest,  as  not 
secure  of  course,  but  as  depending  upon  our  behaviour, 
and  requiring  recollection  and  self-government  to  obtain 
it.  For  it  might  be  alleged,  "  What  you  say  is  our  con-  \ 
dition,  in  one  respect,  is  not  in  any  wise  of  a  sort  with 
what  we  find,  by  experience,  our  condition  is  in  another. 
Our  whole  present  interest  is  secured  to  our  hands,  with- 
out any  solicitude  of  ours ;  and  why  should  not  our 
future  interest,  if  we  have  any  such,  be  so  too  ?''  But 
since,  on  the  contrary,  thought  and  consideration,  the 
voluntary  denying  ourselves  many  things  which  we  de-  I 
sire,  and  a  course  of  behaviour,  far  from  being  always  j 
agreeable  to  us  ;  are  absolutely  necessary  to  our  acting 
even  a  common  decent,  and  common  prudent  part,  so  as 
to  pass  with  any  satisfaction  through  the  present  world, 
and  be  received  upon  any  tolerable  good  terms  in  it: 
since  this  is  the  case,  all  presumption  against  self-denial 
and  attention  being  necessary  to  secure  our  higher  inter- 
est, is  remioved.  Had  we  not  experience,  it  might,  per- 
haps speciously,  be  urged,  that  it  is  improbable  any  thing 
of  hazard  and  danger  should  be  put  upon  us  by  an  infi- 
nite Being  ;  when  every  thing  which  is  hazard  and  dan- 
ger in  our  manner  of  conception,  and  will  end  in  error, 
confusion,  and  misery,  is  now  already  certain  in  his  fore- 
knowledge. And  indeed,  why  any  thing  of  hazard  and 
danger  should  be  put  upon  such  frail  creatures  as  we  are, 
may  well  be  thought  a  difficulty  in  speculation  ;  and  can- 
not but  be  so,  till  we  know  the  whole,  or,  however,  much 
more  of  the  case.  But  still  the  constitution  of  nature  is 
as  it  is.  Our  happiness  and  misery  are  trusted  to  our 
conduct,  and  made  to  depend  upon  it.     Somewhat,  and. 


112  OF  A  STATE  ^F  [Part  I. 

in  many  circumstances,  a  great  deal  too,  is  put  upon  us, 
either  to  do,  or  to  suffer,  as  we  choose.  And  all  the  vari- 
ous miseries  of  life,  which  people  bring  upon  themselves 
by  negligence  and  folly,  and  might  have  avoided  by  pro- 
per care,  are  instances  of  this :  which  miseries  are  be- 
forehand, just  as  contingent  and  undetermined  as  their 
conduct,  and  left  to  be  determined  by  it 
I  These  observations  are  an  answer  to  the  objections 
lagainst  the  credibility  of  a  state  of  trial,  as  implying 
[temptations,  and  real  danger  of  miscarrying  with  regard 
to  our  general  interest,  under  the  moral  government  of 
God :  and  they  show,  that,  if  we  are  at  all  to  be  consid- 
ered in  such  a  capacity,  and  as  having  such  an  interest ; 
the  general  analogy  of  Providence  must  lead  us  to  ap- 
prehend ourselves  in  danger  of  miscarrying,  in  different 
degrees,  as  to  this  interest,  by  our  neglecting  to  act  the 
proper  part  belonging  to  us  in  that  capacity.  For  we 
have  a  present  interest  under  the  government  of  God, 
which  we  experience  here  upon  earth.  And  this  inter- 
est, as  it  is  not  forced  upon  us,  so  neither  is  it  offered  to 
our  acceptance,  but  to  our  acquisition ;  in  such  sort,  as 
that  we  are  in  danger  of  missing  it,  by  means  of  tempta- 
tions to  neglect,  or  act  contrary  to  it ;  and  without  atten- 
tion and  self-denial,  must  and  do  miss  of  it.  It  is  then 
perfectly  credible,  that  this  may  be  our  case,  with  respect 
to  that  chief  and  final  good,  which  Religion  proposes 
to  us. 

CHAP.  V. 

OF    A    STATE    OF    PROBATION,    AS    INTENDED    FOR    MORAL 
DISCIPLINE  AND  IMPROVEMENT.  « 

From  the  consideration  of  our  being  in  a  probation-state, 
of  so  much  difficulty  and  hazard,  naturally  arises  the 
question,  how  we  came  to  be  placed  in  it.f^  But  such  a 
general  inquiry  as  this  would  be  found  involved  in  in- 
superable difficulties.  For,  though  some  of  these  diffi- 
culties would  be  lessened  by  observing,  that  all  wicked- 
ness is  voluntary,  as  is  implied  in  its  very  notion  ;  and 
that  many  of  the  miseries  of  life  have  apparent  good, 


Chap.  V.7  MORAL   DISCIPLINE.  113 

effects:  yet,  when  we  consider  other  circumstances  be- 
longing to  both,  and  what  must  be  the  consequence  of 
the  former  in  a  hfe  to  come ;  it  cannot  but  be  acknow- 
ledged plain  folly  and  presumption,  to  pretend  to  give  an 
account  of  the  whole  reasons  of  this  matter :  the  whole 
reasons  of  our  being  allotted  a  condition,  out  of  which  so 
much  wickedness  and  misery,  so  circumstanced,  would 
in  fact  arise.  Whether  it  be  not  beyond  our  faculties, 
not  only  to  find  out,  but  even  to  understand,  the  whole 
account  of  this  ;  or,  though  we  should  be  supposed  capa- 
ble of  understanding  it,  yet,  whether  it  would  be  of  ser- 
vice or  prejudice  to  us  to  be  informed  of  it,  is  impossible 
to  say.  But  as  our  present  condition  can  in  no  wise  be 
shown  inconsistent  with  the  perfect  moral  government, 
of  God :  so  Religion  teaches  us  we  were  placed  in  it, ' 
that  we  might  qualify  ourselves,  by  the  practice  of  virtue, 
for  another  state  which  is  to  follow  it.  And  this,  though 
but  a  partial  answer,  a  very  partial  one  indeed,  to  the  in- 
quiry now  mentioned  ;  yet,  is  a  more  satisfactory  answer 
to  another,  which  is  of  real,  and  of  the  utmost  importance 
to  us  to  have  answered  :  the  inquiry.  What  is  our  busi- 
ness here  ?  The  known  end  then,  why  we  are  placed 
in  a  state  of  so  much  affliction,  hazard,  and  difficulty,  is, 
our  improvement  in  virtue  and  piety,  as  the  requisite 
qualification  for  a  future  state  of  security  and  happi- 
ness. 

Now  the  beginning  of  life,  considered  as  an  education 
for  mature  age  in  the  present  world,  appears  plainly,  at 
first  sight,  analogous  to  this  our  trial  for  a  future  one  : 
the  former  being  in  our  temporal  capacity,  what  the  lat- 
ter is  in  our  religious  capacity.  But  some  observations 
common  to  both  of  them,  and  a  more  distinct  considera- 
tion of  each,  will  more  distinctly  show  the  extent  and 
force  of  the  analogy  between  them  ;  and  the  credibility, 
which  arises  from  hence,  as  well  as  from  the  nature  of 
the  thing,  that  the  present  life  was  intended  to  be  a  state 
of  discipline  for  a  future  one. 

I.  Every  species  of  creatures  is,  we  see,  designed  for 
a  particular  way  of  life  ;  to  which,  the  nature,  the  capa- 
cities, temper,  and  qualifications  of  each  species,  are  as 
necessary,  as  their  external  circumstances.     Both  come 

H 


114  OF  A  STATE  OP  [Part  I. 

Into  the  notion  of  such  state,  or  particular  way  of  life, 
and  are  constituent  parts  of  it.  Change  a  man's  capaci- 
ties or  character  to  the  degree  in  which  it  is  conceivable 
they  may  be  changed  ;  and  he  would  be  altogether  inca- 
pable of  a  human  course  of  life,  and  human  happiness  ; 
as  incapable,  as  if,  his  nature  continuing  unchanged,  he 
were  placed  in  a  world,  where  he  had  no  sphere  of  ac- 
tion, nor  any  objects  to  answer  his  appetites,  passions, 
and  affections  of  any  sort.  One  thing  is  set  over  against 
another,  as  an  ancient  writer  expresses  it.  Our  nature 
corresponds  to  our  external  condition.  Without  this 
correspondence,  there  would  be  no  possibility  of  any 
such  thing  as  human  life  and  human  happiness :  which 
life  and  happiness  are,  therefore,  a  result  from  our  nature 
and  condition  jointly :  meaning  by  human  life,  not  living 
in  the  literal  sense,  but  the  v/hole  complex  notion  com- 
monly understood  by  those  words.  Sc  that,  without  de- 
termining what  will  be  the  employment  and  happiness, 
the  particular  life,  of  good  men  hereafter;  there  must  be 
[  some  determinate  capacities,  some  necessary  character 
I  and  qualifications,  without  which  persons  cannot  but  be 
utterly  incapable  of  it :  in  like  manner,  as  there  must  be 
some,  without  which  men  would  be  incapable  of  their 
present  state  of  life.     Now, 

,     II.  The  constitution  of  human  creatures,  and  indeed 
/  of  all  creatures  which  come  under  our  notice,  is  such, 
as  that  they  are  capable  of  naturally  becoming  qualified 
for  states  of  life,  for  which  they  were   once  wholly  un- 
\  qualified.      In  imagination  we  may  indeed  conceive  of 
creatures,  as  incapable  of  having  any  of  their  faculties 
naturally  enlarged,  or  as  being  unable  naturally  to  acquire 
any  new  qualifications :  but  the  faculties  of  every  species 
known  to  us  are  made  for  enlargement ;  for  acquirements 
\  of  experience  and  habits.     We  find  ourselves  in  parti- 
cular endued  with  capacities,  not  only  of  perceiving  ideas, 
and  of  knowledge  or  perceiving  truth,  but  also  of  storing 
up  our  ideas  and  knowledge  by  memory.   We  are  capa- 
ble, not  only  of  acting,  and  of  having  different  momen- 
(  tary  impressions  made  upon  us  ;  but  of  getting  a  new 
1  facility  in  any  kind  of  action,  and  of  settled  alterations  in 
)  our  temper  or  character.     The  power  of  the  two  last  is 


Chap,  v.]  MORAL  DISCIPLINE.  115 

the   power  of  habits.     But  neither  the  perception    of 
ideas,  nor  knowledge  of  any  sort,  are  habits;   though 
absolutely  necessary  to  the  forming  of  them.     However, 
apprehension,  reason,  memory,  which  are  the  capacities  \ 
of  acquiring  knowledge,  are  greatly  improved  by  exer-  ' 
cise.     Whether  the  word  habit  is  applicable  to  all  these 
improvements,  and  in  particular  how  far  the  powers  of 
memory  and  of  habits  may  be  powers  of  the  same  nature, 
I  shall  not  inquire.     But  that  perceptions  come  into  our 
minds  readily  and  of  course,  by  means  of  their  having 
been  there  before,  seems  a  thing  of  the  same  sort,  as 
readiness  in  any  particular  kind  of  action,  proceeding 
from  being  accustomed  to  it.     And  aptness  to  recollect 
practical  observations  of  service  in  our  conduct,  is  plainly 
habit  in    many  cases.     There  are  habits  of  perception, 
and  habits  of  action.     An  instance  of  the  former,  is  our 
constant  and  even  involuntary  readiness,  in  correcting 
the  impressions  of  our  sight  concerning  magnitudes  and 
distances,  so  as  to  substitute  judgment  in  the  room  of 
.sensation  imperceptibly  to  ourselves.     And  it  seems  as 
if  all  other  associations  of  ideas  not  naturally  connected 
might  be  called  passive  habits ;  as  properly  as  our  readi-  ^ 
ness  in  understanding  languages  upon  sight,  or  hearing  i 
of  words.     And  our  readiness  in  speaking  and  writing 
them  is  an  instance  of  the  latter,  of  active  habits.     For ' 
distinctness,  we  may  consider  habits,  as  belonging  to  the 
body,  or  the  mind :  and  the  latter  will  be  explained  by 
the  former.     Under  the  former  are  comprehended  all 
bodily  activities   or  motions,  whether  graceful  or  unbe- 
coming, which  are  owing  to  use  :  under  the  latter,  gene- 
ral habits  of  life  and  conduct ;  such  as  those  of  obedience 
and  submission  to  authority,  or  to  any  particular  person ; 
those  of  veracity,  justice,  and  charity  ;  those  of  attention, 
industry,  self-government,  envy,  revenge.     And  habits 
of  this  latter  kind  seem  produced  by  repeated  acts,  as 
well  as  the  former.     And  in  like  manner  as  habits  be- 
longing to  the  body  are  produced  by  external  acts:  so 
habits  of  the  mind  are  produced  by  the  exertion  of  in- 
ward practical  principles ;  i.  e.  by  carrying  them  into  act, 
or  acting  upon   them  ;  the  principles   of  obedience,   of 
veracity,  justice,  and  charity.     Nor  can  those  habits  be 


H2 


115  OF  A  STATE  OF  (Taht  L 

formed  by  any  external  course  of  action,  otherwise  than 
as  it  proceeds  from  these  principles  :  because  it  is  only 
these  inward  principles  exerted,  which  are  strictly  acts 
of  obedience,  of  veracity,  of  justice,  and  of  charity.  So 
hkewise  habits  of  attention,  industry,  self-government, 
are  in  the  same  manner  acquired  by  exercise ;  and  habits 
of  envy  and  revenge  by  indulgence,  whether  in  outward 
iiot,  or  in  thought  and  intention;  i.  e.  inward  act:  for 
'such  intention  is  an  act.  Resolutions  also  to  do  well  are 
properly  acts.  And  endeavouring  to  enforce  upon  our 
own  minds  a  practical  sense  of  virtue,  or  to  beget  in 
others  that  practical  sense  of  it,  which  a  man  really  has 
himself,  is  a  virtuous  act.  All  these,  therefore,  may 
and  will  contribute  towards  forming  good  habits.  But 
going  over  the  theory  of  virtue  in  one's  thoughts,  talking 
well,  and  drawing  fine  pictures,  of  it ;  this  is  so  far  from 
necessarily  or  certainly  conducing  to  form  a  habit  of  it^ 
in  him  who  thus  employs  himself,  that  it  may  harden  the 
mind  in  a  contrary  course,  and  render  it  gradually  more 
insensible  ;  i.  e.  form  a  habit  of  insensibility  to  all  moral 
considerations.  For,  from  our  very  faculty  of  habits, 
passive  impressions,  by  being  repeated,  grow  weaker. 
Thoughts,  by  often  passing  through  the  mind,  are  felt  less 
sensibly  :  being  accustomed  to  danger,  begets  intrepidity,. 
i.  e.  lessens  fear  ;  to  distress,  lessens  the  passion  of  pity ; 
to  instances  of  others'  mortality,  lessens  the  sensible  ap- 
prehension of  our  own.  And  from  these  two  observa- 
tions together ;  that  practical  habits  are  formed  and 
strengthened  by  repeated  acts,  and  that  passive  impres- 
sions grow  weaker  by  being  repeated  upon  us  ;  it  must 
foUov*^,  that  active  habits  may  be  gradually  forming  and 
strengthening,  by  a  course  of  acting  upon  such  and  such 
motives  and  excitements,  whilst  these  motives  and  ex- 
citements themselves  are,  by  proportionable  degrees, 
I  growing  less  sensible ;  i.  e.  are  continually  less  and  less 
/  sensibly  felt,  even  as  the  active  habits  strengthen.  And 
experience  confirms  this:  for  active  principles,  at  the 
very  time  that  they  are  less  lively  in  perception  than  they 
were,  are  found  to  be,  somehow,  v-^rought  more  thorough-, 
ly  into  the  temper  and  character,  and  become  more  effec- 
tual in  influencing  our  practice.     The  three  things  just 


Chap,  v.]  MORAL    DISCIPLINE.  117 

mentioned  may  afford  instances  of  it.  Perception  of 
danger  is  a  natural  excitement  of  passive  fear,  and  active 
caution:  and  by  being  inured  to  danger,  habits  of  the  lat- 
ter are  gradually  wrought,  at  the  same  time  that  the  for- 
mer gradually  lessens.  Perception  of  distress  in  others 
is  a  natural  excitement,  passively  to  pit}^,  and  actively  to 
relieve  it :  but  let  a  man  set  himself  to  attend  to,  in- 
quire out,  and  relieve  distressed  persons,  and  he  cannot 
but  grow  less  and  less  sensibly  affected  with  the  various 
miseries  of  life,  with  which  he  must  become  acquainted ; 
when  yet,  at  the  same  time,  benevolence,  considered  not 
as  a  passion,  but  as  a  practical  principle  of  action,  will 
strengthen  :  and  whilst  he  passively  compassionates  the 
distressed  less,  he  will  acquire  a  greater  aptitude  active- 
ly to  assist  and  befriend  them.  So  also  at  the  same  time 
that  the  daily  instances  of  men's  dying  around  us  give 
us  daily  a  less  sensible  passive  feeling  or  apprehension 
of  our  own  mortality,  such  instances  greatly  contribute 
to  the  strengthening  a  practical  regard  to  it  in  serious 
men ;  i.  e.  to  forming  a  habit  of  acting  with  a  constant 
view  to  it.  And  this  seems  again  further  to  show,  that ! 
passive  impressions  made  upon  our  minds  by  admonition,  J 
experience,  example,  though  they  may  have  a  remote 
efficacy,  and  a  very  great  one,  towards  forming  active 
habits,  yet  can  have  this  efficacy  no  otherwise  than  by 
inducing  us  to  such  a  course  of  action:  and  that  it  is  not 
being  affected  so  and  so,  but  acting,  which  forms  those 
habits:  only  it  must  be  always  remembered,  that  real 
endeavours  to  enforce  good  impressions  upon  ourselves 
are  a  species  of  virtuous  action.  Nor  do  we  know  how 
far  it  is  possible,  in  the  nature  of  things,  that  effects 
should  be  wrought  in  us  at  once,  equivalent  to  habits  ; 
i.  e.  what  is  wrought  by  use  and  exercise.  However,  the 
thing  insisted  upon  is,  not  what  may  be  possible,  but 
what  is  in  fact  the  appointment  of  nature  :  which  is, 
that  active  habits  are  to  be  formed  by  exercise.  Their 
progress  may  be  so  gradual,  as  to  be  imperceptible  in  its 
steps :  it  may  be  hard  to  explain  the  faculty,  by  which 
we  are  capable  of  habits,  throughout  its  several  parts ; 
and  to  trace  it  up  to  its  original,  so  as  to  distinguish  it 
from  all  others  in  our  mind:  and  it  seems  as  if  contrary 


118  OF    A    STATE  OF  [Part I. 

effects  were  to  be  ascribed  to  it.  But  the  thing  in  gene- 
ral, that  our  nature  is  formed  to  yield,  in  some  s  ich  man- 
ner  as  this,  to  use  and  exercise,  is  matter  of  certain  ex- 
perience. 

Thus,  by  accustoming  ourselves  to  any  course  of  ac- 
tion, we  get  an  aptness  to  go  on,  a  facility,  readiness,  and 
/  often  pleasure,  in  it.     The  inclinations  which  rendered 
us  averse  to  it  grow  weaker :  the  difficulties  in  it,  not 
only  the  imaginary  but  the  real  ones,  lessen  :  the  reasons 
for  it  offer  themselves  of  course  to  our  thoughts  upon  all 
occasions  :  and  the  least  glimpse  of  them  is  sufficient  to 
make  us  go  on,  in  a  course  of  actian,  to  which  we  have 
been  accustomed.     And  practical  principles  appear  to 
grow  stronger,    absolutely  in   themselves,  by  exercise; 
as  well  as  relatively,  with  regard  to  contrary  principles  ; 
which,  by  being  accustomed  to  submit,  do  so  habitually, 
;  and  of  course.     And  thus  a  new  character,  in  several 
j  respects,   may  be  formed  ;  and  many  habitudes  of  life, 
j  not  given  by  nature,  but  which  nature  directs  us  to  acquire. 
I     III.  Indeed  we  may  be  assured,  that  we  should  never 
/have  had  these  capacities  of  improving  by  experience^ 
/  acquired  knowledge,  and  habits,  had  they  not  been  he- 
I  cessary,  and  intended  to  be  made  use  of     And  accord- 
ingly we  find  them  so  necessary,  and  so  much  intended, 
that  without  them  we  should  be  utterly  incapable  of  that 
which  was  the  end  for  which  we  were  made,  considered 
in   our  temporal   capacity  only  :  the   employments  and 
satisfactions  of  our  mature  state  of  life. 
1        Nature  does  in  nowise  qualify  us  wholly,  much  less 
)  at  once,  for  this  mature  state  of  life.     Even  maturity  of 
understanding,  and  bodily  strength,  are  not  only  arrived 
to  gradually,  but  are  also  very  much   owing  to  the  con- 
tinued exercise  of  our  powei*s  of  body  and   mind  from 
infancy.     But  if  we  suppose  a  person  brought  into  the 
world  with  both  these  in  maturity,  as  far  as  this  is  con- 
ceivable ;  he  would  plainly  at  first  be  as  unqualified  for 
the  human  life  of  mature  age,  as  an  idiot.     He  would  be 
in  a  manner  distracted,  with  astonishment,   and  appre- 
hension, and  ciiriosity,  and  suspense:  nor  can  one  guess, 
how  long  it  would  be,  before  he  would  be  familiarized  to 
him.self  and  the  ob'ects  about  him  enough,  even- to  set 


Chap.  V.  MORAL  DISCIPLINE.  119 

himself  to  any  thing.  It  may  be  questioned  too,  whether 
the  natural  information  of  his  sight  and  hearing  would 
be  of  any  manner  of  use  at  all  to  him  in  acting,  before 
experience.  And  it  seems,  that  men  would  be  strangely 
headstrong  and  self-willed,  and  disposed  to  exert  them- 
selves with  an  impetuosity,  which  would  render  society 
insupportable,  and  the  living  in  it  impracticable ;  were  it 
not  for  some  acquired  moderation  and  self-government, 
some  aptitude  and  readiness  in  restraining  themselves, 
and  concealing  their  sense  of  things.  Want  of  every 
thing  of  this  kind  which  is  learnt  would  render  a  man  as 
uncapable  of  society,  as  want  of  language  would  ;  or  as 
his  natural  ignorance  of  any  of  the  particular  employ- 
ments of  life  would  render  him  uncapable  of  providing 
himself  with  the  common  conveniences,  or  supplying  the 
necessary  wants  of  it.  In  these  respects,  and  probably 
in  many  more  of  which  we  have  no  particular  notion,  \ 
mankind  is  left,  by  nature,  an  unformed,  unfinished  crea- 1 
ture  ;  utterly  deficient  and  unqualified,  before  the  ac- 
quirement of  knowledge,  experience,  and  habits,  for  that  ■ 
mature  state  of  life,  which  was  the  end  of  his  creation,  ' 
considering  him  as  related  only  to  this  world. 

But  then,  as  nature  has  endued  us  with  a  power  of  , 
supplying  those  de  ficiencies,  by  acquired  knowledge,  ex- 
perience, and  habits  :  so  likewise  we  are  placed  in  a  con- 
dition, in  infancy,  childhood,  and  youth,  fitted  for  it;  fit-  i 
ted  for  our  acquiring  those  qualifications  of  all  sorts,  which 
we  stand  in  need  of  in  mature  age.  Hence  children,  from 
their  very  birth,  are  daily  growing  acquainted  with  the 
objects  about  them,  with  the  scene  in  which  they  are 
placed,  and  to  have  a  future  part ;  and  learning  some- 
what or  other,  necessary  to  the  performance  of  it.  The 
subordinations,  to  which  they  are  accustomed  in  domes- 
tic life,  teach  them  self-government  in  common  beha- 
viour abroad,  and  prepare  them  for  subjection  and  obe- 
dience to  civil  authority.  What  passes  before  their  eyes, 
and  daily  happens  to  them,  ^"ivj.s  them  experience,  cau- 
tion against  treachery  and  dfceir,  together  with  number- 
less little  rules  of  action  an^l  c  )nduct,  which  we  could 
not  live  without;  and  whicli  are  learnt  so  insensiblv  and 
&o  perfectly,  as  to  be  mistaken   perhaps   for  instinct : 


120  OF  A  STATE  OP  '    '  [Part  I 

though  they  are  the  effect  of  long  experience  and  exer- 
cise ;  as  much  so  as  language,  or  knowledge  in  particu- 
lar business,  or  the  quahfications  and  behaviour  belong- 
ing to  the  several  ranks  and  professions.     Thus  the  be- 
ginning of  our  days  is  adapted  to  be,  and  is,  a  state  of 
education  in  the  theory  and  practice  of  mature  life.    We 
are  much  assisted  in  it  by  example,  instruction,  and  the 
care  of  others ;  but  a  great  deal  is  left  to  ourselves  to 
do.     And  of  this,  as  part  is  done  easily  and  of  course ; 
so  part  requires  diligence  and  car^,  the  voluntary  fore- 
,  going  many  things  which  we  desire,  and  setting  ourselves 
1  to  what  we  should  have  no  inclination  to,   but  for  the 
necessity  or  expedience  of  it.     For  that  labour  and  in- 
dustry, which  the  station  of  so  many  absolutely  requires, 
they  would  be  greatly  unqualified  for,  in  maturity,  as 
those  in  other  stations  would  be  for  any  other  sorts  of 
application ;  if  both  were  not  accustomed  to  them  in  their 
youth.     And,  according  as  persons  behave  themselves, 
in  the  general  education  which  all  go  through,  and  in  the 
particular  ones  adapted  to  particular  employments ;  their 
character  is  formed,  and  made  appear;  they  recommend 
themselves  more  or  less  ;  and  are  capable  of,  and  placed 
in,  different  stations  in  the  society  of  mankind, 
j      The  former  part  of  life,  then,  is  to  be  considered  as 
'  an    important  opportunity,  which  nature  puts  into  our 
hands;  and  which,   when  lost  is  not  to  be  recovered. 
:  And  our  being  placed  in  a  state  of  discipline  throughout 
I  this  life,  for  another  world,  is  a  providential  disposition 
of  things,  exactly  of  the  same  kind,  as  our  being  placed 
in  a  state  of  discipline  during  childhood,  for  mature  age. 
Our  condition  in  both  respects  is  uniform  and  of  a-piece, 
and  comprehended  under  one' and  the  same  general  law 
of  nature. 

And  if  we  were  not  able  at  all  to  discern,  how  or  in 
what  way  the  present  life  could  be  our  preparation  for 
another;  this  would  be  no  objection  against  the  credibi- 
lity of  its  being  so.  For  we  do  not  discern,  how  food  ana 
sleep  contribute  to  the  growth  of  the  body;  nor  could 
have  any  thought  that  they  would,  before  we  had  expe- 
rience. Nor  do  children  at  all  think,  on  the  one  hand, 
that  the  sports  and  exercises,  to  which  they  are  so  much 


Chap,  v.]  MORAL  DISCIPLINE.  121 

addicted,  contribute  to  their  health  and  growth ;  nor,  on 
the  other,  of  the  necessity  which  there  is  for  their  being 
restrained  in  them :  nor  are  they  capable  of  understand- 
ing the  use  of  many  parts  of  discipline,  which  neverthe- 
less they  must  be  made  to  go  through,  in  order  to  qua- 
lify them  for  the  business  of  mature  age.     Were  we  not 
able  then  to  discover,  in  what  respects  the  present  life 
could  form  us  for  a  future  one;  yet  nothing  would  be  , 
more  supposable  than  that  it  might,  in  some  respects  or  | 
other,  from  the  general  analogy  of  Providence.     And/ 
this,  for   ought    I  see,  might  reasonably  be  said  even 
though  we  should  not  take  in  the  consideration  of  God's 
moral  government  over  the  world.     But, 

IV.  Take  in  this  consideration,  and  consequently,  that 
the  character  of  virtue  and  piety  is  a  necessary  qualifica- 
tion for  the  future  state ;  and  then  we  may  distinctly  see, 
how,  and  in  what  respects,  the  present  life  may  be  a  pre- 
paration for  it:  since  we  waiit,  and  are  capable  of,  im- 
provement in  that  character,  hy  moral  and  religious  habits; 
and  the  present  life  is  ft  to  be  a  state  of  discipline  for 
such  improvement:  in  like  manner  as  we  have  already 
observed,  how,  and  in  what  respects,  infancy,  child- 
'hood,  and  youth,  are  a  necessary  preparation,  and  a  na- 
tural state  of  discipline,  for  mature  age. 

Nothing  which  we  at  present  see  would  lead  us  to  the 
thought  of  a  solitary  unactive  state  hereafter:  but,  if  we 
judge  at  all  from  the  analogy  of  nature,  we  must  suppose,  ^ 
according  to  the  Scripture  account  of  it,  that  it  will  be  a 
community.  And  there  is  no  shadow  of  any  thing  un- 
reasonable in  conceiving,  though  there  be  no  analogy  for 
it,  that  this  community  will  be,  as  the  Scripture  repre- 
sents it,  under  the  more  immediate,  or,  if  such  an  expres- 
sion may  be  used,  the  more  sensible  government  of  God. 
Nor  is  our  ignorance,  what  will  be  the  employments  of 
this  happy  community,  nor  our  consequent  ignorance, 
what  particular  scope  or  occasion  there  will  be  for  the 
exercise  of  veracity,  justice,  and  charity,  amongst  the 
members  of  it  with  regard  to  each  other ;  any  proof,  that 
there  will  be  no  sphere  of  exercise  for  those  virtues. 
Much  less,  if  that  were  possible,  is  our  ignorance  any 
proot^  that  there  will  be  no  occasion  for  that  frame  of 


122  OF  A  STATE  OF  £P^rt  ^ 

mind,  or  character,  which  is  formed  by  the  daily  prac- 
tice of  those  particular  virtues  here,  and  which  is  a  re- 
sult from  it.  This  at  least  must  be  owned  in  general, 
that,  as  the  government  established  in  the  universe  is  mo- 
ral, the  character  of  virtue  and  piety  must,  in  some  way 
or  other,  be  the  condition  of  our  happiness  or  the  quali- 
fication for  it. 

Now  from  what  is  above  observed,  concerning  our  na- 
tural power  of  habits,  it  is  easy  to  see,  that  we  are  ca- 
pable of  moral  improvement  by  discipline.  And  how 
greatly  we  want  it,  need  not  be  proved  to  any  one  who 
is  acquainted  with  the  great  wickedness  of  mankind;  or 
even  with  those  imperfections,  whi(;h  the  best  are  con- 
scious of.  But  it  is  not  perhaps  distinctly  attended  to  by 
every  one,  that  the  occasion  which  human  creatures  have 
for  discipline,  to  improve  in  them  this  character  of  virtue 
and  piety,  is  to  be  traced  up  higher  than  to  excess  in  the 
passions,  by  indulgence  and  habits  of  vice.  Mankind, 
and  perhaps  all  finite  creatures,  from  the  very  constitu- 
tion of  their  nature,  before  habits  of  virtue,  are  deficient, 
and  in  danger  of  deviating  from  what  is  right;  and  there- 
fore stand  in  need  of  virtuous  habits,  for  a  security  against 
this  danger.  For,  together  with  the  general  principle  of 
moral  understanding,  we  have  in  our  inward  frame  vari- 
ous affections  towards  particular  external  objects.  These 
affections  are  naturally,  and  of  right,  subject  to  the  go- 
vernment of  the  moral  principle,  as  to  the  occasions  upon 
which  they  may  be  gratified  ;  as  to  the  times,  degrees, 
and  manner,  in  which  the  objects  of  them  may  be  pur- 
sued :  but  then  the  principle  of  virtue  can  neither  excite 
them,  nor  prevent  their  being  excited.  On  the  contrary, 
they  are  naturally  felt,  when  the  objects  of  them  are  pre- 
sent to  the  mind,  not  only  before  all  consideration  whe- 
ther they  can  be  obtained  by  lawful  means,  but  after  it 
is  found  they  cannot.  For  the  natural  objects  of  afi"ec- 
tion  continue  so ;  the  necessaries,  conveniences,  and 
pleasures  of  life,  remain  naturally  desirable  ;  though  they 
cannot  be  obtained  innocently  :  nay,  though  they  cannot 
possibly  be  obtained  at  all.  And  when  the  objects  of 
any  affection  wnaiever  cannot  be  obtained  without  un- 
lawful means ;  but  m?.Y  be  obtained  bv  them  :  such  aifec- 


chap.v.  moral  discipline.  123 

tion,  though  its  being  excited,  and  its  continuing  some 
time  in  the  mind,  be  as  innocent  as  it  is  natural  and  ne- 
cessary ;  yet  cannot  but  be  conceived  to  have  a  ten- 
dency to  incUne  persons  to  venture  upon  such  unlawful 
means :  and  therefore  must  be  conceived  as  putting 
them  in  some  danger  of  it.  Now  what  is  the  general 
security  against  this  danger,  against  their  actually  deviat- 
ing from  right?  As  the  danger  is,  so  also  must  the  se- 
curity be,  from  within  :  from  the  practical  principle  of 
virtue.*  And  the  strengthening  or  improving  this  prin- 
ciple, considered  as  practical,  or  as  a  principle  of  action, 
will  lessen  the  danger,  or  increase  the  security  against  it. 
And  this  moral  principle  is  capable  of  improvement,  by 
proper  discipline  and  exercise  :  by  recollecting  the  prac- 
tical impressions  which  example  and  experience  have 
made  upon  us:  and,  instead  of  following  humour  and 
mere  inclination,  by  continually  attending  to  the  equity 
and  right  of  the  case,  in  whatever  we  are  engaged,  be  it 
in  greater  or  less  matters  ;  and  accustoming  ourselves  al- 
ways to  act  upon  it ;  as  being  itself  the  just  and  natural 
motive  of  action  ;  and  as  this  moral  course  of  behaviour 
must  necessarily,  under  the  divine  government,  be  our 
final  interest.  Thus  the  principle  of  virtue,  improved  into 
a  habit,  of  which  improvement  we  are  thus  cajiahle,  will 
plainly  he,  in  proportion  to  the  strength  of  it,  a  security 
against  the  danger  ichich  finite  creatures  are  in,  from  the 
very  nature  of  propension,  or  particular  affections.  This 
way  of  putting  the  matter,  supposes  particular  affections 
to  remain  in  a  future  state  ;  which  it  is  scarce  possible 
to  avoid  supposing.  And  if  they  do  ;  we  clearly  see,  that 

*  It  may  be  thought,  that  a  sense  of  interest  would  as  effectually  restrain  crea- 
tures from  doing-  wrong.  But  if  i)y  a  sense  of  interest  is  meant  a  speculative  coiivic- 
tion  or  belief,  tJiat  such  and  sucii  indulgence  would  occasion  them  greater  uneasi- 
ness, upon  tlie  whole,  than  satisfactirHi ;  it  is  contrary  to  present  experience  to  say, 
that  this  sense  of  interest  is  suiBcient  to  restrain  them  from  tlius  indulging'  them- 
selves. And  if  by  a  sense  of  interest  is  meant  a  practical  regard  to  what  is  upon  the 
whole  our  happiness  ;  this  is  not  only  coincident  with  the  principle  of  virtue  or  mo- 
ral rectitude,  but  is  a  part  of  the  idea  itself.  And  it  is  eviilent  this  reasonable  self- 
love  wants  to  lie  improved,  as  really  as  any  principle  in  our  nature.  For  we  daily 
see  it  overmatched,  not  only  by  the  more  boisterous  passions,  but  by  curiosity,  shame, 
love  of  imitation,  by  any  thing,  even  indolence:  especially  if  the  interest,  the  tem- 
poral interest,  suppose,  which  is  the  end  of  such  self  love,  be  at  a  distance.  So 
greatly  are  profligate  men  mistaken,  when  they  affirm  they  are  wholly  governed  by 
interestedness  and  self-love ;  and  so  little  cause  is  there  for  moralists  to  disclaim 
this  principle. — See  p.  108. 


124  OF  A  STATE  OF  [Part  I. 

acquired  habits  of  virtue  and  self-government  may  be 
necessary  for  the  regulation  of  them.     However,  though 
we  were  not  distinctly  to  take  in  this  supposition,  but  to 
speak  only  in  general ;  the  thing  really  comes  to  the 
same.     For  habits  of  virtue,  thus  acquired  by  disciphne, 
are  improvement  in  virtue :  and  improvement  in  virtue 
must  be  advancement  in  happiness,  if  the  government  of 
the  universe  be  moral 
y       From  these  things  we  may  observe,  and  it  will  further 
show  this  our  natural  and  original  need  of  being  improv- 
ed by  discipline,  how^  it  comes  to  pass,  that  creatures 
made  upright  fall ;    and  that  those  who  preserve  their 
uprightness,  by  so  doing,  raise  themselves   to  a  more 
secure  state  of  virtue.  To  say  that  the  former  is  account- 
ed for  by  the  nature  of  liberty,  is  to  say  no  more,  than 
that  an  event's  actually  happening  is  accounted  for  by  a 
mere  possibility  of  its  happening.     But  it  seems  distinct- 
ly conceivable  from  the  very  nature  of  particular  affec- 
tions or  propensions.     For,  suppose  creatures  intended 
for  such  a  particular  state  of  life,  for  which  such  propen- 
sions were  necessary:  suppose  them  endued  with  such 
propensions,  togetlier  with  moral  understanding,  as  well 
including  a  practical  sense  of  virtue  as  a  speculative  per- 
ception of  it ;  and  that  all  these  several  principles,  both 
natural  and   moral,   forming  an  inward   constitution  ot 
mind,  w^ere  in  the  most  exact  proportion  possible ;  i.  e. 
in  a  proportion  the  most  exactly  adapted  to  their  intend- 
ed state  of  life  ;  such  creatures  would  be  made  upright, 
or  finitely  perfect.     Now  particular  propensions,  from 
their  very  nature,  must  be  felt,  the  objects  of  them  being 
present ;  though  they  cannot  be  gratified  at  all,  or  not 
with  the  allowance  of  the  moral  principle.     But  if  they 
can  be  gratified  without  its  allowance,  or  by  contradict- 
ing it ;  then  they  must  be  conceived  to  have  some  tend- 
ency, in  how  low  a  degree  soever,  yet  some  tendency,  to 
induce    persons  to  such   forbidden  gratification.      Tliis 
tendency,  in  some  one  particular  propension,  may  be  in- 
creased, by  the  greater  frequency  of  occasions  naturally 
exciting  it,  than  of  occasions  exciting  others.     The  least 
voluntary  indulgence  in  forbidden  circumstances,  though 
but  ill  thought,  will  increase  this  wrong  tendency ;-  and  may 


Chaf.  v.]  MORAL    DISCIPLINE.  125 

increase  it  further,  till,  peculiar  conjunctures  perhaps 
ccnspiring,  it  becomes  effect ;  and  danger  of  deviating 
from  right,  ends  in  actual  deviation  from  it ;  a  danger 
necessarily  arising  from  the  very  nature  of  propension  ; 
and  which  therefore  could  not  have  been  prevented, 
though  it  might  have  been  escaped,  or  got  innocently 
through.  The  case  would  be,  as  if  we  were  to  suppose 
a  straight  path  marked  out  for  a  person,  in  which  such  a 
degree  of  attention  would  keep  him  steady :  but  if  he 
would  not  attend  in  this  degree,  any  one  of  a  thousand 
objects,  catching  his  eye,  might  lead  him  out  of  it.  Now 
it  is  impossible  to  say,  how  much  even  the  first  full  overt 
act  of  irregularity  might  disorder  the  inward  constitution ; 
unsettle  the  adjustments,  and  alter  the  proportions,  which 
formed  it,  and  in  which  the  uprightness  of  its  make  con- 
sisted: but  repetition  of  irregularities  would  produce 
habits.  And  thus  the  constitution  would  be  spoiled  ;  and 
creatures  made  upright,  become  corrupt  and  depraved  in 
their  settled  character,  proportionably  to  their  repeated 
irregularities  in  occasional  acts.  But,  on  the  contrary, 
these  creatures  might  have  improved  and  raised  them- 
selves, to  a  higher  and  more  secure  state  of  virtue,  by  the 
contrary  beliaviour:  by  steadily  following  the  moral 
principle,  supposed  to  be  one  part  of  their  nature  :  and 
thus  withstanding  that  unavoidable  danger  of  defection, 
which  necessarily  arose  from  propension,  the  other  part 
of  it.  For,  by  thus  preserving  their  integrity  for  some 
time,  their  danger  would  lessen ;  since  propensions,  by 
being  inured  to  submit,  would  do  it  more  easily  and  of 
course  :  and  their  security  against  this  lessening  danger 
would  increase ;  since  the  moral  principle  would  gain 
additional  strength  by  exercise :  both  which  things  are 
implied  in  the  notion  of  virtuous  habits.  Thus  then  vi- 
cious indulgence  is  not  only  criminal  in  itself,  but  also 
depraves  the  inward  constitution  and  character.  And  vir- 
tuous self-government  is  not  only  right  in  itself,  but  also 
improves  the  inward  constitution  or  character :  and  may 
improve  it  to  such  a  degree,  that  though  we  should  sup- 
pose it  impossible  for  particular  affections  to  be  absolute- 
ly coincident  with  the  moral  principle  ;  and  consequent- 
ly should  allow,  that  such  creatures  as  have  been  above 


126  OF  A  STATE  OF  [Part  1. 

supposed,  would  for  ever  remain  defectible;  yet  their 
danger  of  actually  deviating  from  right  may  be  almost 
infinitely  lessened,  and  they  fully  fortified  against  what 
remains  of  it ;  if  that  may  be  called  danger,  against  which 
there  is  an  adequate,  effectual  security.  But  still,  this 
their  higher  perfection  may  continue  to  consist  in  habits 
of  virtue  formed  in  a  state  of  discipline,  and  this  their 
more  complete  security  remain  to  proceed  from  them. 
And  thus  it  is  plainly  conceivable,  that  creatures  without 
blemish,  as  they  came  out  of  the  hands  of  God,  may  be 
in  danger  of  going  wrong ;  and  so  may  stand  in  need  of 
the  security  of  virtuous  habits,  additional  to  the  moral 
principle  wrought  into  their  natures  by  him.  That  which 
is  the  ground  of  their  danger,  or  their  want  of  security, 
may  be  considered  as  a  deficiency  in  them,  to  which  vir- 
tuous habits  are  the  natural  supply.  And  as  they  are 
naturally  capable  of  being  raised  and  improved  by  dis- 
cipline, it  may  be  a  thmg  fit  and  requisite,  that  they 
should  be  placed  in  circumstances  with  an  eye  to  it :  in 
circumstances  peculiarly  fitted  to  be  to  them  a  state  of 
discipline  for  their  improvement  in  virtue. 

But  how  much  more  strongly  must  this  hold  with  re- 
spect to  those  who  have  corrupted  their  natures,  are 
fallen  from  their  original  rectitude,  and  whose  passions 
are  become  excessive  by  repeated  violations  of  their  in- 
ward constitution?  Upright  creatures  may  want  to  be 
improved:  depraved  creatures  want  to  be  renewed. 
Education  and  discipline,  which  may  be  in  all  degrees 
and  sorts  of  gentleness  and  of  severity,  are  expedient  for 
those:  but  must  be  absolutely  necessary  for  these.  For 
these,  discipline  of  the  severer  sort  too,  and  in  the  high- 
er degrees  of  it,  must  be  necessary,  in  order  to  wear  out 
vicious  habits;  to  recover  their  primitive  strength  of  self- 
government,  which  indulgence  must  have  weakened  ;  to 
repair,  as  well  as  raise  into  a  habit,  the  moral  principle, 
in  order  to  their  arriving  at  a  secure  state  of  virtuous 
happiness. 

Now,  whoever  will  consider  the  thing  may  clearly  see, 
that  the  present  world  is  peculiarly  jit  to  be  a  state  of 
discipline  for  this  purpose,  to  such  as  will  set  themselves 
to  mend  and  improve.   For,  the  various  temptations  with 


Chap  V.]  MORAL  DISCIPLINE.  l2T 

which  we  are  surrounded  ;  our  experience  of  the  deceits 
of  wickedness  ;  having  been  in  many  instances  led  wrong 
ourselves  ;  the  great  viciousness  of  the  world  ;  the  infinite 
disorders  consequent  upon  it ;  our  being  made  acquaint- 
ed with  pain  and  sorrow,  either  from  our  own  feeling  of 
it,  or  from  the  sight  of  it  in  others  ;  these  things,  though 
some  of  them  may  indeed  produce  wrong  effects  upon 
our  minds,  yet  when  duly  reflected  upon,  have,  all  of 
them,  a  direct  tendency  to  bring  us  to  a  settled  modera- 
tion and  reasonableness  of  temper :  the  contrary  both 
to  thoughtless  levity,  and  also  to  that  unrestrained 
self-will,  and  violent  bent  to  follow  present  inclina- 
tion, which  may  be  observed  in  undisciplined  minds. 
Such  experience,  as  the  present  state  affords,  of  the 
frailty  of  our  nature  ;  of  the  boundless  extravagance  of 
ungoverned  passion  ;  of  the  power  which  an  infinite 
Being  has  over  us,  by  the  various  capacities  of  misery 
which  he  has  given  us  ;  in  short,  that  kind  and  degree 
of  experience,  which  the  present  state  affords  us,  that 
the  constitution  of  nature  is  such  as  to  admit  the  possi- 
bility, the  danger,  and  the  actual  event,  of  creatures  los- 
ing their  innocence  and  happiness,  and  becoming  vicious 
and  wretched  ;  hath  a  tendency  to  give  us  a  practical 
sense  of  things  very  different  from  a  mere  speculative 
knowledge,  that  we  are  liable  to  vice,  and  capable  of 
misery.  And  who  knows,  whether  the  security  of  crea- 
tures in  the  highest  and  most  settled  state  of  perfection, 
may  not  in  part  arise,  from  their  having  had  such  a  sense 
of  things  as  this,  formed,  and  habitually  fixed  within  them, 
in  some  state  of  probation.  And  passing  through  the 
present  world  with  that  moral  attention,  which  is  neces- 
sary to  the  acting  a  right  part  in  it,  may  leave  everlast- 
ing impressions  of  this  sort  upon  our  minds.  But  to  be 
a  little  more  distinct:  allurements  to  what  is  wrong  ; 
difficulties  in  the  discharge  of  our  duty  ;  our  not  being 
able  to  act  a  uniform  right  part  without  some  thought  and 
care  ;  and  the  opportunities  which  we  have,  or  imagine 
we  have,  of  avoiding  what  we  dislike,  or  obtaining  what 
we  desire,  by  unlawful  means,  when  we  either  cannot 
do  it  at  all,  or  at  least  not  so  easily,  by  lawful  ones  ; 
these  things,  i.  e.  the  snares  and  temptations  of  vice,  are 


/ 


128  OF  A  STATE  OF  [Part  1. 

what  render  the  present  world  pecuharly  fit  to  be  a  state 
of  disciphne,  to  those  who  will  preserve  their  integrity  : 
because  they  render  being  upon  our  guard,  resolution, 
and  the  denial  of  our  passions,  necessary  in  order  to  that 
end.  And  the  exercise  of  such  particular  recollection, 
intention  of  mind,  and  self-government,  in  the  practice 
of  virtue,  has,  from  the  make  of  our  nature,  a  peculiar 
tendency  to  form  habits  of  virtue ;  as  implying,  not  only 
a  real,  but  also  a  more  continued,  and  a  more  intense 
exercise  of  the  virtuous  principle ;  or  a  more  constant 
and  a  stronger  effort  of  virtue  exerted  into  act.  Thus 
suppose  a  person  to  know  himself  to  be  in  particular 
danger,  for  some  time,  of  doing  any  thing  wrong,  which 
yet  he  fully  resolves  not  to  do :  continued  recollection, 
and  keeping  upon  his  guard,  in  order  to  make  good  his 
resolution,  is  a  continued  exerting  of  that  act  of  virtue  in 
a  high  degree,  which  need  have  been,  and  perhaps  would 
have  been,  only  instantaneous  and  weak,  had  the  tempta- 
tion been  so.  It  is  indeed  ridiculous  to  assert,  that  self- 
denial  is  essential  to  virtue  and  piety  :  but  it  would  have 
been  nearer  the  truth,  though  not  strictly  the  truth  itself, 
to  have  said,  that  it  is  essential  to  discipline  and  improve- 
ment. For  though  actions  materially  virtuous,  which 
have  no  sort  of  difficulty,  but  are  perfectly  agreeable  to 
our  particular  inclinations,  may  possibly  be  done  only 
from  these  particular  inclinations,  and  so  may  not  be  any 
exercise  of  the  principle  of  virtue,  i.  e.  not  be  virtuous 
actions  at  all ;  yet,  on  the  contrary,  they  may  be  an  ex- 
ercise of  that  principle  :  and  when  they  are,  they  have  a 
tendency  to  form  and  fix  the  habit  of  virtue.  But  when 
the  exercise  of  the  virtuous  principle  is  more  continued, 
oftener  repeated,  and  more  intense  ;  as  it  must  be  in  cir- 
cumstances of  danger,  temptation,  and  difficulty,  of  any 
kind  and  in  any  degree  ;  this  tendency  is  increased  pro- 
portionably,  and  a  more  confirmed  habit  is  the  conse- 
quence. 

This  undoubtedly  holds  to  a  certain  length  :  but  how 
far  it  may  hold,  I  know  not.  Neither  our  intellectual 
powers,  nor  our  bodily  strength  can  be  improved  beyond 
such  a  degree  :  and  both  may  be  over-wrought.  Possi- 
bly there  may  be  somewhat  analogous  to  this,  with  re- 


Chap.  V.]  MORAL    DISCIPLINE.  129 

spect  to  the  moral  character ;  which  is  scarce  worth  con- 
sidering. And  I  mention  it  only,  lest  it  should  come 
into  some  persons'  thoughts,  not  as  an  exception  to  the 
foregoing  observations,  which  perhaps  it  is ;  but  as  a 
confutation  of  them,  which  it  is  not.  And  there  may  be 
several  other  exceptions.  Observations  of  this  kind  can- 
not be  supposed  to  hold  minutely,  and  in  every  case.  It 
is  enough  that  they  hold  in  general.  And  these  plainly 
hold  so  far,  as  that  from  them  may  be  seen  distinctly, 
which  is  all  that  is  intended  by  them,  that  the  present 
world  is  peculiarly  jit  to  be  a  state  of  discipline,  for  our 
improvement  in  virtue  and  piety  :  in  the  same  sense  as 
some  sciences,  by  requiring  and  engaging  the  attention, 
not  to  be  sure  of  such  persons  as  will  not,  but  of  such  as 
will,  set  themselves  to  them  ;  are  fit  to  form  the  mind  to 
habits  of  attention. 

Indeed  the  present  state  is  so  far  from  proving,  in 
event,  a  discipline  of  virtue  to  the  generality  of  men,  that, 
on  the  contrary,  they  seem  to  make  it  a  discipline  of  vice. 
And  the  viciousness  of  the  world  is,  in  different  ways, 
the  great  temptation  which  renders  it  a  state  of  virtuous 
discipline,  in  the  degree  it  is,  to  good  men.  The  whole 
end,  and  the  whole  occasion,  of  mankind's  being  placed 
in  such  a  state  as  the  present,  is  not  pretended  to  be  ac- 
counted for.  That  which  appears  amidst  the  general  cor- 
ruption, is,  that  there  are  some  persons,  who,  having 
within  them  the  principle  of  amendment  and  recovery,  at- 
tend to  and  fol]ov\^  the  notices  of  virtue  and  religion,  be 
they  more  clear  or  more  obscure  Avhich  are  afforded  them ; 
and  that  the  present  world  is,  not  only  an  exercise  of  vir- 
tue in  these  persons,  but  an  exercise  of  it  in  ways  and 
degrees,  peculiarly  apt  to  improve  it :  apt  to  improve  it, 
in  some  respects,  even  beyond  what  w^ould  be,  by  the  ex- 
ercise of  it,  required  in  a  perfectly  virtuous  society,  or  in 
a  society  of  equally  imperfect  virtue  with  themselves.  But 
that  the  present  world  does  not  actually  become  a  state 
of  moral  discipline  to  many,  even  to  the  generality,  ^.  e. 
that  they  do  not  improve  or  grow  better  in  it,  cannot  be 
m'ged  as  a  proof,  that  it  was  not  intended  for  moral  dis- 
cipline, by  any  who  at  all  observe  the  analogy  of  nature. 

For,  of  the  numerous  seeds  of  vegetables  and  bodies  of 

1 


130  OP  A  STATE  OP  l?JMiL 

animals,  which  are  adapted  and  put  in  the  way,  to  im- 
/  prove  to  such  a  point  or  state  of  natuTal  maturity  and  per- 
fection, we  do  not  see  perhaps  that  one  in  a  milhon  actu- 
ally does.  Far  the  greatest  part  of  them  decay  before 
they  are  improved  to  it;  and  appear  to  be  absohitely 
destroyed.  Yet  no  one,  who  does  not  deny  all  final 
causes,  will  deny,  that  those  seeds  and  bodies,  which  do 
attain  to  that  point  of  maturity  and  perfection,  answer 
the  end  for  which  they  were  really  designed  by  nature; 
and  therefore  that  nature  designed  them  for  such  perfec- 
tion. And  I  cannot  forbear  adding,  though  it  is  not  to 
the  present  purpose,  that  the  appearance  of  such  an 
amazing  waste  in  nature,  w^ith  respect  to  these  seeds  and 
bodies,  by  foreign  causes,  is  to  us  as  unaccountable,  as, 
what  is  much  more  terrible,  the  present  and  future  ruin 
of  so  many  moral  agents  by  themselves,  i.  e.  by  vice. 

Against  this  whole  notion  of  moral  discipline,  it  may 
be  objected,  in  another  way  ;  that  so  far  as  a  course  of 
behaviour,  materially  virtuous,  proceeds  from  hope  and 
fear,  so  far  it  is  only  a  discipline  and  strengthening  of 
self-love.  But  doing  what  God  commands,  because  he 
commands  it,  is  obedience,  though  it  proceeds  from  hope 
or  fear.  And  a  course  of  such  obedience  will  form 
habits  of  it.  And  a  constant  regard  to  veracity,  justice, 
and  charity,  may  form  distinct  habits  of  these  particular 
virtues ;  and  will  certainly  form  habits  of  self-govern- 
ment, and  of  denying  our  inclinations,  whenever  veracity, 
justice,  or  charity  requires  it.  Nor  is  there  any  founda- 
tion for  this  great  nicety,  with  which  some  affect  to  dis- 
tinguish in  this  case,  in  order  to  depreciate  all  Religion 
proceeding  from  hope  or  fear.  For,  veracity,  justice,  and 
charity,  regard  to  God's  authority,  and  to  our  own  chiel 
interest,  are  not  only  all  three  coincident ;  but  each  of 
them  is,  in  itself,  a  just  and  natural  motive  or  principle 
of  action.  And  he  who  begins  a  good  life  from  any  one 
of  them,  and  perseveres  in  it,  as  he  is  already  in  some 
degree,  so  he  cannot  fail  of  becoming  more  and  more,  of 
that  character  which  is  correspondent  to  the  constitution 
of  nature  as  moral ;  and  to  the  relation  which  God 
stands  in  to  us  as  moral  governor  of  it :  nor  consequent- 
ly can  he  fail  of  obtaining  that  happiness,  which  this  con.- 


C«A!'.  v.]  MORAL  DISCIPLINE.  131 

stiiution  and  relation  necessarily  suppose  connected  with 
■  that  character. 

These  several  observations,  concerning  the  active 
principle  of  virtue  and  obedience  to  God's  commands, 
:ire  applicable  to  passive  submission  or  resignation  to  his 
w  ill :  which  is  another  essential  part  of  a  right  character, 
connected  with  the  former,  and  very  much  in  our  power 
,  to  form  ourselves  to.  It  may  be  imagined,  that  nothing 
but  afflictions  can  give  occasion  for  or  require  this  vir- 
tue ;  that  it  can  have  no  respect  to,  nor  be  any  way  ne- 
cessary to  qualify  for,  a  state  of  perfect  happiness :  but 
it  is  not  experience  which  can  make  us  think  thus. 
Prosperity  itself,  whilst  any  thing  supposed  desirable  is 
not  ours,  begets  extravagant  and  unbounded  thoughts. 
Imagination  is  altogether  as  much  a  source  of  discontent, 
as  any  thing  in  our  external  condition.  It  is  indeed  true, 
that  there  can  be  no  scope  for  patience,  when  sorrow 
shall  be  no  more;  but  there  may  be  need  of  a  temper  of 
mind,  which  shall  have  been  formed  by  patience.  For, 
though  self-love,  considered  merely  as  an  active  prin- 
ciple leading  us  to  pursue  our  chief  interest,  cannot  but  be 
uniformly  coincident  with  the  principle  of  obedience  to 
God's  commands,  our  interest  being  rightly  understood  ; 
because  this  obedience,  and  the  pursuit  of  our  own  chief 
interest,  must  be  in  every  case  one  and  the  same  thing: 
yet  it  may  be  questioned,  whether  self-love,  considered 
merely  as  the  desire  of  our  own  interest  or  happiness, 
can,  from  its  nature,  be  thus  absolutely  and  uniformly 
coincident  with  the  will  of  God ;  any  more  than  particu- 
lar affections  can  :*  coincident  in  such  sort,  as  not  to  be 
liable  to  be  excited  upon  occasions  and  in  degrees,  im- 
possible to  be  gratified  consistently  with  the  constitution 
of  things,  or  the  divine  appointments.  So  that  habits  of 
resignation  may,  upon  this  account,  be  requisite  for  all 
creatures  :  habits,  I  say  ;  which  signify  what  is  formed 
by  use.  However,  in  general  it  is  obvious  that  both 
self-love  and  particular  affection  in  human  creatures  con- 
sidered only  as  passive  feehngs,  distort  and  rend  the 
mind  ;  and  therefore  stand  in  need  of  discipline.  Now 
denial  of  those  particular  affections,  in  a  course  of  active 

*  p.  122, 
L2 


132  OF  A  STATE  OF  [Part  1, 

virtue  and  obedience  to  God's  will,  has  a  tendency  to 
moderate  them ;  and  seems  also  to  have  a  tendency  to 
habituate  the  mind,  to  be  easy  and  satisfied  with  that 
degree  of  happiness  which  is  allotted  us,  i.  e.  to  moderate 
self-love.     But  the  proper  discipline  for  resignation  is 
affliction.     For  a  right  behaviour  under  that  trial ;  recol- 
lecting ourselves  so  as  to  consider  it  in  the  view,  in  which 
Rehgion  teaches  us  to  consider  it,  as  from  the  hand  of 
God ;  receiving  it  as  what  he  appoints,  or  thinks  proper 
to  permit,  in  his  world  and  under  his  government;  this 
will  habituate  the  mind  to  a  dutiful  submission.     And 
such  submission,  together  with  the  active  principle  of 
obedience,  make  up  the   temper  and  character  in  us, 
which  answers  to  his  sovereignty  ;  and  which  absolutely 
belongs  to  the  condition  of  our  being,  as  dependent  crea- 
tures.    Nor  can  it  be  said,  that  this  is  only  breaking  the 
mind  to  a  submission  to  mere  power;  for  mere  power 
may  be  accidental,  and  precarious,  and  usurped :  but  it 
is  forming  within  ourselves  the  temper  of  resignation 
to   his  rightful  authority,  who  is,  by  nature,  supreme 
over  all. 

Upon  the  whole :  such  a  character,  and  such  qualifi- 
cations, are  necessary  for  a  mature  state  of  life  in  the 
present  world,  as  nature  alone  does  in  no  wise  bestow  j 
but  has  put  it  upon  us,  in  great  part,  to  acquire,  in  our 
progress  from  one  stage  of  life  to  another,  from  child- 
hood to  mature  age ;  put  it  upon  us  to  acquire  them,  by 
giving  us  capacities  of  doing  it,  and  by  placing  us,  in  the 
beginning  of  life,  in  a  condition  fit  for  it.     And  this  is  a 
general  analogy  to  our  condition  in  the  present  world,  as 
in  a  state  of  moral  discipline  for  another.     It  is  in  vain 
then  to  object  against  the  credibility  of  the  present  life's 
being  intended  for  this  purpose,  that  all  the  trouble  and 
the  danger  unavoidably  accompanying  such  discipline^ 
might  have  been  saved  us,  by  our  being  made  at  once 
the  creatures  and  the  characters,  which  we  were  to  be. 
For  we  experience,  that  what  we  were  to  be,  was  to  be  the 
effect  of  what  we  would  do:  and  that  the  general  conduct 
of  nature  is,  not  to  save  us  trouble  or  danger,  but  to 
make  us  capable  of  going  through  them,  and  to-  put  it 
upon  us  to  do  so.     Acquirements  of  our  own,  experience 


Cha?.  V.l  ?>I0I?AL  DISCIPII^JE  133 

and  habits,  are  the  natural  supply  to  our  deficiencies,  and 
security  against  our  dangers  :  since  it  is  as  plainly  natu- 
ral to  set  ourselves  to  arquire  the  qualifications,  as  the 
external  things,  which  we  stand  in  need  of.  In  particu- 
lar, it  is  as  plainly  a  general  law  of  nature,  that  we  should 
with  regard  to  our  temporal  interest,  form  and  cultivate 
practical  principles  within  us,  by  attention,  use,  and  dis- 
cipline, as  any  thing  whatever  is  a  natural  law;  chiefly 
in  the  beginning  of  life,  but  also  throughout  the  whole 
course  of  it.  And  the  alternative  is  left  to  our  choice  : 
either  to  improve  ourselves,  and  better  our  condition ;  or, 
in  default  of  such  improvement,  to  remain  deficient  and 
wretched.  It  is  therefore  perfectly  credible,  from  the 
analogy  of  nature,  that  the  same  may  be  our  case,  with 
respect  to  the  happiness  of  a  future  state,  and  the  qualifi- 
cations necessary  for  it. 

There  is  a  third  thing,  which  may  seem  implied  in  the 
present  world's  being  a  state  of  probation;  that  it  is  a 
theatre  of  action,  for  the  manifestation  of  persons'  cha- 
racters, with  respect  to  a  future  one  :  not,  to  be  sure,  to 
an  all-knowing  Being,  but  to  his  creation  or  part  of  it. 
This  may,  perhaps,  be  only  a  consequence  of  our  being 
in  a  state  of  probation  in  the  other  senses.  However,  it 
is  not  impossible,  that  men's  showing  and  making  mani- 
fest, what  is  in  their  heart,  what  their  real  character  is, 
may  have  respect  to  a  future  life,  in  ways  and  manners 
which  we  are  not  acquainted  with:  particularly  it  may 
be  a  means,  for  the  Author  of  Nature  does  not  appear  to 
do  any  thing  without  means,  of  their  being  disposed  of 
suitably  to  their  characters;  and  of  its  being  known  to 
the  creation,  by  way  of  example,  that  they  are  thus  dis- 
posed of.  But  not  to  enter  upon  any  conjectural  account 
of  this ;  one  may  just  mention,  that  the  manifestation  of 
persons'  characters  contributes  very  much,  in  various 
ways,  to  the  carrying  on  a  great  part  of  that  general 
course  of  nature,  respecting  mankind,  which  comes  under 
our  observation  at  present.  I  shall  only  add,  that  pro- 
bation, in  both  these  senses,  as  well  as  in  that  treated  of 
in  the  foregoing  chapter,  is  implied  in  moral  government ; 
since  by  persons'  behaviour  under  it,  their  characters  can- 
not but  be  m.anifested,  and  if  they  behave  well,  improved. 


v^ 


334  OF  THE  OriNlCJ?  of  XECESSITT,  [PartT, 


CHAP.  VI. 

OF  THE  OPINION  OF  NECESSITY,  CONSIDERED  AS 
INFLUENCING  PRACTICE. 

1  Throughout  the  foregoing  Treatise  it  appears,  that  the 
j  condition  of  mankind,  considered  as  inhabitants  of  this 
j  world  only,  and  under  the  government  of  God  which  we 
/  experience,  is  greatly  analogous  to  our  condition,  as  de- 
f  signed  for  another  world,  or  under  that  farther  govern- 
\  ment,  which  Religion  teaches  us.     If  therefore  any  assert, 
as  a  Fatalist  must,  that  the  opinion  of  universal  Necessity 
is  reconcilable  with  the  former ;  there  immediately  arises 
a  question  in  the  way  of  analogy,  whether  he  must  not 
also  own  it  to  be  reconcilable  Avith  the  latter,  i.  e.  with 
the  system  of  Religion  itself,  and  the  proof  of  it.     The 
reader  then  will  observe,  that  the  question  now  before  us 
is  not  absolute.     Whether  the  opinion  of  Fate  be  recon- 
cilable with  Religion  ;  but  hypothetical,  whether,  upon 
supposition  of  its  being  reconcilable  with  the  constitu- 
tion of  Nature,  it  be  not  reconcilable  with  Religion  also: 
or,  what  pretence  a  Fatalist,  not  other  persons,  but  a 
Fatalist,  has  to  conclude  from  his  opinion,  that  there  can 
be  no  such  thing  as  Religion.     And  as  the  puzzle  and 
obscurity,  which  must  unavoidably  arise   from   arguing 
upon  so  absurd  a  supposition  as  that  of  universal  Neces- 
sity, will,  I  fear,  easily  be  seen  ;  it  will,  I  hope,  as  easily 
be  excused. 

But  since  it  has  been  all  along  taken  for  granted,  as  a 
thing  proved,  that  there  is  an  intelligent  Author  of  Na- 
ture, or  natural  Governor  of  the  world  ;  and  since  an 
objection  may  be  made  against  the  proof  of  this,  from 
the  opinion  of  universal  Necessity,  as  it  may  be  supposed^ 
that  such  Necessity  will  itself  account  for  the  origin  and 
preservation  of  all  things  :  it  is  requisite,  that  this  objec- 
tion be  distinctly  answered;  or  that  it  be  shown,  that  a 
Fatality  supposed  consistent  with  what  we  certainly  ex- 
perience, does  not  destroy  the  proof  of  an  intelligent 
Author  and  Governor  of  Nature;  before  we  proceed  to 


Chap.  VI.]      "  AS  INFLUENCING  PRACTICE.  135 

consider,  whether   it  destroys   the   proof  of    a   moral 
Governor  of  it,  or  of  our  being  in  a  state  of  Rehgion. 

Now,  when  it  is  said  by  a  Fatahst,  that  the  whole  con- 
stitution of  Nature,  and  the  actions  of  men,  that  every 
thing,  and  every  mode  and  circumstance  of  every  thing, 
IS  necessary,  and  could  not  possibly  have  been  otherwise ; 
it  is  to  be  observed,  that  this  Necessity  does  not  exclude 
deliberation,  choice,  preference,  and  acting  from  certain 
principles,  and  to  certain  ends :  because  all  this  is  mat- 
ter of  undoubted  experience,  acknowledged  by  all,  and 
what  every  man  may,  every  moment,  be  conscious  of. 
And  from  hence  it  follows,  that  Necessity,  alone  and  of 
itself,  is  in  no  sort  an  account  of  the  constitution  of  Na- 
ture, and  how  things  came  to  be  and  to  continue  as  they 
are;  but  only  an  account  of  this  circumstance  relating  to 
their  origin  and  continuance,  that  they  could  not  have 
been  otherwise,  than  they  are  and  have  been.     The  as- 
sertion,  that  every  thing  is  by  Necessity  of  Nature,  is 
not  an  answer  to  the  question  ;  Whether  the  world  can:e 
into  being  as  it  is,  by  an  intelligent  Agent  forming  it  thus, 
or  not:  but  to  quite  another  question;  Whether  it  came 
into  being  as  it  is,  in  that  way  and  manner  which  we 
call  necessarily,  or  in  that  way  and  manner  which  we  call 
freely.     For  suppose  farther,  that  one  who  was  a  Fata- 
list, and  one  who  kept  to  his  natural  sense  of  things, 
and  believed  himself  a  Free  Agent,  were  disputing  toge- 
ther, and  vindicating  their  respective  opinions;  and  they 
should  happen  to  instance  in  a  house :  they  would  agree 
that  it  was  built  by  an  architect.     Their  difference  con- 
cerning Necessity  and  Freedom  would  occasion  no  dif- 
ference of  judgment  concerning  this;  but  only  concerning 
another  matter ;  whether  the  architect  built  it  necessa- 
rily or  freely.     Suppose  then  they  should  proceed  to  in- 
quire concerning  the  constitution  of  nature :    in  a  lax 
way  of  speaking,  one  of  them  might  say,  it  was  by  Ne- 
cessity; and  the  other,  by  Freedom  :  but  if  they  had  any 
meaning  to  their  v*^ords,  as  the  latter  must  mean  a  Free 
Agent,  so  the  former  must  at  length  be  reduced  to  mean 
an  Agent,  whether  he  would  say  one  or  more,  acting  by 
Necessity  :  for  abstract  notions  can  do  nothing.     Indeed 
we  ascribe  to  God  a  necessary  existence,  uncaused  by 


136  OF  THE  OPINION  OF  NECESSITY,  [Part  L 

any  agent.  For  we  find  within  ourselves  the  idea  of 
infinity,  i.  e.  immensity  and  eternity,  impossible,  even  in 
imagination,  to  be  removed  out  of  being.  We  seem  to 
discern  intuitively,  that  there  must,  and  cannot  but  be, 
somewhat,  external  to  ourselves,  answering  this  idea,  or 
the  archetype  of  it.  And  from  hence  (for  this  abstract ^ 
as  much  as  any  other,  implies  a  concrete)  we  conclude, 
that  there  is,  and  cannot  but  be,  an  infinite  and  immense 
eternal  Being  existing,  prior  to  all  design  contributing  to 
his  existence,  and  exclusive  of  it.  And  from  the  scan- 
tiness of  language,  a  manner  of  speaking  has  been  intro- 
duced ;  that  Necessity  is  the  foundation,  the  reason,  the 
account  of  the  existence  of  God.  But  it  is  not  alleged, 
nor  can  it  be  at  all  intended,  that  every  thing  exists  as  it 
does,  by  this  kind  of  Necessity  ;  a  Necessity  antecedent 
in  nature  to  design  :  it  cannot,  I  say,  be  meant  that  every 
thing  exists  as  it  does,  by  this  kind  of  Necessity,  upon 
several  accounts  ;  and  particularly  because  it  is  admitted, 
that  design,  in  the  actions  of  men,  contributes  to  many 
alterations  in  nature.  For  if  any  deny  this,  I  shall  not 
pretend  to  reason  with  them. 

I  From  these  things  it  follov/s ;  First,  That  when  a  Fa- 
'  talist  asserts,  that  every  thing  is  by  Necessity,  he  must 
mean,  by  an  Agent  acting  necessarily ;  he  must,  I  say,  mean 
this,  for  I  am  very  sensible  he  would  not  choose  t©  mean 
it :  and  Secondly,  That  the  Necessity,  by  which  such  an 
Agent  is  supposed  to  act,  does  not  exclude  intelligence 
and  design.  So  that,  were  the  system  of  Fatality  admit- 
ted, it  would  just  as  much  account  for  the  formation  of 
the  world,  as  for  the  structure  of  a  house,  and  no  more. 
Necessity  as  much  requires  and  supposes  a  Necessary 
Agent,  as  Freedom  requires  and  supposes  a  Free  Agent, 
to  be  the  former  of  the  world.  And  the  appearances  of 
design  and  oi  final  causes  in  the  constitution  of  nature  as 
really  prove  this  acting  Agent  to  be  an  intelligent  designer, 
or  to  act  from  choice;  upon  the  scheme  of  Necessity, 
supposed  possible,  as  upon  that  of  Freedom. 

It  appearing  thus,  that  the  notion  of  Necessity  does 
not  destroy  the  proof,  that  there  is  an  intelligent  Author 
of  Nature  and  natural  Governor  of  the  world  ;  the  pre- 
sent question,  which  the  analogy  before  mentioned  sug- 


Chap.  VI.]  AS  INFLUENCING  PRACTICE.  137 

gests,*  and  whicli,  I  think,  it  will  answer,  is  this :  Whether  ( 
the  opinion  of  Necessity,  supposed  consistent  with  possi-  \ 
bility,  with  the  constitution  of  the  world,  and  the  natural  ■ 
government  which  we  experience  exercised  over  it,  de-  1 
stroys  all  reasonable  ground  of  belief,  that  we  are  in  a  ' 
state  of  Religion :  or  whether  that  opinion  be  reconcil- 
able with  Religion  ;  with  the  system,  and  the  proof  of  it. 
Suppose  then  a  Fatahst  to  educate  any  one,  from  his 
youth  up,  in  his  own  principles;  that  the  child  should 
reason  upon  them,  and  conclude,  that  since  he  cannot 
possibly  behave  otherwise  than  he  does,  he  is  not  a  sub- 
ject of  blame  or  commendation,  nor  can  deserve  to  be 
rewarded  or  punished:  imagine  him  to  eradicate  the  very^ 
perceptions  of  blame  and  commendation  out  of  his  mind, 
by  means  of  this  system  ;  to  form  his  temper,  and  cha- 
racter, and  behaviour  to  it ;  and  from  it  to  judge  of  the 
treatment  he  was  to  expect,  say,  from  reasonable  men, 
upon  his  coming  abroad  into  the  world :  as  the  Fatalist 
iudges  from  this  system,  what  he  is  to  expect  from  the 
Author  of  Nature,  and  with  regard  to  a  future  state.     I 
cannot  forbear  stopping  here  to  ask,  whether  any  one  of 
common  sense  would  think  fit,  that  a  child  should  be  put 
upon  these  speculations,  and  be  left  to  apply  them  to 
practice.     And  a  man  has  little  pretence  to  reason,  who 
is  not  sensible,  that  we  are  all  children  in  speculations  of 
this  kind.    However,  the  child  would  doubtless  be  highly 
delighted  to    find  himself  freed  from  the  restraints  of 
fear  and  shame,  with  which  his  play-fellows  were  fetter- 
ed and  embarrassed;  and  highly  conceited  in  his  supe-    ' 
rior  knowledge,  so  far  beyond  his  years.     But  conceit 
and  vanity  would  be  the  least  bad  part  of  the  influence,    ' 
which  these  principles  must  have,  when  thus  reasoned 
and  acted  upon,  during  the  course  of  his  education.    He 
must  either  be  allowed  to  go  on  and  be  the  plague  of  all 
about  him,  and  himself  too,  even  to  his  own  destruction: 
or  else  correction  must  be  continually  made  use   of,  to 
supply  the  want  of  those  natural  perceptions  of  blame 
and  commendation,  which  we  have  supposed  to  be  re- 
moved ;  and  to  give  him  a  practical  impression,  of  what 
he  had  reasoned  himself  out  of  the  belief  of,  that  he  was 

♦  r.  184. 


138  OF  THE  OPINION  OF  NECESSITY,  [Part  I. 

in  fact  an  accountable  child,  and  to  be  punished  for 
doing  what  he  was  forbid.  It  is  therefore  in  reality  im- 
possible, but  that  the  correction  which  he  must  meet 
with,  in  the  course  of  his  education,  must  convince  him, 
that  if  the  scheme  he  was  instructed  in  were  not  false  ; 
yet  that  he  reasoned  inconclusively  upon  it,  and  some- 
how or  other  misapplied  it  to  practice  and  common  life ; 
as  what  the  Fatalist  experiences  of  the  conduct  of  Pro- 
vidence at  present,  ought  in  all  reason  to  convince  him, 
that  this  scheme  is  misapplied,  when  applied  to  the  sub- 
ject of  Religion.*  But  supposing  the  child's  temper 
could  remain  still  formed  to  the  system,  and  his  expec- 
tation of  the  treatment  he  was  to  have  in  the  world  be 
regulated  by  it ;  so  as  to  expect  that  no  reasonable  man 
would  blame  or  punish  him,  for  any  thing  which  he 
should  do,  because  he  could  not  help  doing  it :  upon  this 
supposition  it  is  manifest  he  would,  upon  his  coming 
abroad  into  the  world,  be  insupportable  to  society,  and 
the  treatment  which  he  would  receive  from  it  would 
render  it  so  to  him ;  and  he  could  not  fail  of  doing  some- 
what, very  soon,  for  which  he  would  be  delivered  over 
into  the  hands  of  civil  justice.  And  thus,  in  the  end,  he 
would  be  convinced  of  the  obligations  he  was  under  to 
his  wise  instructor.  Or  suppose  this  scheme  of  Fatality, 
in  any  other  way,  applied  to  practice,  such  practical  ap- 
phcation  of  it  will  be  found  equally  absurd;  equally  falla- 
cious in  a  practical  sense:  for  instance,  that  if  a  man  be 
destined  to  live  such  a  time,  he  shall  live  to  it,  though 
he  take  no  care  of  his  own  preservation;  or  if  he  be 
destined  to  die  before  that  time,  no  care  can  prevent  it." 
therefore  all  care  about  preserving  one's  life  is  to  be 
neglected:  which  is  the  fallacv  instanced  in  by  the 
p.ncients.  But  now,  on  the  contrary,  none  of  these  prac- 
tical absurdities  can  be  drawn  from  reasoning,  upon  the 
supposition  that  we  are  free  ;  but  all  such  reasoning  with 
regard  to  the  common  affairs  of  life  is  justified  by  expe- 
rience. And  therefore,  though  it  were  admitted  that  this 
opinion  of  Necessity  were  speculatively  true;  yet,  with 
re2;ard  to  practice,  it  is  as  if  it  were  false,  so  far  as  our 
experience  reaches  :  that  is,  to  the  whole  of  our  present 

*  r.  1S6. 


Chaf.  VI.]  AS  INFLUENCING  PRACTICE.  '  139 

life.     For,  the  constitution  of  the  present  world,  and  the 
condition  in  which  we  are  actually  placed,  is,  as  if  we 
were  free.     And  it  may  perhaps  justly  be  concluded,  that 
since  the  whole  process  of  action,  through  every  step  of 
it,  suspense,  deliberation,  inclining  one  way,  determining, 
and  at  last  doing  as  we  determine,  is  as  if  we  were  free, 
therefore  we  are  so.     But  the  thing  here  insisted  upon  is, 
that  under  the  present  natural  government  of  the  world, 
we  find  we  are  treated  and  dealt  with,  as  if  we  were  free, 
prior  to  all  consideration  whether  we  are  or  not.    Were 
this  opinion  therefore  of  Necessity  admitted  to  be  ever 
so  true  ;  yet  such  is  in  fact  our  condition  and  the  natural 
course  of  things,  that  whenever  we  apply  it  to  life  and 
practice,  this  application  of  it  always  misleads  us,  and 
cannot  but  mislead  us,  in  a  most  dreadful  manner,  with 
regard  to   our  present  interest.     And  how  can  people 
think  themselves  so   very   secure   then,  that  the   same 
application  of  the  same  opinion  may  not  mislead  them 
also,  in  some  analogous  manner,  with  respect  to  a  future, 
a  more  general,  and  more   important   interest  .P     For, 
Religion  being  a  practical  subject;  and  the  analogy  of 
nature  showing  us,  that  v^^e  have  not  faculties  to  apply 
this  opinion,  were  it  a  true  one,  to  practical  subjects; 
whenever  we  do  apply  it  to  the  subject  of  Religion,  and 
thence  conclude,  that  we  are  free  from  its  obli2;ations,  it 
is  plain  this  conclusion  cannot  be  depended  upon.    There  \ 
will  still  remain  just  reason  to  think,  whatever  appear- 
ances are,  that  we  deceive  ourselves;  in  somewhat  of  a 
like  manner,  as  when  people  fancy  they  can  draw  con- 
tradictory conclusions  from  the  idea  of  infinity. 

From  these  things  together,  the  attentive  reader  will 
see  it  follows,  that  if  upon  supposition  of  Freedom  the 
evidence  of  Religion  be  conclusive,  it  remains  so,  upon 
supposition  of  Necessity,  because  the  notion  of  Necessity 
is  not  applicable  to  practical  subjects:  i.e.  with  respect 
to  them,  is  as  if  it  were  not  true.  Nor  does  this  contain 
any  reflection  upon  reason,  but  only  upon  what  is  un- 
reasonable. For  to  pretend  to  act  upon  reason,  in  oppo- 
sition to  practical  principles,  which  the  Author  of  our  na- 
ture gave  us  to  act  upon ;  and  to  pretend  to  apply  our 
reason  to  subjects,  with  regard  to  which,  our  own  short 


140  OF  THE  OPINION  OF  NECESSITY,  [Part  I. 

views,  and  even  our  experience,  will  show  us,  it  cannot  be 
depended  upon;  and  such,  at  best,  the  subject  of  Neces- 
sity must  be;  this  is  vanity,  conceit,  and  unreasonableness. 
^  But  this  is  not  all.  For  we  tind  within  ourselves  a 
will,  and  are  conscious  of  a  character.  Now  if  this,  in 
us,  be  reconcilable  with  Fate,  it  is  reconcilable  with  it, 
in  the  Author  of  Nature.  And  besides,  natural  govern- 
ment and  final  causes  imply  a  character  and  a  will  in  the 
Governor  and  Designer;*  a  will  concerning  the  creatures 
whom  he  governs.  The  Author  of  Nature  then  being 
certainly  of  some  character  or  other,  notwithstanding 
Necessity;  it  is  evident  this  Necessity  is  as  reconcilable 
with  the  particular  character  of  benevolence,  veracity, 
and  justice,  in  him,  which  attributes  are  the  foundation  of 
Religion,  as  with  anv  other  character :  since  we  find  this 
Necessity  no  more  hinders  men  from  being  benevolent, 
than  cruel ;  true,  than  faithless  ;  just,  than  unjust ;  or,  if 
the  Fatalist  pleases,  what  we  call  unjust.  For  it  is  said 
indeed,  that  what,  upon  supposition  of  Freedom,  would- 
be  just  punishment ;  upon  supposition  of  Necessity,  be- 
comes manifestly  unjust:  because  it  is  punishment  in- 
flicted for  doing  that  which  persons  could  not  avoid 
doing.  As  if  the  Necessity,  which  is  supposed  to  de- 
stroy the  injustice  of  murder,  for  instance,  would  not 
also  destroy  the  injustice  of  punishing  it.  However,  as 
little  to  the  purpose  as  this  objection  is  in  itself,  it  is  very 
much  to  the  purpose  to  observe  from  it,  how  the  notions 
of  justice  and  injustice  remain,  even  whilst  we  endeavour 
to  suppose  them  removed ;  how  they  force  themselves 
upon  the  mind,  even  whilst  we  are  making  suppositions 
destructive  of  them:  for  there  is  not,  perhaps,  a  man  in 
the  world,  but  would  be  ready  to  make  this  objection  at 
first  thought. 

But  though  it  is  most  evident,  that  universal  Neces- 
sity, if  it  be  reconcilable  with  any  thing,  is  reconcilable 
with  that  character  in  the  Author  of  Nature,  which  is  the 
foundation  of  Religion ;  "  Yet,  does  it  not  plainly  destroy 
the  proof,  that  he  is  of  that  character,  and  consequently 

*  By  teili  and  character  is  meant  that  which,  in  spfaking  of  men,  we  should  ex- 
press, not  only  by  these  words,  but  also  by  the  words  tewper,  (aste,  dispositions,  prac- 
tical principies  :  that  whole  frame  of  mind,  from  whence  we  act  in  one  manner  rather 
than  another. 


Chap.  VI.]  AS  INFLUENCING  PRACTICE.  141 

the  proof  of  Religion  ?"  By  no  means.  For  we  find,  that 
happiness  and  misery  are  not  our  fate,  in  any  such  sense 
as  not  to  be  the  consequences  of  our  behaviour  ;  but  that 
they  are  the  consequences  of  it.*  We  find  God  exer- 
cises the  same  kind  of  government  over  us,  with  that 
which  a  father  exercises  over  his  children,  and  a  civil 
magistrate  over  his  subjects.  Now,  whatever  becomes 
of  abstract  questions  concerning  Liberty  and  Necessity, 
it  evidently  appears  to  us,  that  veracity  and  justice  must 
be  the  natural  rule  and  measure  of  exercising  this  autho- 
rity or  government,  to  a  Being  who  can  have  no  compe- 
titions, or  interfering  of  interests,  with  his  creatures  and 
his  subjects. 

But  as  the  doctrine  of  Liberty,  though  we  experience 
its  truth,  may  be  perplexed  with  difficulties,  which  run 
up  into  the  most  abstruse  of  all  speculations ;  and  as  the 
opinion  of  Necessity  seems  to  be  the  very  basis  upon 
which  infidelity  grounds  itself;  it  may  be  of  some  use 
to  offer  a  more  particular  proof  of  the  obligations  of 
Religion,  which  may  distinctly  be  shown  not  to  be  de- 
stroyed by  this  opinion. 

The  proof  froin  final  causes  of  an  intelligent  Author 
of  Nature  is  not  affected  by  the  opinion  of  Necessity  ; 
supposing  Necessity  a  thing  possible  in  itself,  and  recon- 
cilable with  the  constitution  of  things.t  And  it  is  a  mat- 
ter of  fact,  independent  on  this  or  any  other  speculation, 
that  he  governs  the  world  by  the  method  of  rewards  and 
punishments  :t  and  also  that  he  hath  given  us  a  moral 
faculty,  by  which  we  distinguish  between  actions,  and 
approve  some  as  virtuous  and  of  good  desert,  and  disap- 
prove others  as  vicious  and  of  ill  desert.§  Now  this 
moral  discernment  implies,  in  the  notion  of  it,  a  rule  of 
action,  and  a  rule  x){  a  very  peculiar  kind :  for  it  carries 
in  it  authority  and  a  right  of  direction  ;  authority  in  such 
a  sense,  as  that  we  cannot  depart  from  it  without  being 
self-condemned. II  And  that  the  dictates  of  this  moral 
faculty,  which  are  by  nature  a  rule  to  us,  are  moreover 
the  laws  of  God,  laws  in  a  sense  including  sanctions ; 
may  be  thus  proved.    Consciousness  of  a  rule  or  guide  of 

*  Cliap.  if.  t  P- 134,  8jC.  t  Chap.  ii. 

4  Dissert.  II.  '.'  Serm.  2.  at  tUe  Rollt. 


142  OF  THE  OPINION  OF  NECESSITY,  [Part  I. 

action,  in  creatures  who  are  capable  of  considering  it  as 
given  them  by  their  Maker,  not  only  raises  immediately 
a  sense  of  duty,  but  also  a  sense  of  security  in  following 
it,  and  of  danger  in  deviating  from  it.  A  direction  of 
the  Author  of  Nature,  given  to  creatures  capable  of  look- 
ing upon  it  as  such,  is  plainly  a  command  from  him  :  and 
a  command  from  him  necessarily  includes  in  it,  at  least, 
an  implicit  promise  in  case  of  obedience,  or  threatening 
in  case  of  disobedience.  But  then  the  sense  or  percep- 
tion of  good  and  ill  desert,*  which  is  contained  in  the 
moral  discernment,  renders  the  sanction  explicit,  and 
makes  it  appear,  as  one  may  say,  expressed.  For  since 
his  method  of  government  is  to  reward  and  punish 
actions,  his  having  annexed  to  some  actions  an  insepa- 
rable sense  of  good  desert,  and  to  others  of  ill,  this  surely 
amounts  to  declaring,  upon  whom  his  punishments  shall 
be  inflicted,  and  his  rewards  be  bestowed.  For  he  must 
have  given  us  this  discernment  and  sense  of  things,  as 
a  presentiment  of  what  is  to  be  hereafter:  that  is,  by 
way  of  information  beforehand,  what  we  are  finally  to 
expect  in  this  world.  There  is  then  most  evident  ground 
to  think,  that  the  government  of  God,  upon  the  whole, 
will  be  found  to  correspond  to  the  nature  which  he  has 
given  us:  and  that,  in  the  upshot  and  issue  of  things, 
happiness  and  misery  shall,  in  fact  and  event,  be  made 
to  follow  virtue  and  vice  respectively;  as  he  has  already, 
in  so  peculiar  a  manner,  associated  the  ideas  of  them  in 
our  minds.  And  from  hence  might  easily  be  deduced 
the  obligations  of  religious  worship,  were  it  only  to  be 
considered  as  a  means  of  preserving  upon  our  minds  a 
sense  of  this  moral  government  of  God,  and  securing  our 
obedience  to  it :  which  yet  is  an  extremely  imperfect 
view  of  that  most  important  duty. 

Now,  I  say,  no  objection  from  Necessity  can  lie  against 
this  general  proof  of  Religion.  None  against  the  pro- 
position reasoned  upon,  that  we  have  such  a  moral  faculty 
and  discernment ;  because  this  is  a  mere  matter  of  fact, 
a  thing  of  experience,  that  human  kind  is  thus  oonstitut- 
ed :  none  against  the  conclusion  ;  because  it  is  imme- 
diate and  wholly  from  this  fact.    For  the  conclusion,  that 

*  Dissert.  II. 


Chap.  VI.]  AS  INFLUENCING  PRACTICE.  ~  143 

God  will  finally  reward  the  righteous  and  punish  the 
wicked,  is  not  here  drawn,  from  its  appearing  to  us  fit* 
that  he  should  ;  but  from  its  appearing,  that  he  has  told 
us,  he  will.  And  this  he  hath  certainly  told  us,  in  the  \ 
promise  and  threatening,  which  it  hath  been  observed 
the  notion  of  a  command  implies,  and  the  sense  of  good 
and  ill  desert  which  he  has  given  us,  more  distinctly  ex- 
presses. And  this  reasoning  from  fact  is  confirmed,  and 
in  some  degree  even  verified,  by  other  facts;  by  the  na- 
tural tendencies  of  virtue  and  of  vice  ;t  and  by  this,  that 
God,  in  the  natural  course  of  his  provideilce,  punishes 
vicious  actions  as  mischievous  to  society  ;  and  also  vi- 
cious actions  as  such  in  the  strictest  sense. +  So  that  the 
general  proof  of  Religion  is  unanswerably  real,  even  upon 
the  wild  supposition  which  we  are  arguing  upon. 

It  must  likewise  be  observed  further,  that  natural  Re- 
ligion hath,  besides  this,  an  external  evidence  ;  which  the 
doctrine  of  Necessity,  if  it  could  be  true,  would  not  affect. 
For  suppose  a  person,  by  the  observations  and  reasoning 
above,  or  by  any  other,  convinced  of  the  truth  of  Religion ; 
that  there  is  a  God,  who  made  the  world,  who  is  the  moral 
Governor  and  Judge  of  mankind,  and  will  upon  the  whole 
deal  with  every  one  according  to  his  works :  I  say,  sup- 
pose a  person  convinced  of  this  by  reason  ;  but  to  know 
nothing  at  all  of  antiquity,  or  the  present  state  of  man- 
kind: it  would  be  natural  for  such  a  one  to  be  inquisitive, 
what  was  the  history  of  this  system  of  doctrine  ;  at  what 
time,  and  in  what  manner,  it  came  first  into  the  world  ; 
and  whether  it  were  believed  by  any  considerable  part 
of  it.     And  were  he  upon  inquiry  to  find,  that  a  parti- 

*  However,  I  am  far  from  intending'  to  deny,  that  the  will  of  God  is  determined, 
by  what  is  fit,  by  the  right  and  reason  of  the  case ;  though  one  chooses  to  decline 
matters  of  such  abstract  speculation,  and  to  speak  with  caution  wiien  one  does  speak 
of  ttiem.  But  if  it  be  intelligible  to  say,  that  it  is  fit  and  reasonable  for  every  one  to 
consult  his  oivn  happiness,  then  fitness  of  action,  or  the  right  andreason  of  the  case,  is 
an  intelligible  manner  of  speaking.  And  it  seems  as  inconceivable,  to  suppose  God 
to  approve  one  course  of  action,  or  one  end,  preferably  to  another,  which  yet  his 
acting  at  all  from  design  implies  that  he  does,  without  supposing  somewhat  prior  in 
that  end,  to  be  the  ground  of  the  preference  ;  as  to  suppose  him  to  discern  an  ab- 
stract proposition  to  be  true,  without  supposing  somewhat  prior  in  it,  to  be  the  ground 
of  the  discernment.  It  doth  not  therefore  appear,  that  moral  right  is  any  more  re- 
lative to  perception,  than  abstract  truth  is  ;  or  that  it  is  any  more  improper,  to  speak 
of  the  fitness  and  Tightness  of  actions  and  ends,  as  founded  in  the  nature  of  things, 
than  to  speak  of  abstract  truth,  as  thus  founded. 

t  P.  95.  X  I*-  88,  &c. 


144  OF  THE  OPINION  OF  NECESSITY,  [Part  I. 

cular  person,  in  a  late  age,  first  of  all  proposed  it,  as  a 
deduction  of  reason,  and  that  mankind  were  before 
wholly  ignorant  of  it;  then,  though  its  evidence  from 
reason  would  remain,  there  would  be  no  additional  pro- 
bability of  its  truth,  from  the  account  of  its  discovery. 
But  instead  of  this  being  the  fact  of  the  case,  on  the 
contrary,  he  would  find,  what  could  not  but  afford  him 
a  very  strong  confirmation  of  its  truth :  First,  That  %/ 
somewhat  of  this  system,  with  more  or  fewer  additions 
and  alterations,  hath  been  professed  in  all  ages  and 
countries,  of  which  we  have  any  certain  information 
relating  to  this  matter.  Secondly,  That  it  is  certain^ 
historical  fact,  so  far  as  we  can  trace  things  up,  that  this 
v/hole  system  of  belief,  that  there  is  one  God,  the  Creator 
and  moral  Governor  of  the  world,  and  that  mankind  is 
in  a  state  of  Religion,  was  received  in  the  first  ages. 
And  Thirdly,  That  as  there  is  no  hint  or  intimation  in  \/ 
history,  that  this  system  was  first  reasoned  out ;  so  there 
is  express  historical  or  traditional  evidence,  as  ancient 
as  history,  that  it  was  taught  first  by  revelation.  Now 
these  things  must  be  allowed  to  be  of  great  weight.  The 
first  of  them,  general  consent,  shows  this  system  to  be 
conformable  to  the  common  sense  of  mankind.  The 
second,  namely,  that  Religion  was  believed  in  the  first 
ages  of  the  world,  especially  as  it  does  not  appear  that 
there  were  then  any  superstitious  or  false  additions  to  it, 
cannot  but  be  a  further  confirmation  of  its  truth.  For 
it  is  a  proof  of  this  alternative:  either  that  it  came  into 
the  world  by  revelation ;  or  that  it  is  natural,  obvious, 
and  forces  itself  upon  the  mind.  The  former  of  these 
is  the  conclusion  of  learned  men.  And  whoever  will 
consider,  how  unapt  for  speculation  rude  and  uncultivat- 
ed minds  are,  will,  perhaps  from  hence  alone,  be  strongly 
inclined  to  believe  it  the  truth.  And  as  it  is  shown  in 
the  Second  Part*  of  this  Treatise,  that  there  is  nothing 
of  such  peculiar  presumption  against  a  revelation  in  the 
beginning  of  the  world,  as  there  is  supposed  to  be  against 
subsequent  ones :  a  sceptic  could  not,  I  think,  give  any 
account,  which  would  appear  more  probable  even  to 
himself,  of  the  early  pretences  to  revelation;  than  by 

*  Chap.  ii. 


TiK         tftL 


Chap.  VI.]  AS  INFLUENCING  PRACTICE.  ]  4- 

supposing  some  real  original  one,  from  whence  thev 
were  copied.  And  the  third  thing  above  mentioned, 
that  there  is  express  historical  or  traditional  evidence  as 
ancient  as  history,  of  the  system  of  Religion  being  taught 
mankind  by  revelation ;  this  must  be  admitted  as  some 
degree  of  real  proof,  that  it  was  so  taught.  For  why 
should  not  the  most  ancient  tradition  be  admitted  as 
some  additional  proof  of  a  fact,  against  which  there  is  no 
presumption  ?  And  this  proof  is  mentioned  here,  because 
it  has  its  weight  to  show,  that  Religion  came  into  the 
world  by  revelation,  prior  to  all  consideration  of  the 
proper  authority  of  any  book  supposed  to  contain  it ; 
and  even  prior  to  all  consideration,  whether  the  reve- 
lation itself  be  uncorruptly  handed  down,  and  related,  or 
mixed  and  darkened  with  fables.  Thus  the  historical 
account,  which  we  have  of  the  origin  of  Religion,  taking 
in  all  circumstances,  is  a  real  confirmation  of  its  truth, 
no  way  affected  by  the  opinion  of  Necessity.  And  the 
external  evidence,  even  of  natural  Religion,  is  by  no 
means  inconsiderable. 

But  it  is  carefully  to  be  observed,  and  ought  to  be 
recollected  after  all  proofs  of  virtue  and  religion,  which 
are  only  general ;  that  as  speculative  reason  may  be 
neglected,  prejudiced,  and  deceived,  so  also  may  our 
moral  understanding  be  impaired  and  perverted,  and  the 
dictates  of  it  not  impartially  attended  to.  This  indeed 
proves  nothing  against  the  reality  of  our  speculative  or 
practical  faculties  of  perception ;  against  their  being 
intended  by  nature,  to  inform  us  in  the  theory  of  things, 
and  instruct  us  how  we  are  to  behave,  and  what  we  are 
to  expect  in  consequence  of  our  behaviour.  Yet  our 
liableness,  in  the  degree  we  are  liable,  to  prejudice  and 
perversion,  is  a  most  serious  admonition  to  us  to  be 
upon  our  guard,  with  respect  to  v/hat  is  of  such  conse- 
quence, as  our  determinations  concerning  virtue  and 
religion ;  and  particularly  not  to  take  custom,  and 
fashion,  and  slight  notions  of  honour,  or  imaginations  of 
present  ease,  use,  and  convenience  to  mankind,  for  the 
only  moral  rule.* 

The  foregoing  observations,  drawn  from  the  nature  of 

*  Dissprt,  II. 
K 


146  OF  THE  OPINION  OF  NECESSITY,  \Va*tJ, 

the  thing,  and  the  history  of  Rehgion,  amount,  when 
taken  together,  to  a  real  practical  proof  of  it,  not  to  be 
confuted :  such  a  proof  as,  considering  the  infinite  im- 
portance of  the  thing,  I  apprehend,  would  be  admitted 
fully  sufficient,  in  reason,  to  influence  the  actions  of  men, 
v/ho  act  upon  thought  and  reflection  ;  if  it  were  admitted 
that  there  is  no  proof  of  the  contrary.  But  it  may  be 
said;  "There  are  many  probabilities,  which  cannot  indeed 
be  confuted,  ^.  e.  shown  to  be  no  probabilities,  and  yet 
may  be  overbalanced  by  greater  probabilities  on  the 
other  side  ;  much  more  bv  demonstration.  And  there  is 
no  occasion  to  object  against  particular  arguments  alleged 
for  an  opinion,  when  the  opinion  itself  maybe  clearly 
shown  to  be  false,  without  meddling  with  such  argu- 
ments at  all,  but  leaving  them  just  as  they  are.*  Now  the 
method  of  government  by  rewards  and  punishments,  and 
especially  rewarding  and  punishing  good  and  ill  desert 
as  such  respectively,  must  go  upon  supposition,  that  we 

\  are  Free  and  not  Necessary  Agents.  And  it  is  incredi- 
ble, that  the  Author  of  Nature  should  govern  us  upon  a 
supposition  as  true,  which  he  knows  to  be  false ;  and 
therefore  absurd  to  think,  he  will  reward  or  punish  us 
for  our  actions  hereafter ;  especially  that  he  will  do  it 
under  the  notion,  that  they  are  of  good  or  ill  desert." 
Here  then  the  matter  is  brought  to  a  point.  And  the 
answer  to  all  this  is  full,  and  not  to  be  evaded  ;  that 
the  whole  constitution  and  course  of  things,  the  whole 
analogy  of  providence,  shows  beyond  possibility  of  doubt, 

I  that  the  conclusion  from  this  reasoning  is  false ;  wher- 
ever the  fallacy  lies.  The  doctrine  of  freedom  indeed 
clearly  shows  where :  in  supposing  ourselves  Neces- 
sary, when  in  truth  we  are  Free  Agents.  But,  upon 
the  supposition  of  Necessity,  the  fallacy  lies  in  tak- 
ing for  granted,  that  it  is  incredible  Necessary  Agents 
should  be  rewarded  and  punished.  But  that,  somehow 
or  other,  the  conclusion  now  mentioned  is  false,  is  most 
certain.  For  it  is  fact,  that  God  does  govern  even  brute 
creatures  by  the  method  of  rewards  and  punishments, 
in  the  natural  course  of  things.  And  men  are  rewarded 
and  punished  for  their   actions,    punished   for   actions 

*  p.  49,  62. 


Cbap.vi.]  as  influencing  practice.  147 

miscliievous  to  society  as  being  so,  punished  for  vicious 
actions  as  such ;  by  the  natural  instrumentahty  of  each 
other,  under  the  present  conduct  of  Providence.  Nay 
even  the  affection  of  gratitude,  and  the  passion  of  resent- 
ment, and  the  rewards  and  punishments  following  from 
them,  which  in  general  are  to  be  considered  as  natural, 
t.  e.  from  the  Author  of  Nature ;  these  rewards  and 
punishments,  being  naturally*  annexed  to  actions  con- 
sidered as  implying  good  intention  and  good  desert,  ill 
intention  and  ill  desert;  these  natural  rewards  and 
punishments,  I  say,  are  as  much  a  contradiction  to  the 
conclusion  above,  and  show  its  falsehood,  as  a  more  exact 
and  complete  rewarding  and  punishmg  of  good  and  ill 
desert  as  such.  So  that  if  it  be  incredible,  that  Neces- 
sary Agents  should  be  thus  rewarded  and  punished ; 
then,  men  are  not  necessary  but  free ;  since  it  is  matter 
of  fact,  that  they  are  thus  rewarded  and  punished.  But 
if,  on  the  contrary,  which  is  the  supposition  we  have 
been  arguing  upon,  it  be  insisted,  that  men  are  Neces- 
sary Agents ;  then,  there  is  nothing  incredible  in  the 
further  supposition  of  Necessary  Agents  being  thus 
rewarded  and  punished :  since  we  ourselves  are  thus 
dealt  with. 

From  the  whole  therefore  it  must  follow,  that  a  Neces- 
sity supposed  possible,  and  reconcilable  with  the  consti- 
tution of  things,  does  in  no  sort  prove  that  the  Author  oi 
Nature  will  not,  nor  destroy  the  proof  that  he  will,  fi- 
nally and  upon  the  whole,  in  his  eternal  government, 
render  his  creatures  happy  or  miserable,  by  some  means 
or  other,  as  they  behave  well  or  ill.  Or,  to  express  this 
conclusion  in  words  conformable  to  the  title  of  the 
Chapter,  the  analogy  of  nature  shows  us,  that  the  opinion 
of  Necessity,  considered  as  practical,  is  false.  And  if 
Necessity,  upon  the  supposition  above  mentioned,  doth 
not  destroy  the  proof  of  natural  Religion,  it  evidently 
makes  no  alteration  in  the  proof  of  revealed. 

From  these  things  likewise  we  may  learn,  in  what 
sense  to  understand  that  general  assertion,  that  the 
opinion  of  Necessity  is  essentially  destructive  of  all  reli- 
gion.    First,  in  a  practical  sense ;  that  by  this  notion, 

*  Serin.  8th,  at  the  Rolls. 
HZ 


148  THE    GOVERNMENT    OP   GOD,  [Part I. 

atheistical  men  pretend  to  satisfy  and  encourage  them- 
selves in  vice,  and  justify  to  others  their  disregard  to  all 
religion.  And  secondly,  in  the  strictest  sense ;  that  it 
is  a  contradiction  to  the  whole  constitution  of  nature, 
and  to  what  we  may  every  moment  experience  in  our- 
selves, and  so  overturns  every  thing.  But  by  no  means 
is  this  assertion  to  be  understood,  as  if  Necessity,  sup- 
posing it  could  possibly  be  reconciled  with  the  consti- 
tution of  things  and  with  what  we  experience,  were  not 
also  reconcilable  with  Religion:  for  upon  this  supposi- 
tion, it  demonstrably  is  so. 


CHAP.  VII. 

OF  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD,  CONSIDERED  AS  A  SCHEME 
OR  CONSTITUTION,  IMPERFECTLY  COMPREHENDED. 

Though  it  be,  as  it  cannot  but  be,  acknowledged,  that 
the  analogy  of  nature  gives  a  strong  credibility  to  the 
general  doctrine  of  Religion,  and  to  the  several  particu- 
lar things  contained  in  it,  considered  as  so  many  matters 
of  fact;  and  likewise  that  it  shows  this  credibility  not  to 
ibe  destroyed  by  any  notions  of  Necessity:  yet  still,  ob- 
jjections  may  be  insisted  upon,  against  the  wisdom, 
■equity,  and  goodness  of  the  divine  government  implied 
in  the  notion  of  Religion,  and  against  the  method  by 
which  this  government  is  conducted;  to  which  objections 
analogy  can  be  no  direct  answer.  For  the  credibility, 
or  the  certain  truth,  of  a  matter  of  fact,  does  not  imme- 
diately prove  any  thing  concerning  the  wisdom  or  good- 
ness of  it:  and  analogy  can  do  no  more,  immediately  or 
directly,  than  show  such  and  such  things  to  be  true  or 
credible,  considered  only  as  matters  of  fact.  But  still, 
*if,  upon  supposition  of  a  moral  constitution  of  nature 
and  a  moral  government  over  it,  analogy  suggests  and 
makes  it  credible,  that  this  government  must  be  a 
scheme,  system,  or  constitution  of  government,  as  dis- 
tinguished from  a  number  of  single  unconnected  acts  of 
distributive  justice  and  goodness;  and  likewise,  that  it 
must  be  a  scheme,  so  imperfectly  comprehended,  and  of 


Shap.  VII.]  A    SCHEME    INCOMPREHENSIBLE.  149 

Buch  a  sort  in  other  respects,  as  to  aiford  a  direct  gene- 
ral answer  to  all  objections  against  the  justice  and  good- 
ness of  it:  then  analogy  is,  remotely,  of  great  service  in 
answering  those  objections ;  both  by  suggesting  the  an- 
sAver,  and  showing  it  to  be  a  credible  one. 

Now  this,  upon  inquiry,  will  be  found  to  be  the  case. 
For,  First,  Upon  supposition  that  God  exercises  a  mo- 
ral government  over  the  world,  the  analogy  of  his  natural 
government  suggests  and  makes  it  credible,  that  his  moral 
government  must  be  a  scheme,  quite  beyond  our  compre- 
hension: and  this  affords  a  general  answer  to  all  objec- 
tions against  the  justice  and  goodness  of  it.  And,  Se- 
condly, A  more  distinct  observation  of  some  particular 
things  contained  in  God's  scheme  of  natural  govern- 
ment, the  like  things  being  supposed,  by  analogy,  to  be  \ 
contained  in  his  moral  government,  will  further  show, 
how  little  weight  is  to  be  laid  upon  these  objections. 
I  I.  Upon  supposition  that  God  exercises  a  moral  go-" 
vernment  over  the  world,  the  analogy  of  his  natural  go- 
vernment suggests  and  makes  it  credible,  that  his  moral 
government  must  be  a  scheme,  quite  beyond  our  com- 
prehension; and  this  affords  a  general  answer  to  all  ob- 
jections against  the  justice  and  goodness  of  it.  It  is 
most  obvious,  analogy  renders  it  highly  credible,  that, 
upon  supposition  of  a  moral  government,  it  must  be  a 
scheme :  for  the  world,  and  the  whole  natural  govern- 
ment of  it,  appears  to  be  so:  to  be  a  scheme,  system,  or 
constitution,  whose  parts  correspond  to  each  other,  and 
to  a  whole ;  as  really  as  any  work  of  art,  or  as  any  par- 
ticular model  of  a  civil  constitution  and  government. 
In  this  great  scheme  of  the  natural  world,  individuals 
have  various  peculiar  relations  to  other  individuals  of 
their  own  species.  And  whole  species  are,  we  find, 
variously  related  to  other  species,  upon  this  earth.  Noi" 
do  we  know,  how  much  further  these  kinds  of  relations 
may  extend.  And,  as  there  is  not  any  action  or  natural 
event,  which  we  are  acquainted  with,  so  single  and  un- 
connected, as  not  to  have  a  respect  to  some  other  ac- 
tions and  events ;  so  possibly  each  of  them,  when  it  has 
not  an  immediate,  may  yet  have  a  remote,  natural  re- 
lation  to  other  actions  and  events,  much  beyond  the 


150  THE    GOVERNMENT    OF   GOD,  [Taw  1. 

compass  of  this  present  world.  There  seems  indeed 
nothing,  from  whence  we  can  so  much  as  make  a  conjec- 
tvu-e,  whether  all  creatures,  actions,  and  events,  through- 
out the  Avhole  of  nature,  have  relations  to  each  other. 
But,  as  it  is  obvious,  that  all  events  have  fiiture  un- 
known consequences;  so  if  we  trace  any,  as  far  as  we 
can  go,  into  what  is  connected  with  it,  we  shall  find, 
that  if  such  event  were  not  connected  with  somewhat 
further  in  nature  unknown  to  us,  somewhat  both  past 
and  present,  such  event  could  not  possibly  have  been  at 
all.  Nor  can  we  give  the  whole  account  of  any  one 
thing  v/hatever;  of  all  its  causes,  ends,  and  necessary  ad- 
juncts; those  adjuncts,  I  mean,  without  w^hich  it  could 
not  have  been.  By  this  most  astonishing  connexion, 
these  reciprocal  cori'espondences  and  mutual  relations, 
every  thing  which  we  see  in  the  course  of  nature  is  ac- 
tually brought  about.  And  things  seemingly  the  most 
insignificant  imaginable  are  perpetually  observed  to  be 
necessary  conditions  to  other  things  of  the  greatest  im- 
portance; so  that  any  one  thing  whatever  may,  for  ought 
we  know  to  the  contrary,  be  a  necessary  condition  to 
any  other.  The  natural  world  then,  and  natural  govern- 
ment of  it,  being  such  an  incomprehensible  scheme ;  so 
incomprehensible,  that  a  man  must,  really  in  the  li- 
teral sense,  know  nothing  at  all,  who  is  not  sensible  of 
his  ignorance  in  it ;  this  immediately  suggests,  and 
strongly  shows  the  credibility,  that  the  moral  world  and 
government  of  it  may  be  so  too.  Indeed  the  natural 
and  moral  constitution  and  government  of  the  world  are 
so  connected,  as  to  make  up  together  but  one  scheme: 
and  it  is  highly  piT)bable,  that  the  first  is  formed  and 
carried  on  merely  in  subserviency  to  the  latter;  as  the 
vegetable  world  is  for  the  animal,  and  organized  bodies 
for  minds.  But  the  thing  intended  here  is,  without  in- 
quiring how  far  the  administration  of  the  natural  world 
is  subordinate  to  that  of  the  moral,  only  to  observe  the 
credibility,  that  one  should  be  analogous  or  similar  to 
the  other:  that  therefore  every  act  of  divine  justice  and 
goodness  may  be  supposed  to  look  much  beyond  itself, 
and  its  immediate  object;  may  have  some  reference  to 
other  parts  of  God's  moral  administration,  and  to  a  ge- 


Chap  VII.]  A   SCHEME    INCOMPREHENSIBLE.  151 

neral  moral  plan ;  and  that  every  circumstance  of  this  his 
moral  government  may  be  adjusted  beforehand  with  a 
view  to  the  whole  of  it.  Thus  for  example  :  the  deter- 
mined length  of  time,  and  the  degrees  and  ways,  in 
which  virtue  is  to  remain  in  a  state  of  warfare  and  disci- 
pline, and  in  which  wickedness  is  permitted  to  have  its 
progress ;  the  times  appointed  for  the  execution  of  jus- 
tice ;  the  appointed  instruments  of  it;  the  kinds  of  re- 
wards and  punishments,  and  the  manners  of  their  distri- 
bution; all  particular  instances  of  divine  justice  and 
goodness,  and  every  circumstance  of  them,  may  have 
such  respects  to  each  other,  as  to  make  up  altogether  a 
whole,  connected  and  related  in  all  its  parts ;  a  scheme 
or  system,  which  is  as  properly  one  as  the  natural  world 
is,  and  of  the  like  kind.  And  supposing  this  to  be  the 
case;  it  is  most  evident,  that  we  are  not  competent 
judges  of  this  scheme,  from  the  small  parts  of  it  which 
come  within  our  view  in  the  present  life:  and  therefore 
no  objections  against  any  of  these  parts  can  be  insisted 
upon  by  reasonable  men. 

This  our  ignorance,  and  the  consequence  here  drawn 
from  it,  are  universally  acknowledged  upon  other  occa- 
sions ;  and  though  scarce  denied,  yet  are  universally  for- 
got, when  persons  come  to  argue  against  Religion.  And 
it  is  not  perhaps  easy,  even  for  the  most  reasonable  men, 
always  to  bear  in  mind  the  degree  of  our  ignorance,  and 
make  due  allowances  for  it.  Upon  these  accounts,  it 
may  not  be  useless  to  go  on  a  little  further,  in  order  to 
show  more  distinctly,  how  just  an  answer  our  ignorance 
is,  to  objections  against  the  scheme  of  Providence. 
Suppose  then  a  person  boldly  to  assert,  that  the  things 
complained  of,  the  origin  and  continuance  of  evil,  might 
easily  have  been  prevented  by  repeated  interpositions  ;" 
interpositions  so  guarded  and  circumstanced,  as  would 
preclude  all  mischief  arising  from  them  ;  or,  if  this  were 
impracticable,  that  a  scheme  of  government  is  itself  an 
imperfection;  since  more  good  might  have  been  pro- 
duced, without  any  scheme,  system,  or  constitution  at  all, 
by  continued  single  unrelated  acts  of  distributive  justice 
and  goodness ;  because  these  would  have  occasioned  no 

*  p.  154,  155. 


152  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD,  [R.^rt  I. 

irregularities.  And  farther  than  this,  it  is  presumed,  the 
objections  will  not  be  carried.  Yet  the  answer  is  obvi- 
ous: that  were  these  assertions  true,  still  the  observations 
above,  concerning  oar  ignorance  in  the  scheme  of  divine 
government  and  the  consequence  drawn  from  it,  would 
hold,  in  great  measure;  enough  to  vindicate  Religion, 
against  all  objections  from  the  disorders  of  the  present 
state.  Were  these -assertions  true,  yet  the  government 
of  the  world  might  be  just  and  good  notwithstanding ;  for, 
at  the  most,  they  would  infer  nothing  more  than  that  it 
might  have  been  better.  But  indeed  they  are  mere 
arbitrary  assertions  ;  no  man  being  sufficiently  acquaint- 
ed with  the  possibilities  of  things,  to  bring  any  proof  of 
them  to  the  lowest  degree  of  probability.  For  however 
possible  what  is  asserted  may  seem ;  yet  many  instances 
may  be  alleged,  in  things  much  less  out  of  our  reach,  of 
suppositions  absolutely  impossible,  and  reducible  to  the 
most  palpable  self-contradictions,  which,  not  every  one 
by  any  means  would  perceive  to  be  such,  nor  perhaps 
any  one  at  first  sight  suspect.  From  these  things,  it  is 
easy  to  see  distinctly,  how  our  ignorance,  as  it  is  the 
common,  is  really  a  satisfactory  answer  to  all  objections 
against  the  justice  and  goodness  of  Providence.  If  a 
man,  contemplating  any  one  providential  dispensation, 
which  had  no  relation  to  any  others,  should  object,  that 
he  discerned  in  it  a  disregard  to  justice,  or  a  deficiency 
of  goodness ;  nothing  would  be  less  an  answer  to  such 
objection,  than  our  ignorance  in  other  parts  of  provi- 
dence, or  in  the  Possibilities  of  things,  no  way  related 
to  what  he  was  contemplating.  But  when  we  know  not 
but  the  parts  objected  against  may  be  relative  to  other 
parts  unknown  to  us;  and  when  we  are  unacquainted 
with  what  is,  in  the  nature  of  the  thing,  practicable  in 
the  case  before  us  ;  then  our  ignorance  is  a  satisfactory 
answer ;  because,  some  unknown  relation,  or  some  un- 
known impossibility,  may  render  what  is  objected  against, 
just  and  good;  nay  good  in  the  highest  practicable  de- 
gree. 

II.  And  how  little  weight  is  to  be  laid  upon  such  ob- 
jections, will  further  appear,  by  a  more  distinct  observa- 
tion of  some  particular  things  contained  in  the  natural 


Chap.  VII.]  A  SCHEME  INCOMPREHENSIBLE.  153 

government  of  God,  the  like  to  which  may  be  supposed, 
from  analogy,  to  be  contained  in  his  moral  government. 

First,  As  in  the  scheme  of  the  natural  vs^orld,  no  ends 
appear  to  be  accomplished  without  means:  so  we  find 
that  means  very  undesirable,  often  conduce  to  bring 
about  ends  in  such  a  measure  desirable,  as  greatly  to 
overbalance  the  disagreeableness  of  the  means.  And  in 
cases  where  such  means  are  conducive  to  such  ends,  it 
is  not  reason,  but  experience,  which  shows  us,  that  they 
are  thus  conducive.  Experience  also  shows  many  means 
to  be  conducive  and  necessary  to  accomplish  ends,  which 
means,  before  experience,  we  should  have  thought,  would 
have  had  even  a  contrary  tendency.  Now  from  these 
observations  relating  to  the  natural  scheme  of  the  world, 
the  moral  being  supposed  analogous  to  it,  arises  a  great 
credibility,  that  the  putting  our  misery  in  each  other's 
power  to  the  degree  it  is,  and.  making  men  liable  to  vice 
to  the  degree  we  are  ;  and  in  general,  that  those  things 
which  are  objected  against  the  moral  scheme  of  Provi- 
dence, may  be,  upon  the  whole,  friendly  and  assistant  to 
virtue,  and  productive  of  an  overbalance  of  happiness : 
i.  e.  the  things  objected  against  may  be  means,  by  which 
an  overbalance  of  good  will,  in  the  end,  be  found  pro- 
duced. And  from  the  same  observations,  it  appears  to 
be  no  presumption  against  this,  that  we  do  not,  if  indeed 
we  do  not,  see  those  means  to  have  any  such  tendency, 
or  that  they  seem  to  us  to  have  a  contrary  one.  Thus 
those  things,  which  we  call  irregularities,  may  not  be  so 
at  all:  because  they  may  be  means  of  accomplishing 
wise  and  good  ends  more  considerable.  And  it  may  be  - 
added,  as  above,  that  they  may  also  be  the  only  means, 
by  which  these  wise  and  good  ends  are  capable  of  being 
accomplished. 

After  these  observations  it  may  be  proper  to  add,  in 
order  to  obviate  an  absurd  and  wicked  conclusion  from 
any  of  them,  that  though  the  constitution  of  our  nature, 
from  whence  we  are  capable  of  vice  and  misery,  may,  as 
it  undoubtedly  does,  contribute  to  the  perfection  and 
happiness  of  the  world ;  and  though  the  actual  permission 
of  evil  may  be  beneficial  to  it :  {i.  e.  it  would  have  been 
more  mischie\T:>u.5,  not  that  a  wicked  person  had  himself 


154  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD,  [Pabt  I. 

abstained  from  his  own  wickedness,  but  that  any  one 
had  forcibly  prevented  it,  than  that  it  was  permitted  :) 
yet  notwithstanding,  it  might  have  been  much  better  for 
the  world,  if  this  very  evil  had  never  been  done.  Nay 
it  is  most  clearly  conceivable,  that  the  very  commission 
of  wickedness  may  be  beneficial  to  the  world,  and  yet, 
that  it  would  be  infinitely  more  beneficial  for  men  to  re- 
frain from  it.  For  thus,  in  the  wise  and  good  constitu- 
tion of  the  natural  world,  there  are  disorders  which  bring 
their  own  cures;  diseases,  which  are  themselves  reme- 
dies. Many  a  man  would  have  died,  had  it  not  been  for 
the  gout  or  a  fever;  yet  it  would  be  thought  madness  to 
assert,  that  sickness  is  a  better  or  more  perfect  state  ihan 
health;  though  the  like,  with  regard  to  the  moral  world, 
has  been  asserted.     But, 

Secondly,  The  natural  government  of  the  world  is  car- 
ried on  by  general  laws.  For  this  there  may  be  wise 
and  good  reasons :  the  wisest  and  best,  for  ought  we 
know  to  the  contrary.  And  that  there  are  such  reasons, 
is  suggested  to  our  thoughts  by  the  analogy  of  nature: 
by  our  being  made  to  experience  good  ends  to  be  ac- 
complished, as  indeed  all  the  good  which  we  enjoy  is 
accomplished,  by  this  means,  that  the  laws,  by  which  the 
world  is  governed,  are  general.  For  we  have  scarce  any 
kind  of  enjoyments,  but  what  we  are,  in  some  way  or 
other,  instrumental  in  procuring  ourselves,  by  acting  in 
a  manner  which  we  foresee  likely  to  procure  them:  now 
this  foresight  could  not  be  at  all,  were  not  the  govern- 
ment of  the  world  carried  on  by  general  laws.  And 
though,  for  ought  we  know  to  the  contrary,  every  single 
case  may  be,  at  length,  found  to  have  been  provided  for 
even  by  these:  yet  to  prevent  all  irregularities,  or  remedy 
them  as  they  arise,  by  the  wisest  and  best  general  laws, 
may  be  impossible  in  the  nature  of  thmgs  ;  as  we  see  it 
is  absolutely  impossible  in  civil  government.  But  then 
we  are  ready  to  think,  that,  the  constitution  of  nature  re- 
maining as  it  is,  and  the  course  of  things  being  permitted 
to  go  on,  in  other  respects,  as  it  does,  there  might  be 
interpositions  to  prevent  irregularities  ;  though  they  could 
not  have  been  prevented,  or  remedied  by  any  general 
laws.     And  there  would  indeed  be  reason  to  wish,  which, 


Chap.  VII.]  A  SCHEME  INCOMPREHENSIBLE.  1.55 

by  the  way,  is  very  different  from  a  right  to  claim,  that 
all  irregularities  were  prevented  or  remedied  by  present 
interpositions,  if  these  interpositions  would  have  no  other 
effect  than  this.  But  it  is  plain  they  would  have  some 
visible  and  immediate  bad  effects:  for  instance,  thev 
would  encourage  idleness  and  negligence ;  and  they 
would  render  doubtful  the  natural  rule  of  life,  which  is 
ascertained  by  this  very  thing,  that  the  course  of  the 
world  is  carried  on  by  general  laws.  And  further,  it  is 
certain  they  would  have  distant  effects,  and  very  great 
ones  too;  by  means  of  the  wonderful  connexions  before 
mentioned.*  So  that  we  cannot  so  much  as  guess,  what 
would  be  the  whole  result  of  the  interpositions  desired. 
It  may  be  said,  any  bad  result  might  be  prevented  by 
further  interpositions,  whenever  there  was  occasion  for 
them :  but  this  again  is  talking  quite  at  random,  and  in 
the  dark.t  Upon  the  whole  then,  we  see  wise  reasons, 
why  the  course  of  the  world  should  be  carried  on  by 
general  laws,  and  good  ends  accomplished  by  this  means  : 
and  for  ought  we  know,  there  may  be  the  wisest  rea- 
sons for  it,  and  the  best  ends  accomplished  by  it.  We 
have  no  ground  to  believe,  that  all  irregularities  could  be 
remedied  as  they  arise,  or  could  have  been  precluded,  by 
general  laws.  We  find  that  interpositions  would  pro- 
duce evil,  and  prevent  good:  and,  for  ought  we  know, 
they  would  produce  greater  evil  than  they  would  prevent; 
and  prevent  greater  good  than  they  would  produce.  And 
if  this  be  the  case,  then  the  not  interposing  is  so  far  from 
being  a  ground  of  complaint,  that  it  is  an  instance  of 
goodness.  This  is  intelligible  and  sufficient:  and 
going  further,  seems  beyond  the  utmost  reach  of  our 
faculties. 

But  it  may  be  said,  that  "after  all,  these  supposed  im- 
possibilities and  relations  are  what  we  are  unacquainted 
with  ;  and  we  must  judge  of  Religion,  as  of  other  things, 
by  what  we  do  know,  and  look  upon  the  rest  as  nothing : 
or  however,  that  the  answers  here  given  to  what  is  ob- 
jected against  Rehgion,  may  equally  be  made  use  of  to 
invalidate  the  proof  of  it ;  since  their  stress  lies  so  very 
much  upon  our  ignorance."     But, 

*  p.  160,  &c.  f  p.  152. 


156  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  GCD,  [Part  I. 

Firsfy  Thongii  total  i2;norance  in  an}'  matter  does  in- 
deed equally  destroy,  or  rather  preclude,  all  proof  con- 
cerning it,  and  objections  against  it ;  yet  partial  igno- 
rance does  not.  For  we  may  in  any  degree  be  convinced, 
that  a  person  is  of  such  a  character,  and  consequently 
will  pursue  such  ends  ;  though  we  are  greatly  ignorant, 
what  is  the  proper  way  of  acting,  in  order  the  most 
effectually  to  obtain  those  ends :  and  in  this  case, 
objections  against  his  manner  of  acting,  as  seemingly 
not  conducive  to  obtain  them,  might  be  answered  by 
our  ignorance ;  though  the  proof  that  such  ends  Avere 
intended,  might  not  at  all  be  invalidated  by  it.  Thus, 
the  proof  of  Religion  is  a  proof  of  the  moral  character 
of  God,  and  consequently  that  his  government  is  moral, 
and  that  every  one  upon  the  whole  shall  receive  accord- 
ing to  his  deserts ;  a  proof  that  this  is  the  designed  end 
of  his  government.  But  we  are  not  competent  judges, 
what  is  the  proper  way  of  acting,  in  order  the  most 
effectually  to  accomplish  this  end.*  Therefore  our  ig- 
norance is  an  answer  to  objections  against  the  conduct 
of  Providence,  in  permitting  irregularities,  as  seeming 
contradictory  to  this  end.  Now,  since  it  is  so  obvious, 
that  our  ignorance  may  be  a  satisfactory  answer  to  ob- 
jections against  a  thing,  and  yet  not  affect  the  proof  of  it; 
till  it  can  be  shown,  it  is  frivolous  to  assert,  that  our  ig- 
norance invalidates  the  proof  of  Religion,  as  it  does  the 
objections  against  it. 

Secondly,  Supfiose  unknown  impossibilities,  and  un- 
known relations,  might  justly  be  urged  to  invalidate  the 
proof  of  Religion,  as  well  as  to  answer  objections 
against  it :  and  that,  in  consequence  of  this,  the  proof  of 
it  were  doubtful.  Yet  still,  let  the  assertion  be  despised, 
or  let  it  be  ridiculed,  it  is  undeniably  true,  that  moral 
obligations  would  remain  certain,  though  it  were  not 
certain  what  would,  upon  the  whole,  be  the  conse- 
quences of  observing  or  violating  them.  For,  these 
obligations  arise  immediately  and  necessarily  from  the 
judgment  of  our  own  mind,  unless  perverted,  which  we 
cannot  violate  without  being  self-condemned.  And  they 
would  be  certain  too,  from  considerations  of  interest. 

*  Pp.  63,  54. 


Chap. VII.]  A  SCHEME  INCOMPREHENSIBLE.  157 

For  though  it  were  doubtful,  what  will  be  the  future  con- 
sequences of  virtue  and  vice;  yet  it  is,  however,  credible, 
that  they  may  have  those  consequences,  which  Religion 
teaches  us  they  will :  and  this  credibility  is  a  certain  * 
obligation  in  point  of  prudence,  to  abstain  from  all  wick- 
edness, and  to  live  in  the  conscientious  practice  of  all 
that  is  good.     But, 

Thirdly,  The  answers  above  given  to  the  objections 
against  Religion  cannot  equally  be  made  use  of  to  inva- 
lidate the  proof  of  it.  For,  upon  suspicion  that' God  ex- 
ercises a  moral  government  over  the  world,  analogy  does 
most  strongly  lead  us  to  conclude,  that  this  moral  govern- 
ment must  be  a  scheme,  or  constitution,  beyond  our 
comprehension.  And  a  thousand  particular  analogies 
show  us,  that  parts  of  such  a  scheme,  from  their  relation 
to  other  parts,  may  conduce  to  accomplish  ends,  which 
we  should  have  thought  they  had  no  tendency  at  all  to 
accomplish :  nay  ends,  which  before  experience,  we 
should  have  thought  such  parts  were  contradictory  to, 
and  had  a  tendency  to  prevent.  And  therefore  all  these 
analogies  show,  that  the  way  of  arguing  made  use  of  in 
objecting  against  Religion  is  delusive :  because  they 
show  it  is  not  at  all  incredible,  that,  could  we  compre- 
hend the  whole,  we  should  find  the  permission  of  the 
disorders  objected  against  to  be  consistent  with  justice 
and  goodness  ;  and  even  to  be  instances  of  them.  Now 
this  is  not  applicable  to  the  proof  of  Religion,  as  it  is  to 
the  objections  against  it;t  and  therefore  cannot  invali- 
date that  proof,  as  it  does  these  objections. 

Lastly,  From  the  observation  now  made,  it  is  easy  to 
see,  that  the  answers  above  given  to  the  objections 
against  Providence,  though,  in  a  general  way  of  speak- 
ing, they  may  be  said  fo  be  taken  from  our  ignorance  ; 
yet  are  by  no  means  taken  merely  from  that,  but  from 
somewhat  which  analogy  shows  us  concerning  it.  For 
analogy  shows  us  positively,  that  our  ignorance  in  the 
possibilities  of  things,  and  the  various  relations  in  nature, 
renders  us  incompetent  judges,  and  leads  us  to  false  con- 
clusions, in  cases  similar  to  this,  in  which  we  pretend  to 
judge  and  to  object.     So  that  the  things  above  insisted 

•  p.  49,  and  Part  II.  Chap  vi.  f  Serm.  at  the  Rolls  p.  312.  2d.  ed. 


158  CONCLUSION.  'v  [PabtI. 

upon  are  not  mere  suppositions  of  unknown  impossi- 
bilities and  relations :  but  they  are  suggested  to  our 
thoughts,  and  even  forced  upon  the  observation  of  seri- 
ous men,  and  rendered  credible  too,  by  the  analogy  of 
nature.  And  therefore  to  take  these  things  into  the 
account,  is  to  judge  by  experience  and  what  we  do 
know :  and  it  is  not  judging  so,  to  take  no  notice  of  them. 


CONCLUSION. 

The  observations  of  the  last  Chapter  lead  us  to  consider 
this  little  scene  of  human  life,  in  which  we  are  so  busily 
engaged,  as  having  a  reference,  of  some  sort  or  other,  to 
a  much  larger  plan  of  things.  Whether  we  are,  any 
way,  related  to  the  more  distant  parts  of  the  boundless 
universe,  into  which  we  are  brought,  is  altogether  uncer- 
tain. But  it  is  evident,  that  the  course  of  things,  which 
comes  within  our  view,  is  connected  with  somewhat, 
past,  present,  and  future,  beyond  it.*  So  that  we  are 
placed,  as  one  may  speak,  in  the  middle  of  a  scheme, 
not  a  fixed  but  a  progressive  one,  every  Way,  incompre- 
hensible: incomprehensible,  in  a  manner  equally,  with 
respect  to  what  has  been,  what  now  is,  and  what  shall 
be  hereafter.  And  this  scheme  cannot  but  contain  in  it 
somewhat  as  wonderful,  and  as  much  beyond  our  thought 
and  conception,t  as  any  thing  in  that  of  Religion.  For, 
will  any  man  in  his  senses  say,  that  it  is  less  difficult  to 
conceive,  how  the  world  came  to  be  and  to  continue  as 
it  is,  without,  than  with,  an  intelligent  Author  and  Go- 
vernor of  it  ?  or,  admitting  an  intelligent  Governor  of  it, 
that  there  is  some  other  rule  of  government  more  natu- 
ral, and  of  easier  conception,  than  that  which  we  call 
moral?  Indeed,  without  an  intelligent  Author  and 
Governor  of  Nature,  no  account  at  all  can  be  given,  how 
this  universe,  or  the  part  of  it  particularly  in  which  we 
are  concerned,  came  to  be,  and  the  course  of  it  to  be 
carried  on,  as  it  is :  nor  any,  of  its  general  end  and  de- 
sign, without  a  moral  Governor  of  it.  That  there  is  an 
intelligent  Author  of  Nature,  and  natural  Governor  of 

*  p.  149,  &c  +  See  Part  II.  Ch.  K. 


ohap.-vti.j  conclusion,  159 

the  world,  i?  a  principle  gone  upon  in  the  foregoing 
treatise ;  as  proved,  and  generally  known  and  confessed 
to  be  proved.  And  the  very  notion  of  an  intelligent 
Author  of  Nature,  proved  by  particular  final  causes,  im- 
plies a  will  and  a  character.*  Now,  as  our  whole  nature, 
the  nature  which  he  has  given  us,  leads  us  to  conclude 
his  will  and  character  to  be  moral,  just,  and  good:  so  we 
can  scarce  in  imagination  conceive,  what  it  can  be  other- 
wise. However,  in  consequence  of  this  his  will  and 
character,  whatever  it  be,  he  formed  the  universe  as  it 
is,  and  carries  on  the  course  of  it  as  he  does,  rather  than 
in  any  other  manner ;  and  has  assigned  to  us,  and  to  all 
living  creatures,  a  part  and  a  lot  in  it.  Irrational  crea- 
tures act  this  their  part,  and  enjoy  and  undergo  the  plea- 
sures and  the  pains  allotted  them,  without  any  reflection. 
But  one  would  think  it  impossible,  that  creatures  endued 
with  reason  could  avoid  reflecting  sometimes  upon  all 
this ;  reflecting,  if  not  from  whence  we  came,  yet,  at 
least,  whither  we  are  going;  and  what  the  mysterious 
scheme,  in  the  midst  of  which  we  find  ourselves,  will, 
at  length,  come  out  and  produce:  a  scheme  in  which  it 
is  certain  we  are  highly  interested,  and  in  which  we  may 
be  interested  even  beyond  conception.  For  many  things 
prove  it  palpably  absurd  to  conclude,  that  we  shall  cease 
to  be,  at  death.  Particular  analogies  do  most  sensibly 
show  us,  that  there  is  nothing  to  be  thought  strange,  in 
our  being  to  exist  in  another  state  of  life.  And  that  we 
are  now  living  beings,  affords  a  strong  probability  that 
we  shall  continue  so ;  unless  there  be  some  positive 
ground,  and  there  is  none  from  reason  or  analogy,  to 
think  death  will  destroy  us.  Were  a  persuasion  of  this 
kind  ever  so  well  grounded,  there  would,  surely,  be  little 
reason  to  take  pleasure  in  it.  But  indeed  it  can  have 
no  other  ground,  than  some  such  imagination,  as  that  of 
our  gross  bodies  being  ourselves  ;  which  is  contrary  to 
experience.  Experience  too  most  clearly  shows  us  the 
folly  of  concluding,  from  the  body  and  the  living  agent 
aff'ecting  each  other  mutually,  that  the  dissolution  of  the 
former  is  the  destruction  of  the  latter.  And  there  are 
remarkable  instances  of  their  not  affecting  each  other, 

*  p.  140. 


160  CONCLUSION.  P'abtI. 

which  lead  us  to  a  contrary  conclusion.  The  supposi- 
tion, then,  which  in  all  reason  we  are  to  go  upon,  is,  that 
our  livins  nature  will  continue  after  death.  And  it  is 
infinitely  unreasonable  to  iorm  an  institution  of  life, 
or  to  act  upon  any  other  supposition.  Now  all  ex- 
pectation of  immortality,  whether  more  or  less  cer- 
tain, opens  an  unbounded  prospect  to  our  hopes  and 
our  fears :  since  we  see  the  constitution  of  nature  is  such, 
as  to  admit  of  misery,  as  well  as  to  be  productive  of 
happiness,  and  experience  ourselves  to  partake  of  both 
in  some  degree;  and  since  we  cannot  but  know,  what 
higher  degrees  of  both  we  are  capable  of.  And  there 
is  no  presumption  against  believing  further,  that  our 
future  interest  depends  upon  our  present  behaviour :  for 
we  see  our  present  interest  doth;  and  that  the  happiness 
and  misery,  which  are  naturally  annexed  to  our  actions, 
very  frequently  do  not  follow,  till  long  after  the  actions 
are  done,  to  which  they  are  respectively  annexed.  So 
that  were  speculation  to  leave  us  uncertain,  whether  it 
were  likely,  that  the  Author  of  Nature,  in  giving  happi- 
ness and  misery  to  his  creatures,  hath  regard  to  their 
actions  or  not:  yet,  since  we  find  by  experience  that  he 
hath  such  regard,  the  whole  sense  of  things  which  he 
has  given  us,  plainly  leads  us,  at  once  and  without  any 
elaborate  inquiries,  to  think,  that  it  may,  indeed  must,  be 
to  good  actions  chiefly  that  he  hath  annexed  happiness, 
and  to  bad  actions  misery;  or  that  he  will,  upon  the 
whole,  reward  those  who  do  well,  and  punish  those  who 
do  evil.  To  confirm  this  from  the  constitution  of  the 
world,  it  has  been  observed,  that  some  sort  of  moral  go- 
vernment is  necessarily  implied  in  that  natural  govern- 
ment of  God,  which  we  experience  ourselves  under  ; 
that  good  and  bad  actions,  at  present,  are  naturally  re- 
warded and  punished,  not  only  as  beneficial  and  mis- 
chievous to  society,  but  also  as  virtuous  and  vicious:  and 
that  there  is,  in  the  very  nature  of  the  thing,  a  tendency 
to  their  being  rewarded  and  punished  in  a  much  higher 
degree  than  they  are  at  present.  And  though  this  high- 
er degree  of  distributive  justice,  which  nature  thus  points 
out  and  leads  towards,  is  prevented  for  a  time  from  tak- 
ius,  place ;  it  is  by  obstacles,  which  the  state  of  this  world 


Chap.  VII.]  CONCLUSION.  161 

unhappily  throws  in  its  way,  and  which  therefore  are  in 
their  nature  temporary.  Now,  as  these  things  in  the 
natural  conduct  of  Providence  are  observable  on  the  side 
of  virtue ;  so  there  is  nothing  to  be  set  against  them  on 
the  side  of  vice.  A  moral  scheme  of  government  then 
is  visibly  established,  and,  in  some  degree,  carried  into 
execution:  and  this,  together  with  the  essential  tenden- 
cies of  virtue  and  vice  duly  considered,  naturally  raise 
in  us  an  apprehension,  that  it  will  be  carried  on  further 
towards  perfection  in  a  future  state,  and  that  every  one 
shall  there  receive  according  to  his  deserts.  And  if  this 
be  so,  then  our  future  and  general  interest,  under  the 
moral  government  of  God,  is  appointed  to  depend  upon 
our  behaviour ;  notwithstanding  the  difficulty,  which 
this  may  occasion,  of  securing  it,  and  the  danger  of  los- 
ing it :  just  in  the  same  manner  as  our  temporal  interest, 
under  his  natural  government,  is  appointed  to  depend 
upon  our  behaviour  ;  notwithstanding  the  like  difficulty 
and  danger.  For,  from  our  original  constitution,  and 
that  of  the  world  which  we  inhabit,  we  are  naturally 
trusted  with  ourselves ;  with  our  own  conduct  and  our 
own  interest.  And  from  the  same  constitution  of  nature, 
especially  joined  with  that  course  of  things  which  is 
owing  to  men,  we  have  temptations  to  be  unfaithful  in 
this  trust ;  to  forfeit  this  interest,  to  neglect  it,  and  run 
ourselves  into  misery  and  ruin.  From  these  temptations 
arise  the  difficulties  of  behaving  so  as  to  secure  our 
temporal  interest,  and  the  hazard  of  behaving  so  as  to 
miscarry  in  it.  There  is  therefore  nothing  incredible  in 
supposing  there  may  be  the  like  difficulty  and  hazard 
with  regard  to  that  chief  and  final  good,  which  Religion 
lays  before  us.  Indeed  the  whole  account,  how  it  came 
to  pass  that  we  were  placed  in  such  a  condition  as  this, 
must  be  beyond  our  comprehension.  But  it  is  in  part 
accounted  for  by  what  Religion  teaches  us,  that  the 
character  of  virtue  and  piety  must  be  a  necessary  quali- 
fication for  a  future  state  of  security  and  happiness, 
under  the  moral  government  of  God;  in  like  manner, 
as  some  certain  qualifications  or  other  are  necessary 
for  every  particular  condition  of  hfe,  under  his  natural 
government:  and  that  the  present  state  was  intended  to 

L 


162  CONCLUSION.  [Part  I. 

be  a  school  of  discipline,  for  improving  in  ourselves  that 
character.  Now  this  intention  of  nature  is  rendered 
highly  credible  by  observing ;  that  we  are  plainly  made 
for  improvement  of  all  kinds  :  that  it  is  a  general  appoint- 
ment of  Providence,  that  we  cultivate  practical  principles, 
and  form  within  ourselves  habits  of  action,  in  order  to 
become  fit  for  what  we  were  wholly  unfit  for  before  :  that 
in  particular,  childhood  and  youth  is  naturally  appointed 
to  be  a  state  of  discipline  for  mature  age :  and  that  the 
present  world  is  pccuharly  fitted  for  a  state  of  moral  dis- 
cipline. And,  whereas  objections  are  urged  against  the 
whole  notion  of  moral  government  and  a  probationary 
state,  from  the  opinion  of  Necessity  ;  it  has  been  shown, 
that  God  has  given  us  the  evidence,  as  it  were,  of  expe- 
rience, that  all  objections  against  Religion,  on  this  head, 
are  vain  and  delusive.  He  has  also,  in  his  natural  go- 
vernment, suggested  an  answer  to  all  our  short-sighted 
objections,  against  the  equity  and  goodness  of  his  moral 
government ;  and  in  general  he  has  exemplified  to  us 
the  latter  by  the  former. 

These  things,  which  it  is  to  be  remembered,  are  mat- 
ters of  fact,  ought,  in  all  common  sense,  to  awaken  man- 
kind; to  induce  them  to  consider  in  earnest  their  con- 
dition, and  what  they  have  to  do.  It  is  absurd,  absurd 
to  the  degree  of  being  ridiculous,  if  the  subject  were  not 
of  so  serious  a  kind,  for  men  to  think  themselves  secure 
in  a  vicious  life  ;  or  even  in  that  immoral  thoughtlessness, 
which  far  the  greatest  part  of  them  are  fallen  into.  And 
the  credibility  of  Religion,  arising  from  experience  and 
facts  here  considered,  is  fully  sufficient,  in  reason,  to 
engage  them  to  live  in  the  general  practice  of  all  virtue 
and  piety;  under  the  serious  apprehension,  though  it 
should  be  mixed  with  some  doubt,*  of  a  righteous  admin- 
istration established  in  nature,  and  a  future  judgment 
in  consequence  of  it:  especially  when  we  consider,  how 
very  questionable  it  is,  whether  any  thing  at  all  can  be 
gained  by  vice  ;t  how  unquestionably  little  as  well  as 
precarious,  the  pleasures  and  profits  of  it  are  at  the  best, 
and  how  soon  they  must  be  parted  with  at  the  longest. 
For,  ui  the  deliberations  of  reason,  concerning  what  we 

♦  Part  II.  Ch.  vi.  t  P.  86. 


Chap.  VII.]  CONCLUSION.  163 

are  to  pursue  and  what  to  avoid,  as  temptations  to  any- 
thing from  mere  passion  are  supposed  out  of  the  case : 
so  inducements  to  vice,  from  cool  expectations  of  plea- 
sure and  interest  so  small  and  uncertain  and  short,  are 
really  so  insignificant,  as,  in  the  view  of  reason  to  be 
almost  nothing  in  themselves;  and  in  comparison  with 
the  importance  of  Religion  they  quite  disappear  and  are 
lost.  Mere  passion  indeed  may  be  alleged,  though  not 
as  a  reason,  yet  as  an  excuse,  for  a  vicious  course  of  life. 
And  how  sorry  an  excuse  it  is,  will  be  manifest  by 
observing,  that  we  are  placed  in  a  condition  in  which  we 
are  unavoidably  inured  to  govern  our  passions,  by  being 
necessitated  to  govern  them:  and  to  lay  ourselves  under 
the  same  kind  of  restraints,  and  as  great  ones  too,  from 
temporal  regards,  as  virtue  and  piety,  in  the  ordinary 
course  of  things,  require.  The  plea  of  ungovernable 
passion  then,  on  the  side  of  vice,  is  the  poorest  of  all 
things ;  for  it  is  no  reason,  and  but  a  poor  excuse.  But 
the  proper  motives  to  religion  are  the  proper  proofs  of 
it,  from  our  moral  nature,  Irom  the  presages  of  conscience, 
and  our  natural  apprehension  of  God  under  the  charac- 
ter of  a  righteous  Governor  and  Judge :  a  nature,  and 
conscience,  and  apprehension,  given  us  by  him;  and  from 
the  confirmation  of  the  dictates  of  reason,  by  life  and 
immortality  brought  to  light  by  the  Gospel;  and  the  wrath 
of  God  revealed  from  heaven  against  all  ungodliness  and 
unrighteousness  of  men. 


END  OF  THE  FIRST  PART* 


THE 


ANALOGS  OF  RELIGION. 


PART  II. 
OF  REVEALED  RELIGION. 


CHAP  I. 
OF   THE    IMPORTANCE    OF    CHRISTIANITY. 

Some  persons,  upon  pretence  of  the  sufficiency  of  the 
light  of  nature,  avowedly  reject  all  revelation,  as,  in  its 
very  notion,  incredible,  and  what  must  be  fictitious.  And 
indeed  it  is  certain,  no  revelation  would  have  been  given, 
had  the  light  of  nature  been  sufficient  in  such  a  sense,  as 
to  render  one  not  wanting  and  useless.  But  no  man,  in 
seriousness  and  simplicity  of  mind,  can  possibly  think  it 
so,  who  considers  the  state  of  Religion  in  the  heathen 
(vorld  before  revelation,  and  its  present  state  in  those 
places  which  have  borrowed  no  light  from  it :  particu- 
larly the  doubtfulness  of  some  of  the  greatest  men,  con- 
cerning things  of  the  utmost  importance,  as  well  as  the 
natural  inattention  and  ignorance  of  mankind  in  general. 
(t  is  impossible  to  say,  who  would  have  been  able  to 
have  reasoned  out  that  whole  system,  which  we  call 
natural  Religion,  in  its  genuine  simplicity,  clear  of  super- 
stition: but  there  is  certainly  no  ground  to  affirm  that 
the  generality  could.  If  they  could,  there  is  no  sort  of 
probability  that  they  would.  Admitting  there  were,  they 
would  highly  want  a  standing  admonition  to  remind  them 
of  it,  and  inculcate  it  upon  them. 

And  further  still,  were  they  as  much  disposed  to  attend 
to  Religion,  as  the  better  sort  of  men  are  ;  yet  even  upon 
this  supposition,  there  would  be  various  occasions  for 
supernatural  instruction  and  assistance,  and  the  greatest 


166  OF  THE  IMPORTANCE  [p^rt  U. 

aidvantages  might  be  afforded  by  them.  So  that  to  say 
revelation  is  a  thing  superfluous,  what  there  was  no  need 
of,  and  what  can  be  of  no  service,  is,  I  think,  to  talk  quite 
wildly  and  at  random.  Nor  would  it  be  more  extrava- 
gant to  afhrm,  that  mankind  is  so  entirely  at  ease  in  the 
present  state,  and  life  so  completely  happy,  that  it  is  a 
contradiction  to  suppose  our  condition  capable  of  being, 
in  any  respect,  better. 

There  are  other  persons,  not  to  be  ranked  with  these, 
who  seem  to  be  getting  into  a  way  of  neglecting,  and,  as 
it  were,  overlooking  revelation,  as  of  small  importance, 
provided  natural  Religion  be  kept  to.  With  little  regard 
either  to  the  evidence  of  the  former,  or  to  the  objections 
against  it,  and  even  upon  supposition  of  its  truth;  "the 
only  design  of  it,"  say  they,  "  must  be,  to  establish  a 
belief  of  the  moral  system  of  nature,  and  to  enforce  the 
practice  of  natural  piety  and  virtue.  The  belief  and  prac- 
tice of  these  things  were,  pei'haps,  much  promoted  by 
the  first  publication  of  Christianity:  but  whether  they 
are  believed  and  practised,  upon  the  evidence  and  mo- 
tives of  nature  or  of  revelation,  is  no  great  matter."* 
This  way  of  considering  revelation,  though  it  is  not  the 
same  with  the  former,  yet  borders  nearly  upon  it,  and 
very  much,  at  length,  runs  up  into  it :  and  requires  to  be 
particularly  considered,  with  regard  to  the  persons  who 
seem  to  be  getting  into  this  way.  The  consideration  of 
it  will  likewise  further  show  the  extravagance  of  the  for- 
mer opinion,  and  the  truth  of  the  observations  in  answ^er 
to  it,  just  mentioned.  And  an  inquiry  into  the  Impor- 
tance of  Christianity,  cannot  be  an  improper  introduc- 
tion to  a  treatise  concerning  the  credibility  of  it. 

Now  if  God  has  given  a  revelation  to  mankind,  and 
commanded  those  things  which  are  commanded  in  Chris- 
tianity ;  it  is  evident,  at  first  sight,  that  it  cannot  in  any 
wise  be  an  indifferent  matter,  whether  we  obey  or  dis- 
obey those  commands :  unless  we  are  certainly  assured, 

*  Invenis  multos propterea  nolle  fieri  Cliristianos,  quia  quasi  sufficiunt  sibi 

de  bona  vita  sua.  Bene  vivere  opus  est,  ait.  Quid  niihi  praecepturus  est  Christus  ? 
Ut  bene  vivam?  Jam  bene  vivo.  Quid  milii  necessarius  est  Christus;  nullum 
honiicidiuni,  nullum  furtuni,  nuUani  rapinam  facio,  res  alienas  iion  concupisco,  nuUo 
adulterio  contaminor  ?  'Nnm  inveniatur  in  vita  mea  aliquid  quod  repreliendatur,  e* 
qui  reprehenderit  fe,ciat  Cliristianum.    ^ug,  in  Psai.  xxxS. 


Chap.  I.]  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  157 

that  we  know  all  the  reasons  for  them,  and  that  all 
those  reasons  are  now  ceased,  with  regard  to  mankind 
in  general,  or  to  ourselves  in  particular.  And  it  is  ab- 
solutely impossible  we  can  be  assured  of  this.  For  our 
ignorance  of  these  reasons  proves  nothing  in  the  case : 
since  the  whole  analogy  of  nature  shows,  what  is  indeed 
in  itself  evident,  that  there  may  be  infinite  reasons  for 
things,  with  which  we  are  not  acquainted. 

But  the  importance  of  Christianity  will  more  distinctly 
appear,  by  considering  it  more  distinctly  :  First,  as  a  re- 
publication, and  external  institution,  of  natural  or  es- 
sential Religion,  adapted  to  the  present  circumstances 
of  mankind,  and  intended  to  promote  natural  piety  and 
virtue :  and  Secondly,  as  containing  an  account  of  a 
dispensation  of  things,  not  discoverable  by  reason,  in 
consequence  of  which  several  distinct  precepts  are  en- 
joined us.  For  though  natural  Religion  is  the  founda- 
tion and  principal  part  of  Christianity,  it  is  not  in  any 
sense  the  whole  of  it. 

I.  Christianity  is  a  republication  of  natural  Religion. 
It  instructs  mankind  in  the  moral  system  of  the  world: 
that  it  is  the  work  of  an  infinitely  perfect  Being,  and 
under  his  government ;  that  virtue  is  his  law  ;  and  that 
he  Yvill  finally  judge  mankind  in  righteousness,  and 
render  to  all  according  to  their  works,  in  a  future  state. 
And,  which  is  very  material,  it  teaches  natural  Religion 
in  its  genuine  simplicity ;  free  from  those  superstitions, 
with  which  it  was  totally  corrupted,  and  under  which  it 
was  in  a  manner  lost. 

Revelation  is,  further,  an  authoritative  publication  of 
natural  Religion,  and  so  affords  the  evidence  of  testi- 
mony for  the  truth  of  it.  Indeed  the  miracles  and 
prophecies  recorded  in  Scripture,  were  intended  to 
prove  a  particular  dispensation  of  Providence,  the  re- 
demption of  the  world  by  the  Messiah :  but  this  does 
not  hinder,  but  that  they  may  also  prove  God's  general 
providence  over  the  world,  as  our  moral  Governor  and 
Judge.  And  they  evidently  do  prove  it ;  because  this 
character  of  the  Author  of  Nature,  is  necessarily  con- 
nected witli  and  implied  in  that  particular  revealed 
dispensation  of  things :  it  is  likewise  continually  taught 


168  or  THE  IMPORTANCE  [p^rt  IL 

expressly,  and  insisted  upon,  by  those  persons  who 
wrought  the  miracles  and  delivered  the  prophecies.  So 
that  indeed  natural  Religion  seems  as  much  proved  by 
the  Scripture  revelation,  as  it  would  have  been,  had  the 
design  of  revelation  been  nothing  else  than  to  prove  it. 

But  it  may  possibly  be  disputed,  how  far  miracles  can 
prove  natural  Religion ;  and  notable  objections  may  be 
urged  against  this  proof  of  it,  considered  as  a  matter  of 
speculation :  but  considered  as  a  practical  thing,  there 
can  be  none.  For  suppose  a  person  to  teach  natural 
Religion  to  a  nation,  who  had  lived  in  total  ignorance  or 
forgetfulness  of  it ;  and  to  declare  he  was  commissioned 
by  God  so  to  do :  suppose  him,  in  proof  of  his  commis- 
sion, to  foretell  things  future,  which  no  human  foresight 
could  have  guessed  at ;  to  divide  the  sea  with  a  word  ; 
feed  great  multitudes  with  bread  from  heaven  ;  cure  all 
manner  of  diseases  ;  and  raise  the  dead,  even  himself,  to 
life ;  would  not  this  give  additional  credibility  to  his 
teaching,  a  credibility  beyond  what  that  of  a  common 
man  would  have ;  and  be  an  authoritative  publication  of 
the  law  of  nature,  i.  e.  a  new  proof  of  it  ?  It  would  be  a 
practical  one,  of  the  strongest  kind,  perhaps,  which 
human  creatures  are  capable  of  having  given  them. 
The  Law  of  Moses  then,  and  the  Gospel  of  Christ,  are 
authoritative  publications  of  the  religion  of  nature  ;  they 
affordaproofof  God'sgeneral  providence,  as  moral  Gover- 
nor of  the  world,  as  well  as  of  his  particular  dispensations  of 
providence  towards  sinful  creatures,  revealed  in  the  Law 
and  the  Gospel.  As  they  are  the  only  evidence  of  the 
latter,  so  they  are  an  additional  evidence  of  the  former. 

To  show  this  further,  let  us  suppose  a  man  of  the 
greatest  and  most  improved  capacity,  who  had  never 
heard  of  revelation,  convinced  upon  the  whole,  notwith- 
standing the  disorders  of  the  world,  that  it  was  under 
the  direction  and  moral  government  of  an  infinitely 
perfect  Being ;  but  ready  to  question,  whether  he  were 
not  got  beyond  the  reach  of  his  faculties :  suppose  him 
brought,  by  this  suspicion,  into  great  danger  of  being 
carried  away  by  the  universal  bad  example  of  almost  every 
one  around  hira,  who  appeared  to  have  no  sense,  no  prac- 
tical sense  at  least,  of  these  things :  and  this,  perhaps, 


Chap.  I.]  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  1C9 

would  be  as  advantageous  a  situation  with  regard  to 
Religion,  as  nature  alone  ever  placed  any  man  in. 
What  a  confirmation  now  must  it  be  to  such  a  person, 
all  at  once,  to  find,  that  this  moral  system  of  things  was 
revealed  to  mankind,  in  the  name  of  that  infinite  Being, 
whom  he  had  from  principles  of  reason  believed  in :  and 
that  the  publishers  of  the  revelation  proved  their  com- 
mission from  him,  by  making  it  appear,  that  he  had 
entrusted  them  with  a  power  of  suspending  and  chang- 
ing the  general  laws  of  nature. 

Nor  must  it  by  any  means  be  omitted,  for  it  is  a  thing 
of  the  utmost  importance,  that  life  and  immortality  are 
eminently  brought  to  light  by  the  Gospel.  The  great 
doctrines  of  a  future  state,  the  danger  of  a  course  of 
wickedness,  and  the  efficacy  of  repentance,  are  not  only 
confirmed  in  the  Gospel,  but  are  taught,  especially  the 
last  is,  with  a  degree  of  light,  to  which  that  of  nature  is 
but  darkness. 

Further:  As  Christianity  served  these  ends  and  pur- 
poses, when  it  was  first  pubHshed,  by  the  miraculous 
publication  itself ;  so  it  was  intended  to  serve  the  same 
purposes  in  future  ages,  by  means  of  the  settlement  of  a 
visible  church  :  of  a  society,  distinguished  from  common 
ones,  and  from  the  rest  of  the  world,  by  peculiar  reli- 
gious institutions;  by  an  instituted  method  of  instruction, 
and  an  instituted  form  of  external  Religion.  Miraculous 
powers  were  given  to  the  first  preachers  of  Christianity, 
in  order  to  their  introducing  it  into  the  world  :  a  visible 
church  was  established,  in  order  to  continue  it,  and  carry 
it  on  successively  throughout  all  ages.  Had  Moses  and 
the  Prophets,  Christ  and  his  Apostles,  only  taught,  and 
by  miracles  proved,  Rehgion  to  their  contemporaries  ; 
the  benefits  of  their  instructions  would  have  reached  but 
to  a  small  part  of  mankind.  Christianity  must  have  been, 
in  a  great  degree,  sunk  and  forgot  in  a  very  few  ages. 
To  prevent  this,  appears  to  have  been  one  reason  why 
a  visible  church  was  instituted  :  to  be,  like  a  city  upon 
a  hill,  a  standing  memorial  to  the  world  of  the  duty 
which  we  owe  our  Maker:  to  call  men  continually,  both 
by  example  and  instruction,  to  attend  to  it,  and,  by  the 
form  of  Religion,  ever  before  their  eyes,  remind  them  of 


170  OF  THE  IMPORTANCE  [Part II. 

the  reality:  to  be  the  repository  of  the  oracles  of  God: 
to  hold  up  the  light  of  revelation  in  aid  to  that  of  nature, 
and  propagate  it  throughout  all  generations  to  the  end  of 
the  world — the  light  of  revelation,  considered  here  in  no 
other  view,  than  as  designed  to  enforce  natural  Religion. 
And  in  proportion  as  Christianity  is  professed  and  taught 
in  the  world,  Religion,  natural  or  essential  Religion,  is 
thus  distinctly  and  advantageously  laid  before  mankind, 
and  brought  again  and  again  to  their  thoughts,  as  a 
matter  of  infinite  importance.  A  visible  church  has  also 
a  further  tendency  to  promote  natural  Religion,  as  being 
an  instituted  method  of  education,  originally  intended  to 
be  of  more  peculiar  advantage  to  those  who  conform  to 
it.  For  one  end  of  the  institution  was,  that,  by  admoni- 
tion and  reproof,  as  well  as  instruction  ;  by  a  general 
regular  discipline,  and  public  exercises  of  Religion  ;  the 
hody  of  Christ,  as  the  Scripture  speaks,  should  be  edified ; 
i.  e.  trained  up  in  piety  and  virtue  for  a  higher  and  better 
state.  This  settlement,  then,  appearing  thus  beneficial; 
tending  in  the  nature  of  the  thing  to  answer,  and,  in 
some  degree,  actually  answering,  those  ends ;  it  is  to  be 
remembered,  that  the  very  notion  of  it  implies  positive 
institutions ;  for  the  visibihtv  of  the  church  consists  in 
them.  Take  away  every  thing  of  this  kind,  and  you 
lose  the  very  notion  itself.  So  that  if  the  things  now 
mentioned  are  advantages,  the  reason  and  importance  of 
positive  institutions  in  general  is  most  obvious  ;  since 
without  them  these  advantages  could  not  be  secured  to 
the  world.  And  it  is  mere  idle  wantonness,  to  insist 
upon  knowing  the  reasons,  why  such  particular  ones 
were  fixed  upon  rather  than  others. 

The  benefit  arising  from  this  supernatural  assistance, 
which  Christianity  aifords  to  natural  Religion,  is  Avhat 
some  persons  are  very  slow  in  apprehending.  And  yet 
it  is  a  thing  distinct  in  itself,  and  a  very  plain  obvious 
one.  For  will  any  in  good  earnest  really  say,  that  the 
bulk  of  mankind  in  the  heathen  world  were  in  as  advan- 
tageous a  situation  with  regard  to  natural  Religion,  as 
they  are  now  amongst  us :  that  it  was  laid  before  them, 
and  enforced  upon  them,  in  a  manner  as  distinct,  and  as 
much  tending  to  influence  their  practice  ? 


Chap.  I.]  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  171 

The  objections  against  all  this,  from  the  perversion  of 
Christianity,  and  from  the  supposition  of  its  having  had 
but  little  good  influence,  however  innocently  they  may 
be  proposed,  yet  cannot  be  insisted  upon  as  conclusive, 
upon  any  principles,  but  such  as  lead  to  downright 
y\ theism  ;  because  the  manifestation  of  the  law  of  nature 
by  reason,  which,  upon  all  principles  of  Theism,  must 
have  been  from  God,  has  been  perverted  and  rendered 
ineffectual  in  the  same  manner.  It  may  indeed,  I  think, 
truly  be  said,  that  the  good  effects  of  Christianity  have 
not  been  small ;  nor  its  supposed  ill  effects,  any  effects 
at  all  of  it,  properly  speaking.  Perhaps,  too,  the  things 
themselves  done  have  been  aggravated ;  and  if  not, 
Christianity  hath  been  often  only  a  pretence ;  and  the 
same  evils  in  the  main  would  have  been  done  upon 
some  other  pretence.  However,  great  and  shocking  as 
the  corruptions  and  abuses  of  it  have  really  been,  they 
cannot  be  insisted  upon  as  arguments  against  it,  upon 
principles  of  Theism.  For  one  cannot  proceed  one  step 
in  reasoning  upon  natural  Religion,  any  more  than  upon 
Christianity,  without  laying  it  down  as  a  first  principle, 
that  the  dispensations  of  Providence  are  not  to  be  judged 
of  by  their  perversions,  but  by  their  genuine  tendencies: 
not  by  what  they  do  actually  seem  to  effect,  but  by  what 
they  would  effect  if  mankind  did  their  part ;  that  part 
which  is  justly  put  and  left  upon  them.  It  is  altogether 
as  much  the  language  of  one  as  of  the  other :  He  that  is 
unjust,  let  him  be  unjust  still :  and  he  thai  is  holy,  let  him 
he  holy  still*  The  light  of  reason  does  not,  any  more 
than  that  of  revelation,  force  men  to  submit  to  its 
authority;  both  admonish  them  of  what  they  ought  to 
do  and  avoid,  together  with  the  consequences  of  each; 
and  after  this,  leave  them  at  full  liberty  to  act  just  as 
they  please,  till  the  appointed  time  of  judgment.  Every 
moment's  experience  shows,  that  this  is  God's  general 
rule  of  government. 

To  return  then  :  Christianity  being  a  promulgation  of 
the  law  of  nature;  being  moreover  an  authoritative  pro- 
mulgation of  it ;  with  new  light,  and  other  circumstances 
of  pecuhar  advantage,  adapted  to  the  wants  of  mankind; 

*  Rev.  xxii.  1 1. 


172  OF   THE    IMPORTANCE  [Part  II. 

these  things  fully  show  its  importance.  And  it  is  to  be 
observed  further,  that  as  the  nature  of  the  case  requires, 
so  all  Christians  are  commanded  to  contribute,  by  their 
profession  of  Christianity,  to  preserve  it  in  the  world, 
and  render  it  such  a  promulgation  and  enforcement  of 
Religion.  For  it  is  the  very  scheme  of  the  Gospel,  that 
each  Christian  should,  in  his  degree,  contribute  towards 
continuing  and  carrying  it  on :  all  by  uniting  in  the 
public  profession  and  external  practice  of  Christianity  ; 
some  by  instructing,  by  having  the  oversight  and  taking 
care  of  this  religious  community,  the  Church  of  God. 
Now  this  further  shows  the  importance  of  Christianity; 
and,  which  is  what  I  chiefly  intend,  its  importance  in  a 
practical  sense :  or  the  high  obligations  we  are  under,  to 
take  it  into  our  most  serious  consideration  ;  and  the 
danger  there  must  necessarily  be,  not  only  in  treating  it 
despitefully,  which  I  am  not  now  speaking  of,  but  in 
disregarding  and  neglecting  it.  For  this  is  neglecting  to 
do  what  is  expressly  enjoined  us,  for  continuing  those 
benefits  to  the  world,  and  transmitting  them  down  to 
future  times.  And  all  this  holds,  even  though  the  only 
thing  to  be  considered  in  Christianity,  were  its  subser- 
viency to  natural  Religion.     But, 

II.  Christianity  is  to  be  considered  in  a  further  view; 
as  containing  an  account  of  a  dispensation  of  things, 
not  at  all  discoverable  by  reason,  in  consequence  of 
which  several  distinct  precepts  are  enjoined  us.  Chris- 
tianity is  not  only  an  external  institution  of  natural 
Religion,  and  a  new  promulgation  of  God's  general  pro- 
vidence, as  righteous  Governor  and  Judge  of  the  world; 
but  it  contains  also  a  revelation  of  a  particular  dispensa- 
tion of  Providence,  carrying  on  by  his  Son  and  Spirit, 
for  the  recoverv  and  salvation  of  mankind,  who  are 
represented  in  Scripture  to  be  in  a  state  of  ruin.  And 
in  consequence  of  this  revelation  being  made,  we  are 
commanded  to  he  baptized,  not  only  in  the  name  of  the 
Father,  but  also,  of  the  Son,  and  of  the  Holy  Ghost :  and 
other  obligations  of  duty,  unknown  before,  to  the  Son 
and  the  Holy  Ghost,  are  revealed.  Now  the  importance 
of  these  duties  may  be  judged  of,  by  observing  that  they 
arise,  not  from  positive  command  merely,  but  also  from 


Chap.  L]  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  173 

the  offices,  which  appear,  from  Scripture,  to  belong  to 
those  divine  persons  in  the  Gospel  dispensation ;  or  from 
the  relations,  which,  we  are  there  informed,  they  stand 
in  to  us.  By  reason  is  revealed  the  relation,  which  God 
the  Father  stands  in  to  us.  Hence  arises  the  obligation 
of  duty  which  we  are  under  to  him.  In  Scripture  are 
revealed  the  relations,  which  the  Son  and  Holy  Spirit 
stand  in  to  us.  Hence  arise  the  obhgations  of  duty, 
which  we  are  under  to  them.  The  truth  of  the  case,  as 
one  may  speak,  in  each  of  these  three  respects  being 
admitted:  that  God  is  the  governor  of  the  world,  upon 
the  evidence  of  reason ;  that  Christ  is  the  mediator 
between  God  and  man,  and  the  Holy  Ghost  our  guide 
and  sanctifier,  upon  the  evidence  of  revelation :  the 
truth  of  the  case,  I  say,  in  each  of  these  respects  being 
admitted ;  it  is  no  more  a  question,  why  it  should  be 
commanded,  that  we  be  baptized  in  the  name  of  the 
Son  and  of  the  Holy  Ghost,  than  that  we  be  baptized  in 
the  name  of  the  Father.  This  matter  seems  to  require 
to  be  more  fully  stated.* 

Let  it  be  remembered,  then,  that  Religion  comes 
under  the  twofold  consideration  of  internal  and  external : 
for  the  latter  is  as  real  a  part  of  Religion,  of  true  Reli- 
gion, as  the  former.  Now  when  Religion  is  considered 
under  the  first  notion,  as  an  inward  principle,  to  be 
exerted  in  such  and  such  inward  acts  of  the  mind  and 
heart ;  the  essence  of  natural  Religion  may  be  said  to 
consist  in  religious  regards  to  God  the  Father  Almighty: 
and  the  essence  of  revealed  Religion,  as  distinguished 
from  natural,  to  consist  in  religious  regards  to  the  Son, 
and  to  the  Holy  Ghost.  And  the  obligation  we  are 
under,  of  paying  these  religious  regards  to  each  of  these 
divine  persons  respectively,  arises  from  the  respective 
relations  which  they  each  stand  in  to  us.  How  these  rela- 
tions are  made  known,  whether  by  reason  or  revelation, 
makes  no  alteration  in  the  case:  because  the  duties  arise 
out  of  the  relations  themselves,  not  out  of  the  manner  in 
which  we  are  informed  of  them.  The  Son  and  Spirit 
have  each  his  proper  office  in  that  great  dispensation  of 

,  ♦  See  The  Nature,  Obligation,  and  Efficacy,  of  the  Christian  Sacraments,  fitc.,  and 
CoUiber  of  revealed  Religion,  as  there  quoted. 


174  OF  THE  IMPORTANCE  [p,i„  jj^ 

Providence,  the  redemption  of  the  world;  the  one  our 
mediator,  the  other  our  sanctifier.  Does  not  then  the 
duty  of  rehgious  regards  to  both  these  divine  persons, 
as  immediately  arise  to  the  view  of  reason,  out  of 
the  very  nature  of  these  offices  and  relations  ;  as  the 
inward  good-will  and  kind  intention,  which  we  owe  to 
our  fellow  creatures,  arises  out  of  the  common  relations 
between  us  and  them  ?  But  it  will  be  asked,  "  What 
are  the  inward  religious  regards,  appearing  thus  ob- 
viously due  to  the  Son  and  Holy  Spirit;  as  arising,  not 
merely  from  command  in  Scripture,  but  from  the  very 
nature  of  the  revealed  relations,  which  they  stand  in  to 
us  ?"  I  answer,  the  religious  regards  of  reverence, 
honour,  love,  trust,  gratitude,  fear,  hope.  In  what 
external  manner  this  inward  worship  is  to  be  expressed, 
is  a  matter  of  pure  revealed  command;  as  perhaps  the 
external  manner,  in  which  God  the  Father  is  to  be  wor- 
shipped, may  be  more  so,  than  we  are  ready  to  think: 
but  the  worship,  the  internal  worship  itself,  to  the  Son 
and  Holy  Ghost,  is  no  further  matter  of  pure  revealed 
command,  than  as  the  relations  they  stand  in  to  us  are 
matter  of  pure  revelation:  for  the  relations  being  known, 
the  obligations  to  such  internal  worship  are  obligations 
of  reason,  arising  out  of  those  relations  themselves.  In 
short,  the  history  of  the  Gospel  as  immediately  shows 
lis  the  reason  of  these  obligations,  as  it  shows  us  the 
meaning  of  the  words.  Son  and  Holy  Ghost. 

If  this  account  of  the  Christian  Religion  be  just ;  those 
persons  who  can  speak  lightly  of  it,  as  of  little  conse- 
quence, provided  natural  Religion  be  kept  to,  plainly 
forget,  that  Christianity,  even  what  is  pecuharly  so 
called,  as  distinguished  from  natural  Religion,  has  yet 
somewhat  very  important,  even  of  a  moral  nature.  For 
the  office  of  our  Lord  being  made  known,  and  the  rela- 
tion he  stands  in  to  us,  the  obligation  of  religious 
regards  to  him  is  plainly  moral,  as  much  as  charity  to 
mankind  is;  since  this  obligation  arises,  before  external 
command,  immediately  out  of  that  his  office  and  relation 
itself.  Those  persons  appear  to  forget,  that  revelation 
is  to  be  considered,  as  informing  us  of  somewhat  new, 
in  the  state  of  mankind,  and  in  the  government  of  the 


CsAH.  L]  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  175 

world:  as  acquainting  us  with  some  relations  we  stand 
in,  which  could  not  otherwise  have  been  known.  And 
these  relations  being  real  (though  before  revelation  we 
could  be  under  no  obligations  from  them,  yet  upon  their 
being  revealed),  there  is  no  reason  to  think,  but  that 
neglect  of  behaving  suitably  to  them  will  be  attended  with 
the  same  kind  of  consequences  under  God's  government, 
as  neglecting  to  behave  suitably  to  any  other  relations 
made  known  to  us  by  reason.  And  ignorance,  whether 
unavoidable  or  voluntary,  so  far  as  we  can  possibly  see, 
will  just  as  much,  and  just  as  little,  excuse  in  one  case  as 
in  the  other :  the  ignorance  being  supposed  equally 
unavoidable,  or  equally  voluntary,  in  both  cases. 

If  therefore  Christ  be  indeed  the  mediator  between 
God  and  man,  ^.  e.  if  Christianity  be  true ;  if  he  be  in- 
deed our  Lord,  our  Saviour,  and  our  God ;  no  one  can 
say,  what  may  follow,  not  only  the  obstinate,  but  the 
careless  disregard  to  him,  in  those  high  relations.  Nay 
no  one  can  say,  what  may  follow  such  disregard,  even  in 
the  way  of  natural  consequence.*  For,  as  the  natural 
consequences  of  vice  in  this  life  are  doubtless  to  be  con- 
sidered as  judicial  punishments  inflicted  by  God ;  so 
likewise,  for  aught  we  know,  the  judicial  punishments  of 
the  future  life  may  be,  in  a  like  way  or  a  like  sense,  the 
natural  consequence  of  vice  :t  of  men's  violating  or  disre- 
garding the  relations  which  God  has  placed  them  in  here, 
and  made  known  to  them. 

Again:  If  mankind  are  corrupted  and  depraved  in 
their  moral  character,  and  so  are  unfit  for  that  state, 
which  Christ  is  gone  to  prepare  for  his  disciples  ;  and  if 
the  assistance  of  God's  Spirit  be  necessary  to  renew  their 
nature,  in  the  degree  requisite  to  their  being  qualified  for 
that  state  ;  all  which  is  implied  in  the  express,  though 
figurative  declaration,  Except  a  man  he  horn  of  the  Spirit, 
he  cannot  enter  into  the  kingdom  of  God  :t  supposing  this, 
is  it  possible  any  serious  person  can  think  it  a  slight 
matter,  whether  or  no  he  makes  use  of  the  means,  ex- 
pressly commanded  by  God,  for  obtaining  this  divine 
assistances^  especially  since  the  whole  analogy  of  nature 
shows,  that  we  are  not  to  expect  any  benefits,  without 

*  p.  72. 73.  t  Ch.  V.  J  John  iii.  v. 


176  OF  THE  IMPORTANCE  [P^rt  IL 

making  use  of  the  appointed  means  for  obtaining  or 
enjoying  them.  Now  reason  shows  us  nothing,  of  the 
particular  immediate  means  of  obtaining  either  tempo- 
ral or  spiritual  benefits.  This  therefore  we  must  learn, 
either  from  experience  or  revelation.  And  experience, 
the  present  case  does  not  admit  of. 

The  conclusion  from  all  this  evidently  is,  that,  Chris- 
tianity being  supposed  either  true  or  credible,  it  is 
unspeakable  irreverence,  and  really  the  most  presump- 
tuous rashness,  to  treat  it  as  a  light  matter.  It  can 
never  justly  be  esteemed  of  little  consequence,  till  it  be 
positively  supposed  false.  Nor  do  I  know  a  higher  and 
more  important  obligation  which  we  are  under,  than 
that  of  examining  most  seriously  into  the  evidence  of  it, 
supposing  its  credibility;  and  of  embracing  it,  upon  sup- 
position of  its  truth. 

The  two  following  deductions  may  be  proper  to  be 
added,  in  order  to  illustrate  the  foregoing  observations, 
and  to  prevent  their  being  mistaken. 

First,  Hence  we  may  clearly  see,  where  lies  the  dis- 
tinction between  what  is  positive  and  what  is  moral  in 
Religion.  Moral  precepts  are  precepts,  the  reasons  of 
which  we  see:  positive  precepts  are  precepts,  the  rea- 
sons of  which  we  do  not  see.*  Moral  duties  arise  out  of 
the  nature  of  the  case  itself,  prior  to  external  command. 
Positive  duties  do  not  arise  out  of  the  nature  of  the  case, 
but  from  external  command ;  nor  would  they  be  duties 
at  all,  were  it  not  for  such  command,  received  from  him 
whose  creatures  and  subjects  we  are.  But  the  manner 
in  which  the  nature  of  the  case,  or  the  fact  of  the  rela- 
tion, is  made  known,  this  doth  not  denominate  any  duty 
either  positive  or  moral.  That  we  be  baptized  in  the  name 
of  the  Father  is  as  much  a  positive  duty,  as  that  w^e  be 
I  baptized  in  the  name  of  the  Son;  because  both  arise  equally 
from  revealed  command:  though  the  relation  which  we 
stand  in  to  God  the  Father  is  made  known  to  us  by  rea- 
son; the  relation  we  stand  in  to  Christ,  by  revelation  only. 

*  Tliis  is  the  distinction  between  moral  and  positive  precepts  considered  respec- 
tively as  such.  Rut  yet,  since  the  latter  have  somewhat  of  a  moral  nature,  we  may 
see  the  reason  of  them,  considered  in  this  view.  Moral  and  pc* itire  precepts  are  in 
some  respects  alike,  in  other  resp<'Cts  different.  So  far  as  they  are  alike,  we  discern 
the  reasons  of  hoth  ;  so  far  as  th.ey  are  different,  wc  discern  tiie  reasons  of  the  for 
mer,  bvt  not  of  the  latter.    See  p.  JOS,  &c.,  and  p.  177. 


CtoAP.  I<]  OF  CIiniSTJANITY-  177 

On  the  other  hand,  the  dispensation  of  the  Gospel 
admitted,  gratitude  as  immediately  becomes  due  to  Christ, 
from  his  being  the  voluntary  minister  of  this  dispensation, 
as  it  is  due  to  God  the  Father,  from  his  being  the  foun- 
tain of  all  good ;  though  the  first  is  made  known  to  us  by 
revelation  only,  the  second  by  reason.  Hence  also  we 
may  see,  and,  for  distinctness'  sake,  it  may  be  worth  men- 
tioning, that  positive  institutions  come  under  a  twofold 
consideration.  They  are  either  institutions  founded  on 
natural  Religion,  as  baptism  in  the  name  of  the  Father ; 
though  this  has  also  a  particular  reference  to  the  Gospel 
dispensation,  for  it  is  in  the  name  of  God,  as  the  Father 
of  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ :  or  they  are  external  institu- 
tions founded  on  revealed  Religion ;  as  baptism  in  the 
name  of  the  Son,  and  of  the  Holy  Ghost. 

Secondly,  From  the  distinction  between  what  is  moral 
and  what  is  positive  in  Religion,  appears  the  ground  of 
that  peculiar  preference,  which  the  Scripture  teaches  us 
to  be  due  to  the  former. 

The  reason  of  positive  institutions  in  general  is  very 
obvious ;  though  we  should  not  see  the  reason,  Avhy  such 
particular  ones  are  pitched  upon  rather  than  others. 
Whoever  therefore,  instead  of  cavilling  at  words,  will 
attend  to  the  thing  itself,  may  clearly  see,  that  posi- 
tive institutions  in  general,  as  distinguished  from  this 
or  that  particular  one,  have  the  nature  of  moral  com- 
mands ;  since  the  reasons  of  them  appear.  Thus,  for 
instance,  the  external  worship  of  God  is  a  moral  duty, 
though  no  particular  mode  of  it  be  so.  Care  then  is  to 
be  taken,  when  a  comparison  is  made  between  positive 
and  moral  duties,  that  they  be  compared  no  further  than 
as  they  are  different ;  no  further  than  as  the  former  are 
positive,  or  arise  out  of  mere  external  command,  the 
reasons  of  which  we  are  not  acquainted  with ;  and  as 
the  latter  are  moral,  or  arise  out  of  the  apparent  reason 
of  the  case,  without  such  external  command.  Unless 
this  caution  be  observed,  we  shall  run  into  endless 
confusion. 

Now  this  being  premised,  suppose  two  standing  pre- 
cepts enjoined  by  the  same  authority ;  that,  in  certain 
conjunctures,  it  is  impossible  to  obey  both  ;  that  the  former 

iVi 


178  OF  1  HE  IMPORTANCE  [Part  It 

is  moral,  i.  e.  a  precept  of  which  we  see  the  reasons, 
and  that  they  hold  in  the  particular  case  before  us  ;  but 
that  the  latter  is  positive,  i.  e.  a  precept  of  which  we  do 
not  see  the  reasons:  it  is  indisputable  that  our  obliga- 
tions are  to  obey  the  former ;  because  there  is  an  appa- 
rent reason  for  this  preference,  and  none  against  it. 
Further,  positive  institutions,  I  suppose  all  those  which 
Christianity  enjoins,  are  means  to  a  moral  end:  and  the 
end  must  be  acknowledged  more  excellent  than  the 
means.  Nor  is  observance  of  these  institutions  any 
religious  obedience  at  all,  or  of  any  value,  otherwise 
than  as  it  proceeds  from  a  moral  principle.  This  seems 
to  be  the  strict  logical  way  of  stating  and  determining 
this  matter;  but  will,  perhaps,  be  found  less  applicable 
to  practice,  than  may  be  thought  at  first  sight. 

And  therefore,  in  a  more  practical,  though  more  lax 
way  of  consideration,  and  taking  the  words,  moral  law 
and  positive  institutions,  in  the  popular  sense  ;  I  add, 
that  the  whole  moral  law  is  as  much  matter  of  revealed 
command,  as  positive  institutions  are :  for  the  Scripture 
enjoins  every  moral  virtue.  In  this  respect  then  they 
are  both  upon  a  level.  But  the  moral  law  is,  moreover, 
written  upon  our  hearts ;  interwoven  into  our  very 
nature.  And  this  is  a  plain  intimation  of  the  Author  of 
it,  which  is  to  be  preferred,  wiien  they  interfere. 

But  there  is  not  altogether  so  much  necessity  for  the 
determination  of  this  question,  as  some  persons  seem  to 
think.  Nor  are  we  left  to  reason  alone  to  determine  it. 
For,  First,  Though  mankind  have,  in  all  ages,  been 
greatly  prone  to  place  their  religion  in  peculiar  positive 
rites,  by  way  of  equivalent  for  obedience  to  moral  pre- 
cepts; yet,  without  making  any  comparison  at  all 
between  them,  and  consequently  without  determining 
which  is  to  have  the  preference,  the  nature  of  the  thing 
a])undantly  shows  all  notions  of  that  kind  to  be  utterly 
subversive  of  true  Religion  as  they  are,  moreover,  con- 
trary to  the  whole  general  tenor  of  Scripture  ;  and  like- 
wise to  the  most  express  particular  declarations  of  it, 
that  nothing  can  render  us  accepted  of  God,  without 
moral  virtue.  Secondly,  Upon  the  occasion  of  mention- 
ing together   positive  and    mordl   duties,  the  Scripture 


Chap.  I.]  OP  CHRISTIANITY.  179 

always  puts  the  stress  of  Religion  upon  the  latter,  and 
never  upon  the  former:  which,  though  no  sort  of  allow- 
ance to  neglect  the  former,  when  they  do  not  interfere 
with  the  latter,  yet  is  a  plajn  intimation,  that  when  they 
do,  the  latter  are  to  be  preferred.  And  further,  as 
mankind  are  for  placing  the  stress  of  their  rehgion  any 
where,  rather  than  upon  virtue;  lest  both  the  reason 
of  the  thing,  and  the  general  spirit  of  Christianity, 
appearing  in  the  intimation  now  mentioned,  should  be 
ineffectual  against  this  prevalent  folly:  our  Lord  him- 
self, from  whose  command  alone  the  obligation  of  posi- 
tive institutions  arises,  has  taken  occasion  to  make  the 
comparison  between  them  and  moral  precepts  ;  when 
the  Pharisees  censured  him,  for  eating  with  publicans  and 
sinners;  and  also  when  they  censured  his  disciples,  for 
plucking  the  ears  of  corn  on  the  Sabbath  day.  Upon  this 
comparison,  he  has  determined  expressly,  and  in  form, 
which  shall  have  the  preference  when  they  interfere. 
And  by  delivering  his  authoritative  determination  in  a 
proverbial  manner  of  expression,  he  has  made  it  ge- 
neral: I  will  have  mercy ,  and  not  sacrijice,*  The  pro- 
priety of  the  word  proverbial,  is  not  the  thing  insisted 
upon:  ^.hough  I  think  the  manner  of  speaking  is  to  be 
called  so.  But  that  the  manner  of  speaking  very 
remarkably  renders  the  determination  general,  is  surely 
indisputable.  For,  had  it,  in  the  latter  case,  been  said 
only,  that  God  preferred  mercy  to  the  rigid  observance 
of  the  Sabbath;  even  then,  by  parity  of  reason,  most 
justly  might  we  have  argued,  that  he  preferred  mercy 
likewise,  to  the  observance  of  other  ritual  institutions  ; 
and  in  general,  moral  duties,  to  positive  ones.  And 
thus  the  determination  would  have  been  general ;  though 
its  being  so  were  inferred  and  not  expressed.  But  as 
the  passage  really  stands  in  the  Gospel,  it  is  much 
stronger.  For  the  sense  and  the  very  literal  words  of 
our  Lord's  answer  are  as  applicable  to  any  other 
instance  of  a  comparison,  between  positive  and  moral 
duties,  as  to  this  upon  which  they  were  spoken.  And 
if,  in  case  of  competition,  mercy  is  to  be  preferred  to 
positive   institutions,    it   will    scarce    be    thought,    that 

*  Matth.  ix.  13,  and  xii.  7. 


180  OF  THE  IMPORTANCE  [PiRT  II, 

justice  is  to  give  place  to  them.  It  is  remarkable  too, 
that,  as  the  words  are  a  quotation  from  the  Old  Testa- 
ment, they  are  introduced,  on  both  the  forementioned 
occasions,  with  a  declaration,  that  the  Pharisees  did  not 
understand  the  meaning  of  them.  This,  I  say,  is  very 
remarkable.  For,  since  it  is  scarce  possible,  for  the 
most  ignorant  person,  not  to  understand  the  literal  sense 
of  the  passage,  in  the  Prophet;*  and  since  understanding 
the  literal  sense  would  not  have  prevented  their  con- 
demning the  guiUless,\  it  can  hardly  be  doubted,  that 
the  thing  which  our  Lord  really  intended  in  that  decla- 
ration was,  that  the  Pharisees  had  not  learned  from  it, 
as  they  might,  wherein  the  general  spirit  of  Religion 
consists:  that  it  consists  in  moral  piety  and  virtue,  as 
distinguished  from  forms,  and  ritual  observances.  How- 
ever, it  is  certain  we  may  learn  this  from  his  divine 
application  of  the  passage,  in  the  Gospel. 

But,  as  it  is  one  of  the  peculiar  weaknesses  of  human 
nature,  when,  upon  a  comparison  of  two  things,  one  is 
found  to  be  of  greater  importance  than  the  other,  to 
consider  this  other  as  of  scarce  any  importance  at  all : 
it  is  highly  necessary  that  we  remind  ourselves,  how 
great  presumption  it  is,  to  make  hght  of  any  institutions 
of  divine  appointment ;  that  our  obligations  to  obey  all 
God's  commands  whatever  are  absolute  and  indispens- 
able ;  and  that  commands  merely  positive,  admitted  to 
be  from  him,  lay  us  under  a  moral  obligation  to  obey 
them :  an  obligation  moral  in  the  strictest  and  most 
proper  sense. 

To  these  things  I  cannot  forbear  adding,  that  the' 
account  now  given  of  Christianity  most  strongly  shows 
and  enforces  upon  us  the  obligation  of  searching  the 
Scriptures,  in  order  to  see,  what  the  scheme  of  revela- 
tion really  is;  instead  of  determining  beforehand,  from 
reason,  what  the  scheme  of  it  must  be.+  Indeed  if  in 
Revelation  there  be  found  any  passages,  the  seeming 
meaning  of  which  is  contrary  to  natural  Religion ;  we 
may  most  certainly  conclude,  such  seeming  meaning 
not  to  be  the  real  one.  But  it  is  not  any  degree  of  a 
presumption  against  an  interpretation  of  Scripture,  that 

*  Hoe.  vi.  f  See  Mattli.  xii.  v;i.  %  See  Chap,  iiu 


CaAP.  II.3  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  181 

such  interpretation  contains  a  doctrine,  which  the  hght 
of  nature  cannot  discover;*  or  a  precept,  which  the  law 
of  nature  does  not  obhge  to. 


CHAP.   II. 

OF  THE  SUPPOSED  PRESUMPTION  AGAINST  A  REVELATION 
CONSIDERED  AS  MIRACULOUS. 

Having  shown  the  importance  of  the  Christian  revela- 
tion, and  the  obligations  which  we  are  under  seriously 
to  attend  to  it,  upon  supposition  of  its  truth,  or  its  cre- 
dibility: the  next  thing  in  order,  is  to  consider  the  sup- 
posed presumptions  against  revelation  in  general ;  which 
shall  be  the  subject  of  this  Chapter:  and  the  objections 
against  the  Christian  in  particular;  which  shall  be  the 
subject  of  some  following  ones.f  For  it  seems  the  most 
natural  method,  to  remove  the  prejudices  against  Chris- 
tianity, before  we  proceed  to  the  consideration  of  the 
positive  evidence  for  it,  and  the  objections  against  that 
evidence. J 

It  is,  I  think,  commonly  supposed,  that  there  is  some 
peculiar  presumption,  from  the  analogy  of  nature,  against 
the  Christian  scheme  of  things ;  at  least  against  miracles ; 
so  as  that  stronger  evidence  is  necessary  to  prove  the 
truth  and  reality  of  them,  than  would  be  sufficient  to  con- 
vince us  of  other  events,  or  matters  of  fact,  [ndeed  the 
consideration  of  this  supposed  presumption  cannot  but 
be  thought  very  insignificant,  by  many  persons.  Yet, 
as  it  belongs  to  the  subject  of  this  Treatise ;  so  it  may 
tend  to  open  the  mind,  and  remove  some  prejudices: 
however  needless  the  consideration  of  it  be,  upon  its 
own  account 

I.  I  find  no  appearance  of  a  presumption,  from  the 
analogy  of  nature,  against  the  general  scheme  of  Chris- 
tianity, that  God  created  and  invisibly  governs  the  world 
by  Jesus  Christ;  and  by  him  also  will  hereafter  judge  it 
in  righteousness,  i.  e.  render  to  every  one  according  to 
his  works  ;    and  that  good  men  are  under  the  secret 

*  p.  181,  182.  f  Ch.  iiL  iv,  v.  vL  J  Ch.  vii. 


\ 


182  OF  THE  SUPPOSED  PRESUMPTION  [Part  I J 

influence  of  his  Spirit.  Whether  these  things  are,  or 
are  not,  to  be  called  miraculous,  is,  perhaps,  only  a 
question  about  words ;  or  however,  is  of  no  moment  in 
the  case.  If  the  analogy  of  nature  raises  any  presump- 
tion against  this  general  scheme  of  Christianity,  it  must 
be,  either  because  it  is  not  discoverable  by  reason  or  expe- 
rience; or  else,  because  it  is  unlike  that  course  of  nature, 
which  is.  But  analogy  raises  no  presumption  against 
the  truth  of  this  scheme,  upon  either  of  these  accounts. 

First,  There  is  no  presumption,  from  analogy,  against 
the  truth  of  it,  upon  account  of  its  not  being  discover- 
able by  reason  or  experience.  For  suppose  one  who 
never  heard  of  revelation,  of  the  most  improved  under- 
standing, and  acquainted  with  our  whole  system  of 
natural  philosophy  and  natural  rehgion;  such  a  one 
could  not  but  be  sensible,  that  it  was  but  a  very  small 
part  of  the  natural  and  moral  system  of  the  universe, 
which  he  was  acquainted  with.  He  could  not  but  be 
sensible,  that  there  must  be  innumerable  things,  in  the 
dispensations  of  Providence  past,  in  the  invisible  govern- 
ment over  the  world  at  present  carrying  on,  and  in  what 
is  to  come ;  of  which  he  was  wholly  ignorant,*  and  which 
could  not  be  discovered  without  revelation.  Whether 
the  scheme  of  nature  be,  in  the  strictest  sense,  infinite 
or  not ;  it  is  evidently  vast,  even  beyond  all  possible 
imagination.  And  doubtless  that  part  of  it,  which  is 
opened  to  our  view,  is  but  as  a  point,  in  comparison  of 
the  whole  plan  of  Providence,  reaching  throughout 
eternity  past  and  future ;  in  comparison  of  what  is  even 
now  going  on  in  the  remote  parts  of  the  boundless 
universe;  nay,  in  comparison  of  the  whole  scheme  of 
this  world.  And  therefore,  that  things  lie  beyond  the 
natural  reach  of  our  faculties,  is  no  sort  of  presumption 
against  the  truth  and  reality  of  them :  because  it  is  cer- 
tain, there  are  innumerable  things,  in  the  constitution 
and  government  of  the  universe,  which  are  thus  beyond 
the  natural  reach  of  our  faculties.  Secondly,  Analogy 
raises  no.  presumption  against  any  of  the  things  con- 
tained in  this  general  doctrine  of  Scripture  now  men- 
tioned, upon  account  of  their  being  unlike  the  known 

•  F.   149. 


CHAP.n.]  AGAINST  MIRACLES.  1S3 

course  of  nature.  For  there  is  no  presumption  at  all 
frbin^analogy,  that  the  whole  course  of  things,  or  divine 
government,  naturally  unknown  to  us,  and  every  thing 
in  it,  is  like  to  any  thing  in  that  which  is  known ;  and 
therefore  no  peculiar  presumption  against  any  thing  in 
the  former,  upon  account  of  its  being  unlike  to  any  thing 
in  the  latter.  And  in  the  constitution  and  natural 
government  of  the  world,  as  well  as  in  the  moral 
government  of  it,  we  see  things,  in  a  great  degree, 
unlike  one  another:  and  therefore  ought  not  to  wonder 
at  such  unlikeness  between  things  visible  and  invisible. 
However,  the  scheme  of  Christianity  is  by  no  means 
entirely  unlike  the  scheme  of  nature;  as  will  appear  in 
the  following  part  of  this  Treatise. 

The  notion  of  a  miracle,  considered  as  a  proof  of  a 
divine  mission,  has  been  stated  with  great  exactness  by 
divines  ;  and  is,  I  think,  sufficiently  understood  by  every 
one.  There  are  also  invisible  miracles,  the  Incarnation 
of  Christ,  for  instance,  which,  being  secret,  cannot  be 
alleged  as  a  proof  of  such  a  mission  ;  but  require  them- 
selves to  be  proved  by  visible  miracles.  Revelation 
itself  too  is  miraculous  ;  and  miracles  are  the  proof  of  it ; 
and  the  supposed  presumption  against  these  shall  pre- 
sently be  considered.  All  which  I  have  been  observing 
here  is,  that,  whether  we  choose  to  call  every  thing  in 
the  dispensations  of  Providence,  not  discoverable  with- 
out revelation,  nor  like  the  known  course  of  things, 
miraculous;  and  whether  the  general  Christian  dispensa- 
tion now  mentioned  is  to  be  called  so,  or  not ;  the  fore- 
going observations  seem  certainly  to  show,  that  there  is 
no  presumption  against  it  from  the  analogy  of  nature. 

II.  There  is  no  presumption,  from  analogy,  against 
some  operations,  which  we  should  now  call  miraculous ; 
particularly  none  against  a  revelation  at  the  beginning  of 
the  world:  nothing  of  such  presumption  against  it,  as  is 
supposed  to  be  implied  or  expressed  in  the  word,  inira- 
culous.  For  a  miracle,  in  its  very  notion,  is  relative  to  a 
course  of  nature ;  and  implies  somewhat  different  from 
it,  considered  as  being  so.  Now,  either  there  was  no 
course  of  nature  at  the  time  which  we  are  speaking  of; 
or  if  there  were,  we  are  not  acquainted  what  the  course 


/ 

184  OF  THE  SUPPOSED  PRESUMPTION  fp^BT  II- 

of  nature  is,  upon  the  first  peopling  of  worlds.  And 
therefore  the  question,  whether  mankind  had  a  revelation 
made  to  them  at  that  time,  is  to  be  considered,  not  as  a 
question  concerning  a  miracle,  but  as  a  common  question 
of  fact.  And  we  have  the  like  reason,  be  it  more  or  less, 
to  admit  the  report  of  tradition,  concerning  this  question, 
and  concerning  common  matters  of  fact  of  the  same 
antiquity;  for  instance,  what  part  of  the  earth  was  first 
peopled. 

Or  thus:  When  mankind  was  first  placed  in  this  state, 
there  was  a  power  exerted,  totally  different  from  the  pre- 
sent course  of  nature.  Now,  whether  this  power,  thus 
wholly  different  from  the  present  course  of  nature,  for 
we  cannot  properly  apply  to  it  the  word  miraculous ; 
whr  ther  this  power  stopped  immediately  after  it  had  made 
man,  or  went  on,  and  exerted  itself  further  in  giving  him 
a  revelation,  is  a  question  of  the  same  kind,  as  whether 
an  ordinary  power  exerted  itself  in  such  a  particular  de- 
gree and  manner,  or  not. 

Or  suppose  the  power  exerted  in  the  formation  of  the 
world  be  considered  as  miraculous,  or  rather,  be  called 
bv  that  name  ;  the  case  will  not  be  different :  since  it 
must  be  acknowledged,  that  such  a  power  was  exerted. 
For  supposing  it  acknowledged,  that  our  Saviour  spent 
some  years  in  a  course  of  working  miracles  :  there  is  no 
more  presumption,  worth  mentioning,  against  his  having 
exerted  this  miraculous  power,  in  a  certain  degree 
greater,  than  in  a  certain  degree  less ;  in  one  or  two 
more  instances,  than  in  on?,  or  two  fewer;  in  this,  than 
in  another  manner. 

It  is  evident  then,  that  there  can  be  no  peculiar  pre- 
sumption, from  the  analogy  of  nature,  against  supposing 
a  revelation,  when  man  was  first  placed  upon  earth. 

Add,  that  there  does  not  appear  the  least  intimation 
in  history  or  tradition,  that  Religion  was  first  reasoned 
out :  but  the  whole  of  history  and  tradition  makes  for 
the  other  side,  that  it  came  into  the  world  by  revelation. 
Indeed  the  state  of  Religion  in  the  first  ages,  of  wliich 
we  have  any  account,  seems  to  suppose  and  imply,  that 
this  was  the  original  of  it  amongst  mankind.  And  these 
reflections  together,  without  taking  in  the  peculiar  au^ 


Chap.  U.]  AGAINST  MIRACLES.  185 

thority  of  Scripture,  amount  to  real  and  a  very  material 
degree  of  evidence,  that  there  was  a  revelation  at  the  be- 
ginning of  the  world.  Now  this,  as  it  is  a  confirmation 
of  natural  Religion,  and  therefore  mentioned  in  the 
for.mer  part  of  this  Treatise  ;*  so  hkewise  it  has  a  tend- 
ency to  remove  any  prejudices  against  a  subsequent 
revelation. 

III.  But  still  it  may  be  objected,  that  there  is  some 
peculiar  presumption,  from  analogy,  against  miracles; 
particularly  against  revelation,  after  the  settlement  and 
during  the  continuance  of  a  course  of  nature. 

Now  with  regard  to  this  supposed  presumption,  it  is 
to  be  observed  in  general,  that  before  we  can  have 
ground  for  raising  what  can,  with  any  propriety,  be  called 
an  argument  from  analogy,  for  or  against  revelation  con- 
sidered as  somewhat  miraculous,  we  must  be  acquainted 
with  a  similar  or  parallel  case.  But  the  history  of  some 
other  world,  seemingly  in  like  circumstances  with  our 
own,  is  no  more  than  a  parallel  case:  and  therefore  no- 
thins;  short  of  this  can  be  so.  Yet,  could  we  come  at  a 
presumptive  proof,  for  or  against  a  revelation,  from  being 
informed,  whether  such  world  had  one,  or  not ;  such  a 
proof,  being  drawn  from  one  single  instance  only,  must 
be  infinitely  precarious.  More  particularly:  First  of  all; 
There  is  a  very  strong  presumption  against  common 
speculative  truths,  and  against  the  most  ordinary  facts, 
before  the  proof  of  them;  which  yet  is  overcome  by 
almost  any  proof.  There  is  a  presumption  of  millions 
to  one,  against  the  story  of  Ceesar,  or  of  any  other  man. 
For  suppose  a  number  of  common  facts  so  and  so  cir- 
cumstanced, of  which  one  had  no  kind  of  proof,  should 
happen  to  come  into  one's  thoughts ;  every  one  would, 
without  any  possible  doubt,  conclude  them  to  be  false. 
And  the  like  may  be  said  of  a  single  common  fact.  And 
from  hence  it  appears,  that  the  question  of  importance, 
as  to  the  matter  before  us,  is,  concerning  the  degree  of 
the  peculiar  presumption  supposed  against  miracles ;  not 
whether  there  be  any  peculiar  presumption  at  all  against 
them.  For,  if  there  be  the  presumption  of  millions  to 
one,  against  the  most  common  facts ;  what  can  a  small 

*P.  143,  &c 


186  OF  THE  SUPPOSED  PRESUMPTION  [PAai  II. 

presumption,  additional  to  this,  amount  to,  though  it  be 
peculiar?  It  cannot  be  estimated,  and  is  as  nothing. 
The  only  material  question  is,  whether  there  be  any  such 
presumption  against  miracles,  as  to  render  them  in  any 
sort  incredible.  Secondly,  If  we  leave  out  the  considera- 
tion of  Religion,  we  are  in  such  total  darkness,  upon 
what  causes,  occasions,  reasons,  or  circumstances,  the 
present  course  of  nature  depends;  that  there  does  not 
appear  any  improbability  for  or  against  supposing,  that 
five  or  six  thousand  years  may  have  given  scope  for 
causes,  occasions,  reasons,  or  circumstances,  from  whence 
miraculous  interpositions  may  have  arisen.  And  from 
this,  joined  with  the  foregoing  observation,  it  will  follow, 
that  there  must  be  a  presumption,  beyond  all  comparison, 
greater,  against  the  jmrticidar  common  facts  just  now 
instanced  in,  than  against  miracles  in  general;  before  any 
evidence  of  either.  But,  T/m'dly,  Take  in  the  consid- 
eration of  Religion,  or  the  moral  system  of  the  world, 
and  then  we  see  distinct  particular  reasons  for  miracles: 
to  afford  mankind  instruction  additional  to  that  of  nature, 
and  to  attest  the  truth  of  it.  And  this  gives  a  real  credi- 
bility to  the  supposition,  that  it  might  be  part  of  the 
original  plan  of  things,  that  there  should  be  miraculous 
interpositions.  Then,  Lastly,  Miracles  must  not  be  com- 
pared to  common  natural  events ;  or  to  events  which, 
though  uncommon,  are  similar  to  what  we  daily  expe- 
rience :  but  to  the  extraordinary  phenomena  of  nature. 
And  then  the  comparison  will  be  between  the  presump- 
tion against  miracles,  and  the  presumption  against  such 
uncommon  appearances,  suppose,  as  comets,  and  against 
there  being  any  such  powers  in  nature  as  magnetism  and 
electricity,  so  contrary  to  the  properties  of  other  bodies 
not  endued  with  these  powers.  And  before  any  one  can 
determine,  whether  there  be  any  peculiar  presumption 
against  miracles,  more  than  against  other  extraordinary 
things;  he  must  consider,  what,  upon  first  hearing, 
would  be  the  presumption  against  the  last  mentioned 
appearances  and  powers,  to  a  person  acquainted  only 
with  the  daily,  monthly,  and  annual  course  of  nature  re- 
specting this  earth,  and  with  those  common  powers  of 
matter  which  we  every  da^^  see. 


Chap.  III.]  AGAINST  MIRACLES.  187 

Upon  all  this  I  conclude ;  that  there  certainly  is  no 
such  presumption  against  miracles,  as  to  render  them  in 
any  wise  incredible :  that,  on  the  contrary,  our  being  able 
to  discern  reasons  for  them,  gives  a  positive  credibility 
to  the  history  of  them,  in  cases  where  those  reasons  hold : 
and  that  it  is  by  no  means  certain,  that  there  is  any  pecu- 
liar presumption  at  all,  from  analogy,  even  in  the  lowest 
degree,  against  miracles,  as  distinguished  from  other  ex- 
traordinary phenomena :  though  it  is  not  worth  while  to 
perplex  the  reader  with  inquiries  into  the  abstract  nature 
of  evidence,  in  order  to  determine  a  question,  which, 
without  such  inquiries,  we  see*  is  of  no  importance. 


CHAP.   III. 

OF  OUR  INCAPACITY  OF  JUDGING,  WHAT  WERE  TO  BE 
EXPECTED  IN  A  REVELATION  j  AND  THE  CREDIBILITY, 
FROM  ANALOGY,  THAT  IT  MUST  CONTAIN  THINGS 
APPEARING    LIABLE    TO    OBJECTIONS. 

Besides  the  objections  against  the  evidence  for  Chris- 
tianity, many  are  alleged  against  the  scheme  of  it; 
against  the  whole  manner  in  which  it  is  put  and  left 
with  the  Avorld;  as  well  as  against  several  particular 
relations  in  Scripture:  objections  drawn  from  the  defi- 
ciencies of  revelation:  from  things  in  it  appearing  to 
men  foolishness ;'^  from  its  containing  matters  of  offence, 
which  have  led,  and  it  must  have  been  foreseen  would 
lead,  into  strange  enthusiasm  and  superstition,  and  be 
made  to  serve  the  purposes  of  tyranny  and  wickedness; 
from  its  not  being  universal;  and,  which  is  a  thing  of 
the  same  kind,  from  its  evidence  not  being  so  convinc- 
ing and  satisfactory  as  it  might  have  been:  for  this  last 
is  sometimes  turned  into  a  positive  argument  against  its 
truth.t  It  would  be  tedious,  indeed  impossible,  to  enu- 
merate the  several  particulars  comprehended  under  the 
objections  here  referred  to;  they  being  so  various, 
according  to  the  different  fancies  of  men.  There  are 
persons    who   tliink   it  a  strong   objection    against   the 

*  P.  185.  t  1  Cor.  i.  28.  J  See  Ch.  vi. 


188  THE  CREDIBILITY  OF  REVELATION  [Part  II. 

authority  of  Scripture,  that  it  is  not  composed  by  rules  of 
art,  agreed  upon  by  critics,  for  pohte  and  correct  writing. 
And  the  scorn  is  inexpressible,  with  which  some  of  the 
prophetic  parts  of  Scripture  are  treated:  partly  through 
the  rashness  of  interpreters;  but  very  much  also,  on 
account  of  the  hieroglyphical  and  figurative  language,  in 
which  they  are  left  us.  Some  of  the  principal  things  of 
this  sort  shall  be  particularly  considered  in  the  following 
Chapters.  But  my  design  at  present  is  to  observe  in 
general,  with  respect  to  this  whole  way  of  arguing,  that, 
upon  supposition  of  a  revelation,  it  is  highly  credible 
beforehand,  we  should  be  incompetent  judges  of  it  to  a 
great  degree:  and  that  it  would  contain  many  things 
appearing  to  us  liable  to  great  objections;  in  case  we 
judge  of  it  otherwise,  than  by  the  analogy  of  nature. 
And  therefore,  though  objections  against  the  evidence 
of  Christianity  are  most  seriously  to  be  considered ;  yet 
objections  against  Christianity  itself  are,  in  a  great  mea- 
sure, frivolous:  almost  all  objections  against  it,  except- 
ing those  which  are  alleged  against  the  particular  proofs 
of  its  coming  from  God.  I  express  myself  with  caution, 
lest  I  should  be  mistaken  to  vilify  reason ;  which  is 
indeed  the  only  faculty  we  have  wherewith  to  judge 
concerning  any  thing,  even  revelation  itself:  or  be  mis- 
understood to  assert,  that  a  supposed  revelation  cannot 
be  proved  false,  from  internal  characters.  For,  it  may 
contain  clear  immoralities  or  contradictions;  and  eidier 
of  these  would  prove  it  false.  Nor  will  I  take  upon  me 
to  affirm,  that  nothing  else  can  possibly  render  any  sup- 
posed revelation  incredible.  Yet  still  the  observation 
above,  is,  I  think,  true  beyond  doubt ;  that  objections 
against  Christianity,  as  distinguished  from  objections 
against  its  evidence,  are  frivolous.  To  make  out  this, 
is  the  general  design  of  the  present  Chapter.  And  with 
regard  to  the  w^hole  of  it,  I  cannot  but  particularly  wish, 
that  the  proofs  might  be  attended  to;  rather  than  the 
assertions  cavilled  at,  upon  account  of  any  unacceptable 
consequences,  whether  real  or  supposed,  which  may  be 
drawn  from  them.  For,  after  all,  that  which  is  true, 
must  be  admitted,  though  it  should  show  us  the  short- 
ness of  our  faculties;  and  that  we  are  in  no  wise  judges 


Chap.  III.]  LIABLE  TO  OBJECTIONS.  189 

of  many  things,  of  which  we  are  apt  to  think  ourselves 
very  competent  ones.  Nor  will  this  be  any  objection 
with  reasonable  men,  at  least  upon  second  thought  it 
will  not  be  any  objection  with  such,  against  the  justness 
of  the  following  observations. 

As  God  governs  the  world  and  instructs  his  crea- 
tures, according  to  certain  laws  or  rules,  in  the  known 
course  of  nature  ;  known  by  reason  together  with  ex- 
perience: so  the  Scripture  informs  us  of  a  scheme  of 
divine  Providence,  additional  to  this.  It  relates,  that 
God  has,  by  revelation,  instructed  men  in  things  con- 
cerning his  government,  which  they  could  not  otherwise 
have  known ;  and  reminded  them  of  things,  which 
tliey  might  otherwise  know ;  and  attested  the  truth  of 
the  whole  by  miracles.  Now  if  the  natural  and  the  re- 
vealed dispensation  of  things  are  both  from  God,  if  they 
coincide  with  each  other,  and  together  make  up  one 
scheme  of  Providence  ;  our  being  incompetent  judges  of 
one,  must  render  it  credible,  that  we  may  be  incompe- 
tent judges  also  of  the  other.  Since,  upon  experience, 
the  acknowledged  constitution  and  course  of  nature  is 
found  to  be  greatly  different  from  what,  before  experi- 
ence, would  have  been  expected ;  and  such  as,  men 
fancy,  there  lie  great  objections  against :  this  renders  it 
beforehand  highly  credible,  that  they  may  find  the  re- 
vealed dispensation  likewise,  if  they  judge  of  it  as  they 
do  of  the  constitution  of  nature,  very  different  from 
expectations  formed  beforehand ;  and  liable,  in  appear- 
ance, to  great  objections  :  objections  against  the  scheme 
itself,  and  against  the  degrees  and  manners  of  the  mira- 
culous interpositions,  by  which  it  was  attested  and  carried 
on.  Thus,  suppose  a  prince  to  govern  his  dominions 
in  the  wisest  manner  possible,  by  common  known  laws  ; 
and  that  upon  some  exigencies  he  should  suspend  these 
laws ;  and  govern,  in  several  instances,  in  a  different 
manner ;  if  one  of  his  subjects  were  not  a  competent 
judgs  beforehand,  by  what  common  rules  the  government 
should  or  would  be  carried  on  ;  it  could  not  be  expected, 
that  the  same  person  would  be  a  competent  judge,  in 
what  exigencies,  or  in  what  manner,  or  to  what  degree, 
those  laws  commonly  observed  would  be  suspended  or 


190  THE  CREDIBILITY  OF  REVELATION.  [Part  11. 

deviated  from.  If  he  were  not  a  judge  of  the  wisdom  of 
the  ordinary  administration,  there  is  no  reason  to  think 
he  would  be  a  judge  of  the  wisdom  of  the  extraordinary. 
If  he  thought  he  had  objections  against  the  former; 
doubtless,  it  is  highly  supposable,  he  might  think  also, 
that  he  had  objections  against  the  latter.  And  thus,  as 
we  fall  into  infinite  follies  and  mistakes,  whenever  we 
pretend,  otherwise  than  from  experience  and  analogy,  to 
judge  of  the  constitution  and  course  of  nature;  it  is  evi- 
dently supposable  beforehand,  that  we  should  fall  into  as 
great,  in  pretending  to  judge,  in  like  manner,  concerning 
revelation.  Nor  is  there  any  more  ground  to  expect 
that  this  latter  should  appear  to  us  clear  of  objections, 
than  that  the  former  should. 

These  observations,  relating  to  the  whole  of  Chris- 
tianity, are  applicable  to  inspiration  in  particular.  As 
we  are  in  no  sort  judges  beforehand,  by  what  laws  or 
rules,  in  what  degree,  or  by  what  means,  it  were  to 
have  been  expected,  that  God  would  naturally  instruct 
us;  so  upon  supposition  of  his  affording  us  light  and 
instruction  by  revelation,  additional  to  what  he  has 
afforded  us  by  reason  and  experience,  we  are  in  no  sprt 
judges,  by  what  methods,  and  in  what  proportion,  it 
were  to  be  expected  that  this  supernatural  light  and 
instruction  would  be  afforded  us.  We  know  not  before- 
hand, what  degree  or  kind  of  natural  information  it  were 
to  be  expected  God  would  afford  men,  each  by  his  own 
reason  and  experience:  nor  how  far  he  would  enable 
and  effectually  dispose  them  to  communicate  it,  what- 
ever it  should  be,  to  each  other;  nor  whether  the  evidence 
of  it  would  be  certain,  highly  probable,  or  doubtful ;  nor 
whether  it  would  be  given  with  equal  clearness  and 
conviction  to  all.  Nor  could  we  guess,  upon  any 
good  ground  I  mean,  whether  natural  knowledge,  o^ 
even  the  faculty  itself,  by  which  we  are  capable  o' 
attaining  it,  reason,  would  be  given  us  at  once,  or  gra- 
dually. In  like  manner,  we  are  wholly  ignorant,  what 
degree  of  new  knowledge,  it  were  to  be  expected, 
God  would  give  mankind  by  revelation,  upon  supposi- 
tion of  his  affording  one:  or  how  far,  or  in  what  way, 
he  would   interpose   miraculously,  to   qualify  them,   to 


PiiAP.  HI.]  LIABLE  TO  OBJECTIONS.  ^01 

whom  he  should  originally  make  the  revelation,  for 
communicating  the  knowledge  given  by  it ;  and  to 
secure  their  doing  it  to  the  age  in  which  they  should  live ; 
and  to  secure  its  being  transmitted  to  posterity.  We 
are  equally  ignorant,  whether  the  evidence  of  it  would 
be  certain  or  highly  probable,  or  doubtful:*  or  whether 
all  who  should  have  any  degree  of  instruction  from  it, 
and  any  degree  of  evidence  of  its  truth,  would  have  the 
same:  or  whether  the  scheme  would  be  revealed  at  once, 
or  unfolded  gradually.  Nay  we  are  not  in  any  sort  able 
to  judge,  whether  it  were  to  have  been  expected,  that 
the  revelation  should  have  been  committed  to  writing ;  or 
left  to  be  handed  down,  and  consequently  corrupted,  by 
verbal  tradition,  and  at  length  sunk  under  it,  if  mankind 
so  pleased,  and  during  such  time  as  they  are  permitted, 
in  the  degree  they  evidently  are,  to  act  as  they  will. 

But  it  may  be  said,  "  that  a  revelation  in  some  of  the 
above  mentioned  circumstances,  one,  for  instance,  which 
was  not  committed  to  writing,  and  thus  secured  against 
danger  of  corruption,  would  not  have  answered  its  pur- 
pose." I  ask,  what  purpose  ?  It  would  not  have  answered 
all  the  purposes,  which  it  has  now  answered,  and  in  the 
same  degree:  but  it  would  have  answered  others,  or 
the  same  in  different  degrees.  And  which  of  these  were 
the  purposes  of  God,  and  best  fell  in  with  his  general 
government,  we  could  not  at  all  have  determined  before- 
hand. 

Now  since  it  has  been  shown,  that  we  have  no  prin- 
ciples of  reason,  upon  which  to  judge  beforehand,  how  it 
were  to  be  expected  revelation  should  have  been  left,  or 
what  was  most  suitable  to  the  divine  plan  of  government, 
in  any  of  the  forementioned  respects ;  it  must  be  quite 
frivolous  to  object  afterward  as  to  any  of  them,  against 
its  being  left  in  one  way,  rather  than  another:  for  this 
would  be  to  object  against  things,  upon  account  of  their 
being  different  from  expectations,  which  have  been  shown 
to  be  without  reason.  And  thus  we  see,  that  the  only 
question  concerning  the  truth  of  Christianity  is,  whether 
it  be  a  real  revelation ;  not  whether  it  be  attended  with 
every  circumstance  which  we  should  have  looked  for: 

*  See  Cbap.  vi. 


192  THE  CREDIBILITY  OF  REVELATION  [Part  It 

and  concerning  the  authority  of  Scripture,  whether  it 
be  what  it  claims  to  be ;  not  whether  it  be  a  book  of 
such  sort,  and  so  promulged,  as  weak  men  are  apt  to 
fancy  a  book  containing  a  divine  revelation  should.  And 
therefore,  neither  obscurity,  nor  seeming  inaccuracy  of 
style,  nor  various  readings,  nor  early  disputes  about 
the  authors  of  particular  parts  ;  nor  any  other  things  of 
the  like  kind,  though  they  had  been  much  more  consid- 
erable in  degree  than  they  are,  could  overthrow  the 
authority  of  the  Scripture  :  unless  the  Prophets,  Apostles, 
or  our  Lord,  had  promised,  that  the  book  containing  the 
divine  revelation  should  be  secure  from  those  things. 
Nor  indeed  can  any  objections  overthrow  such  a  kind  of 
revelation  as  the  Christian  claims  to  be,  since  there  are 
no  objections  against  the  morality  of  it,*  but  such  as  can 
show,  that  there  is  no  proof  of  miracles  wrought  origi- 
nally in  attestation  of  it ;  no  appearance  of  any  thing 
miraculous  in  its  obtaining  in  the  world  ;  nor  any  of  pro- 
phecy, that  is,  of  events  foretold,  which  human  sagacity 
could  not  foresee.  If  it  can  be  shown,  that  the  proof 
alleged  for  all  these  is  absolutely  none  at  all,  then  is  reve- 
lation overturned.  But  were  it  allowed,  that  the  proof 
of  any  one  or  all  of  them  is  lower  than  is  allowed ;  yet, 
whilst  any  proof  of  them  remains,  revelation  will  stand 
upon  much  the  same  foot  it  does  at  present,  as  to  all  the 
purposes  of  life  and  practice,  and  ought  to  have  the  hke. 
influence  upon  our  behaviour. 

From  the  foregoing  observations  too,  it  will  follow,  and 
those  who  will  thoroughly  examine  into  revelation  will 
find  it  worth  remarking ;  that  there  are  several  ways  ol 
arguing,  which,  though  just  with  regard  to  other  writings, 
are  not  applicable  to  Scripture  :  at  least  not  to  the  pro- 
phetic parts  of  it.  We  cannot  argue,  for  instance,  that 
this  cannot  be  the  sense  or  intent  of  such  a  passage  of 
Scripture ;  for,  if  it  had,  it  would  have  been  expressed 
more  plainly,  or  have  been  represented  under  a  more 
apt  figure  or  hieroglyphic :  yet  we  may  justly  argue  thus, 
with  respect  to  common  books.  And  the  reason  of  this 
difference  is  very  evident ;  that  in  Scripture  we  are  not 
competent  judges,  as  we  are  in  common  books,  how 

•  p.  198. 


CHAr.  III.]  LIABLE  TO  OBJECTIONS.  193 

plainly  it  were  to  have  been  expected,  what  is  the  true 
sense  should  have  been  expressed,  or  under  how  apt  an 
image  figured.  The  only  question  is,  what  appearance 
there  is,  that  this  is  the  sense ;  and  scarce  at  all,  how 
much  more  determinately  or  accurately  it  might  have 
been  expressed  or  figured. 

"But  is  it  not  self-evident,  that  internal  improbabilities 
of  all  kinds  weaken  external  probable  proof  .^"  Doubtless. 
But  to  what  practical  purpose  can  this  be  alleged  here, 
when  it  has  been  proved  before,*  that  real  internal  im- 
probabihties,  which  rise  even  to  moral  certainty,  are 
overcome  by  the  most  ordinary  testimony ;  and  when  it 
now  has  been  mads  appear,  that  we  scarce  know  what 
are  improbabilities,  as  to  the  matter  we  are  here  con- 
sidering :  as  it  will  further  appear  from  what  follows. 

For  though  from  the  observations  above  made  it  is 
manifest,  that  we  are  not  in  any  sort  competent  judges, 
what  supernatural  instruction  were  to  have  been  expected ; 
and  though  it  is  self-evident,  that  the  objections  of  an 
incompetent  judgment  must  be  frivolous;  yet  it  may  be 
proper  to  go  one  step  farther,  and  observe ;  that  if  m.en 
will  be  regardless  of  these  things,  and  pretend  to  judge 
of  the  Scripture  by  preconceived  expectations ;  the  ana- 
logy of  nature  shows  beforehand,  not  only  that  it  is  highly 
ci'edible  they  may,  but  also  probable  that  they  will,  ima- 
gine they  have  strong  objections  against  it,  however 
really  unexceptionable:  for  so,  prior  to  experience,  they 
would  think  theyjiad,  against  the  circumstances,  and 
degrees,  and  the  whole  manner  of  that  instruction,  which 
is  afforded  by  the  ordinary  course  of  nature.  Were  the 
instruction  which  God  affords  to  brute  creatures  by  in- 
stincts and  mere  propensions,  and  to  mankind  by  these 
together  with  reason,  matter  of  probable  proof,  and  not 
of  certain  observation  ;  it  v/ould  be  rejected  as  incredible, 
in  many  instances  of  it,  only  upon  account  of  the  mean.^ 
by  which  this  instruction  is  given,  the  seeming  dispro- 
portions, the  limitations,  necessary  conditions,  and  cir- 
cumstances of  it.  For  instance:  would  it  not  have  been 
thought  highly  improbable,  that  mm  should  have  been 
so  much  more  capable  of  discovering,  even   to  certainly 

*  p.  181. 

N 


194  THE  CREDIBILITY  OF  REVELATION  [PartIL 

the  general  laws  of  matter,  and  the  magnitudes,  paths, 
and  revolutions,  of  heavenly  bodies  ;  than  the  occasions 
and  cures  of  distempers,  and  many  other  things,  in  which 
human  life  seems  so  much  more  nearly  concerned,  than 
in  astronomy?  How  capricious  and  irregular  a  wav  of 
information  would  it  be  said,  is  that  of  invention,  by  means 
of  which  nature  instructs  us  in  matters  of  science,  and  in 
many  things,  upon  which  the  affairs  of  the  world  greatly 
depend:  that  a  man  should,  by  this  faculty,  be  made  ac- 
quainted with  a  thing  in  an  instant,  when  perhaps  he  is 
thinking  of  somewhat  else,  which  he  has  in  vain  been 
searching  after,  it  may  be,  for  years.  So  likewise  the 
imperfections  attending  the  only  method,  by  which  nature 
enables  and  directs  us  to  communicate  our  thoughts  to 
each  other,  are  innumerable.  Language  is,  in  its  very 
nature,  inadequate,  ambiguous,  liable  to  infinite  abuse, 
even  from  negligence;  and  so  liable  to  it  from  design, 
that  every  man  can  deceive  and  betray  by  it.  And,  to 
mention  but  one  instance  more;  that  brutes,  without 
reason,  should  act,  in  many  respects,  with  a  sagacity  and 
foresight  vastly  greater  than  what  men  have  in  those  re- 
spects, would  be  thought  impossible.  Yet  it  is  certain 
they  do  act  with  such  superior  foresight :  whether  it  be 
their  own,  indeed,  is  another  question.  From  these  things, 
it  is  highly  credible  beforehand,  that  upon  supposition 
God  should  afford  men  some  additional  instruction  by 
revelation,  it  would  be  with  circumstances,  in  manners, 
degrees,  and  respects,  which  we  should  be  apt  to  fancy 
we  had  great  objections  against  the  credibility  of  Nor 
are  the  objections  against  the  Scripture,  nor  against 
Christianity  in  general,  at  all  more  or  greater,  than  the 
analogy  of  nature  would  beforehand — not  perhaps  give 
ground  to  expect ;  for  this  analogy  may  not  be  sufficient, 
in  some  cases,  to  ground  an  expectation  upon;  but  no 
more  nor  greater,  than  analogy  would  show  it,  before- 
.  hand,  to  be  supposable  and  credible,  that  there  might 
seem  to  lie  against  revelation. 

By  applying  these  general  observations  to  a  particular 
objection,  it  will  be  more  distinctly  seen,  how  they  are 
applicable  to  others  of  the  like  kind :  and  indeed  to 
almost  all  objections  against  (,nristianity,  as  distinguish 


Chap.iii.]  liable  to  objections.  195 

from  objections  against  its  evidence.  It  appears  from 
Scripture,  that,  as  it  was  not  unusual  in  the  apostolic  age, 
for  persons,  upon  their  conversion  to  Christianity,  to  be 
endued  with  miraculous  gifts;  so,  some  of  those  persons 
exercised  these  gifts  in  a  strangely  irregular  and  disor- 
derly manner;  and  this  is  made  an  objection  against 
their  being  really  miraculous.  Now  the  foregoing  obser- 
vations quite  remove  this  objection,  how  considerable 
soever  it  may  appear  at  first  sight.  For,  consider  a 
person  endued  with  any  of  these  gifts ;  for  instance,  that 
of  tongues :  it  is  to  be  supposed,  that  he  had  the  same 
power  over  this  miraculous  gift,  as  he  would  have  had 
over  it,  had  it  been  the  effect  of  habit,  of  study  and  use, 
as  it  ordinarily  is ;  or  the  same  power  over  it,  as  he  had 
over  any  other  natural  endowment.  Consequently,  he 
would  use  it  in  the  same  manner  he  did  any  other ;  either 
regularly,  and  upon  proper  occasions  only,  or  irregularly, 
and  upon  improper  ones:  according  to  his  sense  of  de- 
cency, and  his  character  of  prudence.  Where  then  is  the 
objection. ^^  Why,  if  this  miraculous  power  was  indeed 
given  to  the  world  to  propagate  Christianity,  and  attest  the 
truth  of  it,  we  might,  it  seems,  have  expected,  that  other 
sort  of  persons  should  have  been  chosen  to  be  invested 
with  it ;  or  that  these  should,  at  the  same  time,  have  been 
endued  with  prudence;  or  that  they  should  have  been  con- 
tinually restrained  and  directed  in  the  exercise  of  it:  z.  e. 
that  God  should  have  miraculously  interposed,  if  at  all, 
in  a  different  manner,  or  higher  degree.  But,  from  the 
observations  made  above,  it  is  undeniably  evident,  that 
we  are  not  judges  in  what  degrees  and  manners  it  were 
to  have  been  expected  he  should  miraculously  interpose; 
upon  supposition  of  his  doing  it  in  some  degree  and 
manner.  Nor,  in  the  natural  course  of  Providence,  are 
superior  gifts  of  memory,  eloquence,  knowledge,  and 
other  talents  of  great  influence,  conferred  only  on  per- 
sons of  prudence  and  decency,  or  such  as  are  disposed 
to  make  the  properest  use  of  them.  Nor  is  the  instruc- 
tion and  admonition  naturally  afforded  us  for  the  conduct 
of  life,  particularly  in  our  education,  commonly  given  in  a 
manner  the  most  suited  to  recommend  it;  but  often  with 
circumstances  apt  to  prejudice  us  against  such  instruction. 


V  2 


196  THE  CREDIBILITY  OF  REVELATION  rp.vBT  II. 

One  might  go  on  to  add,  that  there  is  a  great  resem- 
blance between  the  hght  of  nature  and  of  revelation,  in 
several  other  respects.  Practical  Christianity,  or  that 
faith  and  behaviour  which  renders  a  man  a  Christian,  is 
a  plain  and  obvious  thing:  like  the  common  rules  of 
conduct,  with  respect  to  our  ordinary  temporal  affairs. 
The  more  distinct  and  particular  knowledge  of  those 
things,  the  study  of  which  the  Apostle  calls  going  on  unto 
perfection*  and  of  the  prophetic  parts  of  revelation, 
like  many  parts  of  iiatm*al  and  even  civil  knowledge, 
may  require  very  exact  thought,  and  careful  considera- 
tion. The  hinderances  too,  of  natural,  and  of  superna- 
tural light  and  knowledge,  have  been  of  the  same  kind. 
And  as  it  is  owned  the  whole  scheme  of  Scripture  is 
not  yet  understood;  so,  if  it  ever  comes  to  be  under- 
stood, before  the  restitution  of  all  things,'^  and  without 
miraculous  interpositions ;  it  must  be  in  the  same  way 
as  natural  knowledge  is  come  at:  by  the  continuance 
and  progress  of  learning  and  of  liberty  ;  and  by  parti- 
cular persons  attending  to,  comparing,  and  pursuing, 
intimations  scattered  up  and  down  it,  which  are  over- 
looked and  disregarded  by  the  generality  of  the  world. 
For  this  is  the  way,  in  which  all  improvements  are 
made ;  by  thoughtful  men's  tracing  on  obscure  hints,  as 
it  were,  dropped  us  by  nature  accidtntaliy,  or  which 
seem  to  come  into  our  minds  by  chance.  Nor  is  it  at 
all  incredible,  that  a  book,  which  has  been  so  long  in 
the  possession  of  mankind,  should  contain  many  truths 
as  yet  undiscovered.  For,  all  the  same  phenomena, 
and  the  same  faculties  of  investigation,  from  which  sucli 
great  discoveries  in  natural  knowledge  have  been  made 
in  the  present  and  last  age,  were  equally  in  the  posses- 
sion of  mankind,  several  thousand  years  before.  And 
possibly  it  might  be  intended,  that  events,  as  they  come 
to  pass,  should  open  and  ascertain  the  meaning  of  se- 
veral parts  of  Scripture. 

It  may  be  objected,  that  this  analogy  fails  in  a  mate- 
rial respect:  for  that  natural  knowledge  is  of  little  or  no 
consequence.  But  I  ha\e  been  speaking  of  the  general 
instruction  which  nature   does  or  does  not  afford  us. 

*  Heb.  vi.  I.  ■{•  Acts  iii.  21. 


Chap.  III.]  LIABLE  TO  OBJECTIONS.  197 

And  besides,  some  parts  of  natural  knowledge,  in  the 
more  common  restrained  sense  cf  the  words,  are  of  the 
greatest  consequence  to  the  ease  and  convenience  of 
life.  But  suppose  the  analogy  did,  as  it  does  not,  fail 
in  this  respect;  yet  it  might  be  abundantly  supplied, 
from  the  whole  constitution  and  course  of  nature:  which 
shows,  that  God  does  not  dispense  his  gifts  according  to 
our  notions  of  the  advantage  and  consequence  they 
would  be  of  to  us.  And  this  in  general,  with  his 
method  of  dispensing  knowledge  in  particular,  would 
together  make  out  an  analogy  full  to  the  point  before  us. 
But  it  may  be  objected  still  further  and  more  gene- 
rally ;  "  The  Scripture  represents  the  world  as  in  a  state 
of  ruin,  and  Christianity  as  an  expedient  to  recover  it, 
to  help  in  these  respects  where  nature  fails:  in  particu- 
lar, to  supply  the  deficiencies  of  natural  light.  Is  it 
credible  then,  that  so  many  ages  should  have  been  let 
pass,  before  a  matter  of  such  a  sort,  of  so  great  and  so 
general  importance,  was  made  known  to  mankmd;  and 
then  that  it  should  be  made  known  to  so  small  a  part  of 
them  ?  Is  it  conceivable,  that  this  supply  should  be  so 
very  deficient,  should  have  the  like  obscurity  and  doubt- 
fulness, be  liable  to  the  like  perversions,  in  short,  lie 
open  to  all  the  like  objections,  as  the  light  of  nature 
itself  .P*  AVithout  determining  how  far  this,  in  fact,  is 
so,  I  answer;  it  is  by  no  means  incredible,  that  it  might 
be  so,  if  the  light  of  nature  and  of  revelation  be  from 
the  same  hand.  Men  are  naturally  liable  to  diseases : 
for  which  God,  in  his  good  providence,  has  provided 
natural  remedies, +  But  remedies  existing  in  nature 
have  been  unknown  to  mankind  for  many  ages :  are 
known  but  to  few  now:  probably  many  valuable  ones 
aie  not  known  yet.  Great  has  been  and  is  the  obscu- 
rity and  difficulty,  in  the  nature  and  application  of  them. 
Circumstances  seem  often  to  make  them  very  improper, 
where  they  are  absolutely  necessary.  It  is  after  long 
labour  and  stud}',  and  many  unsuccessful  endeavours, 
that  they  are  brought  to  be  as  useful  as  they  are ;  after 
high  contempt  and  absolute  rejection  of  the  most  useful 
we  have;    and   after  disputes  and  doubts,  which  have 

•  Ciu  Ti.  t  Ch.  V. 


198  THE  CREDIBILITY  OF  REVELATION  [Part  II. 

seemed  to  be  endless.  The  best  lemedies  too,  when 
unskilfully,  much  more  if  dishonestly  applied,  may  pro- 
duce new  diseases;  and  with  the  rightest  application 
the  success  of  them  is  often  doubtful.  In  many  cases 
they  are  not  at  all  effectual :  where  they  are,  it  is  often 
very  slowly :  and  the  application  of  them,  and  the  neces- 
sary regimen  accompanying  it,  is,  not  uncommonly,  so 
disagreeable,  that  some  will  not  submit  to  them.;  and 
satisfy  themselves  with  the  excuse,  that,  if  they  would, 
it  is  not  certain  whether  it  would  be  successful.  And 
many  persons,  who  labour  under  diseases,  for  which 
there  are  known  natural  remedies,  are  not  so  happy  as 
to  be  always,  if  ever,  in  the  way  of  them.  In  a  word, 
the  remedies  which  nature  has  provided  for  diseases  are 
neither  certain,  perfect,  nor  universal.  And  indeed  the 
same  principles  of  arguing,  which  would  lead  us  to  con- 
clude, that  they  must  be  so,  would  lead  us  likewise  to 
conclude,  that  there  could  be  no  occasion  for  them ;  i.  e. 
that  there  could  be  no  diseases  at  all.  And  therefore 
our  experience  that  there  are  diseases  shows,  that  it  is 
credible  beforehand,  upon  supposition  nature  has  pro- 
vided remedies  for  them,  that  these  remedies  may  be, 
as  by  experience  we  find  they  are,  not  certain,  nor  per- 
fect, nor  universal;  because  it  shows,  that  the  princi- 
ples upon  which  we  should  expect,  the  contrary  are 
fallacious. 

And  now,  wha!:  is  the  just  consequence  from  all  these 
things?  Not  that  reason  is  no  judge  of  what  is  offered  to 
us  as  being  of  divine  revelation.  For  this  would  be  to 
infer  that  we  are  unable  to  judge  of  any  thing,  because 
we  are  unable  to  judge  of  all  things.  Reason  can,  and 
it  ought  to  judge,  not  only  of  the  meaning,  but  also  of 
the  morality  and  the  evidence  of  revelation.  Firsts  It  is 
the  province  of  reason  to  judge  of  the  morality  of  the 
Scripture ;  i.  e.  not  whether  it  contains  things  different 
from  what  we  should  have  expected  from  a  wise,  just, 
and  good  Being ;  for  objections  from  hence  have  been 
now  obviated  :  but  whether  it  contains  things  plainly 
contradictory  to  wisdom,  justice,  or  goodness;  to  what  the 
light  of  nature  teaches  us  of  God.  And  I  know  nothing 
of  this  sort  objected  against  Scripture,  excepting  such  oh 


Chap,  m.]  LIABLE  TO  OBJECTIONS  ■  '  :■      ,.  .      199 

jections  as  are  formed  upon  suppositions^  which  would 
equally  conclude,  that  the  constitution  of  nature  is  con- 
tradictory to  wisdom,  justice  or  goodness ;  which  most 
certainly  it  is  not.  Indeed  there  are  some  particular 
precepts  in  Scripture,  given  to  particular  persons,  re- 
quiring actions,  which  would  be  immoral  and  vicious, 
were  it  not  for  such  precepts.  But  it  is  easy  to  see,  that 
all  these  are  of  such  a  kind,  as  that  the  precept  changes 
the  whole  nature  of  the  case  and  of  the  action  ;  and  both 
constitutes  and  shows  that  not  to  be  unjust  or  immoral, 
■which,  prior  to  the  precept,  must  have  appeared  and 
really  have  been  so :  which  may  well  be,  since  none  of 
these  precepts  are  contrary  to  immutable  morality.  If 
it  were  commanded,  to  cultivate  the  principles,  and  act 
from  the  spirit  of  treachery,  ingratitude,  cruelty ;  the 
command  would  not  alter  the  nature  of  the  case  or  of 
the  action,  in  any  of  these  instances.  But  it  is  quite 
otherwise  in  precepts,  which  require  only  the  doing  an 
external  action :  for  instance,  taking  away  the  property, 
or  life  of  any.  For  men  have  no  right  to  either  life  or 
property,  but  what  arises  solely  from  the  grant  of  God  ; 
wdien  this  grant  is  revoked,  they  cease  to  have  any  right 
at  all  in  either:  and  when  this  revocation  is  made  known, 
as  surely  it  is  possible  it  may  be,  it  must  cease  to  be 
unjust  to  deprive  them  of  either.  And  though  a  course 
of  external  acts,  which  without  command  would  be  im- 
moral, must  make  an  immoral  habit ;  yet  a  few  detached 
commands  have  no  such  natural  tendency.  I.  thought 
proper  to  say  thus  much  of  the  few  Scripture  precepts, 
which  require,  not  vicious  actions,  but  actions  which 
would  have  been  vicious,  had  it  not  been  for  such  pre- 
cepts ;  because  they  are  sometimes  weakly  urged  as 
immoral,  and  great  weight  is  laid  upon  objections  drawn 
from  them.  But  to  me  there  seems  no  difficulty  at  all 
in  these  precepts,  but  what  arises  from  their  being  of- 
fences :  i.  e.  from  their  being  liable  to  be  perverted,  as 
indeed  they  are,  by  wicked  designing  men,  to  serve  the 
most  horrid  piu-poses  ;  and,  perhaps,  to  mislead  the  weak 
and  enthusiastic.  And  obiections  from  this  head  are  riot 
objections  agamst  revelation ;  but  agamst  the  whole 
iiotion  of  rehgion,  as  a  trial :  and  against  the   general 


200  THE  CREDIBILITY  OF  REVELATION,  &C.  [Part  II. 

constitution  of  nature.  Secondly,  Reason  is  aMe  to  judge, 
and  must,  of  the  evidence  of  revelation,  and  of  the  ob- 
jections urged  against  that  evidence :  which  shall  be  the 
subject  of  a  following  Chapter,* 

But  the  consequence  of  the  foregoing  observations  is, 
that  the  question  upon  which  the  truth  of  Christianity 
depends  is  scarce  at  all,  what  objections  there  are  against 
its  scheme,  since  there  are  none  against  the  morality  of 
it;  hnt  ivliat  objections  there  are  against  its  evidence;  or, 
U)hat  proof  there  remains  of  ity  after  due  allowances  made 
for  the  objections  against  that  proof:  because  it  has  been 
shown,  that  the  objections  against  Christianity ,  as  distin- 
guished from  objections  against  its  evidence,  are  frivolous. 
For  surely  very  little  weight,  if  any  at  all,  is  to  be  laid 
upon  a  way  of  arguing  and  objecting,  which,  when  ap- 
plied to  the  general  constitution  of  nature,  experience 
shows  not  to  be  conclusive:  and  such,  I  think,  is  the 
whole  way  of  objecting  treated  of  throughout  this  Chap- 
ter. It  is  resolvable  into  principles,  and  goes  upon  sup- 
positions, which  mislead  us  to  think,  that  the  Author  of 
Nature  would  not  act,  as  we  experience  he  does;  or 
would  act,  in  such  and  such  cases,  as  we  experience  he 
does  not  in  like  cases.  But  the  unreasonableness  of 
this  way  of  objecting  will  appear  yet  more  evidently  from 
hence,  that  the  chief  things  thus  objected  against  are 
justified,  as  shall  be  further  shown,!  by  distinct,  parti- 
cular, and  full  analogies,  in  the  constitution  and  course  of 
nature. 

But  it  is  to  be  remembered,  that,  as  frivolous  as  ob- 
jections of  the  foregoing  sort  against  revelation  are,  yet, 
when  a  supposed  revelation  is  more  consistent  with  itself, 
and  has  a  more  general  and  uniform  tendency  to  pro- 
mote virtue,  than,  all  circumstances  considered,  could 
have  been  expected  from  enthusiasm  and  political  views ; 
this  is  a  presumptive  proof  of  its  not  proceeding  from 
them,  and  so  of  its  truth:  because  we  are  competent 
judges,  what  might  have  been  expected  from  enthusiasm 
and  political  views. 

*  Cbap.  viL  f  Cb,  iv,  latter  part,  and  v.  vi. 


CiL»p,  IVJ     ■'^'i-  CHRISTIANITY  A  SCHEME,  ETC.        "  -      201 


CHAP.  IV, 

OF  CHillSTIANITY,  CONSIDERED  AS  A  SCHEME  OR  CONSTI- 
TUTION, IMPERFECTLY  COMPREHENDED. 

It  hath  been  now  shown,*  that  the  analogy  of  nature 
renders  it  highly  credible  beforehand,  that,  supposing  a 
revelation  to  be  made,  it  must  contain  many  things  very 
different  from  what  we  sh-ould  have  expected,  and  such 
as  appear  open  to  great  objections:  and  that  this  obser- 
vation, in  good  measure,  takes  off  the  force  of  those  ob- 
jections, or  rather  precludes  them.  But  it  may  be  alleged, 
that  this  is  a  very  partial  answer  to  such  objections,  or  a 
very  unsatisfactory  way  of  obviating  them  :  because  it 
doth  not  show  at  all,  that  the  things  objected  against  can 
be  wise,  just,  and  good;  much  less,  that  it  is  credible 
they  are  so.  It  will  therefore  be  proper  to  show  this 
distinctly;  by  applying  to  these  objections  against  the 
wisdom,  justice,  and  goodness  of  Christianity,  the  answer 
abovet  given  to  the  like  objections  against  the  constitu- 
tion of  Nature:  before  we  consider  the  particular  analo- 
gies in  the  latter,  to  the  particular  things  objected  against 
in  the  former.  Now  that  which  affords  a  sufficient 
answer  to  objections  against  the  wisdom,  justice,  and 
goodness  of  the  constitution  of  Nature,  is  its  being  a  con- 
stitution, a  system,  or  scheme,  imperfectly  comprehended ; 
a  scheme  in  which  means  are  made  use  of  to  accomplish 
ends ;  and  which  is  carried  on  by  general  laws.  For 
from  these  things  it  has  been  proved,  not  only  to  be 
possible,  but  also  to  be  credible,  that  those  things  which 
are  objected  against  may  be  consistent  with  wisdom, 
justice,  and  goodness  ;  nay,  ma}^  be  instances  of  them  : 
and  even  that  the  constitution  and  government  of  Nature 
may  be  perfect  in  the  highest  possible  degree.  If  Chris- 
tianity then  be  a  scheme,  and  of  the  like  kind ;  it  is  evi- 
dent, the  like  objections  against  it  must  admit  of  the  like 
answer.     And, 

*  In  the  forpgoing  Chapter. 
t  Part  L  Ch.  vii.  to  wliich  this  ail  along  refen. 


202  "       '         CHRISTIANITY  A  SCHEME         '  [p^bt  U. 

I.  Christianity  is  a  scheme,  quite  beyond  our  compre- 
hension. The  moral  government  of  God  is  exercised, 
by  gradually  conducting  things  so  in  the  course  of  his 
providence,  that  every  one,  at  length  and  upon  the 
whole,  shall  receive  according  to  his  deserts  ;  and  neither 
fraud  nor  violence,  but  truth  and  right,  shall  finally  pre- 
vail. Christianity  is  a  particular  scheme  under  this  ge- 
neral plan  of  Providence,  and  a  part  of  it,  conducive  to 
its  completion,  with  regard  to  mankind  :  consisting  itself 
also  of  various  parts,  and  a  mysterious  economy,  which 
has  been  carrying  on  from  the  time  the  world  came  into 
its  present  wretched  state,  and  is  still  carrying  on,  for  its 
recovery,  by  a  divine  person,  the  Messiah  ;  who  is  to 
(jather  together  in  one  the  children  of  God,  that  are  scatter- 
ed abroad,^  and  establish  an  everlasting  kingdom,  wherein 
dwelleth  7'ighteoicsness.f  And  in  order  to  it ;  after  various 
manifestations  of  things,  relating  to  this  great  and  gene- 
ral scheme  of  Providence,  through  a  succession  of  many 
ages:  (For  the  Spirit  of  Christ  which  loas  in  the  prophets, 
testified  beforehand  his  sufferings,  and  the  glory  that  should 
follow  :  unto  whom  it  was  revealed,  that  not  unto  themselves, 
but  unto  us  they  did  minister  the  things  which  are  now  re- 
ported unto  us  by  them  that  have  preached  the  Gospel; 
which  things  the  angels  desire  to  look  into  .'t) — after  various 
dispensations  looking  forward  and  preparatory  to,  this 
final  salvation;  in  the  fulness  of  time,  when  infinite  wis- 
dom thought  fit;  He,  being  in  the  form  of  God, — made 
him,self  of  no  reputation,  and  took  upon  him  the  form  of  a 
servant,  and  was  made  in  the  likeness  of  men :  and  being 
found  in  fashion  as  a  man,  he  humbled  himself  and  became 
obedient  to  death,  even  the  death  of  the  cross :  wherefore 
God  also  hath  highly  exalted  him,  and  given  him  a  name, 
which  is  above  every  yiame  :  that  at  the  name  of  Jesus  every 
knee  should  bow,  of  things  in  heaven,  and  tilings  in  the 
earth,  and  things  under  the  earth  :  and  that  every  tongue 
should  confess,  that  Jesus  Christ  is  Lord,  to  the  glory  of 
God  the  Father. i  Parts  likewise  of  this  economy  are  the 
miraculous  mission  of  the  Holy  Ghost,  and  his  ordinary 
assistances  given  to  good  men  :  the  invisible  government, 
which  Christ  at  present  exercises  over  his  church :  that 

*Johnx3.  52.  t  2  Pet.  Hi.  13.  i  1  Pet.  i.  11,  12.  §  PhiL  iu 


Chap.  IV.]  IMPERFECTLY  COMPREHENDED.  203 

which  he  himself  refers  to  in  these  Avords  ;  In  my  Father  s 
house  are  many  mansions — /  go  to  prepare  a  place  for 
you  ;*  and  his  future  return  to  judge  the  world  in  right- 
eousness, and  completely  re-establish  the  kingdom  of 
God.  For  the  Father  judgeth  no  man  ;  but  hath  committed 
all  judgment  unto  the  Son:  that  all  men  should  honour  the 
Son,  even  as  they  honour  the  Father  A  All  power  is  given 
unto  him  in  heaven  and  in  earth.X  And  lie  must  reign,  till 
he  hath  put  all  enemies  under  his  feet.  Then  cometh  the 
end,  when  he  shall  have  delivered  up  the  kingdom  to  God, 
even  the  Father  ;  when  he  shall  have  put  down  all  rule,  and 
all  authority  and  power.  And  lohen  all  things  shall  he 
subdued  unto  him,  then  shall  the  Son  also  himself  be  sub- 
ject unto  him  that  put  all  things  under  him,  that  God  may 
be  all  in  all.§  Now  little,  surely,  need  be  said  to  show, 
that  this  system,  or  scheme  of  things,  is  but  imperfectly 
comprehended  by  us.  The  Scripture  expressly  asserts  it 
to  be  so.  And  indeed  one  cannot  read  a  passage  relat- 
ing to  this  great  mystery  of  godliness,\\  but  what  immedi- 
ately runs  up  into  something  which  shows  us  our  igno- 
rance in  it;  as  every  thing  in  nature  shows  us  our  igno- 
rance in  the  constitution  of  nature.  And  whoever  will 
seriously  consider  that  part  of  the  Christian  scheme, 
which  is  revealed  in  Scripture,  will  find  so  much  more 
unrevealed,  as  will  convince  him,  that,  to  all  the  pur- 
poses of  judging  and  objecting,  we  know  as  little  of  it,  as 
of  the  constitution  of  nature.  Our  ignorance,  therefore, 
is  as  much  an  answer  to  our  objections  against  the  per- 
fection of  one,  as  against  the  perfection  of  the  other.f 

II.  It  is  obvious  too,  that  in  the  Christian  dispen- 
sation, as  much  as  in  the  natural  scheme  of  things, 
means  are  made  use  of  to  accomplish  ends.  And  the 
observation  of  this  furnishes  us  with  the  same  answer, 
to  objections  against  the  perfection  of  Christianity,  as  to 
objections  of  the  like  kind,  against  the  constitution  of 
nature.  It  shows  the  credibility,  that  the  things  object- 
ed against,  how  foolish**  soever  they  appear  to  men, 
may  be  the  very  best  means  of  accomplishing  the  very 
best  ends.     And  their  appearing  foolishness  is  no  pre- 

*  John  xiv.  2.  f  John  v.  22,  23.  J  Matth.  xxviii.  18. 

(I  1  Tim.  iii.  IG.  ^  P.  153,  &c.  **  1  Cor.  L 


204  CHRISTIANITY  A  SCHEME  [Tabi  IL 

sumption  against  this,  in  a  scheme  so  greatly  beyond 
cm'  comprehension.* 

A. 

III.  The  crcdibihty,  that  the  Christian  dispensation 
may  have  been,  all  along,  carried  on  by  general  laws,f 
no  less  than  the  course  of  nature,  may  require  to  be 
more  distinctly  made  out.  Consider  then,  upon  what 
ground  it  is  we  say,  that  the  whole  common  course  of 
nature  is  carried  on  according  to  general  fore-ordained 
laws.  We  know  indeed  several  of  the  general  laws  of 
matter:  and  a  great  part  of  the  natural  behaviour  of  liv- 
ing agents  is  reducible  to  general  laws.  But  we  know 
in  a  manner  nothing,  by  what  laws,  storms  and  tem- 
pests, earthquakes,  famine,  pestilence,  become  the 
instruments  of  destruction  to  mankind.  And  the  laws, 
by  which  persons  born  into  the  world  at  such  a  time 
and  place  are  of  such  capacities,  geniuses,  tempers  ;  the 
laws,  by  which  thoughts  come  into  our  mind,  in  a  mul- 
titude of  cases;  and  by  which  innumerable  things  hap- 
pen, of  the  greatest  influence  upon  the  affairs  and  state 
of  the  world;  these  laws  are  so  wholly  unknown  to  us, 
that  we  call  the  events,  which  come  to  pass  by  them, 
accidental:  though  all  reasonable  men  know  certainly, 
that  there  cannot,  in  reality,  be  any  such  thing  as  chance; 
and  conclude,  that  the  things  which  have  this  appear- 
ance are  the  result  of  general  laws,  and  may  be  reduced 
into  them.  It  is  then  but  an  exceeding  little  way,  and 
in  but  a  very  few  respects,  that  we  can  trace  up  the  na- 
tural course  of  things  before  us,  to  general  laws.  And 
it  is  only  from  analogy,  that  we  conclude  the  whole  of  it 
to  be  capable  of  being  reduced  into  them:  only  from 
our  seeing,  that  part  is  so.  It  is  from  our  finding,  that 
the  course  of  nature,  in  some  respects  and  so  far,  goes 
on  by  general  laws,  that  we  conclude  this  of  the  rest. 
And  if  that  be  a  just  ground  for  such  a  conclusion,  it  is 
a  just  ground  also,  if  not  to  conclude,  yet  to  apprehend, 
to  render  it  supposable  and  credible,  which  is  sufficient 
for  answering  objections,  that  God's  miraculous  inter- 
positions may  have  been,  all  along  in  like  manner,  by 
general  laws  of  wisdom.  Thus,  that  miraculous  powers 
should  be  exerted,  at  such  times,  upon  such  occasions, 

*  p.  156, 157.  +  P.  158,  159. 


Chap.  IV.]  IMPERFECTLY  COMPREHENDED.  205 

in  such  degrees  and  manners,  and  with  regard  to  such 
persons,  rather  than  others ;  that  the  affairs  of  the  world, 
being  permitted  to  go  on  in  their  natural  course  so  far, 
should,  just  at  such  a  point,  have  a  new  direction  given 
them  by  miraculous  interpositions;  that  these  interpo- 
sitions should  be  exactly  in  such  degrees  and  respects 
only ;  all  this  may  have  been  by  general  laws.  These 
laws  are  unknown  indeed  to  us:  but  no  more  unknown 
than  the  laws  from  whence  it  is,  that  some  die  as  soon 
as  they  are  born,  and  others  live  to  extrem  ^  old  age ; 
that  one  man  is  so  superior  to  another  in  understanding; 
with  innumerable  more  things,  which,  as  was  before 
observed,  we  cannot  reduce  to  any  laws  or  rules  at  all, 
though  it  is  taken  for  granted,  they  are  as  much  reduci- 
ble to  general  ones,  as  gravitation.  Now,  if  the  revealed 
dispensations  of  Providence,  and  miraculous  interposi- 
tions, be  by  general  law«,  as  well  as  God's  ordinary 
government  in  the  course  of  nature,  made  known  by 
reason  and  experience;  there  is  no  more  reason  to 
expect  that  every  exigence,  as  it  arises,  should  be  pro- 
vided for  l)y  these  general  laws  or  miraculous  interposi- 
tions, than  that  every  exigence  in  nature  should,  by  the 
general  laws  of  nature:  yet  there  might  be  wise  and 
good  reasons,  that  miraculous  interpositions  should  be 
by  general  laws;  and  that  these  laws  should  not  be 
broken  in  upon,  or  deviated  from,  by  other  miracles 

Upon  the  whole,  tlien,  the  appearance  of  deficiencies 
and  irregularities  in  nature  is  owing  to  its  being  a  scheme 
but  in  part  made  known,  and  of  such  a  certain  particular 
kind  in  other  respects.  Now  we  see  no  more  reason 
why  the  frame  and  course  of  nature  should  be  such  a 
scheme,  than  why  Christianity  should.  And  that  the 
former  is  such  a  scheme,  renders  it  credible,  that  the 
latter,  upon  supposition  of  its  truth,  may  be  so  too. 
And  as  it  is  manifest,  that  Christianity  is  a  scheme 
revealed  but  in  part,  and  a  scheme  in  which  means  are 
made  use  of  to  accomplish  ends,  like  to  that  of  nature: 
so  the  credibility,  that  it  may  have  been  all  along  carried 
on  by  general  laws,  no  less  than  the  course  of  nature, 
has  been  distinctly  proved.  And  from  all  this  it  is 
beforehand  credible  that  there  might,  I  think  probable 


206  CHRISTIANITY  A  SCHEME  [P^rt  II. 

that  there  would,  be  the  hke  appearance  of  deficiencies 
and  irregularities  in  Christianity,  as  in  nature :  i.  e.  that 
Christianity  would  be  liable  to  the  like  objections,  as 
the  frame  of  nature.  And  these  objections  are  answered 
by  these  observations  concerning  Christianity;  as  the 
like  objections  against  the  frame  of  nature  are  answered 
by  the  like  observations  concerning  the  frame  of  nature. 

The  objections  against  Christianity,  considered  as  a 
matter  of  fact,*  having,  in  general,  been  obviated  in  the 
preceding  Chapter;  and  the  same,  considered  as  made 
against  the  wisdom  and  goodness  of  it,  having  been 
obviated  in  this :  the  next  thing,  according  to  the  method 
proposed,  is  to  show,  that  the  principal  objections,  in 
particular,  against  Christianity,  may  be  answered,  by 
particular  and  full  analogies  in  nature.  And  as  one  of 
them  is  made  against  the  whole  scheme  of  it  together, 
as  just  now  described,  I  choose  to  consider  it  here, 
rather  than  in  a  distinct  Chapter  by  itself.  The  thing 
objected  against  this  scheme  of  the  Gospel  is,  "  that  it 
seems  to  suppose  God  was  reduced  to  the  necessity  of  a 
long  series  of  intricate  means,  in  order  to  accomplish  his 
ends,  the  recovery  and  salvation  of  the  world:  in  like 
sort  as  men,  for  want  of  understanding  or  power,  not 
being  able  to  come  at  their  ends  directly,  are  forced  to 
go  round-about  w^ays,  and  make  use  of  many  perplexed 
contrivances  to  arrive  at  them."  Now  every  thing  which 
we  see  shows  the  folly  of  this,  considered  as  an  objection 
against  the  truth  of  Christianity.  For,  according  to  our 
manner  of  conception,  God  makes  use  of  variety  of 
means,  what  Ave  often  think  tedious  ones,  in  the  natural 
course  of  providence,  for  the  accomplishment  of  all 
his  ends.  Indeed  it  is  certain  there  is  somewhat  in 
this  matter  quite  beyond  our  comprehension:  but  the 
mystery  is  as  great  in  nature  as  in  Christianity.  We 
know  what  we  ourselves  aim  at,  as  final  ends :  and  what 
courses  we  take,  merely  as  means  conducing  to  those 
ends.  But  we  are  greatly  ignorant  how  far  things  are 
considered  by  the  Author  of  Nature,  under  the  single 
notion  of  means  and  ends ;  so  as  that  it  may  be  said, 

*  p.  149,  &c. 


Chap,  -v.]  IMPElifECTLY  CO:\lPREHEiSDED.  207 

this  is  merely  an  end,  and  that  merely  means,  in  his 
regard.  And  whether  there  be  not  some  peculiar  absur- 
dity in  our  very  manner  of  conception,  concerning  this 
matter,  somewhat  contradictory  arising  from  our  ex- 
tremely imperfect  views  of  things,  it  is  impossible  to 
say.  However,  thus  much  is  manifest,  that  the  whole 
natural  world  and  government  of  it  is  a  scheme  or  sys- 
tem ;  not  a  fixed,  but  a  progressive  one :  a  scheme  in 
which  the  operation  of  various  means  takes  up  a  great 
length  of  time,  before  the  ends  they  tend  to  can  be 
attained.  The  change  of  seasons,  the  ripening  of  the 
fruits  of  the  earth,  the  very  history  of  a  flower,  is  an 
instance  of  this :  and  so  is  human  life.  Thus  vegetable 
bodies,  and  those  of  animals,  though  possibly  formed  at 
once,  yet  grow  up  by  degrees  to  a  mature  state.  And 
thus  rational  agents,  who  animate  these  latter  bodies,  are 
naturally  directed  to  form  each  his  own  manners  and 
character,  by  the  gradual  gaining  of  knowledge  and  ex- 
perience, and  by  a  long  course  of  action.  Our  existence 
is  not  only  successive,  as  it  must  be  of  necessity  ;  but 
one  state  of  our  life  and  being  is  appointed  by  God,  to 
be  a  preparation  for  another ;  and  that  to  be  the  means 
of  attaining  to  another  succeeding  one :  infancy  to  child- 
hood ;  childhood  to  youth  ;  youth  to  mature  age.  Men 
are  impatient,  and  for  precipitating  things :  but  the 
Author  of  Nature  appears  deliberate  throughout  his  ope- 
rations; accomplishing  his  natural  ends  by  slow  successive 
steps.  And  there  is  a  plan  of  things  beforehand  laid 
out,  which,  from  the  nature  of  it,  requires  various  sys- 
tems of  means,  as  well  as  length  of  time,  in  order  to  the 
carrying  on  its  several  parts  into  execution.  Thus,  in 
the  daily  course  of  natural  providence,  God  operates  in 
the  very  same  manner,  as  m  the  dispensation  of  Chris- 
tianity ;  making  one  thing  subservient  to  another ;  this, 
to  somewhat  further ;  and  soon,  through  a  progressive 
series  of  means,  which  extend,  both  backward  and  for- 
ward, beyond  our  utmost  view.  Of  this  manner  of 
operation,  every  thing  we  see  in  the  course  of  nature  is 
as  much  an  instance,  as  any  part  of  the  Christian 
dispensation. 


208  THE  APPOINTMENT  OP  JVaxtU. 


CHAP.  V. 

OF  THE  PARTICULAR  SYSTEM  OF  CHRISTIANITY  ;  THE 
APPOINTMENT  OF  A  MEDIATOR,  AND  THE  REDEMPTION 
OF  THE  WORLD  BY  HIM. 

There  is  not,  I  think,  any  thing  relating  to  Christi- 
anity, which  has  been  more  objected  against,  than  the 
mediation  of  Christ,  in  some  or  other  of  its  parts.  Yet 
upon  thorough  consideration,  there  seems  nothing  less 
justly  liable  to  it.     For, 

I.  The  whole  analogy  of  nature  removes  all  imagined 
presumption  against  the  general  notion  of  a  Mediatoi^ 
between  God  and  man*  For  we  find  all  living  creatures 
are  brought  into  the  world,  and  their  life  in  infancy  is 
preserved,  by  the  instrumentality  of  others:  and  every 
satisfaction  of  it,  some  way  or  other,  is  bestowed  by  the 
like  means.  So  that  the  visible  government,  which  God 
exercises  over  the  world,  is  by  the  instrumentality  and 
mediation  of  others.  And  how  far  his  invisible  govern- 
ment be  or  be  not  so,  it  is  impossible  to  determine  at  all 
by  reason.  And  the  supposition,  that  part  of  it  is  so, 
appears,  to  say  the  least,  altogether  as  credible,  as  the 
contrary.  There  is  then  no  sort  of  objection,  from  the 
light  of  nature,  against  the  general  notion  of  a  mediator 
between  God  and  man,  considered  as  a  doctrine  of 
Christianity,  or  as  an  appointment  in  this  dispensation: 
since  we  find  by  experience,  that  God  does  appoint  medi- 
ators, to  be  the  instruments  of  good  and  evil  to  us:  the 
instruments  of  his  justice  and  his  mercy.  And  the  ob- 
jection here  referred  to  is  urged,  not  against  mediation 
in  that  high,  eminent,  and  peculiar  sense,  in  which  Christ 
is  our  mediator;  but  absolutely  against  the  whole  notion 
itself  of  a  mediator  at  all. 

II.  As  we  must  suppose,  that  the  world  is  under  the 
proper  moral  government  of  God,  or  in  a  state  of  religion, 
before  we  can  enter  into  consideration  of  the  revealed 
doctrine,  concerning  the  redemption  of  it  by  Christ;  so 

*  i  Tim.  ii.  5. 


Chap.  V.]  A  MEDIATOR  AND  REDEEMER.  209 

that  supposition  is  here  to  be  distinctly  taken  notice  of. 
Now  the  divine  moral  government  which  religion  teaches 
us,  implies,  that  the  consequence  of  vice  shall  be  misery, 
in  some  future  state,  by  the  righteous  judgment  of  God. 
That  such  consequent  punishment  shall  take  effect  by  his 
appointment,  is  necessarily  implied.  But,  as  it  is  not  in 
any  sort  to  be  supposed,  that  we  are  made  acquainted 
with  all  the  ends  or  reasons,  for  which  it  is  fit  future 
punishments  should  be  inflicted,  or  why  God  has  ap- 
pointed such  and  such  consequent  misery  should  follow 
vice ;  and  as  we  are  altogether  in  the  dark,  how  or  in 
what  manner  it  shall  follow,  by  what  immediate  occa- 
sions, or  by  the  instrumentality  of  what  means ;  there  is 
no  absurdity  in  supposing  it  may  follow  in  a  way  analo- 
gous to  that,  in  v/hich  many  miseries  follow  such  and 
such  courses  of  action  at  present;  poverty,  sickness,  in- 
famy, untimely  death  by  diseases,  death  from  the  hands 
of  civil  justice.  There  is  no  absurdity  in  supposing 
future  punishment  may  follow  wickedness  of  course,  as 
we  speak,  or  in  the  way  of  natural  consequence  from 
God's  orio;inal  constitution  of  the  world :  from  the  nature 
he  has  given  us,  and  from  the  condition  in  which  he 
places  us  ;  or  in  a  like  manner,  as  a  person  rashly  trifling 
upon  a  precipice,  in  the  way  of  natural  consequence,  fiills 
down ;  in  the  way  of  natural  consequence,  breaks  his 
limbs,  suppose;  in  the  way  of  natural  consequence  of 
this,  without  help,  perishes. 

Some  good  men  may  perhaps  be  offended  with  hear- 
ing it  spoken  of  as  a  supposable  thing  that  future  punish- 
ments of  wickedness  may  be  in  the  way  of  natural  con- 
sequence :  as  if  this  were  taking  the  execution  of  justice 
out  of  the  hands  of  God,  and  giving  it  to  nature.  But 
they  should  remember,  that  when  things  come  to  pass 
according  to  the  course  of  nature,  this  does  not  hinder 
them  from  being  his  doing,  who  is  the  God  of  nature  : 
and  that  the  Scripture  ascribes  those  punishments  to 
divine  justice,  which  are  known  to  be  natural  ;  and  which 
must  be  called  so,  when  distinguished  from  such  as  are 
miraculous.  But  after  all,  this  supposition,  or  rather 
this  way  of  speaking,  is  here  made  use  of  only  byway  of 
illustration  of  the  subject  before  us.     For  since  it  must 

o 


210  THE  APPOINTMENT  OF  ''  n»AM  IT, 

be  admitted,  that  the  future  punishment  of  wickedness  is 
not  a  matter  of  arbitrary  appointment,  but  of  reason, 
equity,  and  justice  ;  it  comes,  for  ought  I  see,  to  the  same 
thing,  whether  it  is  supposed  to  be  inflicted  in  a  way 
analogous  to  that,  in  which  the  temporal  punishments  of 
vice  and  folly  are  inflicted,  or  in  any  other  way.  And 
though  there  were  a  diff'erence,  it  is  allowable,  in  the 
present  case,  to  make  this  supposition,  plainly  not  an  in- 
credible one ;  that  future  punishment  may  follow  wicked- 
ness in  the  way  of  natural  consequence,  or  according  to 
some  general  laws  of  government  already  established  in 
the  universe. 

III.  Upon  this  supposition,  or  even  without  it,  we 
may  observe  somewhat,  much  to  the  present  purpose,  in 
the  constitution  of  nature  or  appointments  of  Providence: 
the  provision  which  is  made,  that  all  the  bad  natural 
consequences  of  men's  actions  should  not  always  actually 
follow ;  or  that  such  bad  consequences,  as,  according  to 
the  settled  course  of  things,  would  inevitably  have  fol- 
lowed if  not  prevented,  should,  in  certain  degrees,  be 
prevented.  We  are  apt  presumptuously  to  imagine, 
that  the  world  might  have  been  so  constituted,  as  that 
there  would  not  have  been  any  such  thing  as  misery  or 
evil.  On  the  contrary  we  find  the  Author  of  Nature 
permits  it:  but  then  he  has  provided  reliefs,  and  in  many 
cases  perfect  remedies  for  it,  after  some  pains  and  diffi- 
culties; reliefs  and  remedies  even  for  that  evil,  whiOi  is 
the  fruit  of  our  own  misconduct;  and  which,  in  the 
course  of  nature,  would  have  continued,  and  ended  in 
our  destruction,  but  for  such  remedies.  And  this  is  an 
instance  both  of  severity  and  of  indulgence,  in  the  con- 
stitution of  nature.  Thus  all  the  bad  consequences,  now 
mentioned,  of  a  man's  trifling  upon  a  precipice,  might 
be  prevented.  And  though  all  were  not,  yet  some  of 
them  might,  by  proper  interposition,  if  not  rejected :  by 
another's  coming  to  the  rash  man's  relief,  with  his  own 
laying  hold  on  that  relief,  in  such  sort  as  the  case  re- 
quired. Persons  may  do  a  great  deal  themselves  towards 
preventing  the  bad  consequences  of  their  follies:  and 
more  may  be  done  by  themselves,  together  with  the 
assistance  of  others  their  fellow  creatures  ;  which  assist- 


Chap,  v.]  A  MEDIATOR  AND  REDEEMER.  211 

ance  nature  requires  and  prompts  us  to.  This  is  the 
general  constitution  of  the  world.  Now  suppose  it  had 
been  so  constituted,  that  after  such  actions  were  done,  as 
were  foreseen  naturally  to  draw  after  them  misery  to  the 
doer,  it  should  have  been  no  more  in  human  power  to 
have  prevented  that  naturally  consequent  misery,  in  any 
instance,  than  it  is  in  all :  no  one  can  say,  whether  such 
a  more  severe  constitution  of  things  misht  not  vet  have 
been  really  good.  But,  that,  on  the  contrarv,  provision 
is  made  by  nature,  that  we  may  and  do,  to  so  great  de- 
gree, prevent  the  bad  natural  effects  of  our  follies ;  this 
may  be  called  mercy  or  compassion  in  the  original  con- 
stitution of  the  world:  compassion,  as  distinguished  from 
goodness  in  general.  And,  the  whole  known  constitu- 
tion and  course  of  things  affording  us  instances  of  such 
compassion,  it  would  be  according  to  the  analogy  of  na- 
ture, to  hope,  that,  however  ruinous  the  natural  conse- 
quences of  vice  might  be,  from  the  general  laws  of  God's 
government  over  the  universe ;  yet  provision  might  be 
made,  possibly  might  have  been  originally  made,  for 
preventing  those  ruinous  consequences  from  inevitably 
following :  at  least  from  following  universally,  and  in  all 
cases. 

Many,  I  am  sensible,  will  wonder  at  finding  this  made 
a  question,  or  spoken  of  as  in  any  degree  doubtful.  The 
generality  of  mankind  are  so  far  from  having  that  awful 
sense  of  things,  which  the  present  state  of  vice  and  misery 
and  darkness  seems  to  make  but  reasonable,  that  they 
have  scarce  any  apprehension  or  thought  at  all  about 
this  matter,  any  w^ay:  and  some  serious  persons  may 
have  spoken  unadvisedly  concerning  it.  But  let  us  ob- 
serve, what  we  experience  to  be,  and  what,  from  the 
very  constitution  of  nature,  cannot  but  be,  the  conse- 
quences of  irregular  and  disorderly  behaviour :  even  of 
such  rashness,  wilfulness,  neglects,  as  we  scarce  call  vi- 
cious. Now  it  is  natural  to  apprehend,  that  the  bad  con- 
sequences of  irregularity  will  be  greater,  in  proportion  as 
the  irregularity  is  so.  And  there  is  no  comparison  be- 
tween these  irregularities,  and  the  greater  instances  of 
vice,  or  a  dissolute  profligate  disregard  to  all  religion ;  if 
there  be  anv  thing  at  all  in  religion.     For  consider  wha* 


OS 


212  THE  APPOINTMENT  OF  [Part  O. 

it  is  for  creatures,  moral  agents,  presumptuously  to  in- 
troduce that  confusion  and  miser}^  into  the  kingdom  of 
God,  which  mankind  have  in  fact  introduced:  to  blas- 
pheme the  Sovereign  Lord  of  all ;  to  contemn  his  autho- 
rity ;  to  be  injurious,  to  the  degree  they  are,  to  their  fel- 
low creatures,  the  creatures  of  God.  Add  that  the  effects 
of  vice  in  the  present  world  are  often  extreme  misery, 
irretrievable  ruin,  and  even  death :  and  upon  putting  all 
this  together,  it  will  appear,  that  as  no  one  can  say,  in 
what  degree  fatal  the  unprevented  consequences  of  vice 
may  be,  according  to  the  general  rule  of  divine  govern- 
ment ;  so  it  is  by  no  means  intuitively  certain,  how  far 
these  consequences  could  possibly,  in  the  nature  of  the 
thing,  be  prevented,  consistently  with  the  eternal  rule  of 
right,  or  with  what  is,  in  fact,  the  moral  constitution  of 
nature.  However,  there  would  be  large  ground  to  hope, 
that  the  universal  government  was  not  so  severely 
strict,  but  that  there  was  room  for  pardon,  or  for  hav- 
ing those  penal  consequences  prevented.     Yet, 

IV.  There  seems  no  probability,  that  any  thing  we 
could  do  would  alone  and  of  itself  prevent  them  :  pre- 
vent their  following,  or  being  inflicted.  But  one  would 
think  at  least,  it  were  impossible  that  the  contrary  should 
be  thought  certain.  For  we  are  not  acquainted  with 
the  whole  of  the  case.  We  are  not  informed  of  all  the 
reasons,  which  render  it  fit  that  future  punishments 
should  be  inflicted:  and  therefore  cannot  know,  whether 
any  thing  we  could  do  would  make  such  an  alteration,  as 
to  render  it  fit  that  they  should  be  remitted.  We  do  not 
know  what  the  whole  natural  or  appointed  consequences 
of  vice  are ;  nor  in  what  way  they  would  follow,  if  not 
prevented :  and  therefore  can  in  no  sort  say,  whether  we 
could  do  any  thing  which  would  be  sufficient  to  prevent 
them.  Our  ignorance  being  thus  manifest,  let  us  recol- 
lect the  analogy  of  Nature  or  Providence.  For,  though 
this  may  be  but  a  slight  ground  to  raise  a  positive  opin- 
ion upon,  in  this  matter ;  yet  it  is  sufficient  to  answer  a 
mere  arbitrary  assertion,  without  any  kind  of  evidence, 
urged  by  way  of  objection  against  a  doctrine,  the  proof 
of  which  is  not  reason,  but  revelation.  Consider  then  : 
people  ruin  their  fortunes  by  extravagance ;  they  bring 


Chap,  v.]  A  MEDIATOR  AND  REDEEMER.  213 

diseases  upon  themselves  by  excess;  they  incur  the 
penalties  of  civil  laws;  and  surely  civil  government  is 
natural;  will  sorrow  for  these  follies  j^ilist,  and  behaving 
well  for  the  future,  alone  and  of  itself  prevent  the  na- 
tural consequences  of  them  ?  On  the  contrary,  men's 
natural  abilities  of  helping  themselves  are  often  impaired; 
or  if  not,  yet  they  are  forced  to  be  beholden  to  the 
assistance  of  others,  upon  several  accounts,  and  in  dif- 
ferent ways ;  assistance  which  they  would  have  had  no 
occasion  for,  had  it  not  been  for  their  misconduct ;  but 
which,  in  the  disadvantageous  condition  they  had  reduced 
themselves  to,  is  absolutely  necessary  to  their  recovery, 
and  retrieving  their  affairs.  Now  since  this  is  our  case, 
considering  ourselves  merely  as  inhabitants  of  this  world, 
and  as  having  a  temporal  interest  here,  under  the  natural 
government  of  God,  which  however  has  a  great  deal 
moral  in  it ;  why  is  it  not  supposable  that  this  may  be 
our  case  also,  in  our  more  important  capacity,  as  under 
his  perfect  moral  government,  and  having  a  more  gene- 
ral and  future  interest  depending?  If  we  have  misbe- 
haved in  this  higher  capacity,  and  rendered  ourselves 
obnoxious  to  the  future  punishment,  which  God  has 
annexed  to  vice :  it  is  plainly  credible,  that  behaving  well 
for  the  time  to  come  may  be — not  useless,  God  for- 
bid— but  w^holly  insufficient,  alone  and  of  itself,  to  pre- 
vent that  punishment :  or  to  put  us  in  the  condition, 
which  w^e  should  have  been  in  had  we  preserved  our 
innocence. 

And  though  we  ought  to  reason  with  all  reverence, 
whenever  we  reason  concerning  the  divine  conduct :  yet 
it  may  be  added,  that  it  is  clearly  contrary  to  all  our 
notions  of  government,  as  well  as  to  what  is,  in  fact,  the 
general  constitution  of  nature,  to  suppose,  that  doing 
well  for  the  future  should,  in  all  cases,  prevent  all  the 
judicial  bad  consequences  of  having  done  evil,  or  all 
the  punishment  annexed  to  disobedience.  And  we 
have  manifestly  nothing  from  whence  to  determine,  in 
what  degree,  and  in  what  cases,  reformation  would  pre- 
vent this  punishment,  even  supposing  that  it  would  in 
some.  Affid  though  the  efficacy  of  repentance  itself 
alone,  to  prevent  w^hat  mankind  had  rendered  themselves 


214  THE  APPOINTMENT  OF  [Part  II, 

obnoxious  to,  and  recover  what  they  had  forfeited,  is 
now  insisted  upon,  in  opposition  to  Christianity ;  yet,  by 
the  general  prevalence  of  propitiatory  sacrifices  over  the 
heathen  world,  this  notion  of  repentance  alone  being 
sufficient  to  expiate  guilt,  appears  to  be  contrary  to  the 
general  sense  of  mankind. 

Upon  the  whole  then  ;  had  the  laws,  the  general  laws 
of  God's  government  been  permitted  to  operate,  with- 
out any  interposition  in  our  behalf,  the  future  punish- 
ment, for  ought  we  know  to  the  contrary,  or  have  any 
reason  to  think,  must  inevitably  have  followed,  notwith- 
standing any  thing  we  could  have  done  to  prevent  it. 
Now, 

V.  In  this  darkness,  or  this  light  of  nature,  call  it 
which  you  please,  revelation  comes  in  ;  confirms  every 
doubting  fear,  which  could  enter  into  the  heart  of  man, 
concerning  the  future  unprevented  consequence  of  wick- 
edness ;  supposes  the  world  to  be  in  a  state  of  ruin  (a 
supposition  which  seems  the  very  ground  of  the  Chris- 
tian dispensation,  and  which,  if  not  provable  by  reason, 
yet  is  in  no  wise  contrary  to  it;)  teaches  us  too,  that  the 
rules  of  divine  government  are  such,  as  not  to  admit  of 
pardon  immediately  and  directly  upon  repentance,  or  by 
the  sole  efficacy  of  it:  but  then  teaches  at  the  same  time, 
what  nature  might  justly  have  hoped,  that  the  moral 
government  of  the  universe  was  not  so  rigid,  but  that 
there  was  room  for  an  interposition,  to  avert  the  fatal 
consequences  of  vice;  which  therefore,  by  this  means, 
does  admit  of  pardon.  Revelation  teaches  us,  that  the 
unknown  laws  of  God's  more  general  government,  no 
less  than  the  particular  laws  by  which  we  experience 
he  governs  us  at  present,  are  compassionate,*  as  well  as 
good  in  the  more  general  notion  of  goodness:  and  that 
he  hath  mercifully  provided,  that  there  should  be  an 
interposition  to  prevent  the  destruction  of  human  kind ; 
whatever  that  destruction  unprevented  would  have  been. 
God  so  loved  the  vjorld,  that  he  gave  his  only  begotten  Son, 
that  whosoever  helievethy  not,  to  be  sure,  in  a  speculative, 
but  in  a  practical  sense,  that  ivhosoever  helieveth  in  hinij, 
should  not  perish:'^  gave  his  Son  in  the  same  way  of 

*  p.  210,  &C.  t  Jofi"  »i-  16. 


Chap,  v.]  A  MEDIATOR  AND  REDEEMER.  215 

goodness  to  the  world,  as  he  affords  particular  persons 
the  friendly  assistance  of  their  fellow  creatures:  when, 
without  it,  their  temporal  ruin  would  be  the  certain 
consequence  of  their  follies:  in  the  same  way  of  good- 
ness, I  say;  though  in  a  transcendent  and  infinitely 
higher  degree.  And  the  Son  of  God  loved  us,  and  gave 
himself  for  us,  with  a  love,  which  he  himself  compares 
to  that  of  human  friendship:  though,  in  this  case,  all 
comparisons  must  fall  infinitely  short  of  the  thing  in- 
tended to  be  illustrated  by  them.  He  interposed  in 
such  a  manner  as  was  necessary  and  effectual  to  prevent 
that  execution  of  justice  upon  sinners,  which  God  had  ap- 
pointed should  otherwise  have  been  executed  upon  them : 
or  in  such  a  manner,  as  to  prevent  that  punishment 
from  actually  following,  which,  according  to  the  general 
laws  of  divine  government,  must  have  followed  the  sins 
of  the  world,  had  it  not  been  for  such  interposition.* 

If  any  thing  here  said  should  appear,  upon  first 
thought,  inconsistent  with  divine  goodness;  a  second,  I 
am  persuaded,  will  entirely  remove  that  appearance. 
For  were  we  to  suppose  the  constitution  of  things  to  be 
such,  as  that  the  whole  creation  must  have  perished, 
had  it  not  been  for  somewhat,  which  God  had  appointed 
should  be,  in  order  to  prevent  that  ruin :  even  this  sup- 
position would  not  be  inconsistent,  in  any  degree,  with 
the  most  absolutely  perfect  goodness.  But  still  it  may 
be  thought,  that  this  whole  manner  of  treating  the  sub- 
ject before  us  supposes  mankind  to  be  naturally  in  a 
very  strange  state.  And  truly  so  it  does.  But  it  is  not 
Christianity  which  has  put  us  into  this  state.     Whoever 

*  It  cannot,  I  suppose,  be  imagined,  even  by  the  most  cursory  render,  that  it  is.  in 
any  sort,  affirmed  or  implied  in  any  thing-  said  in  tiiis  cliapter,  tl.at  none  can  have 
the  benefit  of  the  general  reilemption,  but  such  as  have  the  advantage  of  being  made 
acquainted  with  it  in  the  present  life.  But  it  may  be  needful  to  mention,  that  sevend 
questions,  which  have  been  brougiitinto  the  subject  before  us,  and  determined,  ;ire 
not  in  the  least  entered  into  here  :  questions  which  have  been,  1  frar,  rashly  deti  r- 
niined,  and  perhaps  with  eqtial  rashness  coiitrnry  ways.  For  instance,  whethtr  Gn.l 
could  have  saved  the  world  by  other  means  than  iJie  death  of  Christ,  coiisistenily 
witii  the  gei-eral  laws  of  his  government.  And  had  not  Christ  come  into  tlie  world, 
what  would  have  been  the  future  condition  of  the  better  sort  of  men  ;  those  just 
persons  over  the  face  of  the  earth,  for  whom  Manasses  in  his  prayer  asserts,  repi-n- 
tancfc  was  not  appointed.  The  meaning  of  I  he  first  of  these  questions  is  jyi-eaily 
ambiguous:  and  neither  of  them  can  properly  be  answered,  without  going  ujion  that, 
infinitely  absurd  supposition,  tliat  we  know  (lie  whole  of  the  case.  And  perhaps  Uh; 
very  inquiry,  JVIwt  would  have  followed,  if  God  had  not  done  as  fie  hm,  may  i  'V  i  i 
it  sODie  very  great  impropriety :  and  ought  not  to  be  carried  on  any  farther  iliau  i^ 
Sece&sary  ia  help  our  partial  and  in:;dfipiate  conceptions  of  things^ 


216  THE  APPOINTMENT  OF  [Part  II, 

will  consider  the  manifold  miseries,  and  the  extreme 
wickedness  of  the  world;  that  the  best  have  great 
wrongnesses  within  themselves,  which  they  complain  of, 
and  endeavour  to  amend ;  but  that  the  generality  grow 
more  profligate  and  corrupt  with  age ;  that  even  mora- 
lists thought  the  present  state  to  be  a  state  of  punish- 
ment: and,  v.'hat  might  be  added,  that  the  earth  our 
habitation  has  the  appearances  of  being  a  ruin :  whoever, 
I  say,  will  consider  all  these,  and  some  other  obvious 
things,  will  think  he  has  little  reason  to  object  against 
the  Scripture  account,  that  mankind  is  in  a  state  of 
degradation;  against  this  being  the  fact:  how  difficult 
soever  he  may  think  it  to  account  for,  or  even  to  form  a 
distinct  conception  of  the  occasions  and  circumstances 
of  it.  But  that  the  crime  of  our  first  parents  was  the 
occasion  of  our  being  placed  in  a  more  disadvantageous 
condition,  is  a  thing  throughout  and  particularly  analo- 
gous to  what  we  see  in  the  daily  course  of  natural  pro- 
vidence; as  the  recovery  of  the  world  by  the  interposi- 
tion of  Christ  has  been  shown  to  be  so  in  general, 

VI.  The  particular  manner  in  which  Christ  interposed 
in  the  redemption  of  the  world,  or  his  office  as  Mediator, 
in  the  largest  sense,  between  God  and  man,  is  thus  repre- 
sented to  us  in  the  Scripture.  He  is  the  light  of  the 
world;*  the  revealer  of  the  will  of  God  in  the  most 
eminent  sense.  He  is  a  propitiatory  sacrifice  ;t  the 
Lamb  of  God:X  and,  as  he  voluntarily  offered  himself 
up,  he  is  styled  our  High  Priest. §  And,  which  seems 
of  peculiar  weight,  he  is  described  beforehand  in  the 
Old  Testament,  under  the  same  characters  of  a  priest, 
and  an  expiatory  victim.il  And  whereas  it  is  objected, 
that  all  this  is  merely  by  way  of  allusion  to  the  sacrifices 
of  the  Mosaic  law,  the  Apostle  on  the  contrary  affirms, 
that  the  law  was  a  shadoio  of  good  things  to  come,  and  not 
the  very  image  of  the  things:^  and  that  the  priests  that 
offer  gifts  according  to  the  law — serve  unto  the  example 
iind  shadow  of  heavenly  things,  as  Moses  was  admonished 

*  John  i.  and  viii.  12. 

f  Rom.  iii.  25.  v.  11.  1  Cor.  v.  7.  Fph.  v.  2.  1  John  ii.  2.  Mat.  xxvi.  -28. 

j  John  i,  29,  3(5,  ami  throughout  the  l)Ook  of  Revelation. 

<J  Throiiehout  the  epistle  to  the  Hebrews. 

Ij  Ua.  lii'i.  Diin.  ix    2;.  P:.  ix    4,  ^  ^^^'  ^-  *•  '    ' 


Shap.  v.]  A  MEDIATOR  AND  REDEEMER.  217 

of  God,  when  he  was  about  to  make  the  tabernacle.  For  see, 
saith  lie,  that  thou  make  all  things  according  to  the  pattern 
showed  to  thee  in  the  mount:*  i.  e.  the  Levitical  priesthood 
was  a  shadow  of  the  priesthood  of  Christ;  in  hke  manner 
as  the  tabernacle  made  by  Moses  was  according  to  that 
showed  him  in  the  mount.  The  priesthood  of  Christ, 
and  the  tabernacle  in  the  mount,  were  the  originals:  of 
the  former  of  which  the  Levitical  priesthood  was  a  type ; 
and  of  the  latter  the  tabernacle  made  by  Moses  was  a 
copy.  The  doctrine  of  this  epistle  then  plainly  is,  that 
the  legal  sacrifices  were  allusions  to  the  great  and  final 
atonement  to  be  made  bv  the  blood  of  Christ;  and  not 
that  this  was  an  allusion  to  those.  Nor  can  any  thing 
be  more  express  or  determinate  than  the  following  pas- 
sage. It  is  not  possible  that  the  blood  of  bulls  and  of  goats 
should  take  away  sm.  Wherefore  when  he  cometh  into  the 
world,  he  saith,  Sacrifice  and  offering,  i.  e.  of  bulls  and  of 
goats,  thou  wouldest  7iot,  but  a  body  hast  thou  prepared  me. 
Lo,  I  come  to  do  thy  will,  0  God.  By  which  will  we  are 
sanctified,  through  the  offering  of  the  body  of  Jesus  Christ 
once  for  all.'t  And  to  add  one  passage  more  of  the  like 
kind:  Christ  loas  once  offered  to  bear  the  sins  of  many ; 
and  unto  them  that  look  for  him  shall  he  appear  the  second 
time,  vnthout  sin;  i,  e.  without  bearing  sin,  as  he  did  at 
his  first  coming,  by  being  an  offering  for  it;  without 
having  our  iniquities  again  laid  upon  him,  without  being 
any  more  a  sin-offering: — unto  them  that  look  for  him  shall 
he  appear  the  second  time,  without  sin,  unto  salvation.X 
Nor  do  the  iji spired  writers  at  all  confine  themselves  to 
this  manner  of  speaking  concerning  the  satisfaction  of 
Christ;  but  declare  an  efficacy  in  what  he  did  and  suffered 
for  us,  additional  to  and  beyond  mere  instruction,  ex- 
ample, and  government,  in  great  variety  of  expression: 
That  Jesus  .should  die  for  that  nation,  the  Jews :  and  not 
for  that  nation  only,  but  that  also,  plainly  by  the  efficacy 
of  his  death,  he  should  gather  together  in  one  the  children 
of  God  that  were  scattered  abroad. •§  that  he  suffered  for 
sins,  the  just  for  the  unjust. •{]  that  he  gave  his  life,  himself 
a  ransom  :^  that  we  are  bought,  bought  with  a  price:**  that 

*  Heb.  viii.  4,  5.  f  Heb.  x.  4,  5,  7,  9,  10.  t  Heb,  ix.  28. 

§  John  xi.  51,  52.      ||  I  Pet.  iii.  18.      ^  Matt.  xx.  28.  Mark  x.  45.  1  Tim.  ii.  6, 

*•  2  Pet.  ii.  1.   Rev.  xir.  4.    1  Cor.  vi.  20. 


218  THE  APPOINTMENT  OF  [Part  II. 

he  redeemed  us  with  his  blood:  redeemed  us  from  the  curse 
of  the  law,  being  made  a  curse  for  us  :*  that  he  is  our 
advocate,  intercessor,  and  propitiation  ;t  that  he  was  made^ 
perfect,  or  consummate,  through  sufferings;  and  being 
thus  made  perfect,  he  became  the  author  of  salvation  :X 
that  God  was  in  Christ  reconciling  the  world  to  himself; 
by  the  death  of  his  So7i,  by  the  cross;  not  imputing  their 
trespasses  unto  them:§  and  lastly,  that  through  death  he 
destroyed  him  that  had  the  power  of  death.W  Christ  then 
having  thus  humbled  himself ,  and  become  obedient  to  death, 
even  the  death  of  the  cross;  God  also  hath  highly  exalted 
him,  and  given  him  a  name,  which  is  above  every  name: 
hath  given  all  things  into  his  hands:  hath  committed  all 
judgment  unto  him;  that  all  men  should  honour  the  Son, 
even  as  they  honour  the  Father.*^  For,  worthy  is  the 
Lamb  that  was  slain,  to  receive  power,  and  riches,  and 
im'sdom,  and  strength,  and  honour,  and  glory,  and  blessing. 
And  every  creature  which  is  in  heaven,  and  on  the  earth, 
heard  I,  saying.  Blessing,  and  honour,  and  glory,  and 
power,  be  unto  him  that  sitteth  upon  the  throne,  and  unto 
the  Lamb  for  ever  and  ever** 

These  passages  of  Scripture  seem  to  comprehend  and 
express  the  chief  parts  of  Christ's  office,  as  Mediator 
between  God  and  man,  so  far,  I  mean,  as  the  nature  of 
this  his  office  is  revealed ;  and  it  is  usually  treated  of  by 
divines  under  three  heads. 

First,  He  was,  by  way  of  eminence,  the  Prophet:  that 
Prophet  that  should  come  into  the  world,\\  to  declare  the. 
divine  will.  He  published  anew  the  law  of  nature, 
w^hich  men  had  corrupted;  and  the  very  knowledge  of 
which,  to  some  degree,  was  lost  among  them.  He 
taught  mankind,  taught  us  authoritatively,  to  live  soberly, 
7'ighteously,  and  godly  in  this  j^resent  world,  in  expectation 
of  the  future  judgment  of  God.  He  confirmed  the  truth 
of  this  moral  system  of  nature,  and  gave  us  additional 
evidence  of  it;  the  evidence  of  testimony. tt  He  dis- 
tinctly revealed  the   manner,  in  which  God  would  be 

*  1  Pet.  i.  19.  Rev.  v.  9.  Gal.  iii.  13.  f  Heb,  vii.  25.  1  John  ii.  1,  2. 

X  Heb.  ii.  x.  v.  9.  %  2  Cor.  v.  19.  Rom.  v.  10.  Eph.  ii.  16. 

II  Heb.  ii.  14.     See  also  a  remarkable  passage  in  tlie  book  of  Job,  xxxiii.  24. 
T[  Phil.  ii.  8,  9.  Jolui  iii.  35.  v.  22,  23.  **  Rev.  v.  12,  13. 

tj- John  vi.  14.  ttP.  167,  &c. 


Chap.  V.]  A  MEDIATOR  AND  REDEEMER.  219 

worshipped,  the  efficacy  of  repentance,  and  the  rewards 
and  punishments  of  a  future  hfe.  Thus  he  was  a  pro- 
phet in  a  sense  in  which  no  other  evei"  was.  To  which 
is  to  be  added,  that  he  set  us  a  perfect  example,  that  we 
sliould  follow  his  steps. 

Secondly,  He  has  a  kingdom  which  is  not  of  this  world. 
He  founded  a  Church,  to  be  to  mankind  a  standing 
memorial  of  religion,  and  invitation  to  it;  which  he  pro- 
mised to  be  with  always  even  to  the  end.  He  exercises 
an  invisible  government  over  it,  himself,  and  by  his  Spirit: 
over  that  part  of  it,  which  is  militant  here  on  earth,  a 
government  of  discipline,  for  the  perfecting  of  the  saints, 
for  the  edifying  his  body:  till  we  all  come  in  the  unity  of 
the  faith,  and  of  the  knowledge  of  the  Son  of  God,  unto  a 
perfect  man,  unto  the  measure  of  the  stature  of  the  fulness 
of  Christ.*  Of  this  Church,  all  persons  scattered  over 
the  world,  who  live  in  obedience  to  his  laws,  are  mem- 
bers. For  these  he  is  gone  to  prepare  a  place,  and  will 
come  again  to  7'eceive  them  unto  himself,  that  where  he  is, 
there  they  may  he  also  ;  and  reign  with  him  for  ever  and 
ever:\  and  likewise  to  take  vengeance  on  them  that  know 
not  God,  and  obey  not  his  Gospel.t 

Against  these  parts  of  Christ's  office  I  find  no  objec- 
tions, but  what  are  fully  obviated  in  the  beginning  of 
this  Chapter. 

Lastly,  Christ  offered  himself  a  propitiatory  sacrifice, 
and  made  atonement  for  the  sins  of  the  world ;  which  is 
mentioned  last,  in  regard  to  what  is  objected  against  it. 
Sacrifices  of  expiation  were  commanded  the  Jews,  and 
obtained  amongst  most  other  nations,  from  tradition, 
whose  original  probably  was  revelation.  And  they  were 
continually  repeated,  both  occasionally,  and  at  the  re- 
turns of  stated  times :  and  made  up  great  part  of  the 
external  religion  of  mankind.  But  now  once  in  the  end 
of  the  world  Christ  appeared  to  j)ut  away  sin  by  the  sacri- 
fice of  himself. §  And  this  sacrifice  was,  in  the  highest 
degree  and  with  the  most  extensive  influence,  of  that 
efficacy  for  obtaining  pardon  of  sin,  which  the  heathens 
may  be  supposed  to  have  thought  their  sacrifices  to  have 

*  Eph.  iv.  12,  13.  f  John  xiv.  2,  3.  Rev.  iii.  21,  and  xi.  15. 

t  2  Thess.  i.  8.  §  Heb.  ix.  26. 


220  "  THE  APPOINTMENT  OF  [Pjrt  II. 

been,  and  v-hich  the  Jewish  sacrifices  really  were  in 
some  degree,  and  with  regard  to  some  persons. 

How  and  in  what  particidar  way  it  had  this  efficacy, 
there  are  not  wanting  persons  who  have  endeavoured  to 
explain :  but  I  do  not  find  that  the  Scripture  has  ex- 
plained it.  We  seem  to  be  very  much  in  the  dark 
concerning  the  manner  in  which  the  ancients  understood 
atonement  to  be  made,  i.  e.  pardon  to  be  obtained  by 
sacrifices.  And  if  the  Scripture  has,  as  surely  it  has, 
left  this  matter  of  the  satisfaction  of  Christ  mvsterious, 
left  somewhat  in  it  unrevealed,  all  conjectures  about  it 
must  be,  if  not  evidently  absurd,  yet  at  least  uncertain. 
Nor  has  any  one  reason  to  complain  for  want  of  further 
information,  unless  he  can  show  his  claim  to  it. 

Some  have  endeavoured  to  explain  the  efficacy  of 
what  Christ  has  done  and  suffered  for  us,  beyond  vvdiat 
the  Scripture  has  authorized :  others,  probably  because 
they  could  not  explain  it,  have  been  for  taking  it  away, 
and  confining  his  office  as  Redeemer  of  the  world  to  his 
instruction,  exarr)ple,  and  government  of  the  church. 
Whereas  the  doctrine  of  the  Gospel  appears  to  be,  not 
only  that  he  taught  the  efficacy  of  repentance,  but  ren- 
dered it  of  the  efficacy  of  which  it  is,  by  what  he  did 
and  suffered  for  us :  that  he  obtained  for  us  the  benefit 
of  having  our  repentance  accepted  unto  eternal  hfe :  not 
only  that  he  revealed  to  sinners,  that  they  were  in  a 
capacity  of  salvation,  and  how  they  might  obtain  it ;  but 
moreover  that  he  put  them  into  this  capacity  of  salvation, 
by  what  he  did  and  suffered  for  them ;  put  us  into  a 
capacity  of  escaping  future  punishment,  and  obtaining 
future  happiness.  And  it  is  our  wisdom  thankfully  to 
accept  the  benefit,  by  performing  the  conditions,  upon 
which  it  is  offered,  on  our  part,  without  disputing  how 
it  was  procured  on  his.     For, 

VII.  Since  we  neither  know  by  what  means  punish- 
ment in  a  future  state  would  have  followed  wickedness 
in  this:  nor  in  what  manner  it  would  have  been  inflicted, 
had  it  not  been  prevented ;  nor  all  the  reasons  why  its 
infliction  would  have  been  needful,  nor  the  particular 
•nature  of  that  state  of  happiness,  which  Christ  is.  gone 
to  prepare  for  his  disciples :  and  since  we  are  ignorant 


Chaiv-YO  a  mediator  AND  REDEEMER.  221 

how  far  any  thing  which  we  could  do,  would,  alone  and 
of  itself,  have  been  effectual  to  prevent  that  punishment 
to  which  we  were  obnoxious,  and  recover  that  happi- 
ness, which  we  had  forfeited ;  it  is  most  evident  we  are 
not  judges,  antecedently  to  revelation,  whether  a  me- 
diator was  or  was  not  necessarv,  to  obtain  those  ends :  to 
prevent  that  future  punishment,  and  bring  mankind  to 
the  final  happiness  of  their  nature.  And  for  the  very 
same  reasons,  upon  supposition  of  the  necessity  of  a 
mediator,  we  are  no  more  judges,  antecedently  to  reve- 
lation, of  the  whole  nature  of  his  office,  or  the  several 
parts  of  which  it  consists  ;  of  what  was  fit  and  requisite 
to  be  assigned  him,  in  order  to  accomplish  the  ends  of 
divine  Providence  in  the  appointment.  And  from 
hence  it  follows,  that  to  object  against  the  expediency 
or  usefulness  of  particular  things,  revealed  to  have  been 
done  or  suffered  by  him,  because  we  do  not  see  how 
they  were  conducive  to  those  ends,  is  highly  absurd. 
Yet  nothing  is  more  common  to  be  met  with,  than  this 
absurdity.  But  if  it  be  acknowledged  beforehand,  that 
we  are  not  judges  in  the  case,  it  is  evident  that  no  ob- 
jection can,  with  any  shadow  of  reason,  be  urged  against 
any  particular  part  of  Christ's  mediatorial  office  revealed 
in  Scripture,  till  it  can  be  shown  positively  not  to  be  re- 
quisite or  conducive  to  the  ends  proposed  to  be  accom- 
plished ;  or  that  it  is  in  itself  unreasonable. 

And  there  is  one  objection  made  against  the  satisfac- 
tion of  Christ,  which  looks  to  be  of  this  positive  kind : 
that  the  doctrine  of  his  being  appointed  to  suffer  for  the 
sins  of  the  world,  represents  God  as  being  indifferent 
whether  he  punished  the  innocent  or  the  guilty.  Now 
from  the  foregoing  observations  we  may  see  the  extreme 
slightness  of  all  such  objections;  and  (though  it  is  most 
certain  all  who  make  them  do  not  see  the  consequence) 
that  they  conclude  altogether  as  much  against  God's 
whole  original  constitution  of  nature,  and  the  whole 
daily  course  of  divine  Providence  in  the  government  of 
the  world,  i.  e.  against  the  whole  scheme  of  Theism  and 
the  whole  notion  of  Religion,  as  against  Christianity. 
For  the  world  is  a  constitution  or  system,  whose  parts 
have  a  mutual  reference  to  each  other :  and  there  is  a 


222  THE  APPOINTMENT  OF  [Pabt  II. 

> 

scheme  of  things  gradually  carrying  on,  called  the  course 
of  nature,  to  the  carrying  on  of  which  God  has  appointed 
us,  in  various  ways,  to  contribute.     And  when,  in  the 
daily  course  of  natural  providence,  it  is  appointed  that 
innocent  people  should  suffer  for  the  faults  of  the  guilty, 
this  is  liable  to  the  very  same  objection,  as  the  instance 
we  are  now  considering.     The  infinitely  greater  impor- 
tance of  that  appointment  of  Christianity,  which  is  ob- 
jected against,  does  not  hinder  but  it  may  be,  as  it  plain- 
ly is,  an  appointment  of  the  very  same  kind,  with  what 
the  world  affords  us  daily  examples  of.     Nay,  if  there 
were   any   force   at    all  in  the   objection,   it  would    be 
stronger,  in  one  respect,  against  natural  providence,  than 
against  Christianity:  because  under  the  former  we  are 
in  many  cases  commanded,  and  even  necessitated  whe- 
ther we  will  or  no,  to  suffer  for  the  faults  of  others  ; 
whereas  the  sufferings  of  Christ  were  voluntarv.     The 
world's  being  under  the  righteous  government  of  God 
does  indeed  imply,  that  finally   and    upon  the  whole 
everyone  shall  receive  according  to  his  personal  deserts: 
and  the  general  doctrine  of  the  whole  Scripture  is,  that 
this  shall  be  the  completion  of  the  divine  government. 
But  during  the  progress,  and,  for  ought  we  know,  even 
in  order  to  the  completion  of  this  moral  scheme,  vica- 
rious punishments  may  be  fit,  and  absolutely  necessary. 
Men  by  their  follies  run  themselves  into  extreme  dis- 
tress ;  into  difficulties  which  would  be  absolutely  fatal  to 
them,  were  it  not  for  the  interposition  and  assistance  of 
others.     God  commands  by  the  law  of  nature,  that  we 
afford   them    this    assistance,  in  many  cases  where  we 
cannot  do  it  without  very  great  pains,  and  labour,  and 
sufferings  to  ourselves.     And  we  see  in  what  variety  of 
ways  one  person's  sufferings  contribute  to  the  relief  of 
another:    and  how,  or  by  what  particular  means,  this 
comes  to  pass,  or  follows,  from  the  constitution  and  laws 
of  nature,  which  came  under  our  notice  :  and,  being  fami- 
liarized to  it,  men  are  not  shocked  with  it.     So  that  the 
reason  of  their  insisting  upon  objections  of  the  foregoing 
kind  against  the  satisfaction  of  Christ  is,  either  that  they 
do  not  consider  God's  settled  and  uniform  appointments 
as  his  appointments  at  all ;  or  else  they  forget  that  vica- 


CujLP.  v.]  A  MEDIATOR  AND  REDEEMER.  223 

rious  punishment  is  a  providential  appointment  of  every 
day's  experience :  and  then,  from  their  being  unac- 
quainted with  the  more  general  laws  of  nature  or  divine 
government  over  the  world,  and  not  seeing  how  the  suf- 
ferings of  Christ  could  contribute  to  the  redemption  of 
it,  unless  by  arbitrary  and  tyrannical  will ;  they  conclude 
his  sufferings  could  not  contribute  to  it  any  other  way. 
And  yet,  what  has  been  often  alleged  in  justification  of 
this  doctrine,  even  from  the  apparent  natural  tendency 
of  this  method  of  our  redemption  ;  its  tendency  to  vindi- 
cate the  authority  of  God's  laws,  and  deter  his  creatures 
from  sin;  this  has  never  yet  been  answered,  and  is  I 
think  plainly  unanswerable :  though  I  am  far  from  think- 
ing it  an  account  of  the  whole  of  the  case.  But,  with- 
out taking  this  into  consideration,  it  abundantly  appears, 
from  the  observations  above  made,  that  this  objection  is, 
not  an  objection  against  Christianity,  but  against  the 
whole  general  constitution  of  nature.  And  if  it  were  to 
be  considered  as  an  objection  against  Christianity,  or 
considering  it  as  it  is,  an  objection  against  the  constitu- 
tion of  nature  ;  it  amounts  to  no  more  in  conclusion  than 
this,  that  a  divine  appointment  cannot  be  necessary  or  ex- 
pedient, because  the  objector  does  not  discern  it  to  be  so: 
though  he  must  own  that  the  nature  of  the  case  is  such, 
as  renders  him  incapable  of  judging,  whether  it  be  so  or 
not ;  or  of  seeing  it  to  be  necessary,  though  it  were  so. 

It  is  indeed  a  matter  of  great  patience  to  reasonable 
men,  to  find  people  arguing  in  this  manner :  objecting 
against  the  credibility  of  such  particular  things  revealed 
in  Scripture,  that  they  do  not  see  the  necessity  or  ex- 
pediency of  them.  For  though  it  is  highly  right,  and 
tlie  most  pious  exercise  of  our  understanding,  to  inquire 
v/ith  due  reverence  into  the  ends  and  reasons  of  God's 
dispensation :  yet  when  those  reasons  are  concealed,  to 
argue  from  our  ignorance,  that  such  dispensations  can- 
not be  from  God,  is  infinitely  absurd.  The  presumption 
of  this  kind  of  objections  seems  almost  lost  in  the  folly 
of  them.  And  the  folly  of  them  is  yet  greater,  when 
they  are  urged,  as  usually  they  are,  against  things  in 
Christianity  analogous  or  like  to  those  natural  dispensa- 
tions of  Providence,  which  are  matter   of  experience. 


224  THE  APPOINTMENT  OF  [Pabt  II. 

Let  reason  be  kept  to :  and  if  any  part  of  the  Scripture 
account  of  the  redemption  of  the  world  by  Christ  can  be 
shown  to  be  reallv  contrary  to  it,  let  the  Scripture,  in 
the  name  of  God,  be  given  up :  but  let  not  such  poor 
creatures  as  we  go  on  objecting  against  an  infinite 
scheme,  that  we  do  not  see  the  necessity  or  usefulness 
of  all  its  parts,  and  call  this  reasoning ;  and,  which  still 
further  heightens  the  absurdity  in  the  present  case,  parts 
which  we  are  not  actively  concerned  in.  For  it  may  be 
v.'orth  mentioning, 

Lastly,  That  not  only  the  reason  of  the  thing,  but  the 
v/hole  analogy  of  nature,  should  teach  us,  not  to  expect 
to  have  the  like  information  concerning  the  divine  con- 
duct, as  concerning  our  own  duty.     God  instructs  us  by 
experience  (for  it  is  not  reason,  but  experience  which 
instructs    us),    what    good   or   bad   consequences  will 
follow  from  our  acting  in  such  and  such  manners :  and 
by  this  he  directs  us  how  we  are  to  behave  ourselves. 
But,  though  we  are  sufficiently  instructed  for  the  com- 
mon purposes  of  life :  yet  it  is  but  an  almost  infinitely 
small  part  of  natural  providence,  which  we  are  at  all  let 
into.     The  case  is  the  same  with  regard  to  revelation. 
The  doctrine  of  a  mediator   between    God    and   man, 
against  which   it   is    objected,  that   the    expediency    of 
some  things  in  it  is  not  understood,  relates  only  to  what 
vvas  done  on  God's  part  in  the  appointment,  and  on  the 
Mediator's  in  the  execution  of  it.      For  what  is  required 
of  us,  in  consequence  of  this  gracious  dispensation,   is 
another  subject,  in  which  none  can  complain  for  want  of 
information.     The  constitution  of  the  world,  and  God's 
natural  government  over  it,  is  all  mystery,  as  much  as 
the  Christian  dispensation.     Yet  under  the  first  he  has 
given  men  all  things  pertaining  to  life;  and  under  the 
other  all  things  pertaining  unto  godliness.     And  it  may 
be  added,  that  there  is  nothing  hard  to  be  accounted  for 
in  any  of  the  common  precepts  of  Christianity:  though 
if  there  were,  surely  a  divine  command  is  abundantly 
sufficient  to  lay  us  under  the  strongest  obligations  to 
obedience.     But  the  fact  is,  that  the  reasons  of  all  the 
Christian  precepts  are  evident.     Positive  institutions  are 
manifestly  necessary  to  keep  up  and  propagate  religion 


Chap.  VI.]  A  MEDIATOR  AND  REDEEMER.  '       225 

amongst  mankind.  And  our  duty  to  Christ,  the  internal 
and  external  worship  of  him ;  this  part  of  the  religion  of 
the  Gospel  manifestly  arises  out  of  what  he  has  done 
and  suffered,  his  authority  and  dominion,  and  the  rela- 
tion which  he  is  revealed  to  stand  in  to  us.* 


CHAP.  VI. 

OF  THE  WANT  OF  UNIVERSALITY  IN  REVELATION ;  AND  OF 
THE  SUPPOSED  DEFICIENCY  IN  THE  PROOF  OF  IT. 

It  has  been  thought  by  some  persons,  that  if  the  evi- 
dence of  revelation  appears  doubtful,  this  itself  turns 
into  a  positive  argument  against  it:  because  it  cannot  be 
supposed,  that,  if  it  were  true,  it  would  be  left  to  subsist 
upon  doubtful  evidence.  And  the  objection  against 
revelation  from  its  not  being  universal  is  often  insisted 
upon  as  of  great  weight. 

Now  the  weakness  of  these  opinions  may  be  shown, 
by  observing  the  suppositions  on  which  they  are  found- 
ed: which  are  really  such  as  these;  that  it  cannot  be 
thought  God  would  have  bestowed  any  favour  at  all 
upon  us,  unless  in  the  degree,  which,  we  think,  he  might, 
and  which,  we  imagine,  would  be  most  t?  our  particular 
advantage;  and  also  that  it  cannot  be  thought  he  would 
bestow  a  favour  upon  any,  unless  he  bestowed  the  same 
upon  all ;  suppositions,  which  we  find  contradicted,  not 
by  a  few  instances  in  God's  natural  government  of  the 
world,  but  by  the  general  analogy  of  nature  together. 

Persons  who  speak  of  the  evidence  of  religion  as 
doubtful,  and  of  this  supposed  doubtfulness  as  a  positive 
argument  against  it,  should  be  put  upon  considering, 
what  that  evidence  indeed  is,  which  they  act  upon  with 
regard  to  their  temporal  interests.  For,  it  is  not  only 
extremely  difficult,  but  in  many  cases  absolutely  impos- 
sible, to  balance  pleasure  and  pain,  satisfaction  and 
uneasiness,  so  as  to  be  able  to  say  on  which  side  the 
overplus  is.  There  are  the  like  difficulties  and  impossi- 
bilities in  making  the  due  allowances  for  a  change  of 

•  p,ni,&c 


226  REVELATION  NOT  UNIVERSAL:  [Part  H, 

temper  and  taste,  for  satiety,  disgusts,  ill  health:  any  of 
which  render  men  incapable  of  enjoying,  after  they  have 
obtained  what  they  most  eagerly  desired.  Numberless 
too  are  the  accidents,  besides  that  one  of  untimely  death, 
which  may  even  probably  disappoint  the  best  concerted 
schemes:  and  strong  objections  are  often  seen-  to  lie 
against  them,  not  to  be  removed  or  answered,  but  which 
seem  overbalanced  by  reasons  on  the  other  side;  so  as 
that  the  certain  difficulties  and  dangers  of  the  pursuit 
are,  by  every  one,  thought  justly  disregarded,  upon 
account  of  the  appearing  greater  advantages  in  case  of 
success,  though  there  be  but  little  probability  of  it. 
Lastly,  every  one  observes  our  liableness,  if  we  be  not 
upon  our  guard,  to  be  deceived  by  the  falsehood  of  men, 
and  the  false  appearances  of  things:  and  this  danger 
must  be  greatly  increased,  if  there  be  a  strong  bias 
within,  suppose  from  indulged  passion,  to  favour  the 
deceit.  Hence  arises  that  great  uncertainty  and  doubt- 
fulness of  proof,  wherein  our  temporal  interest  really 
consists;  what  are  the  most  probable  means  of  attaining 
it;  and  whether  those  means  will  eventually  be  success- 
ful. And  numberless  instances  there  are,  in  the  daily 
course  of  life,  in  which  all  men  think  it  reasonable  to 
engage  in  pursuits,  though  the  probability  is  greatly 
against  succeeding;  and  to  make  such  provision  for 
themselves,  as  it  is  supposable  they  may  have  occasion 
for,  though  the  plain  acknowledged  probability  is,  that 
they  never  shall.  Then  those  who  think  the  objection 
against  revelation,  from  its  light  not  being  universal,  to 
be  of  weight,  should  observe,  that  the  Author  of  Nature, 
in  numberless  instances,  bestows  that  upon  some,  which 
he  does  not  upon  others,  who  seem  equally  to  stand  in 
need  of  it.  Indeed  he  appears  to  bestow  all  his  gifts 
with  the  most  promiscuous  variety  among  creatures  of 
the  same  species:  health  and  strength,  capacities  of  pru- 
dence and  of  knowledge,  means  of  improvement,  riches, 
und  all  external  advantages.  And  as  there  are  not  any 
two  men  found,  of  exactly  like  shape  and  features;  so 
it  is  probable  there  are  not  any  two,  of  an  exactly  like 
constitution,  temper,  and  situation,  with  regard  to  the 
goods  and  evils   of  life.      Yet,  notwithstanding   these 


Cbap.vi.j      supposed  deficiency  in  its  proof.  227 

uncertainties  and  varieties,  God  does  exercise  a  natural 
government  over  the  world ;  and  there  is  such  a  thing 
as  a  prudent  and  imprudent  institution  of  hfe,  with  re- 
gard to  our  health  and  our  affairs,  under  that  his  natural 
government. 

As  neither  the  Jewish  nor  Christian  revelation  have 
been  universal ;  and  as  they  have  been  afforded  to  a 
greater  or  less  part  of  the  world,  at  different  times ;  so 
likewise  at  different  times,  both  revelations  have  had 
different  degrees  of  evidence.  The  Jews  who  lived 
during  the  succession  of  prophets,  that  is,  from  Moses 
till  after  the  Captivity,  had  higher  evidence  of  the  truth 
of  their  religion,  than  those  had,  who  lived  in  the  inter- 
val between  the  last  mentioned  period,  and  the  coming 
of  Christ.  And  the  first  Christians  had  higher  evidence 
of  the  miracles  wrought  in  attestation  of  Christianity, 
than  what  we  have  now.  They  had  also  a  strong  pre- 
sumptive proof  of  the  truth  of  it,  perhaps  of  much 
greater  force,  in  way  of  argument,  than  many  think,  of 
which  we  have  very  little  remaining ;  I  mean  the  pre- 
sumptive proof  of  its  truth,  from  the  influence  which  it 
had  upon  the  lives  of  the  generality  of  its  professors. 
And  we,  or  future  ages,  may  possibly  have  a  proof  of  it, 
which  they  could  not  have,  from  the  conformity  between 
the  prophetic  history,  and  the  state  of  the  world  and  of 
Christianity.  And  further:  if  we  were  to  suppose  the 
evidence,  which  some  have  of  religion,  to  amount  to 
little  more  than  seeing  that  it  may  be  true;  but  that 
they  remain  in  great  doubts  and  uncertainties  about 
both  its  evidence  and  its  nature,  and  great  perplexities 
concerning  the  rule  of  life:  others  to  have  a  full  con- 
viction of  the  truth  of  rehgion,  with  a  distinct  knowledge 
of  their  duty ;  and  others  severally  to  have  all  the  inter- 
mediate degrees  of  religious  light  and  evidence,  which 
lie  between  these  two — if  we  put  the  case,  that  for  the 
present,  it  was  intended,  revelation  should  be  no  more 
than  a  small  light,  in  the  midst  of  a  world  greatly  over- 
spread, notwithstanding  it,  with  ignorance  and  darkness  : 
that  certain  glimmerings  of  this  light  should  extend,  and 
be  directed,  to  remote  distances,  in  such  a  manner  as 
that  those  who  reallv  uartook  of  it  should  not  discern 

P2 


228  REVELATION  NOT  UNIVERSAL:  [Part  U. 

from  whence  it  originally  came:  that  some  in  a  nearer 
situation  to  it  should  have  its  light  obscured,  and,  in  dif- 
ferent ways  and  degrees,  intercepted:  and  that  others 
should  be  placed  within  its  clearer  influence,  and  be 
much  more  enlivened,  cheered,  and  directed  by  it ;  but 
yet  that  even  to  these  it  should  be  no  more  than  a  light 
shining  in  a  dark  place :  all  this  would  be  perfectly  uni- 
form, and  of  a  piece  with  the  conduct  of  Providence,  in 
the  distribution  of  its  other  blessings.  If  the  fact  of  the 
case  really  were,  that  some  have  received  no  light  at  all 
from  the  Scripture  ;  as  many  ages  and  countries  in  the 
heathen  world  :  that  others,  though  they  have,  by  means 
of  it,  had  essential  or  natural  religion  enforced  upon  their 
consciences,  yet  have  never  had  the  genuine  Scripture 
revelation,  with  its  real  evidence,  proposed  to  their  con- 
sideration;  and  the  ancient  Persians  and  modern  Maho- 
metans may  possibly  be  instances  of  people  in  a  situa- 
tion somewhat  like  to  this:  that  others,  though  thev  have 
had  the  Scripture  laid  before  them  as  of  divine  revelation, 
yet  have  had  it  with  the  system  and  evidence  of  Christi- 
anity so  interpolated,  the  system  so  corrupted,  the  evi- 
dence so  blended  with  false  miracles,  as  to  leave  the 
mind  in  the  utmost  doubtfulness  and  uncertainty  about 
the  whole;  which  may  be  the  state  of  some  thoughtful 
men,  in  most  of  those  nations  who  call  themselves  Chris- 
tian :  and  lastly,  that  others  have  had  Christianity  offered 
to  them  in  its  genuine  simplicity,  and  with  its  proper 
evidence,  as  persons  in  countries  and  churches  of  civil 
and  of  Christian  liberty;  but  however  that  even  thesfc 
persons  are  left  in  great  ignorance  in  many  respects,  and 
have  by  no  means  light  afforded  them  enough  to  satisfy 
their  curiosity,  but  only  to  regulate  their  life,  to  teach 
them  their  duty,  and  encourage  them  in  the  careful  dis- 
charge of  it:  I  say,  if  we  were  to  suppose  this  somewhat 
(>f  a  general  true  account  of  the  degrees  of  moral  and 
religious  light  and  evidence,  which  were  intended  to  be 
aff'orded  mankind,  and  of  what  has  actually  been  and  is 
their  situation,  in  their  moral  and  religious  capacity ;  there 
would  be  nothing  in  all  this  ignorance,  doubtfulness,  and 
uncertainty,  in  all  these  varieties,  and  supposed  disad- 
vantages of  some  in  comparison  of  others,  respecting 


Chap.  VI.]        SUPPOSED  DEFICIENCY  IN  ITS  PROOF.  229 

religion,  but  may  be  paralleled  by  manifest  analogies  in 
the  natural  dispensations  of  Providence  at  present,  and 
considering  ourselves  merely  in  our  temporal  capacity. 

Nor  is  there  any  thing  shocking  in  all  this,  or  which 
would  seem  to  bear  hard  upon  the  moral  administration 
in  nature,  if  we  would  really  keep  in  mind,  that  everv 
one  shall  be  dealt  equitably  with:  instead  of  forgetting 
this,  or  explaining  it  away,  after  it  is  acknowledged  in 
words.  All  shadow  of  injustice,  and  indeed  all  harsh 
appearances,  in  this  various  economy  of  Providence, 
would  be  lost;  if  we  would  keep  in  mind,  that  every 
merciful  allowance  shall  be  made,  and  no  more  be  re- 
quired of  any  one,  than  what  might  have  been  equitably 
expected  of  him,  from  the  circumstances  in  which  he  was 
placed  ;  and  not  what  might  have  been  expected,  had  he 
been  placed  in  other  circumstances :  i,  e.  in  Scripture 
language,  that  every  man  shall  be  accepted  according  to 
what  he  had,  not  according  to  what  he  had  not*  This  how- 
ever doth  not  by  any  means  imply,  that  all  persons'con- 
dition  here  is  equally  advantageous  with  respect  to  futu- 
rity. And  Providence's  designing  to  place  some  in 
greater  darkness  with  respect  to  religious  knowledge,  is 
no  more  a  reason  why  they  should  not  endeavour  to  get 
out  of  that  darkness,  and  others  to  bring  them  out  of  it; 
than  why  ignorant  and  slow  people  in  matters  of  other 
knowledge  should  not  endeavour  to  learn,  or  should  not 
be  instructed. 

It  is  not  unreasonable  to  suppose,  that  the  same  wise 
and  good  principle,  whatever  it  was,  which  disposed  the 
Author  of  Nature  to  make  different  kinds  and  orders  of 
creatures,  disposed  him  also  to  place  creatures  of  like 
kinds  in  different  situations :  and  that  the  same  principle 
which  disposed  him  to  make  creatures  of  different  moral 
capacities,  disposed  him  also  to  place  creatures  of  like 
moral  capacities  in  different  religious  situations;  and  even 
the  same  creatures,  in  different  periods  of  their  being. 
And  the  account  or  reason  of  this  is  also  most  probably 
the  account  why  the  constitution  of  things  is  such,  as 
that  creatures  of  moral  natures  or  capacities,  for  a  con- 
sixier-ible  part  of  that  duration  in  which  they  are  living 

*  2  Cor.  viii.  12. 


230  REVELATICN  NOT  UNIVERSAL  :  j-p.^RT  IL 

agents,  are  not  at  all  subjects  of  morality  and  religion ; 
but  grow  up  to  be  so,  and  grow  up  to  be  so  more  and 
more  gradually  from  childhood  to  mature  age. 

What,  in  particular,  is  the  account  or  reason  of  these 
things,  we  must  be  greatly  in  the  dark,  were  it  only  that 
we  know  so  very  little  even  of  our  own  case.  Our  pre- 
sent state  may  possibly  be  the  consequence  of  somewhat 
past,  which  we  are  wholly  ignorant  of:  as  it  has  a  refer- 
ence to  somewhat  to  come,  of  which  we  know  scarce  any 
more  than  is  necessary  for  practice.  A  system  or  con- 
stitution, in  its  notion,  implies  variety;  and  so  compli- 
cated a  one  as  this  world,  very  great  variety.  So  that 
were  revelation  universal,  yet,  from  men's  different  capa- 
cities of  understanding,  from  the  different  lengths  of  their 
lives,  their  different  educations  and  other  external  cir- 
cumstances, and  from  their  difference  of  temper  and  bodily 
constitution  ;  their  religious  situations  would  be  widely 
different,  and  the  disadvantage  of  some  in  comparison 
of  others,  perhaps,  altogether  as  much  as  at  presents 
And  the  true  account,  whatever  it  be,  why  mankind,  or 
such  a  part  of  mankind,  are  placed  in  this  condition  of 
ignorance,  must  be  supposed  aJso  the  true  account  of 
our  fur.ther  ignorance,  in  not  knowing  the  reasons  why,, 
or  whence  it  is,  that  they  are  placed  in  this  condition. 
But  the  following  practical  reflections  may  deserve  the 
serious  consideration  of  those  persons,  who  think  the 
circumstances  of  mankind  or  their  own,  in  the  foremen- 
tioned  respects,  a  ground  of  complaint. 

First,  The  evidence  of  religion  not  appearing  obvious^ 
may  constitute  one  particular  part  of  some  men's  trial  in 
the  religious  sense :  as  it  gives  scope,  for  a  virtuous  ex- 
ercise, or  vicious  neglect  of  their  understanding,  in  ex- 
amining or  not  examining  into  that  evidence.  There 
seems  no  possible  reason  to  be  given,  why  we  may  not 
be  in  a  state  of  moral  probation,  with  regard  to  the  ex- 
ercise of  our  understanding  upon  the  subject  of  religion, 
as  we  are  with  regard  to  our  behaviour  in  common 
affairs.  The  former  is  as  much  a  thing  within  our  power 
and  choice  as  the  latter.  And  I  suppose  it  is  to  be  laid 
down  for  certain,  that  the  same  character,  the  same  in- 
ward principle,  which,  after  a  man  is  convinced  of  the 


CSAP.VL]  SUPPOSED  DEFICIENCY  IN  ITS  PROOF.  231 

truth  of  religion,  renders  him  obedient  to  the  precepts  of 
it,  would,  were  he  not  thus  convinced,  set  him  about  an 
examination  of  it,  upon  its  system  and  evidence  being 
offered  to  his  thoughts :  and  that  in  the  latter  state  his 
examination  would  be  with  an  impartiahty,  seriousness, 
and  sohcitude,  proportionable  to  what  his  obedience  is 
in  the  former.  And  as  inattention,  negligence,  want  of 
all  serious  concern,  about  a  matter  of  such  a  nature  and 
such  importance,  when  offered  to  men's  consideration,  is, 
before  a  distinct  conviction  of  its  truth,  as  real  immoral 
depravity  and  dissoluteness ;  as  neglect  of  religious  prac- 
tice after  such  conviction :  so  active  solicitude  about  it, 
and  fair  impartial  consideration  of  its  evidence  before 
such  conviction,  is  as  really  an  exercise  of  a  morally  right 
temper ;  as  is  religious  practice  after.  Thus,  that  reli- 
gion is  not  intuitively  true,  but  a  matter  of  deduction 
and  inference  ;  that  a  conviction  of  its  truth  is  not  forced 
upon  every  one,  but  left  to  be,  by  some,  collected  with 
heedful  attention  to  premises ;  this  as  much  constitutes 
religious  probation,  as  much  affords  sphere,  scope,  oppor- 
tunity, for  right  and  wrong  behaviour,  as  any  thing  what- 
ever does.  And  their  manner  of  treating  this  subject, 
when  laid  before  them,  shows  what  is  in  their  heart,  and 
is  an  exertion  of  it. 

Secondly,  It  appears  to  be  a  thing  as  evident,  though 
it  is  not  so  much  attended  to,  that  if,  upon  consideration 
of  religion,  the  evidence  of  it  should  seem  to  any  persons 
doubtful,  in  the  highest  supposable  degree;  even  this 
doubtful  evidence  will,  however,  put  them  into  a  general 
state  of  probation  in  the  moral  and  rehgious  sense.  For, 
suppose  a  man  to  be  really  in  doubt,  whether  such  a 
person  had  not  done  him  the  greatest  favour ;  or,  whether 
his  whole  temporal  interest  did  not  depend  upon  that 
person  :  no  one.  who  had  any  sense  of  gratitude  and  of 
prudence,  could  possibly  consider  himself  in  the  same 
situation,  with  regard  to  such  person,  as  if  he  had  no 
such  doubt.  In  truth,  it  is  as  just  to  say,  that  certainty 
and  doubt  are  the  same;  as  to  say  the  situations 
now  mentioned  would  leave  a  man  as  entirely  at  liberty 
in  point  of  gratitude  or  prudence,  as  he  would  be,  werf; 
he  certain  he  had  received  no  favour  from  such  person, 


232  REVELATION  NOT  UNIVERSAL  [P..«r  IF. 

or  that  he  no  way  depended  upon  him.  And  Jlius, 
though  the  evidence  of  reHgion  which  is  afforded  to  some 
men  should  be  httle  more  than  they  are  given  to  see,  the 
system  of  Christianity,  or  rehgion  in  general,  to  be  sup- 
posable  and  credible;  this  ought  in  all  reason  to  beget  a. 
serious  practical  apprehension,  that  it  may  be  true.  And 
even  this  will  afford  matter  of  exercise  for  religious 
suspense  and  deliberation,  for  moral  resolution  and 
self-government;  because  the  apprehension  that  religion 
may  be  true  does  as  really  lay  men  under  obligations,  as 
a  full  conviction  that  it  is  true.  It  gives  occasion  and 
motives  to  consider  further  the  important  subject;  to  pre- 
serve attentively  upon  their  minds  a  general  implicit  sense 
that  they  may  be  under  divine  moral  government,  an  awful 
solicitude  about  religion,  whether  natural  or  revealed. 
Such  apprehension  ought  to  turn  men's  eyes  to  every 
degree  of  new  light  which  may  be  had,  from  whatever 
side  it  comes ;  and  induce  them  to  refrain,  in  the  mean 
time,  from  all  immoralities,  and  live  in  the  conscientious 
practice  of  every  common  virtue.  Especially  are  they 
bound  to  keep  at  the  greatest  distance  from  all  dissolute 
profaneness ;  for  this  the  very  nature  of  the  case  forbids ; 
and  to  treat  with  highest  reverence  a  matter,  upon  which 
their  oAvn  whole  interest  and  being,  and  the  fate  of 
nature,  depend.  This  behaviour,  and  an  active  endeavour 
to  maintain  within  themselves  this  temper,  is  the  busi- 
ness, the  duty,  and  the  wisdom  of  those  persons,  who 
complain  of  the  doubtfulness  of  religion:  is  what  they  are 
under  the  most  proper  obhgations  to.  And  such  beha- 
viour is  an  exertion  of,  and  has  a  tendency  to  improve 
in  them,  that  character,  which  the  practice  of  all  the 
several  duties  of  religion,  from  a  full  conviction  of  its 
truth,  is  an  exertion  of,  and  has  a  tendency  to  improve 
in  others :  others,  I  say,  to  whom  God  has  afforded  such 
conviction.  Nay,  considering  the  infinite  importance  of 
religion,  revealed  as  well  as  natural,  I  think  it  may  be 
said  in  general,  that  whoever  will  weigh  the  matter 
thoroughly  may  see,  there  is  not  near  so  much  difference, 
as  is  commonly  imagined,  between  what  ought  in  reason 
to  be  the  rule  of  life,  to  those  persons  who  are  fully  con- 
vinced of  its  truth,  and  to  those  who  have  only  a  serious 


Chap.  VI.]        SUPPOSED  DEFICIENCY  IN  ITS  P'ROOF.  233 

doubting  apprehension,  that  it  may  be  true.  Their  hopes, 
and  fears,  and  obhgations,  will  be  in  various  degrees :  but, 
as  the  subject  matter  of  their  hopes  and  fears  is  the  same; 
so  the  subject  matter  of  their  obligations,  what  they  are 
bound  to  do  and  to  refrain  from,  is  not  so  very  unlike. 

It  is  to  be  observed  further,  that,  from  a  character  of 
understanding,  or  a  situation  of  influence  in  the  world, 
some  persons  have  it  in  ffieir  power  to  do  infinitely  more 
harm  or  good,  by  setting  an  example  of  profaneness  and 
avowed  disregard  to  all  religion,  or,  on  the  contrary,  of 
a  serious,  though  perhaps  doubting,  apprehension  of  its 
truth,  and  of  a  reverend  regard  to  it  under  this  doubt- 
fulness ;  than  they  can  do,  by  acting  well  or  ill  in  all  the 
common  intercourses  amongst  mankind.  And  conse- 
quently they  are  most  highly  accountable  for  a  behaviour, 
which,  they  may  easily  foresee,  is  of  such  importance, 
and  in  which  there  is  most  plainly  a  right  and  a  wrong; 
even  admitting  the  evidence  of  religion  to  be  as  doubtful 
as  is  pretended. 

The  ground  of  these  observations,  and  that  which 
renders  them  just  and  true,  is,  that  doubting  necessarily 
implies  some  degree  of  evidence  for  that,  of  which  we 
doubt.  For  no  person  would  be  in  doubt  concerning 
the  truth  of  a  number  of  facts  so  and  so  circumstanced, 
which  should  accidentally  come  into  his  thoughts,  and  of 
which  he  had  no  evidence  at  all.  And  though  in  the 
case  of  an  even  chance,  and  where  consequently  we  were 
in  doubt,  we  should  in  common  language  say,  that  we 
had  no  evidence  at  all  for  either  side;  yet  that  situation 
of  things,  which  renders  it  an  even  chance  and  no  more, 
that  such  an  event  will  happen,  renders  this  case  equiva- 
lent to  all  others,  where  there  is  such  evidence  on  both 
sides  of  a  question,*  as  leaves  the  mind  in  doubt  con- 
cerning the  truth.  Indeed  in  all  these  cases,  there  is  no 
more  evidence  on  one  side  than  on  the  other ;  but  there 
is  (what  is  equivalent  to)  much  more  for  either,  than  for 
the  truth  of  a  number  of  facts,  which  come  into  one's 
thoughts  at  random.  And  thus,  in  all  these  cases,  doubt 
a.s  much  presupposes  evidence,  lower  degrees  of  evi- 
dence, as  belief  presupposes  higher,  and  certainty  higher 

*  Introduction. 


234  REVELATION  NOT  UNIVERSAL:  [Pari  H. 

still.  Any  one,  who  will  a  little  attend  to  the  nature  of 
evidence,  will  easily  carry  this  observation  on,  and  see, 
that  between  no  evidence  at  all,  and  tliat  degree  of  it 
which  affords  ground  of  doubt,  there  are  as  many  inter- 
mediate degrees,  as  there  are,  between  that  degree  which 
is  the  ground  of  doubt,  and  demonstration.  And  though 
we  have  not  faculties  to  dis^guish  these  degrees  of 
evidence  with  any  sort  of  exactness  ;  yet,  in  proportion 
as  they  are  discerned,  they  ought  to  influence  our  prac- 
tice. For  it  is  as  n  al  an  imperfection  in  the  moral  cha- 
racter, not  to  be  influenced  in  practice  by  a  lower  degree 
of  evidence  when  discerned,  as  it|is  in  the  understanding, 
not  to  discern  it.  And  as,  in  all  subjects  which  men  con- 
sider, they  discern  the  lower  as  well  as  higher  degrees  of 
evidence,  proportionably  to  their  capacity  of  understand- 
ing; so,  in  practical  subjects,  they  are  influenced  in  prac- 
tice, by  the  lower  as  well  as  higher  degrees  of  it,  propor- 
tionably to  their  fairness  and  honesty.  And  as,  in  pro- 
portion to  defects  in  the  understanding,  men  are  unapt 
to  see  lower  degrees  of  evidence,  are  in  danger  of  over- 
looking evidence  when  it  is  not  glaring,  and  are  easily 
imposed  upon  in  such  cases ;  so,  in  proportion  to  the 
corruption  of  the  heart,  they  seem  capable  of  satisfying 
themselves  with  having  no  regard  in  practice  to  evidence 
acknowledged  real,  if  it  be  not  overbearing.  From  these 
things  it  must  follow,  that  doubting  concerning  religion 
imphes  such  a  degree  of  evidence  for  it,  as,  joined  with 
the  consideration  of  its  importance,  unquestionably  lays 
men  under  the  obligations  before  mentioned,  to  have  a 
dutiful  regard  to  it  in  all  their  behaviour. 

Thirdly,  The  difficulties  in  which  the  evidence  of  reli- 
gion is  involved,  which  some  complain  of,  is  no  more  a 
just  ground  of  complaint,  than  the  external  circumstances 
of  temptation,  which  others  are  placed  in;  or  than  diffi- 
culties in  the  practice  of  it,  after  a  full  conviction  of  its 
truth.  Temptations  render  our  state  a  more  improving 
state  of  discipline,*  than  it  would  be  otherwise  :  as  they 
give  occasion  for  a  more  attentive  exercise  of  the  vir- 
tuous principle,  which  confirms  and  strengthens  it  more, 
than  an  easier  or  less  attentive  exercise  of  it  could.  Now 

*  I'iin  I.  Chap.  V.  ■  J 


Chap.  VI.]        SUPPOSED  DEFICIENCY  IN  ITS  PROOF.  235 

speculative  difficulties  are,  in  this  respect,  of  the  very- 
same  nature  with  these  external  temptations.  For  the 
evidence  of  religion  not  appearing  obvious,  is  to  some 
persons  a  temptation  to  reject  it,  without  any  considera- 
tion at  all;  and  therefore  requires  such  an  attentive  ex- 
ercise of  the  virtuous  principle,  seriously  to  consider  that 
evidence,  as  there  would  be  no  occasion  for,  but  for  such 
temptation.  And  the  supposed  doubtfulness  of  its  evi- 
dence, after  it  has  been  in  some  sort  considered,  affords 
opportunity  to  an  unfair  mind  of  explaining  away,  and 
deceitfully  hiding  from  itself,  that  evidence  which  it  might 
see;  and  also  for  men's  encouraging  themselves  in  vice, 
from  hopes  of  impunity,  though  they  do  clearly  see  thus 
much  at  least,  that  these  hopes  are  uncertain :  in  like 
manner  as  the  common  temptation  to  many  instances  of 
folly,  which  end  in  temporal  infamy  and  ruin,  is  the 
ground  for  hope  of  not  being  detected,  and  of  escaping 
with  impunity ;  i.  e.  the  doubtfulness  of  the  proof  before- 
hand, that  such  foolish  behaviour  will  thus  end  in  infamy 
and  ruin.  On  the  contrary,  supposed  doubtfulness  in 
the  evidence  of  religion  calls  for  a  more  careful  and  atten- 
tive exercise  of  the  virtuous  principle,  in  fairly  yielding 
themselves  up  to  the  proper  influence  of  any  real  evi- 
dence, though  doubtful ;  and  in  practising  conscientiously 
all  virtue,  though  under  some  uncertainty,  whether  the 
government  in  the  universe  may  not  possibly  be  such,  as 
that  vice  may  escape  with  impunity.  And  in  general, 
temptation,  meaning  by  this  word  the  lesser  allurements 
to  wrong  and  difficulties  in  the  discharge  of  our  duty,  as 
well  as  the  greater  ones ;  temptation,  I  say,  as  such  and 
of  every  kind  and  degree,  as  it  calls  forth  some  virtuous 
efforts,  additional  to  what  would'  otherwise  have  been 
wanting,  cannot  but  be  an  additional  disciphne  and  im- 
provement of  virtue,  as  well  as  probation  of  it  in  the 
other  senses  of  that  word.*  So  that  the  very  same  ac- 
count is  to  be  given,  why  the  evidence  of  religion  should 
be  left  in  such  a  manner,  as  to  require,  in  some,  an 
attentive,  solicitous,  perhaps  painful  exercise  of  their 
understanding  about  it ;  as  why  others  should  be  placed 
in  such  circumstances,  as  that  the  practice  of  its  comraoii 

*  Part  1.  Chap.  iv.  and  pp.  133, 134.  j 


/i36  REVELATION  NOT  universal:  [Part  II. 

duties,  atlcr  a  full  conviction  of  the^  truth  of  it,  should 
require  attention,  solicitude,  and  pains :  or,  why  appear- 
ing doubtfulness  should  be  permitted  to  alford  matter  of 
temptation  to  some ;  as  why  external  difficulties  and 
allurements  should  be  permitted  to  afford  matter  of 
temptation  to  others.  The  same  account  also  is  to  be 
given,  why  some  should  be  exercised  with  temptations 
of  both  these  kinds ;  as  why  others  should  be  exercised 
with  the  latter  in  such  very  high  degrees,  as  some  have 
been,  particularly  as  the  primitive  Christians  were. 

Nor  does  there  appear  any  absurdity  in  supposing, 
that  the  speculative  difficulties,  in  which  the  evidence  of 
religion  is  involved,  may  make  even  the  principal  part 
of  some  persons'  trial.  For  as  the  chief  temptations  of 
the  generality  of  the  world  are  the  ordinary  motives  to 
injustice  or  unrestrained  pleasure ;  or  to  live  in  the  ne- 
glect of  religion  from  that  frame  of  mind,  which  renders 
many  persons  almost  without  feeling  as  to  any  thing  dis- 
tant, or  which  is  not  the  object  of  their  senses:  so  there 
are  other  persons  without  this  shallowness  of  temper, 
persons  of  a  deeper  sense  as  to  what  is  invisible  and 
future  ;  who  not  only  see,  but  have  a  general  practical 
feeling,  that  what  is  to  come  will  be  present,  and  that 
things  are  not  less  real  for  their  not  being  the  objects  of 
sense;  and  who,  from  their  natural  constitution  of  body 
and  of  temper,  and  from  their  external  condition,  may 
have  small  temptations  to  behave  ill,  small  difficulty  in 
behaving  well,  in  the  common  course  of  life.  Now 
when  these  latter  persons  have  a  distinct  full  conviction 
of  the  truth  of  religion,  without  any  possible  doubts  or 
difficulties,  the  practice  of  it  is  to  them  unavoidable,  un- 
less they  will  do  a  constant  violence  to  their  own  minds; 
and  religion  is  scarce  any  more  a  discipline  to  them, 
than  it  is  to  creatures  in  a  state  of  perfection.  Yet 
these  persons  may  possibly  stand  in  need  of  moral  dis- 
cipline and  exercise  in  a  higher  degree,  than  they  would 
have  by  such  an  easy  practice  of  religion.  Or  it  may 
be  requisite,  for  reasons  unknown  to  us,  that  they  should 
give  some  further  manifestation*  what  is  their  moral 
character,  to  the  creation  of  God,  than  such  a  practice 

*  p.  133,  134. 


Chap.  VI.J         SUPPOSED  DEFICIENCY  IN  ITS  PROOF.  237 

of  it  would  be.  Thus  in  the  great  variety  of  religious 
situations  in  which  men  are  placed,  what  constitutes, 
what  chiefly  and  peculiarly  constitutes,  the  probation,  in 
all  senses,  of  some  persons,  may  be  the  difficulties  in 
which  the  evidence  of  religion  is  involved:  and  their 
principal  and  distinguished  trial  may  be,  how  they  will 
behave  under  and  with  respect  to  these  difficulties. 
Circumstances  in  men's  situation  in  their  temporal  capa- 
city, analogous  in  good  measure  to  this  respecting  reli- 
gion, are  to  be  observed.  We  find  some  persons  are 
placed  in  such  a  situation  in  the  world,  as  that  their 
chief  difficulty  with  regard  to  conduct,  is  not  the  doing 
what  is  prudent  when  it  is  known;  for  this,  in  number- 
less cases,  is  as  easy  as  the  contrary:  but  to  some  the 
principal  exercise  is,  recollection  and  being  upon  their 
guard  against  deceits,  the  deceits  suppose  of  those  about 
them ;  against  false  appearances  of  reason  and  prudence. 
To  persons  in  some  situations,  the  principal  exercise 
with  respect  to  conduct  is,  attention  in  order  to  inform 
themselves  what  is  proper,  what  is  really  the  reasonable 
and  prudent  part  to  act. 

But  as  I  have  hitherto  gone  upon  supposition,  that 
men's  dissatisfaction  with  the  evidence  of  religion  is  not 
owing  to  their  neglects  or  prejudices;  it  must  be  added, 
on  the  other  hand,  in  all  common  reason,  and  as  what 
the  truth  of  the  case  plainly  requires  should  be  added, 
that  such  dissatisfaction  possibly  may  be  owing  to  those, 
possibly  may  be  men's  own  fault.     For, 

If  there  are  any  persons,  who  never  set  themselves 
heartily  and  in  earnest  to  be  informed  in  religion;  if 
there  are  any,  who  secretly  wish  it  may  not  prove  true ; 
and  are  less  attentive  to  evidence  than  to  difficulties,  and 
more  to  objections  than  to  what  is  said  in  answer  to 
them :  these  persons  will  scarce  be  thought  in  a  likely 
way  of  seeing  the  evidence  of  religion,  though  it  were 
most  certainly  true,  and  capable  of  being  ever  so  fully 
proved.  If  any  accustom  themselves  to  consider  this 
subject  usually  in  the  way  of  mirth  and  sport:  if  they 
attend  to  forms  and  representations,  and  inadequate  man- 
ners of  expression,  instead  of  the  real  things  intended 
by  them :  (for  signs  often  can  be  no  more  than  inade- 


238  REVELATION  NOT  UNIVERSAL.*  [PabtU, 

quately  expressive  of  the  things  signified:)  or  if  they 
substitute  human  errors  in  the  room  of  divine  truth; 
why  may  not  all,  or  any  of  these  things,  hinder  some 
men  from  seeing  that  evidence,  which  really  is  seen  by 
others;  as  a  like  turn  of  mind,  with  respect  to  matters 
of*  common  speculation  and  practice,  does,  w^e  find  by 
experience,  hinder  them  from  attaining  that  knowledge 
and  right  understanding,  in  matters  of  common  specu- 
lation and  practice,  which  more  fair  and  attentive  minds 
attain  to?  And  the  effect  will  be  the  same,  whether 
their  neglect  of  seriously  considering  the  evidence  of 
religion,  and  their  indirect  behaviour  with  regard  to  it, 
proceed  from  mere  carelessness,  or  from  the  grosser 
vices ;  or  whether  it  be  owing  to  this,  that  forms  and 
figurative  manners  of  expression,  as  well  as  errors,  ad- 
minister occasions  of  ridicule,  when  the  things  intended, 
and  the  truth  itself,  would  not.  Men  may  indulge  a 
ludicrous  turn  so  far  as  to  lose  all  sense  of  conduct  and 
prudence  in  worldly  affairs,  and  even,  as  it  seems,  to 
impair  their  faculty  of  reason.  And  in  general,  levity, 
carelessness,  passion,  and  prejudice  do  hinder  us  from 
being  rightly  informed,  with  respect  to  common  things: 
and  they  may,  in  like  manner,  and  perhaps  in  some 
further  providential  manner,  with  respect  to  moral  and 
religious  subjects:  may  hinder  evidence  from  being  laid 
before  us,  and  from  being  seen  when  it  is.  The  Scrip- 
ture* does  declare,  that  every  one  shall  not  understand. 
And  it  makes  no  difference,  by  what  providential  con- 
duct this  comes  to  pass:  whether  the  evidence  of  Chris- 
tianity was,  originally  and  with  design,  put  and  left  so, 
as  that  those  who  are  desirous  of  evading  moral  obliga- 
tions should  not  see  it;  and  that  honest-minded  per- 
sons should:  or,  whether  it  comes  to  pass  by  any  other 
means. 

Further :  The  general  proof  of  natural  religion  and  of 

*  Dan.  xi>.  10.  Soe  also  Isa.  xxix.  13,  14.  Matth.  vi.  23.  and  xi.  25.  and 
xiii.  11,  12.  John  iii.  19.  and  V.  44.  1  Cor.  ii.  14.  and  2  Cor.  iv.  4.  2  Tim.  iii.  13. 
and  that  afffctioiiatc  as  well  as  authoritative  admonition,  so  very  many  times  incul- 
cated, He  that  hath  ears  to  hear,  let  him  hear.  Grotius  saw  so  strongly  the  thing 
intended  in  tiiese  and  oilier  passages  of  Scripture  of  the  like  sense,  as  to  say,  that  the 
proof  given  ns  of  (Christianity  was  less  tlian  it  nreht  have  been,  for  this  very  pur- 
pose :  Uf  ita  sermo  Evangelii  tanouam  tapis  esset  Lydius  ad  "uem  wgeiiia  sanabilia, 
txplorarentur.     De  Ver.  R.  C.  lib.  ii.  towards  the    ad. 


Chap.  VI.]        SUPPOSED  DEFICIENCY  IN  ITS  PROOF.  239 

Christianity  does,  I  think,  He  level  to  common  men ;  even 
those,  the  greatest  part  of  whose  time,  from  childhood 
to  old  age,  is  taken  up  with  providing  for  themselves 
and  their  families  the  common  conveniences,  perhaps 
necessaries,  of  life  :  those  I  mean,  of  this  rank,  who  ever 
think  at  all  of  asking  after  proof,  or  attending  to  it. 
Common  men,  were  thev  as  much  in  earnest  about 
religion,  as  about  their  temporal  affairs,  are  capable  of 
being  convinced  upon  real  evidence,  that  there  is  a  God 
who  governs  the  world :  and  they  feel  themselves  to  be 
of  a  moral  nature,  and  accountable  creatures.  And  as 
Christianity  entirely  falls  in  with  this  their  natural  sense 
of  things,  so  they  are  capable,  not  only  of  being  persuad- 
ed, but  of  being  made  to  see,  that  there  is  evidence  of 
miracles  wrought  in  attestation  of  it,  and  many  appearing 
completions  of  prophecy.  But  though  this  proof  is  real 
and  conclusive,  yet  it  is  liable  to  objections,  and  may  be 
run  up  into  difficulties ;  which  however  persons  who  are 
capable  not  only  of  talking  of,  but  of  really  seeing,  are 
capable  also  of  seeing  through :  i.  e,  not  of  clearing  up 
and  answerine;  them,  so  as  to  satisfv  their  curiositv,  for 
of  such  knowledge  we  are  not  capable  with  respect  to 
any  one  thing  in  nature ;  but  capable  of  seeing  that  the 
proof  is  not  lost  in  these  difficulties,  or  destroyed  by 
these  objections.  But  tlien  a  thorough  examination  into 
religion  with  regard  to  these  objections,  which  cannot  be 
the  business  of  every  man,  is  a  matter  of  pretty  large 
compass,  and,  from  the  nature  of  it,  requires  some 
knowledge,  as  well  as  time  and  attention ;  to  see,  how 
the  evidence  comes  out,  upon  balancing  one  thing  witl. 
another,  and  what,  upon  the  whole,  is  the  amount  of  it. 
Now  if  persons  who  have  picked  up  these  objections 
from  others,  and  tak(i  for  granted  they  are  of  weight, 
upon  the  word  of  those  from  whom  they  received  them, 
or,  by  often  retailiiig  of  them,  come  to  see  or  fancy  they 
see  them  to  be  of  weight;  will  not  prepare  themselves 
for  such  an  examination,  with  a  competent  degree  of 
knowledge  ;  or  will  not  give  that  time  and  attention  to 
the  subject,  which,  from  the  nature  of  it,  is  necessary  for 
attaining  such  information:  in  this  case,  they  must  remain 
in  doubtfulness,  ignorance,  or  error :  in  tlie  same  way  as 


240  REVELATION  NOT  universal:  {Vart  U. 

they  must,  with  regard  to  common  sciences,  and  matters 
of  common  hfe,  if  they  neglect  the  necessary  means  of 
being  informed  in  them. 

But  still  perhaps  it  will  be  objected,  that  if  a  prince  or 
common  master  were  to  send  directions  to  a  servant,  he 
would  take  care,  that  they  should  always  bear  the  certain 
marks,  who  they  came  from,  and  that  their  sense  should 
be  always  plain  :  so  as  that  there  should  be  no  possible 
doubt  if  he  could  help  it,  concerning  the  authority  or 
meaning  of  them.  Now  the  proper  answer  to  all  this 
kind  of  objections  is,  that,  wherever  the  fallacy  lies,  it  is 
even  certain  we  cannot  argue  thus  with  respect  to  Him, 
who  is  the  governor  of  the  world :  and  particularly  that 
he  does  not  afford  us  such  information,  with  respect  to 
our  temporal  affairs  and  interests,  as  experience  abun- 
dantly shows.  However,  there  is  a  full  answer  to  this 
objection,  from  the  very  nature  of  rehgion.  For,  the 
reason  why  a  prince  would  give  his  directions  in  this 
plain  manner  is,  that  he  absolutely  desires  such  an  ex- 
ternal action  should  be  done,  without  concerning  himself 
with  the  motive  or  principle  upon  which  it  is  done :  i.  e. 
he  regards  only  the  external  event,  or  the  thing's  being 
done  ;  and  not  at  all,  properly  speaking,  the  doing  of  it, 
or  the  action.  Whereas  the  wliole  of  morality  and 
religion  consisting  merely  in  action  itself,  there  is  no 
sort  of  ])arallel  between  the  cases.  But  if  the  prince  be 
supposed  to  regard  only  the  action ;  i.  e.  only  to  desire 
to  exercise,  or  in  any  sense  prove,  the  understanding  or 
loyalty  of  a  servant ;  he  would  not  always  give  his  orders 
in  such  a  plain  manner.  It  may  be  proper  to  add,  that 
the  will  of  God,  respecting  morality  and  religion,  may 
be  considered  either  as  absolute,  or  as  only  conditional. 
If  it  be  absolute,  it  can  only  be  thus,  that  we  should  act 
virtuously  in  such  given  circumstances ;  not  that  we 
should  be  brought  to  act  so,  by  his  changing  of  our 
circumstances.  And  if  God's  will  be  thus  absolute, 
then  it  is  in  our  power,  in  the  highest  and  strictest  sense, 
to  do  or  to  contradict  his  will ;  which  is  a  most  weighty 
consideration.  Or  his  will  may  be  considered  only  as 
conditional,  that  if  we  act  so  and  so,  we  shall  be  reward- 
ed ;  if  otherwise,  punished :  of  which  conditional  will  o^ 


Chap.  VI.]         SUPPOSED  DEFICIENCY  IN  ITS  PROOF.  241 

the  Author  of  Nature,  the  whole  constitution  of  it  affords 
most  certain  instances. 

Upon  the  whole:  that  we  are  in  a  state  of  religion 
necessarily  implies,  that  we  are  in  a  state  of  probation: 
and  the  credibility  of  our  being  at  all  in  such  a  state 
being  admitted,  there  seems  no  peculiar  difficulty  in 
supposing  our  probation  to  be,  just  as  it  is,  in  those 
respects  which  are  above  objected  against.  There  seems 
no  pretence,  from  the  reason  of  the  thing,  to  say,  that  the 
trial  cannot  equitably  be  any  thing,  but  whether  persor.s 
will  act  suitably  to  certain  information,  or  such  as  admits 
no  room  for  doubt ;  so  as  that  there  can  be  no  danger 
of  miscarriage,  but  either  from  their  not  attending  to 
what  they  certainly  know,  or  from  overbearing  passion 
hurrying  them  on  to  act  contrary  to  it.  For,  since  igno- 
rance and  doubt  afford  scope  for  probation  in  all  senses, 
as  really  as  intuitive  conviction  or  certainty;  and  since 
the  two  former  are  to  be  put  to  the  same  account  as 
difficulties  in  practice;  men's  moral  probation  may  also 
be,  whether  they  will  take  due  care  to  inform  themselves 
by  impartial  consideration,  and  afterwards  whether  they 
will  act  as  the  case  requires,  upon  the  evidence  which 
they  have,  however  doubtful.  And  this,  we  find  by 
experience,  is  frequently  our  probation,*  in  our  temporal 
capacity.  For,  the  information  which  we  want  with 
regard  to  our  worldly  interests  is  by  no  means  always 
given  us  of  course,  without  any  care  of  our  own.  And 
we  are  greatly  liable  to  self-deceit  from  inward  secret 
prejudices,  and  also  to  the  deceits  of  others.  So  that  to 
be  able  to  judge  what  is  the  prudent  part,  often  requires 
much  and  difficult  consideration.  Then  after  we  have 
judged  the  very  best  we  can,  the  evidence  upon  which 
we  must  act,  if  we  will  live  and  act  at  all,  is  perpetually 
doubtful  to  a  very  high  degree.  And  the  constitution 
and  course  of  the  world  in  fact  is  such,  as  that  want  of 
impartial  consideration  what  we  have  to  do,  and  ventui 
ing  upon  extravagant  courses  because  it  is  doubtful  what 
will  be  the  consequence,  are  often  naturally,  ^.  e.  provi- 
dentially, altogether  as  fatal,  as  misconduct  occasioned 

*  p.  78,  234-,  &c. 
Q 


'2V2  OF  THE  PARTICULAR  EVIDENCE  [Paxv  lU 

by  heedless  inattention  to  what  we  certainly  know,  or 
disregarding  it  from  overbearing  passion. 

Several  of  the  observations  here  made  may  well  seem 
strange,  perhaps  unintelligible,  to  many  good  men.    But 
if  the  persons  for  whose  sake  they  are  made  think  so ; 
persons  who  object  as  above,  and  throw  off  all  regard  to 
rehgion  under  pretence  of  want  of  evidence;  I  desire 
them  to  consider  again,    whether  their  thinking  so  be 
owing  to  any  thing  unintelligible  in  these  observations, 
or  to  their  own  not  having  such  a  sense  of  religion  and 
serious  solicitude  about  it,  as  even  their  state  of  scepti- 
cism does  in  all  reason  require  ?     It  ought  to  be  forced 
upon  the  reflection  of  these  persons,  that  our  nature  and 
condition  necessarily  require  us,  in  the  daily  course  of 
life,  to  act  upon  evidence  much  lower  than  what  is  com- 
monly called  probable :  to  guard,  not  only  against  what 
we  fully  believe  will,  but  also  against  what  we  tSiink  it 
supposable   may,   happen;    and   to  engage  in  pursuits 
when  the  probability  is  greatly  against  success,  if  it  be 
credible,  that  possibly  we  may  succeed  in  them. 


CHAP.  VII. 

OF  THE  PAUTICULAR  EVIDENCE  FOR  CHRISTIANITY. 

The  presumptions  against  revelation,  and  objections 
against  the  general  scheme  of  Christianity,  and  particu- 
lar things  relating  to  it,  being  removed;  there  remains 
to  be  considered,  what  positive  evidence  we  have  for 
the  truth  of  it;  chiefly  in  order  to  see,  what  the  analogy 
of  nature  suggests  with  regard  to  that  evidence,  and  the 
objections  against  it:  or  to  see  what  is,  and  is  allowed 
to  be,  the  plain  natural  rule  of  judgment  and  of  action, 
in  our  temporal  concerns,  in  cases  where  we  have  the 
same  kind  of  evidence,  and  the  same  kind  of  objections 
against  it,  that  we  have  in  the  case  before  us. 

Now  in  the  evidence  of  Christianity  there  seem  to  be 
several  things  of  great  weight,  not  reducible  to  the  head, 
either  of  miracles,  or  the  completion  of  prophecy,  in  the 
common  acceptation  of  the  words.     But  these  two  are 


CaAP.  VII.]  FOR  CHRISTIANITY.  243 

its  direct  and  faiidamental  proofs :  and  those  other  things, 
however  considerable  they  are,  yet  ought  never  to  be 
urged  apart  from  its   direct  proofs,   but  always  to  be 
joined  with  them.      Thus  the  evidence  of  Christianity 
will  be  a  long  series  of  things,  reaching,  as  it  seems,  from 
the  beginning  of  the  world  to  the  present  time,  of  great 
variety  and  compass,  taking  in  both  the  direct  and  also  the 
collateral,  proofs;  and  making  up,  all  of  them  together, 
one  argument:  the  conviction  arising  from  which  kind 
of  proof  may  be  compared  to  what  they  call  the  effect 
in  architecture  or  other  works  of  art;  a  result  from  a 
great  number  of  things  so  and  so  disposed,  and  taken 
into   one  view.       I  shall   therefore,  first,    make   some 
observations   relating   to  miracles,   and    the    appearing 
completions   of  prophecy;   and   consider  what   analogy 
suggests,  in  answer    to  the  objections  brought  against 
this  evidence.     And,  secondly,  1  shall  endeavour  to  give 
some  account  of  the  general  argument  now  mentioned, 
consisting  both  of  the  direct   and  collateral  evidence, 
considered  as  making  up  one  argument:  this  being  the 
kind  of  proof,  upon  which  we  determine  most  questions 
of  difficulty,  concerning  common  facts,  alleged  to  have 
happened,  or  seeming  likely  to  happen;  especially  ques- 
tions relating  to  conduct. 

First,  I  shall  make  some  observations  upon  the  direct 
proof  of  Christianity  from  miracles  and  prophecy,  and 
upon  the  objections  alleged  against  it. 

I.  Now  the  following  observations  relating  to  the  his- 
torical evidence  of  miracles  WTought  in  attestation  of 
Christianity  appear  to  be  of  great  weight. 

1.  The  Old  Testament  affords  us  the  same  historical 
evidence  of  the  miracles  of  Moses  and  of  the  prophets, 
as  of  the  common  civil  history  of  Moses  and  the  kings 
of  Israel;  or,  as  of  the  affairs  of  the  Jewish  nation.  And 
the  Gospels  and  the  Acts  afford  us  the  same  historical 
evidence  of  the  miracles  of  Christ  and  the  Apostles,  as 
of  the  common  matters  related  in  them.  This  indeed 
could  not  have  been  affirmed  by  any  reasonable  man,  if 
the  authors  of  these  books,  like  many  other  historians, 
had  appeared  to  make  an  entertaining  manner  of  writ- 
ing their  aim;  though  they  had  interspersed  miracles  ir. 

'q2 


2i4  OF  THE  PARTICULAR  EV^IDENCE  [Part  II. 

tlieir  works,  at  proper  distances  and  upon  proper  oc- 
casions. These  might  have  animated  a  dull  relation, 
amused  the  reader,  and  engaged  his  attention.  And  the 
same  account  would  naturally  have  been  given  of  them, 
as  of  the  speeches  and  descriptions  of  such  authors:  the 
same  account,  in  a  manner,  as  is  to  be  given,  why  the 
poets  make  use  of  wonders  and  prodigies.  But  the 
facts,  both  miraculous  and  natural,  in  Scripture,  are 
related  in  plain  unadorned  narratives:  and  both  of  them 
appear,  in  all  respects,  to  stand  upon  the  same  foot  of 
historical  evidence.  Further:  some  parts  of  Scripture, 
containing  an  account  of  miracles  fully  sufficient  to  prove 
the  truth  of  Christianity,  are  quoted  as  genuine,  from 
the  age  in  which  they  are  said  to  be  written,  down  to 
the  present:  and  no  other  parts  of  them,  material  in  the 
present  question,  are  omitted  to  be  quoted  in  such  man- 
ner, as  to  afford  any  sort  of  proof  of  their  not  being 
genuine.  And,  as  common  history,  when  called  in 
question  in  any  instance,  may  often  be  greatly  confirmed 
by  contemporary  or  subsequent  events  more  known  and 
acknowledged;  and  as  the  common  Scripture  histor)^ 
like  many  others,  is  thus  confirmed;  so  likewise  is  the 
miraculous  history  of  it,  not  only  in  particular  instances, 
but  in  general.  For,  the  establishment  of  the  Jewish  and 
Christian  religions,  which  were  events  contemporary  with 
the  miracles  related  to  be  wrought  in  attestation  of  both, 
or  subsequent  to  them,  these  events  are  just  what  we 
should  have  expected,  upon  supposition  such  miracles 
were  really  wrought  to  attest  the  truth  of  those  religions. 
These  miracles  are  a  satisfactory  account  of  those  events : 
of  which  no  other  satisfactory  account  can  be  given;  nor 
any  account  at  all,  but  what  is  imaginary  merely,  and 
invented.  It  is  to  be  added,  that  the  most  obvious,  the 
most  easy  and  direct  account  of  this  history,  how  it  came 
to  be  written  and  to  be  received  in  the  world,  as  a  true 
history,  is,  that  it  really  is  so:  nor  can  any  other  account 
of  it  be  easy  and  direct.  Now,  though  an  account,  not 
at  all  obvious,  but  very  far-fetched  and  indirect,  may 
indeed  be,  and  often  is,  the  true  account  of  a  matter ; 
yet  it  cannot  be  admitted  on  the  authority  of  its  being 
asserted.       Mere   guess,    supposition,    and    jpossibilit)', 


Chap.  VII.]  FOR  CHRISTIANITY.  245 

when  opposed  to  historical  evidence,  prove  nothing,  hut 
that  historical  evidence  is  not  demonstrative. 

Now  the  just  consequence  from  all  this,  I  think,  is, 
that  the  Scripture-history  in  general  is  to  be  admitted  as 
an  authentic  genuine  history,  till  somewhat  positive  be 
alleged  sufficient  to  invalidate  it.  But  no  man  will  deny 
the  consequence  to  be,  that  it  cannot  be  rejected,  or 
thrown  by  as  of  no  authority,  till  it  can  be  proved  to  be 
of  none  ;  even  though  the  evidence  now  mentioned  for 
its  authority  were  doubtful.  This  evidence  may  be  con- 
fronted by  historical  evidence  on  the  other  side,  if  there 
be  any :  or  general  incredibility  in  the  things  related,  or 
inconsistence  in  the  general  turn  of  the  history,  would 
prove  it  to  be  of  no  authority.  But  since,  upon  the  face 
of  the  matter,  upon  a  first  and  general  view,  the  appear- 
ance is,  that  it  is  an  authentic  history;  it  cannot  be  de- 
termined to  be  fictitious  without  some  proof  that  it  is  so. 
And  the  following  observations  in  support  of  these,  and 
coincident  with  them,  will  greatly  confirm  the  historical 
evidence  for  the  truth  of  Christianity. 

2.  The  Epistles  of  St  Paul,  from  the  nature  of  episto- 
lary writing,  and  moreover  from  several  of  them  being 
written,  not  to  particular  persons,  but  to  churches,  carry 
in  them  evidences  of  their  being  genuine,  beyond  what 
can  be  in  a  mere  historical  narrative,  left  to  the  world  at 
large.  This  evidence,  joined  with  that  which  they  have 
in  common  with  the  rest  of  the  New  Testament,  seems 
not  to  leave  so  much  as  any  particular  pretence  for  deny- 
ing their  genuineness,  considered  as  an  ordinary  matter 
of  fact,  or  of  criticism:  I  say  particular  pretence,  for 
denying  it;  because  any  single  fact,  of  such  a  kind  and 
such  antiquity,  may  have  general  doubts  raised  concern- 
ing it,  from  the  very  nature  of  human  affairs  and  human 
testimony.  There  is  also  to  be  mentioned  a  distinct  and 
particular  evidence  of  the  genuineness  of  the  epistle 
chiefly  referred  to  here,  the  first  to  the  Corinthians  ;  from 
the  manner  in  which  it  is  quoted  by  Clemens  Romanus, 
in  an  epistle  of  his  own  to  that  church.*  Now  these 
epistles  afford  a  proof  of  Christianity,  detached  from  ail 

*  C:em.  Rom.  Ep.  1.  c.  47. 


246  OF  THE  PARTICULAR  EVIDENCE  [Pakt  «. 

others,  which  is,  I  think,  a  thing  of  weight;  and  also  a 
proof  of  a  nature  and  kind  pecuhar  to  itself.     For, 

In  them  the  author  declares,  that  he  received  the  Gos- 
pel in  general,  and  the  institution  of  the  Communion  in 
particular,  not  from  the  rest  of  the  Apostles,  or  jointly 
together  with  them,  but  alone,  from  Christ  himself; 
whom  he  declares  likewise,  conformably  to  the  history 
in  the  Acts,  that  he  saw  after  his  ascension.*  So  that 
the  testimony  of  St  Paul  is  to  be  considered,  as  detached 
from  that  of  the  rest  of  the  Apostles. 

And  he  declares  further,  that  he  was  endued  with  a 
power  of  working  miracles,  as  what  was  publicly  known 
to  those  very  people,  speaks  of  frequent  and  great  variety 
of  miraculous  gifts  as  then  subsisting  in  those  very 
churches,  to  which  he  was  writing  ;  which  he  was  re- 
proving for  several  irregularities ;  and  where  he  had 
personal  opposers :  he  mentions  these  gifts  incidentally, 
in  the  most  easy  manner,  and  without  effort ;  by  way  of 
reproof  to  those  who  had  them,  for  their  indecent  use  of 
them  ;  and  by  way  of  depreciating  them,  in  comparison 
of  moral  virtues :  in  short  he  speaks  to  these  churches, 
of  these  miraculous  powers,  in  the  manner,  any  one 
would  speak  to  another  of  a  thing,  which  was  as  familiar 
and  as  much  known  in  common  to  them  both,  as  any 
thing  in  the  world.!  And  this,  as  hath  been  observed 
by  several  persons,  is  surely  a  very  considerable  thing. 

3.  It  is  an  acknowledged  historical  fact,  that  Christia- 
nity offered  itself  to  the  world,  and  demanded  to  be  re- 
ceived, upon  the  allegation,  i.  e.  as  unbelievers  would 
speak,  upon  the  pretence,  of  miracles,  publicly  wrought 
to  attest  the  truth  of  it,  in  such  an  age ;  and  that  it  was 
actually  received  by  great  numbers  in  that  very  age,  and 
upon  the  professed  belief  of  the  reality  of  these  miracles. 
And  Christianity,  including  the  dispensation  of  the  Old 
Testament,  seems  distinguished  by  this  from  all  other 
religions.  I  mean,  that  this  does  not  appear  to  be  the 
case  with  regard  to  any  other;  for  surely  it  will  not  be 
supposed  to  lie  upon  any  person,  to  prove  by  positive 

*  Gal.  i.  1  Cor.  xi.  23,  &c.  1  Cor.  xv.  8.  f  Rom.  xv.  19.  1  ,Cor.  xii.  8,  £>, 

10—28,  &c.  and  xiii.  1,  2,  8.  .wd  Uie  whole  xktli  chapter.  2  Cor.  xii.  12.  la.  GaL 
ui.  2,  5. 


Chap.  VII.]  FOR  CHRISTIANITY.  247 

historical  evidence,  that  it  was  not.  It  does  in  no  sort 
appear  that  Mahometanism  was  first  received  in  the 
world  upon  the  foot  of  supposed  miracles,*  i.  e.  public 
ones:  for,  as  revelation  is  itself  miraculous,  all  pretence 
to  it  must  necessarily  imply  some  pretence  of  miracles. 
And  it  is  a  known  fact,  that  it  was  immediately,  at  the 
very  first,  propagatod  by  other  means.  And  as  parti- 
cular institutions,  whether  in  Paganism  or  Popery,  said 
to  be  confirmed  by  miracles  after  those  institutions  had 
obtained,  are  not  to  the  purpose  :  so,  were  there  what 
might  be  called  historical  proof,  that  any  of  them  were 
introduced  by  a  supposed  divine  command,  believed  to 
be  attested  by  miracles  ;  these  would  not  be  in  any  wise 
parallel.  For  single  things  of  this  sort  are  easy  to  be 
accounted  for,  after  parties  are  formed,  and  have  power 
in  their  hands  ;  and  the  leaders  of  them  are  in  veneration 
with  the  multitude ;  and  political  interests  are  blended 
with  religious  claims,  and  religious  distinctions.  But  be- 
fore any  thing  of  this  kind,  for  a  few  persons,  and  those 
of  the  lowest  rank,  all  at  once,  to  brinjj;  over  such  great 
numbers  to  a  new  religion,  and  get  it  to  be  received 
upon  the  particular  evidence  of  miracles;  this  is  quite 
another  thing.  And  I  think  it  will  be  allowed  bv  anv 
fair  adversary,  that  the  fact  now  mentioned,  taking  in  all 
the  circumstances  of  it,  is  peculiar  to  the  Christian  reli- 
gion. However,  the  fact  itself  is  allowed,  that  Christianity 
obtained,  i.  e.  was  professed  to  be  received  in  the  world, 
upon  the  belief  of  miracles,  immediately  in  the  age  in 
which  it  is  said  those  miracles  were  wrought ;  or  that 
this  is  what  its  first  converts  would  have  alleged,  as  the 
reason  for  their  embracing  it.  Now  certainly  it  is  not  to 
be  supposed  that  such  numbers  of  men,  in  the  most  dis- 
tant parts  of  the  world  should  forsake  the  religion  of 
their  country,  in  which  they  had  been  educated;  sepa- 
rate themselves  from  their  friends,  particularly  in  their 
festival  shows  and  solemnities,  to  which  the  common 
people  are  so  greatly  addicted,  and  which  were  of  a  na- 
ture to  engage  them  much  more,  than  any  thing  of  that 
sort  amongst  us ;  and  embrace  a  religion,  which  could 
iiot  but  expose  them  to   many  inconveniences,  and  in- 

*  See  the  Koran,  c.  xiii.  and  c.  xvii. 


248  OF  THE  PARTICULAR  EVIDENCE  [PabtIL 

deed  must  have  been  a  giving  up  the  world  in  a  great 
degree,  even  from  the  very  first,  and  before  the  empire 
engaged  in  form  against  them :  it  cannot  be  supposed, 
that  such  numbers  should  make  so  great,  and,  to  say  the 
least,  so  inconvenient  a  change  in  their  whole  institution 
of  life,  unless  they  were  really  convinced  of  the  truth  of 
those  miracles,  upon  the  knowledge  or  belief  of  which 
they  professed  to  make  it.  And  it  will,  I  suppose,  readily 
be  acknowledged,  that  the  generality  of  the  first  converts 
to  Christianity  must  have  beheved  them :  that  as  by  be- 
coming Christians  they  declared  to  the  world,  they  were 
satisfied  of  the  truth  of  those  miracles  ;  so  this  declara- 
tion was  to  be  credited.  And  this  their  testimony  is  the 
same  kind  of  evidence  for  those  miracles,  as  if  they  had 
put  it  in  writing,  and  these  writings  had  come  down  to 
us.  And  it  is  real  evidence,  because  it  is  of  facts,  which 
they  had  capacity  and  full  opportunity  to  inform  them- 
selves of.  It  is  also  distinct  from  the  direct  or  expres? 
historical  evidence,  though  it  is  of  the  same  kind:  and  it 
would  be  allowed  to  be  distinct  in  all  cases.  For  were 
a  fact  expressly  related  by  one  or  more  ancient  histo- 
rians, and  disputed  in  after  ages  ;  that  this  fact  is  acknow- 
ledged to  have  been  believed  by  great  numbers  of  the 
age  in  which  the  historian  says  it  was  done,  would  be 
allowed  an  additional  proof  of  such  fact,  quite  distinct 
from  the  express  testimony  of  the  historian.  The  cre- 
dulity of  mankind  is  acknowledged:  and  the  suspicions 
of  mankind  ought  to  be  acknowledged  too;  and  their 
backwardness  even  to  believe,  and  greater  still  to  prac- 
tise, what  makes  against  their  interest.  And  it  must 
particularly  be  remembered,  that  education,  and  prejudice, 
and  authority,  were  against  Christianity,  in  the  age  I  am 
speaking  of.  So  that  the  immediate  conversion  of  such 
numbers  is  a  real  presumption  of  somewhat  more  than 
human  in  this  matter:  I  say  presumption,  for  it  is  not 
alleged  as  a  proof  alone  and  by  itself.  Nor  need  any  one 
of  the  things  mentioned  in  this  Chapter  be  considered 
as  a  proof  by  itself:  and  yet  all  of  them  together  may  be 
one  of  the  strongest.* 

Upon  the  whole:  as  <^here  is  large  historical  evidence, 

*  p.  273,  &c. 


CHAr.VILJ  FOR    CHRISTIANITY.  249 

both  direct  and  circumstantial,  of  miracles  wrought  in 
attestation  of  Christianity,  collected  by  those  who  have 
writ  upon  the  subject ;  it  lies  upon  unbelievers  to  show, 
why  this  evidence  is  not  to  be  credited.  This  way  of 
speaking  is,  I  think,  just;  and  what  persons  who  write 
in  defence  of  religion  naturally  fall  into.  Yet,  in  a  matter 
of  such  unspeakable  importance,  the  proper  question  is, 
not  whom  it  lies  upon,  according  to  the  rules  of  argu- 
ment, to  maintain  or  confute  objections:  but  whether 
there  really  are  any,  against  this  evidence,  sufficient,  in 
reason,  to  destroy  the  credit  of  it.  However,  unbelievers 
seem  to  take  upon  them  the  part  of  showing  that  there 
are. 

They  allege,  that  numberless  enthusiastic  people,  in 
different  ages  and  countries,  expose  themselves  to  the 
same  difficulties  which  the  primitive  Christians  did  ;  and 
are  ready  to  give  up  their  lives  for  the  most  idle  follies 
imaginable.  But  it  is  not  very  clear,  to  what  purpose 
this  objection  is  brought.  For  every  one,  surely,  in 
every  case,  must  distinguish  between  opinions  and  facts. 
And  though  testimony  is  no  proof  of  enthusiastic  opi- 
nions, or  of  any  opinions  at  all ;  yet  it  is  allowed,  in  all 
other  cases,  to  be  a  proof  of  facts.  And  a  person's  lay- 
ing down  his  life  in  attestation  of  facts  or  of  opinions, 
is  the  strongest  proof  of  his  believing  them.  And  if  the 
Apostles  and  their  contemporaries  did  believe  the  facts, 
in  attestation  of  which  they  exposed  themselves  to  suf- 
ferings and  death;  this  their  belief,  or  rather  knowledge, 
must  be  a  proof  of  those  facts :  for  they  were  such  as 
came  under  the  observation  of  their  senses.  And  though 
it  is  not  of  equal  weight,  yet  it  is  of  weight,  4;hat  the 
martyrs  of  the  next  age,  notwithstanding  they  were  not 
eye-witnesses  of  those  facts,  as  were  the  Apostles  and 
their  contemporaries,  had,  however,  full  opportunity  to 
inform  themselves,  whether  they  were  true  or  not,  and 
gave  equal  proof  of  their  believing  them  to  be  true. 

But  enthusiasm,  it  is  said,  greatly  weakens  the  evi- 
dence of  testimony  even  for  facts,  in  matters  relating  to 
religion :  some  seem  to  think  it  totally  and  absolutely 
destroys  the  evidence  of  testimony  upon  this  subject. 
And  indeed  the  powers  of  enthusiasm,  and  of  diseases 


250  OF  THE  PARTICULAR  EVIDENCE  [Part  II. 

too,  which  operate  in  a  hke  manner,  are  very  wonderful, 
in  particular  instances.  But  if  great  numbers  of  men, 
not  appearing  in  any  pecuhar  degree  weak,  nor  under 
any  pecuhar  suspicion  of  neghgence,  affirm  that  they 
saw  and  heard  such  things  plainly  with  their  eyes  and 
their  ears,  and  are  admitted  to  be  in  earnest;  such  testi- 
mony is  evidence  of  the  strongest  kind  we  can  have,  for 
any  matter  of  fact.  Yet  possibly  it  may  be  overcome, 
strong  as  it  is,  by  incredibility  in  the  things  thus  attest- 
ed, or  by  contrary  testimony.  And  in  an  instance  where 
one  thought  it  was  so  overcome,  it  might  be  just  to  con- 
sider, how  far  such  evidence  could  be  accounted  for,  by 
enthusiasm;  for  it  seems  as  if  no  other  imaginable  ac- 
count were  to  be  given  of  it.  But  till  such  incredibility 
be  shown,  or  contrary  testimony  produced,  it  cannot 
surely  be  expected,  that  so  far-fetched,  so  indirect  and 
wonderful  an  account  of  such  testimony,  as  that  of  en- 
thusiasm must  be;  an  account  so  strange,  that  the  gene- 
rality of  mankind  can  scarce  be  made  to  understand  what 
is  meant  by  it :  it  cannot,  I  say,  be  expected,  that  such 
account  will  be  admitted  of  such  evidence ;  when  there 
is  this  direct,  easy,  and  obvious  account  of  it,  that  peo- 
ple really  saw  and  heard  a  thing  not  incredible,  which 
they  affirm  sincerely  and  with  full  assurance,  they  did 
see  and  hear.  Granting  then  that  enthusiasm  is  not 
(strictly  speaking)  an  absurd,  but  a  possible  account  of 
such  testimony;  it  is  manifest,  that  the  very  mention  of  it 
goes  upon  the  previous  supposition,  that  the  things  so 
attested  are  incredible:  and  therefore  need  not  be  con- 
sidered, till  they  are  shown  to  be  so.  Much  less  need  it 
be  considered,  after  the  contrary  has  been  proved.  And 
I  think  it  has  been  proved,  to  full  satisfaction,  that  there 
is  no  incredibility  in  a  revelation,  in  general ;  or  in  such 
a  one  as  the  Christian,  in  particular.  However,  as  reli- 
gion is  supposed  peculiarly  liable  to  enthusiasm,  it  may 
just  be  observed,  that  prejudices  almost  without  number, 
and  without  name,  romance,  affectation,  humour,  a  desire 
to  engage  attention,  or  to  surprise,  the  party  spirit,  custom, 
little  competitions,  unaccountable  likings  and  dislikings; 
these  influence  men  strongly  in  common  matters.  And 
as  these  prejudices  are  often  scarce  known  or  reflected 


Chap.  VIL]  FOR  CHRISTIANITY.  '    "  25i 

upon  Tby  the  persons  themselves  who  are  influenced  by 
them,  they  are  to  be  considered  as  influences  of  a  hke 
kind  to  enthusiasm.  Yet  human  testimony  in  com- 
mon matters  is  naturally  and  justly  believed  notwith- 
standins:. 

It  is  intimated  further,  in  a  more  refined  way  of  obser- 
vation, that  though  it  should  be  proved,  that  the  Apostles 
and  first  Christians  could  not,  in  some  respects,  be  de- 
ceived themselves,  and,  in  other  respects,  cannot  be 
thought  to  have  intended  to  impose  upon  the  world  ;  yet 
it  will  not  follow,  that  their  general  testimony  is  to  be 
believed,  though  truly  handed  down  to  us:  because  they 
might  still  in  part,  i.  e.  in  other  respects,  be  deceived 
themselves,  and  in  part  also  designedly  impose  upon 
others ;  which,  it  is  added,  is  a  thing  very  credible,  from 
that  mixture  of  real  enthusiasm,  and  real  knavery,  to  be 
met  with  in  the  same  characters.  And,  I  must  confess, 
I  think  the  matter  of  fact  contained  in  this  observation 
upon  mankind  is  not  to  be  denied  ;  and  that  somewhat 
very  much  akin  to  it  is  often  supposed  in  Scripture  as  a 
very  common  case,  and  most  severely  reproved.  But  it 
were  to  have  been  expected,  that  persons  capable  of 
applying  this  observation  as  applied  in  the  objection, 
might  also  frequently  have  met  with  the  like  mixed  cha- 
racter, in  instances  where  religion  was  quite  out  of  the 
case.  The  thing  plainly  is,  that  mankind  are  naturally 
endued  with  reason,  or  a  capacity  of  distinguishing  be- 
tween truth  and  falsehood  ;  and  as  naturally  they  are 
endued  with  veracity,  or  a  regard  to  truth  in  what  they 
say:  but  from  many  occasions  they  are  liable  to  be  pre- 
judiced and  biassed  and  deceived  themselves,  and  capa- 
ble of  intending  to  deceive  others,  in  every  degree :  in- 
somuch that,  as  we  are  all  liable  to  be  deceived  by  pre- 
judice, so  likewise  it  seems  to  be  not  an  uncommon  thing, 
for  persons,  who,  from  their  regard  to  truth,  would  not 
invent  a  he  entirely  without  any  foundation  at  all,  to 
propagate  it  with  heightening  circumstances,  after  it  is 
once  invented  and  set  agoing.  And  others,  though  they 
would  not  propagate  a  lie,  yet,  which  is  a  lower  degree 
of  falsehood,  will  let  it  pass  without  contradiction.  But, 
notwithstanding  all  this,  human  testimony  remains  still  a 


252  OF  THE  PARTICULAR  EVIDENCE  TPart  II. 

natural  ground  of  assent;  and  this  assent  a  natural  prin- 
ciple of  action. 

It  is  objected  further,  that  however  it  has  happened, 
the  fact  is,  that  mankind  have,  in  different  ages,  been 
strangely  deluded  with  pretences  to  miracles  and  won- 
ders. But  it  is  by  no  means  to  be  admitted,  that  they 
have  been  oftener,  or  are  at  all  more  liable  to  be  deceived 
by  these  pretences,  than  by  others. 

It  is  added,  that  there  is  a  very  considerable  degree  of 
historical  evidence  for  miracles,  which  are,  on  all  hands, 
acknowledged  to  be  fabulous.  But  suppose  there  were 
even  the  like  historical  evidence  for  these,  to  w^hat  there 
is  for  those  alleged  in  proof  of  Christianity,  which  yet  is 
in  no  wise  allowed,  but  suppose  this ;  the  consequence 
would  not  be,  that  the  evidence  of  the  latter  is  not  to  be 
admitted.  Nor  is  there  a  man  in  the  world,  who,  in 
common  cases,  would  conclude  thus.  For  what  would 
such  a  conclusion  really  amount  to  but  this,  that  evidence, 
confuted  by  contrary  evidence,  or  any  way  overbalanced, 
destroys  the  credibility  of  other  evidence,  neither  con- 
futed, nor  overbalanced  .^^  To  argue,  that  because  there 
is,  if  there  were,  like  evidence  from  testimony,  for  mira- 
cles acknowledged  false,  as  for  those  in  attestation  of 
Christianity,  therefore  the  evidence  in  the  latter  case  is 
not  to  be  credited ;  this  is  the  same  as  to  argue,  that  if 
two  men  of  equally  good  reputation  had  given  evidence 
in  different  cases  no  wav  connected,  and  one  of  them 
had  been  convicted  of  perjury,  this  confuted  the  testi- 
mony of  the  other. 

Upon  the  whole  then,  the  general  observation,  that 
human  creatures  are  so  liable  to  be  deceived,  from  en- 
thusiasm in  religion,  and  principles  equivalent  to  enthu- 
siasm in  common  matters,  and  in  both  from  negligence  ; 
and  that  they  are  so  capable  of  dishonestly  endeavouring 
to  deceive  others ;  this  does  indeed  weaken  the  evidence 
of  testimony  in  all  cases,  but  does  not  destroy  it  in  any. 
And  these  things  will  appear,  to  different  men,  to  weaken 
the  evidence  of  testimony,  in  different  degrees :  in  de- 
grees proportionable  to  the  observations  they  have  made, 
or  the  notions  they  have  any  way  taken  up,  concerning 
the  weakness  and  negligence  and  dishonesty  of  man- 


Chap.  VII.]  FOR  CHRISTIA'NITY.  253 

kind ;  or  concerning  the  powers  of  enthusiasm,  and  pre- 
judices equivalent  to  it.  But  it  seems  to  me,  that  peo-  > 
pie  do  not  know  what  they  say,  who  affirm  these  things 
to  destroy  the  evidence  from  testimony,  which  we  have 
of  the  truth  of  Christianity.  Nothing  can  destroy  the 
evidence  of  testimony  in  any  case,  but  a  proof  or  pro- 
bability, that  persons  are  not  competent  judges  of  the 
facts  to  which  they  give  testimony ;  or  that  they  are 
actually  under  some  indirect  influence  in  giving  it,  in 
such  particular  case.  Till  this  be  made  out,  the  natural 
laws  of  human  actions  require,  that  testimony  be  ad- 
mitted. It  can  never  be  sufficient  to  overthrow  direct 
historical  evidence,  indolently  to  say,  that  there  are  so 
many  principles,  from  whence  men  are  liable  to  be  de- 
ceived themselves,  and  disposed  to  deceive  others,  espe- 
cially in  matters  of  religion,  that  one  knows  not  what  to 
believe.  And  it  is  surprising  persons  can  help  reflect- 
ing, that  this  very  maimer  of  speaking  supposes  they 
are  not  satisfied  that  there  is  nothing  in  the  evidence, 
of  which  they  speak  thus  ;  or  that  they  can  avoid  observ- 
ing, if  they  do  make  this  reflection,  that  it  is  on  such  a 
subject,  a  very  material  one.* 

And  over  against  all  these  objections  is  to  be  set  the 
importance  of  Christianity,  as  what  must  have  engaged 
the  attention  of  its  first  converts,  so  as  to  have  rendered 
them  less  liable  to  be  deceived  from  carelessness,  than 
they  would  in  common  matters ;  and  likewise  the  strong 
obligations  to  veracity,  which  their  religion  laid  them 
under:  so  that  the  first  and  most  obvious  presumption 
is,  that  they  could  not  be  deceived  themselves  nor  de- 
ceive others.  And  this  presumption,  in  this  degree,  is 
peculiar  to  the  testimony  we  have  been  considering. 

In  argument,  assertions  are  nothing  in  themselves, 
and  have  an  air  of  positiveness  which  sometimes  is  not 
very  easy:  yet  they  are  necessary,  and  necessar}'^  to  be 
repeated ;  in  order  to  connect  a  discourse,  and  distinctly 
to  lay  before  the  view  of  the  reader,  what  is  proposed  to 
be  proved,  and  what  is  left  as  proved.  Now  the  conclu- 
sion from  the  foregoing  observations  is,  I  think,  beyond 
all  doubt,  this  :  that  unbelievers  must  be  forced  to  admit 

*  See  the  foregoing  Clmpter. 


254  OF  THE  PARTICULAR  EVIDENCE.  [Part  II. 

the  external  evidence  for  Christianity,  i.  e.  the  proof  of 
miracles  wrought  to  attest  it,  to  be  of  real  weight  and  very- 
considerable  ;  though  they  cannot  allow  it  to  be  sufficient, 
to  convince  them  of  the  realitv  of  those  miracles.  And 
as  they  must,  in  all  reason,  admit  this ;  so  it  seems  to 
me,  that  upon  consideration  they  would,  in  fact,  admit 
it ;  those  of  them,  I  mean,  who  know  any  thing  at  all  of 
the  matter  ;  in  like  manner  as  persons,  in  many  cases, 
own  they  see  strong  evidence  from  testimony,  for  the 
truth  of  things,  which  yet  they  cannot  be  convinced  are 
true :  cases,  suppose,  where  there  is  contrary  testimony ; 
or  things  which  they  think,  whether  with  or  without 
reason,  to  be  incredible.  But  there  is  no  testimony 
contrary  to  that  which  we  have  been  considering :  and 
it  has  been  fully  proved,  that  there  is  no  incredibility  in 
Christianity  in  general,  or  in  any  part  of  it. 

II.  As  to  the  evidence  for  Christianity  from  prophecy, 
I  shall  only  make  some  few  general  observations,  which 
are  suggested  by  the  Analogy  of  Nature  ;  i.  e.  by  the  ac- 
knowledged natural  rules  of  judging  in  common  matters, 
concerning  evidence  of  a  like  kind  to  this  from  pro- 
phecy. 

1.  The  obscurity  or  unintelhgibleness  of  one  part  of 
a  prophecy  does  not,  in  any  degree,  invalidate  the  proof 
of  foresight,  arising  from  the  appearing  completion  of 
those  other  parts,  which  are  understood.  For  the  case 
is  evidently  the  same,  as  if  those  parts,  which  are  not 
understood,  were  lost,  or  not  written  at  all,  or  written  in 
an  unknown  tongue.  Whether  this  observation  be  com- 
monly attended  to  or  not,  it  is  so  evident,  that  one  can 
scarce  bring  oneself  to  set  down  an  instance  in  common 
matters,  to  exemplify  it  However,  suppose  a  writing, 
partly  in  cipher,  and  partly  in  plain  words  at  length  ;  and 
that  in  the  part  one  understood,  there  appeared  mention 
of  several  known  facts  ;  it  would  never  come  into  any 
man's  thoughts  to  imagine,  that  if  he  understood  the  whole, 
perhaps  lie  might  find,  that  those  facts  were  not  in  reality 
known  by  tl^e  writer.  Indeed,  both  in  this  example  and 
the  thing  intended  to  be  exemplified  by  it,  our  not  under- 
standing the  whole  (the  whole,  suppose,  of  a  sentence  or 
a  paragraph)  might  sometimes  occasion  a  doubt,  whether 


Chap.  VH.]  FOR  CHRISTIANITY.  '  255 

one  understood  the  literal  meaning  of  such  a  part :  but 
this  comes  under  another  consideration. 

For  the  same  reason,  though  a  man  should  be  inca- 
pable, for  want  of  learning,  or  opportunities  of  inquiry,  or 
from  not  having  turned  his  studies  this  way,  even  so 
much  as  to  judge  whether  particular  prophecies  have 
been  throughout  completely  fulfilled  ;  yet  he  may  see,  in 
general,  that  they  have  been  fulfilled  to  such  a  degree, 
as,  upon  very  good  ground,  to  be  convinced  of  foresight 
more  than  human  in  such  prophecies,  and  of  such 
events  being  intended  by  them.  For  the  same  reason 
also,  though,  by  means  of  the  deficiencies  in  civil  history, 
and  the  different  accounts  of  historians,  the  most  learned 
should  not  be  able  to  make  out  to  satisfaction,  that  such 
parts  of  the  prophetic  history  have  been  minutely  and 
throughout  fulfilled ;  yet  a  very  strong  proof  of  foresight 
may  arise,  from  that  general  completion  of  them,  which 
is  made  out :  as  much  proof  of  foresight,  perhaps,  as  the 
giver  of  prophecy  intended  should  ever  be  afforded  by 
such  parts  of  prophecy. 

2.  A  long  series  of  prophecy  being  applicable  to  such 
and  such  events,  is  itself  a  proof  that  it  was  intended 
of  them  :  as  the  rules  by  which  we  naturally  judge  and 
determine,  in  common  cases  parallel  to  this,  will  show. 
This  observation  I  make  in  answer  to  the  common 
objection  against  the  application  of  the  prophecies,  that, 
considering  each  of  them  distinctly  by  itself,  it  does  not 
at  all  appear,  that  they  were  intended  of  those  particular 
events,  to  which  they  are  applied  by  Christians ;  and 
therefore  it  is  to  be  supposed,  that,  if  they  meant  any 
thing,  they  were  intended  of  other  events  unknown  to 
us,  and  not  of  these  at  all. 

Now  there  are  two  kinds  of  writing,  which  bear  a 
great  resemblance  to  prophecy,  with  respect  to  the  mat- 
ter before  us  :  the  mythological,  and  the  satirical,  where 
the  satire  is,  to  a  certain  degree,  concealed.  And  a  man 
might  be  assured,  that  he  understood  what  an  author 
intended  by  a  fable  or  parable  related  without  any  appli- 
cation or  moral,  merely  from  seeing  it  to  be  easily  capa- 
ble of  such  application,  and  that  such  a  moral  might 
naturally  be  deduced  from  it.     And  he  might  be  fully 


/ 


256  OF  THE  TARTIxCULAR  EVIDENCE  [Part  11. 

assured,  that  such  persons  and  events  were  intended 
in  a  satirical  writing,  merely  from  its  being  applicable 
to  them.  And,  agreeable  to  the  last  observation,  he 
might  be  in  a  good  measure  satisfied  of  it,  though  he 
were  not  enough  informed  in  affairs,  or  in  the  story 
of  such  persons  to  understand  half  the  satire.  For, 
his  satisfaction,  that  he  understood  the  meaning,  the 
intended  meaning,  of  these  writings,  would  be  greater 
or  less  in  proportion  as  he  saw  the  general  turn  of 
them  to  be  capable  of  such  application;  and  in  propor- 
tion to  the  number  of  particular  things  capable  of  it. 
And  thus,  if  a  long  series  of  prophecy  is  applicable  to 
the  present  state  of  the  church,  and  to  the  political  situ- 
ations of  the  kingdoms  of  the  world,  some  thousand 
years  after  these  prophecies  were  delivered,  and  a  long 
series  of  prophecy  delivered  before  the  coming  of  Christ 
is  applicable  to  him ;  these  things  are  in  themselves  a 
proof,  that  the  prophetic  history  was  intended  of  him, 
and  of  those  events:  in  proportion  as  the  general  turn 
of  it  is  capable  of  such  application,  and  to  the  number 
and  variety  of  particular  prophecies  capable  of  it.  And 
though,  in  all  just  way  of  consideration,  the  appearing 
completion  of  prophecies  is  to  be  allowed  to  be  thus 
explanatory  of,  and  to  determine,  their  meaning ;  yet  it 
is  to  be  remembered  further,  that  the  ancient  Jews  ap- 
plied the  prophecies  to  a  Messiah  before  his  coming,  in 
much  the  same  manner  as  Christians  do  now :  and  that 
the  primitive  Christians  interpreted  the  prophecies  re- 
specting the  state  of  the  church  and  of  the  world  in  the 
last  ages,  in  the  sense  which  the  event  seems  to  confirm 
and  verify.  And  from  these  things  it  may  be  made 
appear : 

3.  That  the  showing  even  to  a  high  probability,  if 
that  could  be,  that  the  prophets  thought  of  some  other 
events,  in  such  and  such  predictions,  and  not  those  at 
all  which  Christians  alk^ge  to  be  completions  of  those 
predictions ;  or  that  such  and  such  prophecies  are  capa- 
ble of  being  applied  to  other  events  than  those,  to  which 
Christians  apply  them — that  this  would  not  confute  or 
destroy  the  force  of  the  argument  from  prophecy,  even 
with  regard  to  those  very  instances.     For,  observe  how 


Chip.  VII.]  FOR  CIIRISTIAMTY.  257 

this  matter  really  is.     If  one  knew  such  a  person  to  be 
the  sole  author  of  such  a  book,  and  was  certainly  assured, 
or  satisfied  to  any  degree,  that  one  knew  the  whole  of 
what  he  intended  in  it;  one  should  be  assured  or  satis- 
fied to  such  degree,  that  one  knew  the  whole  meaning 
of  that  book :  for  the  meaning  of  a  book  is  nothing  but 
the  meaning  of  the  author.     But  if  one  knew  a  person 
to  have  compiled  a  book  out  of  memoirs,  which  he  re- 
ceived from  another,  of  vastly  superior  knowledge  in  the 
subject  of  it,  especially  if  it  were  a  book  full  of  great 
intricacies  and  difficulties;  it  would  in  no  wise  follow, 
that  one  knew  the  whole  meaning  of  the  book,  from 
knowing  the  whole  meaning  of  the  compiler:  for  the 
original  memoirs,  i.  e.  the  author  of  them,  might  have, 
and  there  would  be  no  degree  of  presumption,  in  many 
cases,   against  supposing   him   to   have,    some    further 
meaning  than  the  compiler  saw.     To  say  then,  that  the 
Scriptures,  and  the  things  contained  in  them,  can  have 
ro  other  or  further  meaning  than  those  persons  thought 
or  had,  who  first  recited  or  wrote  them,    is  evidenth' 
saying,  that  those  persons  were  the  original,  proper,  and 
sole  authors  of  those  books,  i.  e.  that  they  are  not  in- 
spired: which  is  absurd,  whilst  the  authority  of  these 
books  is  under  examination;  i.  e.  till  you  have  deter- 
mined  they  are  of  no  divine  authority  at  all.     Till  this 
be  determined,  it  must  in  all  reason  be  supposed,  not 
indeed  that  they  have,  for  this  is  taking  for  granted  that 
they  are  inspired;  but  that  they  may  have,  some  further 
meaning  than  what  the  compilers  saw  or   understood. 
And,  upon  this  supposition,  it  is  supposable  also,  that 
this  further  meaning  may  be  fulfilled.    Now  events  corre- 
sponding to  prophecies,  interpreted  in  a  different  meaning 
from  that,  in  which  the  prophets  are  supposed  to  have 
understood  them ;  this  affords,  in  a  manner,  the  same  proof, 
that    this  different  sense  was    originally  intended,  as  it 
would  have  afforded,  if  the  prophets  had  not  understood 
their  predictions  in  the  sense  it  is  supposed  they  did: 
because  there  is  no  presumption  of  their  sense  of  them 
being  the  whole  sense  of  them.     And  it  has  been  al- 
ready shown,  that  the  apparent  completions  of  prophecy 
must  be  allowed  to  be  explanatory  of  its  meaning.     So 


K 


258  OF  THE  PARTICULAR  EVIDENCE  [Part  II, 

that  the  question  is,  whether  a  series  of  prophecy  has 
been  fulfilled,  in  a  natural  or  proper,  i.  e.  in  any  real 
sense  of  the  words  of  it.  For  such  completion  is  equally 
a  proof  of  foresight  more  than  human,  whether  the  pro- 
phets are,  or  are  not,  supposed  to  have  understood  it  in 
a  different  sense.  I  say,  supposed:  for,  though  I  think 
it  clear,  that  the  prophets  did  not  understand  the  full 
meaning  of  their  predictions ;  it  is  another  question,  how 
far  they  thought  they  did,  and  in  what  sense  they  under- 
stood them. 

Hence  may  be  seen,  to  how  little  purpose  those  per- 
sons busy  themselves,  who  endeavour  to  prove,  that  the 
prophetic  history  is  applicable  to  events  of  the  age  in 
which  it  was  written,  or  of  ages  before  it.  Indeed  to 
have  proved  this,  before  there  was  any  appearance  of  a 
further  completion  of  it,  might  have  answered  some  pur- 
pose; for  it  might  have  prevented  the  expectation  of  any 
such  further  completion.  Thus  could  Porphyry  have 
shown,  that  some  principal  parts  of  the  book  of  Daniel, 
for  instance,  the  seventh  verse  of  the  seventh  chapter, 
which  the  Christians  interpreted  of  the  latter  ages,  was 
applicable  to  events,  which  happened  before  or  about  the 
age  of  Antiochus  Epiphanes ;  this  might  have  prevented 
them  from  expecting  any  further  completion  of  it.  And, 
unless  there  was  then,  as  I  think  there  must  have  been, 
external  evidence  concerning  that  book,  more  than  is 
come  down  to  us ;  such  a  discovery  might  have  been  a 
stumbling-block  in  the  way  of  Christianity  itself:  con- 
sidering the  authority  which  our  Saviour  has  given  to 
the  book  of  Daniel,  and  how  much  the  general  scheme 
of  Christianity  presupposes  the  truth  of  it.  But  even 
this  discovery,  had  there  been  any  such,*  would  be  of 
very  little  weight  with  reasonable  men  now ;  if  this 
passage,  thus  applicable  to  events  before  the  age  of 
Porphyry,  appears  to  be  applicable  also  to  events,  which 
succeeded    the  dissolution    of  the   Roman    empire.      I 

*  It  appears  that,  Pnrpliyry  did  nothing  worth  montioiiing  in  tliis  way.  For  Jerome 
on  the  place  says :  Duas  posteriores  bestias — in  nno  Macedonum  regno  ponit.  And 
BS  to  t!ie  ten  kinos  ;  Dcntm  regcs  emimerat.  qui  fuenmt  swvissimi :  ipsosque  rege$ 
non  uniits  ponit  rr^ni,  verii  gratia,  Macedonice,  Si/rice,  JsieF,  et  .f^gypli ;  sed  dt 
</»w*/.»  vegnis  vnutn  rfficit  regum  ordinem.  And  in  tliis  way  of  interpretation,  any 
tluiig  may  he  m  de  of  any  thing. 


Cmap.  VII.]  FOR  CHIIISTIANITY.  259 

mention  this,  not  at  all  as  intendinf^  to  insinuate,  that 
the  division  of  this  empire  into  ten  parts,  for  it  plainly 
was  divided  into  about  that  number,  were,  alone  and  by 
itself,  of  any  moment  in  verifying  the  prophetic  history: 
but  only  as  an  example  of  the  thing  I  am  speaking  of. 
And  thus  upon  the  whole,  the  matter  of  inquiry  evidently 
must  be,  as  above  put,  Whether  the  prophecies  are  ap- 
plicable to  Christ,  and  to  the  present  state  of  the  world, 
and  of  the  church;  a])plicable  in  such  a  degree,  as  to  im- 
ply foresight:  not  whether  thev  are  capable  of  anv  other 
apphcation;  though  I  know  no  pretence  for  saying  the 
general  turn  of  them  is  capable  of  any  other. 

These  observations  are,  I  think,  just;  and  the  evidence 
referred  to  in  them  real:  though  there  may  be  people 
who  will  not  accept  of  such  imperfect  imformation  from 
Scripture.  Some  too  have  not  integrity  and  regard 
enough  to  truth,  to  attend  to  evidence,  which  keeps  the 
mind  in  doubt,  perhaps  perplexity,  and  which  is  much 
of  a  different  sort  from  what  they  expected.  And  it 
plainly  requires  a  degree  of  modesty  and  fairness,  be- 
yond what  every  one  has,  for  a  man  to  say,  not  to  the 
world,  but  to  himself,  that  there  is  a  real  appearance  of 
somewhat  of  great  weight  in  this  matter,  though  he  is 
not  able  thoroughly  to  satisfy  himself  about  it ;  but  it 
shall  have  its  influence  upon  him,  in  proportion  to  its 
appearing  reality  and  weight.  It  is  much  more  easy, 
and  more  falls  in  with  the  negligence,  presumption,  and 
wilfulness  of  the  generality,  to  determine  at  once,  with  a 
decisive  air.  There  is  nothing  in  it.  The  prejudices 
arising  from  that  absolute  contempt  and  scorn,  with 
which  this  evidence  is  treated  in  the  world,  I  do  not 
mention.  For  what  indeed  can  be  said  to  persons,  who 
are  weak  enough  hi  their  understandings  to  think  this 
any  presumption  against  it;  or,  if  they  do  not,  are  yet 
weak  enough  in  their  temper  to  be  influenced  by  such 
prejudices,  upon  such  a  subject? 

I  shall  now,  Secondly,  endeavour  to  give  some  account 
of  the  general  argument  for  the  truth  of  Christianity, 
consisting  both  of  the  direct  and  circumstantial  evidence 
considered  as  making  up  one  argument.     Indeed  to  state 
and  examine  this  argument  fully,  would  be  a  work  much 

11 '^ 


260  OF  THE  PARTICULAR  EVIDENCE  [P.*bt  II. 

beyond  the  compass  of  this  whole  treatise;  nor  is  so 
much  as  a  proper  abridgment  of  it  to  be  expected  here. 
Yet  the  present  subject  requires  to  have  some  brief  ac- 
count of  it  given.  For  it  is  the  kind  of  evidence,  upon 
which  most  questions  of  difficulty,  in  common  practice, 
are  determined:  evidence  arising  from  various  coinci- 
dences, which  support  and  confirm  each  other,  and  in 
this  manner  prove,  with  more  or  less  certainty,  the 
point  under  consideration.  And  I  choose  to  do  it  also: 
First,  because  it  seems  to  be  of  the  greatest  importance, 
and  not  duly  attended  to  by  every  one,  that  the  proof  of 
revelation  is,  not  some  direct  and  express  things  only, 
but  a  great  variety  of  circumstantial  things  also;  and  that 
though  each  of  these  direct  and  circumstantial  things  is 
indeed  to  be  considered  separately,  yet  they  are  after- 
wards to  be  joined  together;  for  that  the  proper  force  of 
the  evidence  consists  in  the  result  of  those  several  things, 
considered  in  their  respects  to  each  other,  and  united 
into  one  view:  and  in  the  next  place,  because  it  seems 
to  me,  that  the  matters  of  fact  here  set  down,  which  are 
acknowledged  by  unbelievers,  must  be  acknowledged  by 
them  also  to  contain  together  a  degree  of  evidence  of 
great  weight,  if  they  could  be  brought  to  lay  these  several 
things  before  themselves  distinctly,  and  then  with  atten- 
tion consider  them  together ;  instead  of  that  cursory 
thought  of  them,  to  which  we  are  familiarized.  For 
being  familiarized  to  the  cursory  thought  of  things  as 
really  hinders  the  weight  of  them  from  being  seen,  as 
from  having  its  due  influence  upon  practice. 

The  thing  asserted,  and  the  truth  of  which  is  to  be  in- 
quired into,  is  this:  That  over  and  above  our  reason  and 
affections,  which  God  has  given  us  for  the  information  of 
our  judgment  and  the  conduct  of  our  lives,  he  has  also, 
by  external  revelation,  given  us  an  account  of  himself 
afid  his  moral  government  over  the  world,  implying  a 
future  state  of  rewards  and  punishments ;  i.  e.  hath  re- 
vealed the  system  of  natural  religion:  for  natural  religion 
may  be  externally*  revealed  by  God,  as  the  ignorant  may 
be  taught  it  by  mankind,  their  fellow  creatures — that 
God,  I  say,  has  given  us  the  evidence  of  revelation,  as 

*  p.  166,  &c. 


Chap.  VII.]  FOR  CHRISTIANITY.  261 

well  as  the  evidence  of  reason,  to  ascertain  this  moral 
system;  together  with  an  account  of  a  particular  dispen- 
sation of  Providence,  which  rtason  could  no  way  have 
discovered,  and  a  particular  institution  of  religion  founded 
on  it,  for  the  recovery  of  mankind  out  of  their  present 
wretched  condition,  and  raising  them  to  the  perfection 
and  final  happiness  of  their  nature. 

This  revelation,  whether  real  or  supposed,  may  be 
considered  as  wholly  historical.  For  prophecy  is  nothing 
but  the  history  of  events  before  they  come  to  pass ;  doc- 
trines also  are  matters  of  fact ;  and  precepts  come  under 
the  same  notion.  And  the  general  design  of  Scripture, 
which  contains  in  it  this  revelation,  thus  considered  as 
historical,  may  be  said  to  be,  to  give  us  an  account  of 
the  world,  in  this  one  single  view,  as  God's  world:  by 
which  it  appears  essentially  distinguished  from  all  other 
books,  so  far  as  I  have  found,  except  such  as  are  copied 
from  it  It  begins  with  an  account  of  God's  creation  of 
the  world,  in  order  to  ascertain,  and  distinguish  from  all 
others,  who  is  the  object  of  our  worship,  by  what  he  has 
done :  in  order  to  ascertain,  who  he  is,  concerning  whose 
providence,  commands,  promises,  and  threatenings,  this 
sacred  book,  all  along,  treats;  the  Maker  and  Proprietor 
of  the  world,  he  whose  creatures  we  are,  the  God  of 
Nature:  in  order  likewise  to  distinguish  him  from  the 
idols  of  the  nations,  which  are  either  imaginary  beings, 
i.  e.  no  beings  at  all ;  or  else  part  of  that  creation,  the 
historical  relation  of  which  is  here  given.  And  St  John, 
not  improbably,  with  an  eye  to  this  Mosaic  account  of 
the  creation,  begins  his  Gospel  with  an  account  of  our 
Saviour's  pre-existence,  and  that  all  things  were  made  by 
him;  and  without  him  was  not  any  thing  mude  that  was 
made:*  agreeably  to  the  doctrine  of  St  Paul,  that  God 
created  all  things  by  Jesus  Christ.\  This  being  premised, 
the  Scripture,  taken  together,  seems  to  profess  to  con- 
tain a  kind  of  an  abridgment  of  the  history  of  the  world, 
in  the  view  just  now  mentioned:  that  is,  a  general  ac- 
count of  the  condition  of  religion  and  its  professors,  dur- 
mg  the  continuance  of  that  apostasy  from  God,  and  state 
of  wickedness,  which  it  every  where  supposes  the  world 

*  Jolui  i.  3.  +  Ejjh.  iii.  9. 


262  OF  THE  .PARTICULAR  EVIDENCE  [P^rt  n. 

to  lie  in.  And  this  account  of  the  state  of  religion  carries 
with  it  some  brief  account  of  the  political  state  of  things, 
as  religion  is  affected  by  it.  Revelation  indeed  considers 
the  common  affairs  of  this  world,  and  what  is  going  on 
in  it,  as  a  mere  scene  of  distraction ;  and  cannot  be  sup- 
posed to  concern  itself  with  foretelling  at  what  time  Rome, 
or  Babylon,  or  Greece,  or  any  particular  place,  should  be 
the  most  conspicuous  seat  of  that  tyranny  and  dissolute- 
ness, wiiich  all  places  equally  aspire  to  be ;  cannot,  I 
say,  be  supposed  to  give  any  account  of  this  wild  scene 
for  its  own  sake.  But  it  seems  to  contain  some  very 
general  accomit  of  the  chief  governments  of  the  world, 
as  the  general  state  of  religion  has  been,  is,  or  shall  be, 
affected  by  them,  from  the  first  transgression,  and  during 
the  whole  interval  of  the  world's  continuing  in  its  pre- 
sent state,  to  a  certain  future  period,  spoken  of  both  in 
the  Old  and  New  Testament,  very  distinctly,  and  in 
great  variety  of  expression:  The  times  of  the  restitution  of 
all  things  :*  when  the  mystery  of  God  shall  be  finished,  as 
he  hath  declared  to  his  servards  the  prophets  .-^  when  the 
God  of  heaven  shall  set  up  a  kingdom.,  which  shall  never  he 
destroyed :  and  the  kingdom  shcdl  not  he  left  to  other 
people,\  as  it  is  represented  to  be  during  this  apostasy,  but 
judgmcid  shall  he  given  to  the  sainfs,§  and  they  shall 
reign :\\  and  the  kingdom  and  dominion,  and  the  greatness 
of  the  kingdom  under  the  whole  heaven,  shall  he  given  to 
the  people  of  the  saints  of  the  Most  High..% 

Upon  this  general  view  of  the  Scripture,  I  would  re- 
mark, how  great  a  length  of  time  the  whole  relation 
takes  up,  near  six  thousand  years  of  which  are  past;  and 
how  great  a  variety  of  things  it  treats  of;  the  natural  and 
moral  system  or  history  of  the  world,  including  the  time 
when  it  was  formed,  all  contained  in  the  very  first  book, 
and  evidently  written  in  a  rude  and  unlearned  age;  and 
in  subsequent  books,  the  various  common  and  prophetic 
history,  and  the  particular  dispensation  of  Christianity. 
Now  all  this  together  gives  the  largest  scope  for  criticism  ; 
and  for  confutation  of  what  is  capable  of  being  confuted, 
either  from  reason,  or  from  common  histoiy,  or  from  any 

*  Acts  iii.  21.         t  H.'^v.  x.  7-  X  r>an.  ii.  44.. 

§  Dan.  vii.  22.        j   ilev.  xi.  17,  18.  xx.  6.      H  Dan.  vii.  27. 


Chap.  VII.J  FOR    CHRISTIANITY.  263 

inconsistence  in  its  several  parts.  And  it  is  a  thing  which 
deserves,  I  think,  to  be  mentioned,  that  whereas  some 
imagine  the  supposed  doubtfulness  of  the  evidence  for 
revelation  implies  a  positive  argument  that  it  is  not  true; 
it  appear?,  on  the  contrary,  to  imply  a  positive  argu- 
ment that  it  is  true.  For,  could  any  common  relation  of 
such  antiquity,  extent,  and  variety' (for  in  these  things 
the  stress  of  what  I  am  now  observing  hes),  be  proposed 
to  the  examination  of  the  world :  that  it  could  not,  in 
an  age  of  knowledge  and  liberty,  be  confuted,  or  shown 
to  have  nothing  in  it,  to  the  satisfaction  of  reasonable 
men;  this  would  be  thought  a  strong  presumptive  proof 
of  its  truth.  And  indeed  it  must  be  a  proof  of  it,  just 
in  proportion  to  the  probability,  that  if  it  were  false,  it- 
might  be  shown  to  be  so :  and  this,  I  think,  is  scarce 
pretended  to  be  shown,  but  upon  principles  and  in  ways 
of  arguing,  which  have  been  clearly  obviated.*  Nor 
does  it  at  all  appear,  that  any  set  of  men,  who  believe 
natural  religion,  are  of  the  opinion,  that  Christianity  has 
been  thus  confuted.     But  to  proceed: 

Together  with  the  moral  system  of  the  world,  the  Old 
Testament  contains  a  chronological  account  of  the  be- 
ginning of  it,  and  from  thence,  an  unbroken  genealogy 
of  mankind  for  many  ages  before  common  history  be- 
gins ;  and  carried  on  as  much  farther  as  to  make  up  a 
continued  thread  of  history  of  the  length  of  between  three 
and  four  thousand  vears.  It  contains  an  account  of 
God's  making  a  covenant  with  a  particular  nation,  that 
they  should  be  his  people,  and  he  would  be  their  God, 
in  a  peculiar  sense ;  of  his  often  interposing  miraculously 
in  their  affairs ;  giving  them  the  promise,  and,  long  after, 
the  possession,  of  a  particular  country;  assuring  them  of 
the  greatest  national  prosperity  in  it,  if  they  would  wor- 
ship him,  in  opposition  to  the  idols  which  the  rest  of  the 
world  worshipped,  and  obey  his  commands ;  and  threat- 
ening them  with  unexampled  punishments  if  they  dis- 
obeyed him,  and  fell  into  the  general  idolatry :  insomuch 
that  this  one  nation  should  continue  to  be  the  observa- 
tion and  the  wonder  of  all  the  world.  It  declares  parti- 
cularly, that  God  would  scatter  them  among  all  'people, 

*  C\\.  ii,  iii.  &c. 


264  OF  THE  PARTICULAR  EVIDENCE  [P^rt  II. 

-from  one  end  of  the  earth  unto  the  other ;  but  that  when 
they  should  return  unto  the  Lord  their  God,  he  would  have 
compassion  upon  thejn,  and  gather  them  from  all  the  nations  j 
tohither  he  had  scattered  them  :  that  Israel  should  he  saved 
in   the  Lord,  with  an  everlasting  salvation;  and  not  he 
ashamed  or  confounded  world  without  end.     And  as  some 
of  these  promises  are  conditional,  others  are  as  absolute, 
as  any  thing  can  be  expressed  :  that  the  time  should  come, 
when  the  people  should  he  all  righteous,  and  inherit  the 
land,  for  ever:  that  though  God  would  make  a  full  end  of 
all  nations  whither  he  had  scattered  them,  yet  would  he  not 
make  a  full  end  of  them:  that  he  would  bring  again  the 
captivity  of  his  people  Israel,  and  plant  them  upon  their 
land,  and  they  should  he  no  more  pulled  up  out  of  their 
land:  that  the  seed  of  Israel  should  not  cease  from  heing  a 
nation  forever  *  It  foretells,  that  God  would  raise  them 
up  a  particular  person,  in  whom  all  his  promises  should 
finally  be  fulfilled ;    the  Messiah,  who  should  be,  in  a 
high  and   eminent   sense,    their   anointed   Prince   and 
Saviour.     This  was  foretold  in  such  a  manner,  as  raised 
a  general  expectation  of  such  a  person  in  the  nation,  as 
appears  from   the  New  Testament,  and  is  an  acknow- 
ledged fact ;  an  expectation  of  his  coming  at  such  a  par- 
ticular time,  before  any  one  appeared  claiming  to  be  that 
person,  and  when  there  was  no  ground  for  such  an  ex- 
pectation, but  from  the  prophecies:  which  expectation, 
therefore,  must  in  all  reason  be  presumed  to  be  explana- 
tory of  those  prophecies,  if  there  were  any  doubt  about 
their  meaning.     It  seems  moreover  to  foretell,  that  this 
person  should  be  rejected  by  that  nation,  to  whom  he 
had  been  so  long  promised,  and  though  he  was  so  much 
desired  by  them.t     And  it  expressly  foretells,  that  he 
should  be  the  Saviour  of  the  Gentiles;  and  even  that 
the  completion  of  the  scheme  contained  in  this  book,  and 
then  begun,  and  in  its  progress,  should  be  somewhat  so 
great,  that  in  comparison  with  it,  the  restoration  of  the 
Jews  alone  would  be  but  of  small  account.      It  is  a  light 
thing  that  thou  shouldest  he  my  servant  to  raise  up  the 

•  Deut.  xxviii.  64.  xxx.  2,  3.  Is.  xlv.   17.  Ix.  21.  Jer.  xxx.  11.  xlvi.  28.  Aino« 
far.  14,  15.     Jer.  xxxi.  .S6. 
^  Is.  viii.  14',  15.  xlix.  5.  ch.  liii.    Mai.  i.  10,  11.  and  ch.  iit. 


Ceap.  Vri.]  FOR  CHRISTIANITY.  265 

tribes  of  Jacob,  and  to  restore  the  preserved  of  Israel :  I 
will  also  give  thee  for  a  light  to  the  Gentiles,  that  thou 
may  est  be  for  salvation  unto  the  end  of  the  earth.  And,  In 
the  last  days,  the  mountain  of  the  Lord's  house  shall  be 
established  in  the  top  of  the  mountains,  arid  shall  be  exalted 
above  the  hills  ;  and  all  nations  shall  flow  into  it— for  out 
of  Zion  shall  go  forth  the  law,  and  the  word  of  the  Lord 
from  Jerusalem,  And  he  shall  judge  among  the  nations — 
and  the  Lord  alone  shall  be  exalted  in  that  day,  and  the 
idols  he  shall  utterly  abolish*  The  Scripture  further  con- 
tains an  account,  that  at  the  time  the  Messiah  was  ex- 
pected, a  person  rose  up  in  this  nation,  claiming  to  be 
that  Messiah,  to  be  the  person  whom  all  the  prophecies 
referred  to,  and  in  whom  they  should  centre :  that  he 
spent  some  years  in  a  continued  course  of  miraculous 
works  ;  and  endued  his  immediate  disciples  and  followers 
with  a  power  of  doing  the  same,  as  a  proof  of  the  truth 
of  that  religion,  which  he  commissioned  them  to  publish : 
that,  invested  with  this  authority  and  power,  they  made 
numerous  converts  in  the  remotest  countries,  and  settled 
and  established  his  religion  in  the  world ;  to  the  end  of 
which  the  Scripture  professes  to  give  a  prophetic  account 
of  the  state  of  this  religion  amongst  mankind. 

Let  us  now  suppose  a  person  utterly  ignorant  of  his- 
tory, to  have  all  this  related  to  him  out  of  the  Scripture. 
Or  suppose  such  a  one,  having  the  Scripture  put  into  his 
hands,  to  remark  these  things  in  it,  not  knowing  but  that 
the  whole,  even  its  civil  history,  as  well  as  the  other 
parts  of  it,  might  be,  from  beginning  to  end,  an  entire 
invention ;  and  to  ask.  What  truth  was  in  it,  and  whether 
the  revelation  here  related  was  real,  or  a  fiction  ?  And, 
instead  of  a  direct  answer,  suppose  him,  all  at  once,  to 
be  told  the  following  confessed  facts;  and  then  to  unite 
them  into  one  view. 

Let  him  first  be  told,  in  how  great  a  degree  the  pro- 
fession and  establishment  of  natural  religion,  the  belief 
that  there  is  one  God  to  be  worshipped,  that  virtue  is  his 
law,  and  that  mankind  shall  be  rewarded  and  punished 

*  Is.  xlix.  6.  chap.  ii.  chap.  xi.  chap.  Ivi.  7.  Mai.  i,  11.  To  which  must  be 
added,  the  other  prophecies  of  the  like  kind,  several  in  the  New  Testament,  and 
very  many  in  the  Old  :  which  describe  what  shall  be  the  completion  of  the  revealed 
plan  of  Providence.  


266       -  OF  THE  PARTICULAR  EVIDENCE  [Part  II. 

hereafter,  as  they  obey  and  disobey  it  here  ;  in  how  very 
great  a  degree,  I  say,  the  profession  and  estabhshment 
of  this  moral  system  in  the  world  is  owing  to  the  revela- 
tion, whether  real  or  supposed,  contained  in  this  book : 
the  establishment  of  this  moral  system,  even  in   those 
countries  which  do  not  acknowledge  the  proper  autho- 
rity of  the  Scripture.*     Let  him  be  told  also,  what  num- 
ber of  nations  do  acknowledge  its  proper  authority.   Let 
him  then  take  in  the  consideration,  of  what  importance 
religion  is  to  mankind.    And  upon  these  things  he  might, 
I  think,  truly  observe,  that  this   supposed  revelation's 
obtaining  and  being  received  in  the  world,  with  all  the 
circumstances  and  effects  of  it,  considered  together  as 
one  event,  is  the  most  conspicuous  and  important  event 
in  the  history  of  mankind:  that  a  book  of  this  nature, 
and  thus  promulged  and  recommended  to  our  considera-  . 
tion,  demands,  as  if  by  a  voice  from  heaven,  to  have  its 
claims  most  seriously  examined  into:  and  that,  before 
such  examination,  to  treat  it  with  any  kind  of  scoffing 
and  ridicule,  is  an   offence  against  natural  piety.     But 
it  is  to  be  remembered,  that  how  much  soever  the  esta- 
blishment of  natural  religion  in  the  world  is  owing  to  the 
Scripture  revelation,  this  does  not  destroy  the  proof  of 
religion  from  reason,  any  more  than  the  proof  of  Euclid's 
Elements  is  destroyed,  by  a  man's  knowing  or  thinking, 
that  he  should  never  have  seen  the  truth  of  the  several 
propositions  contained  in  it,  nor  had  those  propositions 
come  into  his  thoughts,  but  for  that  mathematician. 

Let  sucli  a  person  as  we  are  speaking  of  be,  in  the 
next  place,  informed  of  the  acknowledged  antiquity  of 
the  first  parts  of  this  book ;  and  that  its  chronology,  its 
account  of  the  time  when  the  earth,  and  the  several  parts 
of  it,  were  first  peopled  with  human  creatures,  is  no  way 
contradicted,  but  is  really  confirmed,  by  the  natural  and 
civil  history  of  the  world,  collected  from  common  histo- 
rians, from  the  state  of  the  earth,  and  from  the  late  in- 
vention of  arts  and  sciences.  And  as  the  Scripture  con- 
tains an  unbroken  thread  of  common  and  civil  history, 
from  the  creation  to  the  captivity,  for  between  three  and 
four  thousand  years ;  let  the  person  we  are  speaking  of 

*  p.  25W 


Ckai..V:I.]  for  CHRISTIANITY.  267 

be  to!d,  in  tl>e  next  place,  that  this  general  history,  as  it 
is  not  contradicted,  but  is  confirmed  by  profane  history 
as  much  as  there  would  be  reason  to  expect,  upon  sup- 
position of  its  truth ;  so  there  is  nothing  in  the  whole 
history  itself,  to  give  any  reasonable  ground  of  suspicion 
of  its  not  being,  in  the  general,  a  faithful  and  literally 
true  genealogy  of  men,  and  series  of  things.  I  speak 
here  only  of  the  common  Scripture-history,  or  of  the 
course  of  ordinary  events  related  in  it,  as  distinguished 
from  miracles,  and  from  the  prophetic  history.  In  all 
the  Scripture-narrations  of  this  kind,  following  events 
arise  out  of  foregoing  ones,  as  in  all  other  histories. 
There  appears  nothing  related  as  done  in  any  age,  not 
conformable  to  the  manners  of  that  age :  nothing  in  the 
account  of  a  succeeding  age,  which,  one  would  say,  could 
not  be  true,  or  was  improbable,  from  the  account  of 
things  in  the  preceding  one.  There  is  nothing  in  the 
characters,  which  would  raise  a  thought  of  their  being 
feigned ;  but  all  the  internal  marks  imaginable  of  their 
being  real.  It  is  to  be  added  also,  that  mere  genealogies, 
bare  narratives  of  the  number  of  years,  which  persons 
called  by  such  and  such  names  lived,  do  not  carry  the 
face  of  fiction;  perhaps  do  carry  some  presumption  of 
veracity  :  and  all  unadorned  narratives,  which  have  noth- 
ing to  surprise,  may  be  thought  to  carry  somewhat  of  the 
like  presumption  too.  And  the  domestic  and  the  politi- 
cal history  is  plainly  credible.  There  may  be  incidents 
in  Scripture,  which,  taken  alone  in  the  naked  way  they 
are  told,  may  appear  strange;  especially  to  persons  of 
other  manners,  temper,  education :  but  there  are  also 
incidents  of  undoubted  truth,  in  many  or  most  persons' 
lives,  which,  in  the  same  circumstances,  would  appear 
to  the  full  as  strange.  There  may  be  mistakes  of  tran- 
scribers, there  may  be  other  real  or  seeming  mistakes, 
not  easy  to  be  particularly  accounted  for:  but  there  are 
certainly  no  more  things  of  this  kind  in  the  Scripture, 
than  what  were  to  have  been  expected  in  books  of  such 
antiquity;  and  nothing,  in  any  wise,  sufficient  to  discredit 
the  general  narrative.  Now,  that  a  history,  claiming  to 
commence  from  the  creation,  and  extending  in  one  con- 
tinued series,  throe.gh  so  great  a  length  of  time,  and 


268  "        OF  THE  PARTICULAR  EVIDENCE  [P^rt  n. 

variety  of  events,  should  have  such  appearances  of  reality 
and  truth  in  its  whole  contexture,  is  surely  a  very  re- 
markable circumstance  in  its  favour.  And  as  all  this  is 
applicable  to  the  common  history  of  the  New  Testament, 
so  there  is  a  further  credibilit)^  and  a  very  high  one, 
given  to  it  by  profane  authors :  many  of  these  writing  o1 
the  same  times,  and  confirming  the  truth  of  customs  and 
events,  which  are  incidentally  as  well  as  more  purposely 
mentioned  in  it.  And  this  credibility  of  the  common 
Scripture-history,  gives  some  credibility  to  its  miracu- 
lous history:  especially  as  this  is  interwoven  with  the 
common,  so  as  that  they  imply  each  other,  and  both  to- 
gether make  up  one  relation. 

Let  it  then  be  more  particularly  observed  to  this  per- 
son, that  it  is  an  acknowledged  matter  of  fact,  which  is 
indeed  implied  in  the  foregoing  observation,  that  there 
was  such  a  nation  as  the  Jews,  of  the  greatest  antiquity, 
whose  government  and  general  polity  was  founded  on 
the  law,  here  related  to  be  given  them  by  Moses  as  from 
heaven  :  that  natural  religion,  though  with  rites  additional 
yet  no  way  contrary  to  it,  was  their  established  religion, 
which  cannot  be  said  of  the  Gentile  world:  and  that 
their  very  being  as  a  nation,  depended  upon  their  ac- 
knowledgment of  one  God,  the  God  of  the  universe.  For, 
suppose  in  their  captivity  in  Babylon,  they  had  gone  over 
to  the  religion  of  their  conquerors,  there  would  have  re- 
mained no  bond  of  union,  to  keep  them  a  distinct  people. 
And  whilst  they  were  under  their  own  kings,  in  their 
own  country,  a  total  apostasy  from  God  would  have 
been  the  dissolution  of  their  whole  government.  They 
in  such  a  sense  nationally  acknowledged  and  worshipped 
the  Maker  of  heaven  and  earth,  when  the  rest  of  the 
world  were  sunk  in  idolatry,  as  rendered  them,  in  fact, 
the  peculiar  people  of  God.  And  this  so  remarkable 
an  establishment  and  preservation  of  natural  religion 
amongst  them,  seems  to  add  some  peculiar  credibility  to 
the  historical  evidence  for  the  miracles  of  Moses  and 
the  Prophets:  because  these  miracles  are  a  full  satisfac- 
tory account  of  this  event,  which  plainly  wants  to  be 
accounted  for,  and  cannot  otherwise. 

Let  this  person,  supposed  wholly  ignorant  of  history, 


Chap.  VII.]  FOR  CHRISTIANITY.  269 

be  acquainted  further,  that  one  claiming  to  be  the  Mes- 
siah, of  Jewish  extraction,  rose  up  at  the  time  when  this 
nation,  from  the  prophecies  above  mentioned,  expected 
the  Messiah:  that  he  was  rejected,  as  it  seemed  to  have 
been  foretold  he  should,  by  the  body  of  the  people,  un- 
der the  direction  of  their  rulers:  that  in  the  course  of 
a  very  few  years,  he  was  believed  on  and  acknowledged 
as  the  promised  Messiah,  by  great  numbers  among  the 
Gentiles,  agreeably  to  the  prophecies  of  Scripture,  yet 
not  upon  the  evidence  of  prophecy,  but  of  miracles,*  of 
which  miracles  we  have  also  strong  historical  evidence ; 
(by  which  I  mean  here  no  more  than  must  be  acknow- 
ledged by  unbelievers ;  for  let  pious  frauds  and  follies 
be  .admitted  to  weaken,  it  is  absurd  to  say  they  destroy, 
our  evidence  of  miracles  wrought  in  proof  of  Chris- 
tianity:+)  that  this  religion  approving  itself  to  the  reason 
of  mankind,  and  carrying  its  own  evidence  with  it,  so 
far  as  reason  is  a  judge  of  its  system,  and  being  no  way 
contrary  to  reason  in  those  parts  of  it  which  require  to 
be  believed  upon  the  mere  authority  of  its  Author;  that 
this  religion,  I  say,  gradually  spread  and  supported  itself 
for  some  hundred  years,  not  only  without  any  assistance 
from  temporal  power,  but  under  constant  discourage- 
ments, and  often  the  bitterest  persecutions  from  it;  and 
then  became  the  religion  of  the  world :  that  in  the  mean 
time  the  Jewish  nation  and  government  were  destroyed 
in  a  very  remarkable  manner,  and  the  people  carried 
away  captive  and  dispersed  through  the  most  distant 
countries;  in  which  state  of  dispersion  they  have  re- 
mained fifteen  hundred  years:  and  that  they  remain  a 
numerous  people,  united  amongst  themselves,  and  dis- 
tinguished from  the  rest  of  the  world,  as  they  were  in 
the  days  of  Moses,  by  the  profession  of  his  law;  and 
every  where  looked  upon  in  a  manner,  which  one  scarce 
knows  how  distinctly  to  express,  but  in  the  words  of  the 
prophetic  account  of  it,  given  so  many  ages  before  it 
came  to  pass :  Thou  shalt  become  an  astonishment^  a  pro- 
verb, and  a  by-word,  among  all  nations  whither  the  Lord 
shall  lead  thee.X 

The  appearance  of  a  standing  miracle,  in  the  Jews 

♦  p.  246,  &C.  +  p.  252,  &c.  X  DPut-  xxviii.  37. 


270  OF  THE  PARTICULAR  EVIDENCE  [Part  I L 

remaining  a  distinct  people  in  their  dispersion,  and  the 
confirmation  which  this  event  appears  to  give  to  the 
truth  of  revelation,  may  be  thought  to  be  answered,  by 
their  religion's  forbidding  them  intermarriages  with 
those  of  any  other,  and  prescribing  them  a  great  many 
peculiarities  in  their  food,  by  which  they  are  debarred 
from  the  means  of  incorJDorating  with  the  people  in 
whose  countries  they  live.  This  is  not,  I  think,  a  satis- 
factory account  of  that  which  it  pretends  to  account  for. 
But  what  does  it  pretend  to  account  for?  The  cor- 
respondence between  this  event  and  the  prophecies;  or 
the  coincidence  of  both,  with  a  long  dispensation  of 
Providence,  of  a  peculiar  nature,  towards  that  people 
formerly?  No.  It  is  only  the  event  itself,  which  is 
offered  to  be  thus  accounted  for;  which  single  event, 
taken  alone,  abstracted  from  all  such  correspondence 
and  coincidence,  perhaps  would  not  have  appeared  mira- 
culous: but  that  correspondence  and  coincidence  may 
be  so,  though  the  event  itself  be  supposed  not.  Thus 
the  concurrence  of  our  Saviour's  being  born  at  Beth- 
lehem, with  a  long  foregoing  series  of  prophecy  and 
other  coincidences,  is  doubtless  miraculous;  the  series 
of  prophecy,  and  other  coincidences,  and  the  event, 
being  admitted:  though  the  event  itself,  his  birth  at  that 
place,  appears  to  have  been  brought  about  in  a  natural 
way;  of  which,  however,  no  one  can  be  certain. 

And  as  several  of  these  events  seem,  in  some  degree 
expressly,  to  have  verified  the  prophetic  history  already ; 
so  likewise  they  may  be  considered  further,  as  having  a 
peculiar  aspect  towards  the  full  completion  of  it;  as  af- 
fording some  presumption  that  the  whole  of  it  shall,  one 
time  or  other,  be  fulfilled.  Thus,  that  the  Jews  have 
been  so  wonderfully  preserved  in  their  long  and  wide 
dispersion ;  which  is  indeed  the  direct  fulfilling  of  some 
prophecies,  but  is  now  mentioned  only  as  looking  forward 
to  somewhat  yet  to  come:  that  natural  religion  came 
forth  from  Judea,  and  spread,  in  the  degree  it  has  done 
over  the  world,  before  lost  in  idolatry;  which,  together 
with  some  other  things,  have  distinguished  that  very 
place,  in  like  manner  as  the  people  of  it  are  distinguished: 
that  tliis  great  change  of  religion  over  the  earth  was 


Chap.VII.""  for  CHRISTIANITY.  271 

brought  about  under  the  profession  and  acknowledg- 
ment, that  Jesus  was  the  promised  Messiah:  things  of 
this  kind  naturally  turn  the  thoughts  of  serious  men 
towards  the  full  completion  of  the  prophetic  history, 
concerning  the  final  restoration  of  that  people ;  concern- 
ing the  establishment  of  the  everlasting  kingdom  among 
them,  the  kingdom  of  the  Messiah;  and  the  future  state 
of  the  world,  under  this  sacred  government.  Such  cir- 
cumstances and  events,  compared  with  these  prophecies, 
though  no  completions  of  them,  yet  would  not,  I  think, 
be  spoken  of  as  nothing  in  the  argument,  by  a  person 
upon  his  first  being  informed  of  them.  They  fall  in 
with  the  prophetic  history  of  things  still  future,  give  it 
some  additional  credibility,  have  the  appearance  of  being 
somewhat  in  order  to  the  full  completion  of  it. 

Indeed  it  requires  a  good  degree  of  knowledge,  and 
great  calmness  and  consideration,  to  be  able  to  judge 
thoroughly  of  the  evidence  for  the  truth  of  Christianity, 
from  that  part  of  the  prophetic  history  which  relates  to 
the  situation  of  the  kingdoms  of 'the  world,  and'  to  the 
state  of  the  church,  from  the  establishment  of  Christia- 
nity to  the  present  time.  But  it  appears  from  a  general 
view  of  it,  to  be  very  material.  And  those  persons  who 
have  thoroughly  examined  it,  and  some  of  them  were 
men  of  the  coolest  tempers,  greatest  capacities,  and 
least  liable  to  imputations  of  prejudice,  insist  upon  it  as 
determinately  conclusive. 

Suppose  now  a  person  quite  ignorant  of  history,  firs* 
to  recollect  the  passages  above  mentioned  out  of  Scrip  - 
ture,  without  knowing  but  that  the  whole  was  a  late  fic- 
tion, then  to  be  informed  of  the  correspondent  facts  now 
mentioned,  and  to  unite  them  all  into  one  view :  that  the 
profession  and  establishment  of  natural  religion  in  the 
world  is  greatly  owing,  in  different  ways,  to  this  book, 
and  the  supposed  revelation  which  it  contains ;  that  it  is 
acknowledged  to  be  of  the  earliest  antiquity;  that  its 
chronology  and  common  history  are  entirely  credible; 
that  this  ancient  nation,  the  Jews,  of  whom  it  chiefly 
treats,  appear  to  have  been,  in  fact,  the  people  of  God, 
in  a  distinguished  sense;  that,  as  there  was  a  national 
expectation  amongst  them,  raised  from  the  prophecies, 


272  OF  THE  PARTICULAR  EVIDENCE  [Part  TL 

of  a  Messiah  to  appear  at  such  a  time,  so  one  at  this 
time  appeared  claiming  to  be  that  Messiah;  that  he  was 
rejected  by  this  nation,  but  received  by  the  Gentiles,  not 
upon  the  evidence  of  prophecy,  but  of  miracles;  that  the 
religion  he  taught  supported  itself  under  the  greatest 
difficulties,  gained  ground,  and  at  length  became  the 
religion  of  the  world;  that  in  the  mean  time  the  Jewish 
polity  was  utterly  destroyed,  and  the  nation  dispersed 
over  the  face  of  the  earth;  that  notwithstanding  this,  they 
have  remained  a  distinct  numerous  people  for  so  many 
centuries,  even  to  this  day;  which  not  only  appears  to  be 
the  express  completion  of  several  prophecies  concerning 
them,  but  also  renders  it,  as  one  may  speak,  a  visible 
and  easy  possibility  that  tl\s  promises  made  to  them  as 
a  nation,  may  yet  be  fulfilled.  And  to  these  acknow- 
ledged truths,  let  the  person  we  have  been  supposing 
add,  as  I  think  he  ought,  whether  every  one  will  allow 
it  or  no,  the  obvious  appearaii',;es  which  there  are,  of  the 
state  of  the  world,  in  other  respects  besides  what  relates 
to  the  Jews,  and  of  the  Christian  church,  having  so  long 
answered,  and  still  answeriiig  to  the  prophetic  history. 
Suppose,  I  say,  these  facts  set  over  against  the  things 
before  mentioned  out  of  the  Scripture,  and  seriously 
compared  with  them;  the  joint  view  of  both  together 
must,  I  think,  app3ir  of  very  graat  weight  to  a  conside- 
rate reasonable  person:  of  nvi?h  greater  indeed,  upon 
having  them  first  laid  before  him,  than  is  easy  for  us, 
who  are  so  familiarized  to  them,  to  conceive,  without 
some  particular  attention  for  that  purpose. 

All  these  things,  and  the  several  particulars  contained 
under  them,  require  to  be  distinctly  and  most  thoroughly 
examined  into ;  that  the  weight  of  each  may  be  judged  of, 
upon  such  examination,  and  such  conclusion  drawn  as 
results  from  their  united  force.  But  this  has  not  been 
attempted  here.  I  have  gone  no  further  than  to  show, 
that  the  general  imperfect  view  of  them  now  given,  the 
confessed  historical  evidence  for  miracles,  and  the  many 
obvious  appearing  completions  of  prophecy,  together 
with  the  collateral  things*  here  mentioned,  and  there  are 

*  All  the  particular  thinjjs  inrntioned  in  this  chapter,  not  reducible  to  the  head  of 
ci I'.a  .1  iuiriioli!S,  or  dettrmiuate  completions  of  prophecy.     See  p.  2i2 


Chap.  VII.]  FOR  CHRISTIANITY.  273 

several  others  of  the  hke  sort;  that  all  this  together, 
which,  being  fact,  must  be  acknowledged  by  unbelievers, 
amounts  to  real  evidence  of  somewhat  more  than  human 
in  this  matter:  evidence  much  more  important,  than  care- 
less men,  who  have  been  accustomed  only  to  transient 
and  partial  views  of  it,  can  imagine;  and  indeed  abun- 
dantly sufficient  to  act  upon.  And  these  things,  I  ap- 
prehend, must  be  acknowledged  by  unbelievers.  For 
though  they  may  say,  that  the  historical  evidence  of 
miracles  wrought  in  attestation  of  Christianity,  is  not 
sufficient  to  convince  them,  that  such  miracles  were 
really  wrought:  they  cannot  deny,  that  there  is  such 
historical  evidence,  it  being  a  known  matter  of  fact  that 
there  is.  They  may  say,  the  conformity  between  the 
prophecies  and  events  is  by  accident:  but  there  are 
many  instances  in  which  such  conformity  itself  cannot 
be  denied.  They  may  say,  with  regard  to  such  kind  of 
collateral  things  as  those  above  mentioned,  that  any  odd 
accidental  events,  without  meaning,  will  have  a  meaning 
found  in  thenl  by  fanciful  people :  and  that  such  as  are 
fanciful  in  any  one  certain  way,  will  make  out  a  thousand 
coincidences,  which  seem  to  favour  their  peculiar  follies 
Men,  I  say,  may  talk  thus:  but  no  one  who  is  serious, 
can  possibly  think  these  things  to  be  nothing,  if  he  con- 
siders the  importance  of  collateral  things,  and  even  of 
lesser  circumstances,  in  the  evidence  of  probability,  as 
distinguished  in  nature,  from  the  evidence  of  demonstra- 
tion. In  many  cases  indeed  it  seems  to  require  the 
truest  judgment,  to  determine  with  exactness  the  weight 
of  circumstantial  evidence:  but  it  is  very  often  alto- 
gether as  convincing,  as  that  which  is  the  most  express 
and  direct. 

This  general  view  of  the  evidence  for  Christianity, 
considered  as  making  one  argument,  may  also  serve  to 
recommend  to  serious  persons,  to  set  down  every  thing 
which  they  think  may  be  of  any  real  weight  at  all  in 
proof  of  it,  and  particularly  the  many  seeming  comple- 
tions of  prophecy :  and  they  will  find,  that,  judging  by 
the  natural  rules,  by  which  we  judge  of  probable  evi- 
dence in  common  matters,  they  amount  to  a  much  higher 
degree  of  proof,  upon  such  a  joint  review,  than  could  be 

s 


274  OF  THE  PARTICULAR  EVIDENCE  [PaktII. 

supposed  upon  considering  them  separately,  at  different 
times ;  how  strong  soever  the  proof  might  before  appear 
to  them,  upon  such  separate  views  of  it.  For  probable 
proofs,  by  being  added,  not  only  increase  the  evidence, 
but  multiply  it.  Nor  should  I  dissuade  any  one  from 
setting  down,  what  he  thought  made  for  the  contrary 
side.  But  then  it  is  to  be  remembered,  not  in  order  to 
influence  his  judgment,  but  his  practice,  that  a  mistake 
on  one  side  may  be,  in  its  consequences,  much  more 
dangerous,  than  a  mistake  on  the  other.  And  what 
course  is  most  safe,  and  what  most  dangerous,  is  a  con- 
sideration thought  very  material,  when  we  deliberate, 
not  concerning  events,  but  concerning  conduct  in  our 
temporal  affairs.  To  be  influenced  by  this  considera- 
tion in  our  judgment,  to  believe  or  disbelieve  upon  it, 
is  indeed  as  much  prejudice,  as  any  thing  whatever. 
And,  like  other  prejudices,  it  operates  contrary  ways, 
in  different  men ;  for  some  are  inclined  to  believe  what 
they  hope,  and  others  what  they  fear.  And  it  is  manifest 
unreasonableness  to  apply  to  men's  passions  in  order  to 
gain  their  assent.  But  in  deliberations  concerning  con- 
duct, there  is  nothing  which  reason  more  requires  to 
be  taken  into  the  account,  than  the  importance  of  it. 
For,  suppose  it  doubtful,  what  would  be  the  conse- 
quence of  acting  in  this,  or  in  a  contrary  manner :  still, 
that  taking  one  side  could  be  attended  with  little  or  no 
bad  consequence,  and  taking  the  other  might  be  attended 
with  the  greatest,  must  appear,  to  unprejudiced  reason, 
of  the  highest  moment  towards  determining,  how  we  are 
to  act.  But  the  truth  of  our  religion,  like  the  truth  of 
common  matters,  is  to  be  judged  of  by  all  the  evidence 
taken  together.  And  unless  the  whole  series  of  things 
which  may  be  alleged  in  this  argument,  and  every  par- 
ticular thing  in  it,  can  reasonably  be  supposed  to  have 
been  by  accident  (for  here  the  stress  of  the  argument 
for  Christianity  lies) ;  then  is  the  truth  of  it  proved:  in 
like  manner,  as  if  in  any  common  case,  numerous  events 
acknowledged,  were  to  be  alleged  in  proof  of  any  other 
event  disputed ;  the  truth  of  the  disputed  event  would 
be  proved,  not  only  if  any  one  of  the  acknowlcniged  ones 
did  of  itself  clearly  imply  it,  but,  though  no  one  of  them 


Chap,  YIII.]  FOR  CHRISTIANITY.  275 

singly  did  so,  if  the  whole  of  the  acknowledged  events 
taken  together  could  not  in  reason  be  supposed  to  have 
happened,  unless  the  disputed  one  were  true. 

It  is  obvious,  how  much  advantage  the  nature  of  this 
evidence  gives  to  those  persons  who  attack  Christianity, 
especially  in  conversation.  For  it  is  easy  to  show,  in  a 
short  and  lively  manner,  that  such  arid  such  things  are 
liable  to  objection,  that  this  and  another  thing  is  of  little 
weight  in  itself;  but  impossible  to  show,  in  like  manner, 
the  united  force  of  the  whole  argument  in  one  view. 

However,  lastly,  as  it  has  been  made  appear,  that  there 
is  no  presumption  against  a  revelation  as  miraculous ; 
that  the  general  scheme  of  Christianity,  and  the  principal 
parts  of  it,  are  conformable  to  the  experienced  constitu- 
tion of  things,  and  tlie  whole  perfectly  credible :  so  the 
account  now  given  of  the  positive  evidence  for  it,  shows, 
that  this  evidence  is  such,  as,  from  the  nature  of  it,  can- 
not be  destroyed,  though  it  should  be  lessened. 


CHAP.  vni. 

OF  THE  OBJECTIONS  WHICH  MAY  BE  MADE  AGAINST 
ARGUING  FROM  THE  ANALOGY  OF  NATURE,  TO  RELI- 
GION. 

If  every  one  would  consider,  with  such  attention  as  they 
are  bound,  even  in  point  of  morality,  to  consider,  what 
they  judge  and  give  characters  of;  the  occasion  of  this 
chapter  would  be,  in  some  good  measure  at  least,  super- 
seded. But  since  this  is  not  to  be  expected ;  for  some 
we  find  do  not  concern  themselves  to  understand  even 
what  they  write  against :  since  this  treatise,  in  common 
with  most  others,  lies  open  to  objections,  which  may  ap- 
pear very  material  to  thoughtful  men  at  first  sight ;  and, 
besides  that,  seems  peculiarly  liable  to  the  objections  of 
such  as  can  judge  without  thinking,  and  of  such  as  can 
censure  without  judging ;  it  may  not  be  amiss  to  set 
down  the  chief  of  these  objections  which  occur  to  me, 
and  consider  them  to  their  hands.  And  they  are  such  as 
these : 

S9 


276  OBJECTIONS  AGAINST  THE  ANALOGY.  [Part  II. 

"That  it  is  a  poor  thing -to  solve  difficulties  in  reve- 
lation, by  saying,  that  there  are  the  same  in  natural 
religion ;  when  what  is  wanting  is  to  clear  both  of  them 
of  these  their  common,  as  well  as  other  their  respective, 
difficulties :  but  that  it  is  a  strange  way  indeed  of  con- 
vincing men  of  the  obligations  of  religion,  to  show  them, 
that  they  have  as  little  reason  for  their  worldly  pursuits: 
and  a  strange  way  of  vindicating  the  justice  and  goodness 
of  the  Author  of  Nature,  and  of  removing  the  objections 
against  both,  to  which  the  system  of  religion  lies  open, 
to  show,  that  the  like  objections  lie  against  natural 
providence;  a  way  of  answering  objections  against  re- 
ligion, without  so  much  as  pretending  to  make  out,  that 
the  system  of  it,  or  the  particular  things  in  it  objected 
against,  are  reasonable — especially,  perhaps  some  may  be 
inattentive  enough  to  add.  Must  this  be  thought  strange, 
when  it  is  confessed  that  analogy  is  no  answer  to  such 
objections:  that  when  this  sort  of  reasoning  is  carried  to 
the  utmost  length  it  can  be  imagined  capable  of,  it  will 
yet  leave  the  mind  in  a  very  unsatisfied  state  ;  and  that 
it  must  be  unaccountable  ignorance  of  mankind,  to  ima- 
gine they  will  be  prevailed  with  to  forego  their  present 
interests  and  pleasures,  from  regard  to  religion,  upon 
doubtful  evidence." 

Now,  as  plausible  as  this  way  of  talking  may  appear, 
that  appearance  will  be  found  in  a  great  measure  owing 
to  half  views,  which  show  but  part  of  an  object,  yet  show 
that  indistinctly,  and  to  undeterminate  language.  By 
these  means  weak  men  are  often  deceived  by  others, 
and  ludicrous  men,  by  themselves.  And  even  those, 
who  are  serious  and  considerate,  cannot  always  readily 
disentangle,  and  at  once  clearly  see  through  the  perplex- 
ities, in  which  subjects  themselves  are  involved ;  and 
which  are  heightened  by  the  deficiencies  and  the  abuse 
of  words.  To  this  latter  sort  of  persons,  the  following 
reply  to  each  part  of  this  objection  severally,  may  be  of 
some  assistance ;  as  it  may  also  tend  a  little  to  stop  and 
silence  others. 

First,  The  thing  wanted,  i.  e.  what  men  require,  is  to 
have  all  difficulties  cleared.  And  this  is,  or,  at  least  for 
any  tViing  we  know  to  the  contrary,  it  may  be,  the  same. 


Chap.  VIII.]  OF  NATURE  TO  RELIGION.  277 

as  requiring  to  comprehend  the  Divine  nature,  and  the 
whole  plan  of  Providence  from  everlasting  to  everlast- 
ing. But  it  hath  alwaj^s  been  allowed  to  argue  from 
what  is  acknowledged,  to  what  is  disputed.  And  it  is 
in  no  other  sense  a  poor  thing,  to  argue  from  natural 
religion  to  revealed,  in  the  manner  found  fault  with,  than 
it  is  to  argue  in  numberless  other  ways  of  probable  de- 
duction and  inference,  in  matters  of  conduct,  which  we 
are  continually  reduced  to  the  necessity  of  doing.  In- 
deed the  epithet  poor  may  be  applied,  I  fear  as  properly, 
to  great  part  or  the  whole  of  human  life,  as  it  is  to  the 
things  mentioned  in  the  objection.  Is  it  not  a  poor  thing, 
for  a  physician  to  have  so  little  knowledge  in  the  cure 
of  diseases,  as  even  the  most  eminent  have  ?  To  act 
upon  conjecture  and  guess,  where  the  life  of  man  is  con- 
cerned.^ Undoubtedly  it  is:  but  not  in  comparison  of 
having  no  skill  at  all  in  that  useful  art,  and  being  obliged 
to  act  wholly  in  the  dark. 

Further :  since  it  is  as  unreasonable,  as  it  is  common, 
to  urge  objections  against  revelation,  which  are  of  equal 
weight  against  natural  religion  ;  and  those  who  do  this, 
if  they  are  not  confused  themselves,  deal  unfairly  with 
others,  in  making  it  seem,  that  they  are  arguing  only 
against  revelation,  or  particular  doctrines  of  it,  when  in 
reality  they  are  arguing  against  moral'  providence ;  it  is  a 
thing  of  consequence  to  show,  that  such  objections  are 
as  much  levelled  against  natural  religion,  as  against  re- 
vealed. And  objections,  which  are  equally  applicable 
to  both,  are  properly  speaking  answered,  by  its  being 
shown  that  they  are  so,  provided  the  former  be  admitted 
to  be  true.  And  without  taking  in  the  consideration 
how  distinctly  this  is  admitted,  it  is  plainly  very  material 
to  observe,  that  as  the  things  objected  against  in  natural 
religion  are  of  the  same  kind  with  what  is  certain  mat- 
ter of  experience  in  the  course  of  providence,  and  in  the 
information  which  God  affords  us  concerning  our  tem- 
poral interest  under  his  government;  so  the  objections 
against  the  system  of  Christianity,  and  the  evidence  of 
it,  are  of  the  very  same  kind  with  those  which  are 
made  against  the  system  and  evidence  of  natural  religion, 
iljvvfcver,  the  reader  upon  review  may  see,  that  most  of 


2V8  OBJECTIONS  AGAINST  THE  ANALOGY  [P.,Rr  II, 

the  analogies  insisted  upon,  even  in  the  latter  part  of 
this  treatise,  do  not  necessarily  require  to  have  more 
taken  for  granted  than  is  in  the  former;  that  there  is  an 
Author  of  nature,  or  natural  Governor  of  the  world:  and 
Christianity  is  vindicated,  not  from  its  analogy  to  natural 
religion,  but  chiefly  from  its  analogy  to  the  experienced 
constitution  of  nature. 

Secondly,  Religion  is  a  practical  thing,  and  consists  in 
such  a  determinate  course  of  life,  as  being  what,  there  is 
reason  to  think,  is  commanded  by  the  Author  of  nature, 
and  will,  upon  the  whole,  be  our  happiness  under  his 
government.  Now  if  men  can  be  convinced,  that  they 
have  the  like  reason  to  believe  this,  as  to  believe  that 
taking  care  of  their  temporal  affairs  will  be  to  their  ad- 
vantage ;  such  conviction  cannot  but  be  an  argument  to 
them  for  the  practice  of  religion.  And  if  there  be  really 
any  reason  for  believing  one  of  these,  and  endeavouring 
to  preserve  life,  and  secure  ourselves  the  necessaries  and 
conveniences  of  it ;  then  there  is  reason  also  for  believ- 
ing the  other,  and  endeavouring  to  secure  the  interest  it 
proposes  to  us.  And  if  the  interest,  which  religion  pro- 
poses to  us,  be  infinitely  greater  than  our  whole  temporal 
interest;  then  there  must  be  proportionably  greater  reason 
for  endeavouring  to  secure  one,  than  the  other;  since,  by 
the  supposition,  the  probability  of  our  securing  one  is 
equal  to  the  probability  of  our  securing  the  other.  This 
seems  plainly  unanswerable  ;  and  has  a  tendency  to  in- 
fluence fair  minds,  who  consider  what  our  condition  really 
is,  or  upon  what  evidence  we  are  naturally  appointed  to 
act ;  and  who  are  disposed  to  acquiesce  in  the  terms 
upon  which  we  live,  and  attend  to  and  follow  that  practical 
instruction,  whatever  it  be,  which  is  afforded  us. 

But  the  chief  and  proper  force  of  the  argument  re 
ferred  to  in  the  objection,  hes  in  another  place.  For,  it 
is  said  that  the  proof  of  religion  is  involved  in  such  in- 
extricable difficulties,  as  to  render  it  doubtful ;  and  that 
it  cannot  be  supposed,  that,  if  it  were  true,  it  would  be 
left  upon  doubtful  evidence.  Here  then,  over  and  above 
the  force  of  each  particular  difficulty  or  objection,  these 
difficulties  and  objections  taken  t(  gether  are  turned  into 
a  positive  argument  against  the  truth  of  religion;  which 


Cbap.  nil.]  OF  NATURE  TO  RELIGION.  279 

argument  would  stand  thus.  If  religion  were  true,  it 
would  not  be  left  doubtful,  and  open  to  .objections  to  the 
degree  in  which  it  is :  therefore  that  it  is  thus  left,  not 
only  renders  the  evidence  of  it  weak,  and  lessens  its 
force,  in  proportion  to  the  weight  of  such  objections  ; 
but  also  shows  it  to  be  false,  or  is  a  general  presumption 
of  its  being  so.  Now  the  observation,  that,  from  the 
natural  constitution  and  course  of  things,  we  must  in  our^ 
temporal  concerns,  almost  continually,  and  in  matters  of 
great  consequence,  act  upon  evidence  of  a  like  kind  and 
degree  to  the  evidence  of  religion,  is  an  answer  to  this 
argument ;  because  it  shows,  that  it  is  according  to  the 
conduct  and  character  of  the  Author  of  nature  to  appoint 
we  should  act  upon  evidence  like  to  that,  whicli  this 
argument  presumes  he  cannot  be  supposed  io  appoint 
we  should  act  upon :  it  is  an  instance,  a  general  one, 
made  up  of  numerous  particular  ones,  of  somewhat  in 
his  dealing  with  us,  similar  to  what  is  said  to  be  incredi- 
ble. And  as  the  force  of  this  answer  lies  merely  in  the 
parallel,  which  there  is  between  the  evidence  for  religion 
and  for  our  temporal  conduct;  the  answer  is  equally  just 
and  conclusive,  whether  the  parallel  be  made  out,  by 
showing  the  evidence  of  the  former  to  be  higher,  or  the 
evidence  of  the  latter  to  be  lower. 

Thirdly,  The  design  of  this  treatise  is  not  to  vindicate 
the  character  of  God,  but  to  show  the  obligations  of  men: 
it  is  not  to  justify  his  providence,  but  to  show  what  be- 
longs to  us  to  do.  These  are  two  subjects,  and  ought 
not  to  be  confounded.  And  though  they  may  at  length 
run  up  into  each  other,  yet  observations  may  imme- 
diately tend  to  make  out  the  latter,  which  do  not  appear, 
by  any  immediate  connexion,  to  the  purpose  of  the  for- 
mer; which  is  less  our  concern,  than  many  seem  to 
think.  For,  first,  it  is  not  necessary  we  should  justify 
the  dispensations  of  Providence  against  objections,  any 
farther  than  to  show,  that  the  things  objected  against 
may,  for  ought  we  know,  be  consistent  with  justice  and 
goodness.  Suppose  then,  that  there  are  things  in  the 
system  of  this  world,  and  plan  of  Providence  relating  to 
it,  which  taken  alone  would  be  unjust:  yet  it  has  been 
shown  unanswerably,  that  if  we  could  take  in  the  refer- 


280  Objections  AGAINST  THE  ANALOGY         [Pabtii. 

ence,  which  these  things  may  have  to  other  things  pre- 
sent, past,  and  to  come;  to  the  whole  scheme,  which  the 
things  objected  against  are  parts  of;  these  very  things 
might,  for  ought  we  know,  be  found  to  be,  not  only  con- 
sistent with  justice,  but  instances  of  it.  Indeed  it  has 
been  shown,  by  tho  analogy  of  what  we  see,  not  only 
possible  that  this  may  be  the  case,  but  credible  that  it  is. 
And  thus  objections,  drawn  from  such  things,  are  an- 
swered, and  Providence  is  vindicated,  as  far  as  religion 
makes  its  vindication  necessary.  Hence  it  appears, 
secondly,  that  objections  against  the  Divine  justice  and 
goodness  are  not  endeavoured  to  be  removed,  by  show- 
ing that  the  like  objections,  allowed  to  be  really  conclu- 
sive, lie  against  natural  providence  :  but  those  objections 
being  supposed  and  shown  not  to  be  conclusive,  the 
things  objected  against,  considered  as  matters  of  fact,  are 
farther  shown  to  be  credible,  from  their  conformity  to 
the  constitution  of  nature ;  for  instance,  that  God  will  re- 
ward and  punish  men  for  their  actions  hereafter,  from 
the  observation,  that  he  does  reward  and  punish  them 
for  their  actions  here.  And  this,  I  apprehend,  is  of 
weight.  And  I  add,  thirdly,  it  would  be  of  weight,  even 
though  those  objections  were  not  answered.  For,  there 
being  the  proof  of  religion  above  set  down ;  and  religion 
implying  several  facts ;  for  instance  again,  the  fact  last 
mentioned,  that  God  will  reward  and  punish  men  for 
their  actions  hereafter;  the  observation,  that  his  present 
method  of  government  is  by  rewards  and  punishments, 
shows  that  future  fact  not  to  be  incredible:  whatever  ob- 
jections men  may  think  they  have  against  it,  as  unjust  or 
unmerciful,  according  to  their  notions  of  justice  and 
mercy;  or  as  improbable  from  their  belief  of  necessity. 
I  say,  as  improhable:  for  it  is  evident  no  objection  against 
it,  as  unjust,  can  be  urged  from  necessity ;  since  this  no- 
tion as  much  destroys  injustice,  as  it  does  justice.  Then, 
fourthly.  Though  objections  against  the  reasonableness 
of  the  system  of  religion  cannot  indeed  be  answered  with- 
out entering  into  consideration  of  its  reasonableness; 
vet  objections  against  the  credibihty  or  truth  of  it  may. 
Because  the  system  of  it  is  reducible  into  what  is  pro- 
perly matter  of  fact :  and  the  truth,  the  probable  truth, 


Chap.  VIII.]  OF  NATURE  TO  RELIGION.      *  281 

of  facts,  may  be  shown  without  consideration  of  their 
reasonableness.  Nor  is  it  necessary,  though,  in  some 
cases  and  respects,  it  is  highly  useful  and  proper,  yet  it 
is  not  necessary,  to  give  a  proof  of  the  reasonableness  of 
every  precept  enjoined  us,  and  of  every  particular  dis- 
pensation of  Providence,  which  comes  into  the  system  of 
religion.  Indeed  the  more  thoroughly  a  person  of  a 
right  disposition  is  convinced  of  the  perfection  of  the 
Divine  nature  and  conduct,  the  farther  he  will  advance 
towards  that  perfection  of  religion,  which  St  John*  speaks 
of  But  the  general  obligations  of  religion  are  fully 
made  out,  by  proving  the  reasonableness  of  the  practice 
of  it.  And  that  the  practice  of  religion  is  reasonable, 
may  be  shown,  though  no  more  could  be  proved,  than 
that  the  system  of  it  may  be  so,  for  ought  we  know  to 
the  contrary:  and  even  without  entering  into  the  distinct 
consideration  of  this.  And  from  hence,  fifthly.  It  is  easy 
to  see,  that  though  the  analogy  of  nature  is  not  an  imme- 
diate answer  to  objections  against  the  wisdom,  the  jus- 
tice, or  goodness,  of  any  doctrine  or  precept  of  religion ; 
yet  it  may  be,  as  it  is,  an  immediate  and  direct  answer 
to  what  is  really  intended  by  such  objections ;  which 
is,  to  show  that  the  things  objected  against  are  incre- 
dible. 

Fourthly,  It  is  most  readily  acknowledged,  that  the 
foregoing  treatise  is  by  no  means  satisfactory ;  very  far 
indeed  from  it :  but  so  would  any  natural  institution  of 
life  appear,  if  reduced  into  a  system,  together  with  its 
evidence.  Leaving  religion  out  of  the  case,  men  are 
divided  in  their  opinions,  whether  our  pleasures  over- 
balance our  pains  :  and  whether  it  be,  or  be  not,  eligible 
to  live  in  this  world.  And  were  all  such  controversies 
settled,  which  perhaps,  in  speculation,  would  be  found 
involved  in  great  difficulties ;  and  were  it  determined 
upon  the  evidence  of  reason,  as  nature  has  determined 
it  to  our  hands,  that  life  is  to  be  preserved:  yet  still,  the 
rules  which  God  has  been  pleased  to  afford  us,  for  escap- 
ing the  miseries  of  it,  and  obtaining  its  satisfactions,  the 
rules,  for  instance,  of  preserving  health,  and  recovering 
it  when  lost,  are  not  only  fallible   and  precarious,  but 

*  John  iv.  18.  '  ^  /, 


282  OBJECTIONS  AGAINST  THE  ANALOGY  [Part II. 

very  far  from  being  exact.  Nor  are  we  informed  by  na- 
ture, in  future  contingencies  and  accidents,  so  as  to  ren- 
der it  at  all  certain,  what  is  the  best  method  of  managing 
our  affairs.  What  will  be  the  success  of  our  temporal 
pursuits,  in  the  common  sense  of  the  word  Success,  is 
highly  doubtful.  And  what  will  be  the  success  of  them 
in  the  proper  sense  of  the  word  ;  i.  e.  what  happiness  or 
enjoyment  we  shall  obtain  by  them,  is  doubtful  in  a  much 
higher  degree.  Indeed  the  unsatisfactory  nature  of  the 
evidence,  with  which  we  are  obliged  to  take  up,  in  the 
daily  course  of  life,  is  scarce  to  be  expressed.  Yet  men 
do  not  throw  away  life,  or  disregard  the  interests  of  it, 
upon  account  of  this  doubtfulness.  The  evidence  of  re- 
ligion then  being  admitted  real,  those  who  object  against 
it,  as  not  satisfactory,  i.  e.  as  not  being  what  they  wish 
it,  plainly  forget  the  very  condition  of  our  being :  for 
satisfaction,  in  this  sense,  does  not  belong  to  such  a 
creature  as  man.  And,  which  is  more  material,  they 
forget  also  the  very  nature  of  religion.  For,  religion  pre- 
supposes, in  all  those  who  will  embrace  it,  a  certain  de- 
gree of  integrity  and  honesty;  which  it  was  intended  to 
try  w^hether  men  have  or  not,  and  to  exercise  in  such  as 
have  it,  in  order  to  its  improvement.  Religion  presup- 
poses this  as  much,  and  in  the  same  sense,  as  speaking 
to  a  man  presupposes  he  understands  the  language  in 
which  you  speak  ;  or  as  warning  a  man  of  any  danger 
presupposes  that  he  hath  such  a  regard  to  himself,  as 
that  he  will  endeavour  to  avoid  it.  And  therefore  the 
question  is  not  at  all,  Whether  the  evidence  of  religion 
be  satisfactory  ;  but  Whether  it  be,  in  reason,  sufficient 
to  prove  and  discipline  tha't  virtue,  which  it  presupposes. 
Now  the  evidence  of  it  is  fully  sufficient  for  all  those 
purposes  of  probation  ;  how  far  soever  it  is  from  being 
satisfactory,  as  to  the  purposes  of  curiosity,  or  any  other: 
and  indeed  it  answers  the  purposes  of  the  former  in 
several  respects,  which  it  would  not  do,  if  it  were  as 
overbearing  as  is  required.  One  might  add  farther;  that 
whether  the  motives  or  the  evidence  for  any  course  of 
action  be  satisfactory,  meaning  here,  by  thait  word,  what 
satisfies  a  man,  that  such  a  course  of  action  will  in  event 
be  for  his  good  ;  this  need  never  be,  and  I  think^  strictly 


Chap.  VIII.]  OF  NATURE  TO  RELIGION.  283 

speaking,  never  is,  the  practical  question  in  common 
matters.  But  the  practical  question  in  all  cases  is, 
Whether  the  evidence  for  a  course  of  action  be  such  as, 
taking  in  all  circumstances,  makes  the  faculty  within  us, 
which  is  the  guide  and  judge  of  conduct,*  determine  that 
course  of  action  to  be  prudent.  Indeed,  satisfaction  that 
it  will  be  foi*  our  interest  or  happiness,  abundantly  deter- 
mines an  action  to  be  prudent :  but  evidence  almost  in- 
finitely lower  than  this,  determines  actions  to  be  so  too ; 
even  in  the  conduct  of  every  day. 

Fifthly,  As  to  the  objection  concerning  the  influence 
which  this  argument,  or  any  part  of  it,  may,  or  may  not 
be  expected  to  have  upon  men ;  I  observe,  as  above, 
that  religion  being  intended  for  a  trial  and  exercise  of 
the  morality  of  every  person's  character,  who  is  a  sub- 
ject of  it ;  and  there  being,  as  I  have  shown,  such  evi- 
dence for  it,  as  is  sufficient,  in  reason,  to  influence  men 
to  embrace  it :  to  object,  that  it  is  not  to  be  imagined 
mankind  will  be  influenced  by  such  evidence,  is  nothing 
to  the  purpose  of  the  foregoing  treatise.  For  the  pur- 
pose of  it  is  not  to  inquire,  what  sort  of  creatures  man- 
kind are  ;  but  what  the  light  and  knowledge,  which  is 
afforded  them,  requires  they  should  be  :  to  show  how,  in 
reason,  they  ought  to  behave ;  not  how,  in  fact,  they  will 
behave.  This  depends  upon  themselves,  and  is  their 
own  concern  ;  the  personal  concern  of  each  man  in  par- 
ticular. And  how  little  regard  the  generality  have  to  it, 
experience  indeed  does  too  fully  show.  But  religion, 
considered  as  a  probation,  has  had  its  end  upon  all  per- 
sons, to  whom  it  has  been  proposed  w4th  evidence  suf- 
ficient in  reason  to  influence  their  practice:  for  by  this 
means  they  have  been  put  into  a  state  of  probation ;  let 
tliem  behave  as  they  will  in  it.  And  thus,  not  only  re- 
velation, but  reason  also,  teaches  us,  that  by  the  evidence 
of  religion  being  laid  before  men,  the  designs  of  Provi- 
dence are  carrying  on,  not  only  with  regard  to  those  who 
will,  but  likewise  with  regard  to  those  who  will  not,  be 
influenced  by  it.  However,  lastly,  the  objection  here  re- 
ferred to,  allows  the  things  insisted  upon  in  this  treatise 
to  be  of  some  weight ;  and  if  so,  it  may  be  hoped  it  will 

*  See  Dissert.  II. 


284  OBJECTIONS  AGAINST  THE  ANALOGY  [PartH, 

have  some  influence.  And  if  there  be  a  probabihty  that 
it  will  have  any  at  all,  tliere  is  the  same  reason  in  kind, 
though  not  in  degree,  to  lay  it  before  men,  as  there  would 
be,  if  it  were  likely  to  have  a  greater  influence. 

And  farther,  I  desire  it  may  be  considered,  with  re- 
spect to  the  whole  of  the  foregoing  objections,  that  in  this 
treatise  I  have  argued  upon  the  principles  of  others,*  not 
my  own :  and  have  omitted  what  1  think  true,  and  of  the 
utmost  importance,  because  by  others  thought  unintelli- 
gible, or  not  true.  Thus  I  have  argued  upon  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  Fatalists,  which  I  do  not  believe :  and  have 
omitted  a  thing  of  the  utmost  importance  which  I  do  be- 
lieve, the  moral  fitness  and  unfitness  of  actions,  prior  to 
all  will  whatever;  which  I  apprehend  as  certainly  to 
determine  the  Divine  conduct,  as  speculative  truth  and 
falsehood  necessarily  determine  the  Divine  judgment. 
Indeed  the  principle  of  liberty,  and  that  of  moral  fitness, 
so  force  themselves  upon  the  mind,  that  moralists,  the 
ancients  as  well  as  moderns,  have  formed  their  language 
upon  it  And  probably  it  may  appear  in  mine  :  though 
I  have  endeavoured  to  avoid  it;  and,  in  order  to  avoid  it, 
have  sometimes  been  obliged  to  express  myself  in  a 
manner,  which  will  appear  strange  to  such  as  do  not 
observe  the  reason  for  it:  but  the  general  argument  here 
pursued  does  not  at  all  suppose,  or  proceed  upon  these 
principles.  Now,  these  two  abstract  principles  of  liberty 
and  moral  fitness  being  omitted,  religion  can  be  consid- 
ered in  no  other  view,  than  merely  as  a  question  of 
fact:  and  in  this  view  it  is  here  considered.  It  is  obvious, 
that  Christianity,  and  the  proof  of  it,  are  both  historical. 
And  even  natural  religion  is,  properly,  a  matter  of  fact. 
For,  that  there  is  a  righteous  Governor  of  the  world,  is 
so:  and  this  proposition  contains  the  general  system  of 
natural  religion.  But  then,  several  abstract  truths,  and 
in  particular  those  two  principles,  are  usually  taken  into 
consideration  in  the  proof  of  it:  whereas  it  is  here  treated 
of  only  as  a  matter  of  fact.  To  explain  this:  that  the 
three  angles  of  a  triangle  are  equal  to  two  right  ones, 

*  By  arguing  vpon  the  principles  of  others,  the  ri'ader  will  observe  is  meant,  not 
proving  any  tiling  from  those  iiriiici},l«'S,  hut  nctwilhsiajiditig  thom.  Thus  reli{>i(>n 
is  proved,  not  from  the  ojiiiiion  of  iitctssiLy  ;  wliicli  is  absurd:  but,  notwithstanding 
or  eveJ^  though  that  opinion  were  admitted  to  be  true. 


ch.u'.  a'iii.]  of  nature  to  religion.  285 

is  an  abstract  truth:  but  that  they  appear  so  to  our  mind, 
is  only  a  matter  of  fact.  And  this  last  must  have  been 
admitted,  if  any  thing  was,  by  those  ancient  sceptics,  who 
would  not  have  admitted  the  former:  but  pretended  to 
doubt,  Whether  there  were  any  such  thing  as  truth,  or 
Whether  we  could  certainly  depend  upon  our  faculties 
of  understanding  for  the  knowledge  of  it  in  any  case. 
So  likewise,  that  there  is,  in  the  nature  of  things,  an 
original  standard  of  right  and  wrong  in  actions,  indepen- 
dent upon  all  will,  but  which  unalterably  determines  the 
will  of  God,  to  exercise  that  moral  government  over  the 
•world,  which  religion  teaches,  i.  e.  finally  and  upon  the 
whole  to  reward  and  punish  men  respectively  as  they  act 
right  or  wrong ;  this  assertion  contains  an  abstract  truth, 
as  well  as  matter  of  fact.  But  suppose,  in  the  present 
state,  every  man,  without  exception,  was  rewarded  and 
punished,  in  exact  proportion  as  he  followed  or  trans- 
gressed that  sense  of  right  and  wrong,  which  God  has 
implanted  in  the  nature  of  every  man :  this  would  not  be 
at  all  an  abstract  truth,  but  only  a  matter  of  fact.  And 
though  this  fact  were  acknowledged  by  every  one ;  yet 
the  very  same  difficulties  might  be  raised  as  are  now, 
concerning  the  abstract  questions  of  liberty  and  moral 
fitness:  and  we  should  have  a  proof,  even  the  certain 
one  of  experience,  that  the  government  of  the  world  was 
perfectly  moral,  without  taking  in  the  consideration  of 
those  questions:  and  this  proof  would  remain,  in  what 
way  soever  they  were  determined.  And  thus,  God  hav- 
ing given  mankind  a  moral  faculty,  the  object  of  which 
is  actions,  and  which  natiirally  approves  some  actions  as 
right,  and  of  good  desert,  and  condemns  others  as  wrong, 
and  of  ill  desert;  that  he  will,  finally  and  upon  the  whole, 
reward  the  former  and  punish  the  latter,  is  not  an  asser- 
tion of  an  abstract  truth,  but  of  what  is  as  mere  a  fact,  as 
his  doing  so  at  present  w^ould  be.  This  future  fact  I 
have  not,  indeed,  proved  with  the  force  with  which  it 
might  be  proved,  from  the  principles  of  liberty  and  moral 
fitness;  but  without  them  have  given  a  really  conclusive 
practical  proof  of  it,  which  is  greatly  strengthened  by  the 
general  analogy  of  nature:  a  proof  easily  cavilled  at, 
easilv  shown  not  to  be  demonstrative,  for  it  is  not  offered 


286  CONCLUSION.  [PartII 

as  such;  but  impossible,  I  think,  to  be  evaded,  or  an- 
swered. And  thus  the  obhgations  of  rehgion  are  made 
out,  exclusively  of  the  questions  concerning  liberty  and 
moral  fitness;  which  have  been  perplexed  with  difficul- 
ties and  abstruse  reasonings,  as  every  thing  may. 

Hence  therefore  may  be  observed  distinctly,  what  is 
the  force  of  this  treatise.  It  w411  be,  to  such  as  are  con- 
vinced of  religion  upon  the  proof  arising  out  of  the  two 
last  mentioned  principles,  an  additional  proof  and  a  con- 
firmation of  it:  to  such  as  do  not  admit  those  principles, 
an  original  proof  of  it,*  and  a  confirmation  of  that  proof. 
Those  who  believe  will  here  find  the  scheme  of  Chris- 
tianity cleared  of  objections,  and  the  evidence  of  it  in  a 
peculiar  manner  strengthened:  those  v/ho  do  not  believe 
will  at  least  be  shown  the  absurdity  of  all  attempts  to 
prove  Christianity  false,  the  plain  undoubted  credibility 
of  it;  and,  I  hope,  a  good  deal  more. 

And  thus,  though  some  perhaps  may  seriously  think, 
that  analogy,  as  here  urged,  has  too  great  stress  laid 
upon  it;  and  ridicule,  unanswerable  ridicule,  may  be 
applied,  to  show  the  argument  from  it  in  a  disadvan- 
tageous light;  yet  there  can  be  no  question,  but  that  it  is 
a  real  one.  For  religion,  both  natural  and  revealed, 
implying  in  it  numerous  facts;  analogy,  being  a  confir- 
mation of  all  facts  to  which  it  can  be  applied,  as  it  is  the 
only  proof  of  most,  cannot  but  be  admitted  by  every  one 
to  be  a  material  thing,  and  truly  of  weight  on  the  side 
of  religion,  both  natural  and  revealed:  and  it  ought  to 
be  particularly  regarded  by  such  as  profess  to  follow 
nature,  and  to  be  less  satisfied  with  abstract  reasonings. 


CONCLUSION. 

Whatever  account  may  be  given  of  the  strange  inat- 
tention and  disregard,  in  some  ages  and  countries,  to  a 
matter  of  such  importance  as  Religion;  it  would,  before 
experience,  be  incredible,  that  there  should  be  the  like 
disregard  in  those,  who  have  had  the  moral  system  of 
the  world  laid  before  them,  as  it  is  by  Christianity,  and 

*  p.  141,  &c. 


Partil]  conclusion.  287 

often  inculcated  upon  them :  because  this  moral  system 
carries  in  it  a  good  degree  of  evidence  for  its  truth,  upon 
its  being  barely  proposed  to  our  thoughts.     There  is  no 
need  of  abstruse  reasonings  and  distinctions,  to  convince 
an  unprejudiced  understanding,  that  there  is  a  God  who 
made  and  governs  the  world,  and  will  judge  it  in  right- 
eousness;   though  they  may    be  necessary  to   answer 
abstruse  difficulties,  when  once  such  are  raised:  when 
the  very  meaning  of  those  words,  which  express  most 
intelligibly  the  general  doctrine  of  religion,  is  pretended 
to  be  uncertain;  and  the  clear  truth  of  the  thing  itself  is 
obscured  by  the  intricacies  of  speculation.     But  to  an 
unprejudiced  mhid,  ten  thousand  thousand  instinces  of 
design  cannot  but  prove  a  designer.     And  it  is  intui- 
tively manifest,  that  creatures  ought  to  live  under  a  duti- 
ful sense  of  their  Maker;  and  that  justice  and  charity 
must  be  his  laws,  to  creatures  whom  he  has  made  social, 
and  placed  in  society.     Indeed  the   truth  of  revealed 
religion,  peculiarly  so  called,  is  not  self-evident,  but  re- 
quires  external  proof,  in   order  to  its  being  received. 
Yet  inattention,  among  us,  to  revealed  religion,  will  be 
found  to  imply  the  same  dissolute  immoral  temper  of 
iviind,  as  inattention  to  natural  religion:  because,  wiien 
bo  h  are  laid  before  us,  in  the  manner  they  are  in  Chris-^ 
uan  countries  of  liberty,  our  obligations  to  inquire  into 
ooth,  and  to  embrace  both  upon  supposition   of  their 
tiuth,  are  obligations  of  the  same  nature.     For,  revela- 
tion claims  to  be  the  voice  of  God:  and  our  obligation 
to  attend  to  his  voice  is  surely  moral  in  all  cases.     And 
as  it  is  insisted,  that   its  evidence  is  conclusive,  upon 
thorough  consideration  of  it;  so  it  offers  itself  to  us  with 
manifest  obvious  appearances  of  having  something  more 
than  human  in  it,  and  therefore  in  all  reason  requires  to 
have  its  claims  most  seriously  examined  into.     It  is  to 
be   added,  that   though  light  and  knowledge,  in  what 
manner  soever  afforded  us,  is  equally  from  God ;  yet  a 
miraculous  revelation  has  a  peculiar  tendency,  from  the 
first  principles  of  our  nature,  to  awaken  mankind,  and 
mspire  them  with   reverence   and   awe  :   and  this  is  a 
peculiar  obligation,  to   attend  to  what  claims  to  be  so 
with  such  appearances  of  truth.     It  is  therefore  most 


288  CONCLUSION.  [Part  II. 

certain,  that  our  obligations  to  inquire  seriously  into  the 
evidence  of  Christianity,  and,  upon  supposition  of  its 
truth,  to  embrace  it,  are  of  the  utmost  importance,  and 
moral  in  the  highest  and  most  proper  sense.  Let  us 
then  suppose,  that  the  evidence  of  religion  in  general, 
and  of  Christianity,  has  been  seriously  inquired  into,  by 
all  reasonable  men  among  us.  Yet  we  find  many  pro- 
fessedly to  reject  both,  upon  speculative  principles  of 
infidelity.  And  all  of  them  do  not  content  themselves 
with  a  bare  neglect  of  religion,  and  enjoying  their  ima- 
ginary freedom  from  its  restraints.  Some  go  much 
beyond  this.  They  deride  God's  moral  government 
over  the  world.  They  renounce  his  protection,  and 
defy  his  justice.  They  ridicule  and  vilify  Christianity, 
and  blaspheme  the  author  of  it ;  and  take  all  occasions 
to  manifest  a  scorn  and  contempt  of  revelation.  This 
amounts  to  an  active  setting  themselves  against  religion; 
to  what  may  be  considered  as  a  positive  principle  of  irre- 
ligion ;  which  they  cultivate  within  themselves,  and, 
whether  they  intend  this  effect  or  not,  render  habitual,  as  a 
good  man  does  the  contrary  principle.  And  others,  who 
are  not  chargeable  with  all  this  profligateness,  yet  are  in 
avowed  opposition  to  religion,  as  if  discovered  to  be 
groundless.  Now  admitting,  which  is  the  supposition 
we  go  upon,  that  these  persons  act  upon  what  they 
think  principles  of  reason,  and  otherwise  they  are  not 
to  be  argued  with;  it  is  really  inconceivable,  that  they 
should  imagine  they  clearly  see  the  whole  evidence  of 
it,  considered  in  itself,  to  be  nothing  at  all:  nor  do  they 
pretend  this.  They  are  far  indeed  from  having  a  just 
notion  of  its  evidence:  but  they  would  not  say  its  evi- 
dence was  nothing,  if  they  thought  the  system  of  it,  with 
all  its  circumstances,  were  credible,  like  other  matters  of 
science  or  history.  So  their  manner  of  treating  it  must 
proceed,  either  from  such  kind  of  objections  against  all 
rehgion,  as  have  been  answered  or  obviated  in  the  for- 
mer part  of  this  treatise;  or  else  from  objections,  and 
difficulties,  supposed  more  peculiar  to  Christianity. 
Thus,  they  entertain  prejudices  against  the  whole  no- 
tion  of  a  revelation,  and  miraculous  interpositions. 
They  find  things   in  Scripture,  whether  in  incidental 


partii.1  conclusion.  289 

passages,  or  in  the  general  scheme  of  it,  which  appear 
to  them  unreasonable.  They  take  for  granted,  that  if 
Christianity  were  true,  the  light  of  it  must  have  been 
more  general,  and  the  evidence  of  it  more  satisfactory, 
or  rather  overbearing :  that  it  must  and  would  have 
been,  in  some  way,  otherwise  put  and  left,  than  it  is. 
Now  this  is  not  imagining  they  see  the  evidence  itself  to 
be  nothing,  or  inconsiderable  ;  but  quite  another  thing. 
It  is  being  fortified  against  the  evidence,  in  some  degree 
acknowledged,  by  thinking  they  see  the  system  of  Chris- 
tianity, or  somewhat  which  appears  to  them  necessarily 
connected  with  it,  to  be  incredible  or  false  ;  fortified 
against  that  evidence,  w^hich  might,  otherwise,  make 
great  impression  upon  them.  Or,  lastly,  if  any  of  these 
persons  are,  upon  the  whole,  in  doubt  concerning  the 
truth  of  Christianity ;  their  behaviour  seems  owing  to 
their  taking  for  granted,  through  strange  inattention,  that 
such  doubting  is,  in  a  manner,  the  same  thing  as  being 
certain  against  it. 

To  these  persons,  and  to  this  state  of  opinion  con- 
cerning religion,  the  foregoing  treatise  is  adapted.  For, 
all  the  general  objections  against  the  moral  system  of 
nature  having  been  obviated,  it  is  shown,  that  there  is 
not  any  peculiar  presumption  at  all  against  Christianity, 
either  considered  as  not  discoverable  bv  reason,  or  as  un- 
like  to  what  is  so  discovered ;  nor  any  worth  mentioning 
against  it  as  miraculous,  if  any  at  all ;  none,  certainly, 
which  can  render  it  in  the  least  incredible.  It  is  shown, 
that,  upon  supposition  of  a  divine  revelation,  the  analogy 
of  nature  renders  it  beforehand  highly  credible,  I  think 
probable,  that  many  things  in  it  must  appear  liable  to 
great  objections  ;  and  that  we  must  be  incompetent  judges 
of  it,  to  a  great  degree.  This  observation  is,  I  think, 
unquestionably  true,  and  of  the  very  utmost  importance: 
but  it  is  urged,  as  I  hope  it  will  be  understood,  with 
great  caution  of  not  vilifying  the  faculty  of  reason,  which 
is  the  candle  of  the  Lord  within  us  ;*  though  it  can  afford 
no  light,  where  it  does  not  shine  ;  nor  judge,  where  it 
has  no  principles  to  judge  upon.  The  objections  here 
spoken  of,  being  first  answered  in  the  view  of  objections 

•  Prov.  xs.  27 
T 


290  CONCLUSION.  [PabtIL 

against  Christianity  as  a  matter  of  fact,  are  in  the  next 
place  considered  as  urged  more  immediately  against  the 
wisdom,  justice,  and  goodness  of  the  Christian  dispensa- 
tion. And  it  is  fully  made  out,  that  they  admit  of 
exactly  the  like  answer,  in  every  respect,  to  what  the 
like  objections  against  the  constitution  of  nature  admit 
of:  that,  as  partial  views  give  the  appearance  of  wrong 
to  things,  which,  upon  further  consideration  and  know- 
ledge of  their  relations  to  other  things,  are  found  just 
and  good  ;  so  it  is  perfectly  credible,  that  the  things 
objected  against  the  wisdom  and  goodness  of  the  Chris- 
tian dispensation,  may  be  rendered  instances  of  wis- 
dom and  goodness,  by  their  reference  to  other  things 
beyond  our  view :  because  Christianity  is  a  scheme  as 
much  above  our  comprehension,  as  that  of  nature  ;  and 
like  that,  a  scheme  in  which  means  are  made  use  of  to 
accomplish  ends,  and  which,  as  is  most  credible,  may  be 
carried  on  by  general  laws.  And  it  ought  to  be  attended 
to,  that  this  is  not  an  answer  taken  merely  or  chiefly 
from  our  ignorance  ;  but  from  somewhat  positive,  which 
our  observation  shows  us.  For,  to  like  objections,  the  like 
answer  is  experienced  to  be  just,  in  numberless  parallel 
cases.  The  objections  against  the  Christian  dispensation, 
and  the  method  by  which  it  is  carried  on,  having  been 
thus  obviated,  in  general  and  together  ;  the  chief  of  them 
are  considered  distinctly,  and  the  particular  things  ob- 
jected to  are  shown  credible,  by  their  perfect  analogy, 
each  apart,  to  the  constitution  of  nature.  Thus,  if  man  be 
fallen  from  his  primitive  state,  and  to  be  restored,  and  in- 
finite wisdom  and  power  engages  in  accomplishing  our 
recovery  :  it  were  to  have  been  expected,  it  is  said,  that 
this  should  have  been  effected  at  once ;  and  not  by  such 
a  long  series  of  means,  and  such  a  various  economy 
of  persons  and  things ;  one  dispensation  preparatory  to 
another,  this  to  a  further  one,  and  so  on  through  an  in- 
definite number  of  ages,  before  the  end  of  the  scheme 
proposed  can  be  completely  accomplished ;  a  scheme 
conducted  by  infinite  wisdom,  and  executed  by  almighty 
power.  But  now,  on  the  contrary,  our  findiiig  that 
every  thing  in  the  constitution  and  course  of  nature  is 
thus   carried  on,   shows   such   expectations  concerning 


Part  II.]  '  CONCLUSION.  291 

revelation  to  be  highly  unreasonable  ;  and  is  a  satisfac- 
tory answer  to  them,  when  urged  as  objections  against 
the  credibility,  that  the  great  scheme  of  Providence  in 
the  redemption  of  the  world  may  be  of  this  kind,  and  to 
be  accomplished  in  this  manner.  As  to  the  particular 
method  of  our  redemption,  the  appointment  of  a  Medi- 
ator between  God  and  man  :  this  has  been  shown  to  be 
most  obviously  analogous  to  the  general  conduct  of  na- 
ture, i  e.  the  God  of  nature,  in  appointing  others  to  be 
the  instruments  of  his  mercy,  as  v/e  experience  in  the 
daily  course  of  providence.  The  condition  of  this  world, 
which  the  doctrine  of  our  redemption  by  Christ  presup- 
poses, so  much  falls  in  with  natural  appearances,  that 
heathen  moralists  inferred  it  from  those  appearances  : 
inferred,  that  human  nature  was  fallen  from  its  original 
rectitude,  and  in  consequence  of  this,  degraded  from  its 
primitive  happiness.  Or,  however  this  opinion  came 
into  the  world,  these  appearances  must  have  kept  up 
the  tradition,  and  confirmed  the  belief  of  it.  And  as  it 
was  the  general  opinion  under  the  light  of  nature,  that 
repentance  and  reformation,  alone  and  by  itself,  was  not 
sufficient  to  do  away  sm,  and  procure  a  full  remission  of 
the  penalties  annexed  to  it ;  and  as  the  reason  of  the 
thing  does  not  at  all  lead  to  any  such  conclusion  ;  so 
every  day's  experience  shows  us,  that  reformation  is  not, 
in  any  sort,  sufficient  to  prevent  the  present  disadvan- 
tages and  miseries,  which,  in  the  natural  course  of 
things,  God  has  annexed  to  folly  and  extravagance. 
Yet  there  may  be  ground  to  think,  that  the  punish- 
ments, which,  by  the  general  laws  of  divine  government, 
are  annexed  to  vice,  may  be  prevented :  that  provision 
may  have  been,  even  originally,  made,  that  they  should 
be  prevented  by  some  means  or  other,  though  they 
could  not  by  reformation  alone.  For  we  have  daily  in- 
stances of  such  mercy ^  in  the  general  conduct  of  nature  : 
compassion  provided  for  misery,*  medicines  for  diseases, 
friends  against  enemies.  There  is  provision  made,  in 
the  original  constitution  of  the  world,  that  much  of  the 
natural  bad  consequences  of  our  follies,  which  persons 
themselves  alone  cannot  prevent,  may  be  prevented  by 

*  Serm.  at  the  Rolls,  p.  106. 
2  T 


r92  CONCL    SION.  '  [PABtn. 

the  assistance  of  others  ;  assistance,  which  nature  ena- 
bles, and  disposes,  and  appoints  them  to  afibrd.      By  a 
nit'thod  of  goodness  analogous  to  this,  when  the  world 
lay  in  wickedness,  and  consequently  in  ruin,  God  so  loved 
tlie  worlds  that  he  gave  his  only  hegoiten  Son  to  save  it : 
and  he  being  made  perfect  hi)  sufferings  became  the  author 
of  eternal  salvation  to  all  them  that  obey  him*     Indeed 
neither  reason  nor  analogy  would  lead  us  to  think,  in 
particular,  that  the  interposition  of  Christ,  in  the  manner 
in  which  he  did  interpose,  would  be  of  that  efficacy  for 
recovery  of  the  world,  which  the  Scripture  teaches  us  it 
was  :  but  neither  would  reason  nor  analogy  lead  us  to 
think,  that  other  particular  means  would  be  of  the  eflS- 
cacy,  which  experience  shows  they  ai-e,  in  numberless 
instances.     And  therefore,  as  the  case  before  us  does  not 
admit  of  experience  ;  so,  that  neither  reason  nor  analogy 
can  show  how,  or  in  what  particular  way,  the  interposition 
oF  Christ,  as  revealed  in   Scripture,  is  of  that  efficacy, 
which  it  is  there  represented  to  be  ;  this  is  no  kind  nor 
degree  of  presumption  against  its  being  really  of  that . 
eiHcacy.     Further:  the  objections  against  Christianity, 
fVom  the  light  of  it  not  being  universal,  nor  its  evidence 
so    strong  as    might   possibly  be   given  us,   have  been 
answered  by  the  general  analogy  of  nature.     That  God 
has  made  such  variety  of  creatures,  is  indeed  an  answer 
to  the  former :  but  that  he  dispenses  his  gifts  in  such 
variety,  both  of  degrees  and  kinds,  amongst  creatures  cf 
the  same  species,  and  even  to  the  same  individuals  at 
different  times ;  is  a  more  obvious  and  full  answer  to  it. 
And  it  is  so  far  from  being;  the  method  of  Providence  in 
other  cases,  to  afford  us  such  overbearing  evidence,  as 
some  require  in  proof  of  Christianity;  that  on  the  contrary, 
the  evidence  upon  which  we  are  naturally  appointed  to 
act  in  common  matters,  throughout  a  very  great  part  of 
life,  is  doubtful  in  a  high  degree.     And  admitting  the 
fact,  that  God  has  afforded  to  some  no  more  than  doubtful 
evidence  of  religion ;  the  same  account  may  be  given  of 
it,  as  of  difficulties  and  temptations  with  regard  to  prac- 
tice.    But  as  it  is  not  impossible,!  surely,  that  this  alleged 
doubtfulness  may  be  men's  own  fault ;  it  deserves  their 

♦  John  iii.  16,     Hub.  v.  9.  f  P.  237,  &c. 


pARrll.]  CONCLUSION.  293 

most  serious  consideration,  whether  it  be  not  so.  How- 
ever, it  is  certain,  that  doubting  implies  a  degree  of  evi- 
dence for  that  of  which  we  doubt :  and  that  this  degree 
of  evidence  as  really  lays  us  under  obligations  as  demon- 
strative evidence. 

The  whole  then  of  religion  is  throughout  credible  :  nor 
is  there,  I  think,  any  thing  relating  to  the  revealed  dis- 
pensation of  things,  more  different  from  the  experienced 
constitution  and  course  of  nature,  than  some  parts  of  the 
constitution  of  nature  are  from  other  parts  of  it.  And 
if  so,  the  only  question  which  remains  is,  what  positive 
evidence  can  be  alleged  for  the  truth  of  Christianity. 
This  too  in  general  has  been  considered,  and  the  objec- 
tions against  it  estimated.  Deduct,  therefore,  what  is  to 
be  deducted  from  that  evidence,  upon  account  of  any 
weight  which  may  be  thought  to  remain  in  these  objec- 
tions, after  what  the  analogy  of  nature  has  suggested  in 
answer  to  them  :  and  then  consider,  what  are  the  practi- 
cal consequences  from  all  this,  upon  the  most  sceptical 
principles  one  can  argue  upon  (for  I  am  writing  to  per- 
sons who  entertain  these  principles)  :  and  upon  such 
consideration  it  will  be  obvious,  that  immorality,  as  little 
excuse  as  it  admits  of  in  itself,  is  greatly  aggravated,  in 
persons  who  have  been  made  acquainted  with  Christia- 
nity, whether  they  believe  it  or  not :  because  the  moral 
system  of  nature,  or  natural  religion,  which  Christianity 
lays  before  us,  approves  itself,  almost  intuitively,  to  a 
reasonable  mind,  upon  seeing  it  proposed.  In  the  next 
place,  with  regard  to  Christianity,  it  will  be  observed ; 
that  there  is  a  middle  between  a  full  satisfaction  of  the 
truth  of  it,  and  a  satisfaction  of  the  contrary.  The 
middle  state  of  mind  between  these  two  consists  in  a 
serious  apprehension,  that  it  may  be  true,  joined  with 
doubt  whether  it  be  so.  And  this,  upon  the  best  judg- 
ment I  am  able  to  make,  is  as  far  towards  speculative 
infidelity,  as  any  sceptic  can  at  all  be  supposed  to  go, 
who  has  had  true  Christianity,  with  the  proper  evidences 
of  it,  laid  before  him,  and  has  in  any  tolerable  measure 
considered  them.  For  I  would  not  be  mistaken  to  com- 
prehend all  who  have  ever  heard  of  it :  because  it  seemn 
evident,  that  iu  many  countries  called  Christian,  neither 


294  CONCLUSION.  [Part  II. 

Christianity,  nor  its  evidence,  are  fairly  laid  before  men 
And  in  places  where  both  are,  there  appear  to  be  some 
who  have  very  little  attended  to  either,  and  who  reject 
Christianity  with  a  scorn  proportionate  to  their  inatten- 
tion ;  and  yet  are  by  no  means  without  understanding 
in  other  matters.  Now  it  has  been  shown,  that  a  serious 
apprehension  that  Christianity  may  be  true,  lays  per- 
sons under  the  strictest  obligations  of  a  serious  regard 
to  it,  throughout  the  whole  of  their  life;  a  reijard  not 
the  same  exactly,  but  m  many  respects  nearly  the  same 
with  what  a  full  conviction  of  its  truth  would  lay  them 
under.  Lastly,  it  will  appear,  that  blasphemy  and  pro- 
faneness,  I  mean  with  regard  to  Christianity,  are  ab- 
solutely without  excuse.  For  there  is  no  temptation  to 
it,  but  from  the  wantonness  of  vanity  or  mirth;  and  these, 
considering  the  infinite  importance  of  the  subject,  are 
no  such  temptations  as  to  afford  any  excuse  for  it..  If 
this  be  a  just  account  of  things,  and  yet  men  can  go  on 
to  vilify  or  disregard  Christianity,  which  is  to  talk  and 
act  as  if  they  had  a  demonstration  of  its  falsehood  j 
there  is  no  reason  to  think  they  would  alter  their  be- 
haviour to  any  purpose,  though  there  were  a  demon- 
stration of  its  truth. 


TWO  BRIEF 

DISSERTATIONS. 


I.  OP  PERSONAL  IDENTITY. 
IL  OF  THE  NATUEE  OP  VIETUS 


DISSERTATION   I. 

OF  PERSONAL  IDENTITY. 

"Whether  we  are  to  live  in  a  future  state,  as  it  is  tLe 
most  important  question  which  can  possibly  be  asked,  so 
it  is  the  most  intelligible  one  which  can  be  expressed  in 
language.  Yet  strange  perplexities  have  been  raised 
about  the  meaning  of  that  identity  or  sameness  of  per- 
son, which  is  implied  in  the  notion  of  our  living  now  and 
hereafter,  or  in  any  two  successive  moments.  And  the 
solution  of  these  difficulties  hath  been  stranger  than  the 
difficulties  themselves.  For,  personal  identity  has  been 
explained  so  by  some,  as  to  render  the  inquiry  concern- 
ing a  future  life  of  no  consequence  at  all  to  us  the  per- 
sons who  are  making  it.  And  though  few  men  can  be 
misled  by  such  subtleties  ;  yet  it  may  be  proper  a  little  to 
consider  them. 

Now,  when  it  is  asked  wherein  personal  identity  con- 
sists, the  answer  should  be  the  same,  as  if  it  were  asked 
wherein  consists  similitude,  or  equality  ;  that  all  attempts 
to  define  would  but  perplex  it.  Yet  there  is  no  difficulty 
at  all  in  ascertaining  the  idea.  For  as,  upon  two  triangles 
being  compared  or  viewed  together,  there  arises  to  the 
mind  the  idea  of  similitude  ;  or  upon  twice  two  and  four, 
the  idea  of  equality  :  so  likewise,  upon  comparing  the 
consciousness  of  one's  self,  or  one's  own  existence,  in 
any  two  moments,  there  as.  immediately  arises  to  the 
mind  the  idea  of  personal  identity.  And  as  the  two  for- 
mer comparisons  not  only  give  us  the  ideas  of  similitude 
and  equality ;  but  also  show  us,  that  two  triangles  are 
alike,  and  twice  two  and  four  are  equal :  so  the  latter 
comparison  not  only  gives  us  the  idea  of  personal  iden- 
tity, but  also  shows  us  the  identity  of  ourselves  in  those 
two  moments ;  the  present,  suppose,  and  that  immedi- 
ately past ;  or  the  present,  and  that  a  month,  a  year,  or 
twenty  years  past.  Or  in  other  words,  by  reflecting  upon 
that  which  is  myself  now,  and  that  which  was  mvself 


298  OF  PERSONAL  IDENTITY.  [Diss.  I. 

twenty  years  ago,  I  discern  they  are  not  two,  but  one  and 
the  same  self. 

But  though  consciousness  ot  what  is  past  does  thus 
ascertain  our  personal  identity  to  ourselves,  yet  to  say, 
that  it  makes  personal  identity,  or  is  necessary  to  our 
being  the  same  persons,  is  to  say,  that  a  person  has  not 
existed  a  single  moment,  nor  done  one  action,  but  what 
he  can  remember  ;  indeed  none  but  what  he  reflects 
upon.  And  one  should  really  think  it  self-evident,  that 
consciousness  of  personal  identity  presupposes,  and 
therefore  cannot  constitute,  personal  identity  ;  any  more 
than  knowledge,  in  any  other  case,  can  constitute  truth, 
which  it  presupposes. 

This  wonderful  mistake  may  possibly  have  arisen  from 
hence  ;  that  to  be  endued  with  consciousness  is  insepa- 
rable from  the  idea  of  a  person,  or  intelligent  being.  For, 
this  might  be  expressed  inaccurately  thus,  that  conscious- 
ness makes  personality :  and  from  hence  it  might  be 
concluded  to  make  personal  identity.  But  though  pre- 
sent consciousness  of  what  we  at  present  do  and  feel  is 
necessary  to  our  being  the  persons  we  now  are  ;  yet 
present  consciousness  of  past  actions  or  feelings  is  not 
necessary  to  our  being  the  same  persons  who  performed 
those  actions,  or  had  those  feelings. 

The  inquiry,  what  makes  vegetables  the  same  in  the 
common  acceptation  of  the  word,  does  not  a^%pear  to 
have  any  relation  to  this  of  personal  identity  :  because, 
the  word  same,  when  applied  to  them  and  to  person,  is 
not  only  applied  to  different  subjects,  but  it  is  also  used 
in  different  senses.  For  when  a  man  swears  to  the  same 
tree,  as  having  stood  fifty  years  in  the  same  place,  he 
means  only  the  same  as  to  all  the  purposes  of  property 
and  uses  of  common  life,  and  not  that  the  tree  has  been 
all  that  time  the  same  in  the  strict  philosophical  sense  of 
the  word.  For  he  does  not  know,  whether  any  one 
particle  of  the  present  tree  be  the  same  with  any  one 
particle  of  the  tree  which  stood  in  the  same  place  fifty 
years  ago.  And  if  they  have  not  one  common  particle 
of  matter,  they  cannot  be  the  same  tree  in  the  proper 
philosophic  sense  of  the  word  same  :  it  being  evidently  a 
contradiction  in  terms,  to  say  they  are,  when  no  part  of 


Diss.  I.]  OF  PERSONAL  IDENTITY.  299 

their  substance,  and  no  one  of  their  properties  is  the 
same  :  no  part  of  their  substance,  by  the  supposition  ;  no 
one  of  their  properties,  because  it  is  allowed,  that  the 
same  property  cannot  be  transferred  from  one  substance 
to  another.  And  therefore  when  we  say  the  identity  or 
sameness  of  a  plant  consists  in  a  continuation  of  the 
same  life,  communicated  under  the  same  organization,  to 
a  number  of  particles  of  matter,  whether  the  same  or 
not;  the  word  same,  when  applied  to  life  and  to  organi- 
zation, cannot  possibly  be  understood  to  signify,  what  it 
signifies  in  this  very  sentence,  when  applied  to  matter. 
In  a  loose  and  popular  sense  then,  the  life  and  the  orga- 
nization and  the  plant  are  justly  said  to  be  the  same, 
notwithstanding  the  perpetual  change  of  the  parts.  But 
in  a  strict  and  philosophical  manner  of  speech,  no  man, 
no  being,  no  mode  of  being,  no  anything,  can  be  the 
same  with  that,  with  which  it  has  indeed  nothing  the 
same.  Now  sameness  is  used  in  this  latter  sense,  when 
applied  to  persons.  The  identity  of  these^  therefore, 
cannot  subsist  with  diversity  of  substance. 

The  thing  here  considered,  and  demonstratively,  as  I 
think,  determined,  is  proposed  by  Mr  Locke  in  these 
words.  Whether  it,  i.  e.  the  same  self  or  person,  be  the 
same  identical  substatice?  And  he  has  suggested  what  is 
a  much  better  answer  to  the  question,  than  that  which 
he  gives  it  in  form.  For  he  defines  Person,  a  tJdnking 
intelligent  being,  &c.,  and  personal  identity,  the  sameness 
of  a  rational  Being  *  The  question  then  is,  whether  the 
same  rational  being:  is  the  same  substance  :  which  needs 
no  answer,  because  Being  and  Substance,  in  this  place, 
stand  for  the  same  idea.  The  ground  of  the  doubt, 
whether  the  same  person  be  the  same  substance,  is  said 
to  be  this ;  that  the  consciousness  of  our  own  existence, 
in  youth  and  in  old  age,  or  in  any  two  joint  successive 
moments,  is  not  the  same  indimdual  action,^  i.  e.  not  the 
same  consciousness,  but  different  successive  conscious- 
nesses. Now  it  is  strange  that  this  should  have  occa- 
sioned such  perplexities.  For  it  is  surely  conceivable, 
that  a  person  may  have  a  capacity  of  knowing  some 
object  or  other  to  be  the  same  now,  which  it  was  when  he 

*  Lucke's  Works,  vol.  i.  p.  146.  f  Locke,  p.  146,  147. 


300  OF  PERSONAL  IDENTITY.  [Diss.  I. 

contemplated  it  formerly :  yet  in  this  case,  where,  by  the 
supposition,  the  object  is  perceived  to  be  the  same,  the 
perception  of  it  in  any  two  moments  cannot  be  one  and 
the  same  perception.  And  thus,  though  the  successive 
consciousnesses,  which  we  have  of  our  own  existence, 
are  not  the  same,  yet  are  they  consciousnesses  of  one 
and  the  same  thing  or  object;  of  the  same  person,  self, 
or  living  agent.  The  person,  of  whose  existence  the 
consciousness  is  felt  now,  and  was  felt  an  hour  or  a  year 
ago,  is  discerned  to  bo,  not  two  persons,  but  one  and  the 
same  person  ;  and  therefore  is  one  and  the  same. 

Mr  Locke's  observations  upon  this  subject  appear 
hasty :  and  he  seems  to  profess  himself  dissatisfied  with 
suppositions,  which  he  has  made  relating  to  it.*  But 
some  of  those  hasty  observations  have  been  carried  to  a 
strange  length  by  others  ;  whose  notion,  when  traced  and 
examined  to  the  bottom,  amounts,  I  think,  to  this  :f 
**  That  Personality  is  not  a  permanent,  but  a  transient 
thing  :  that  it  lives  and  dies,  begins  and  ends  continually  : 
that  no  one  can  any  more  remain  one  and  the  same  per- 
son two  moments  together,  than  two  successive  moments 
can  be  one  and  the  same  moment :  that  our  substance  is 
indeed  continually  changing ;  but  whether  this  be  so  or 
not,  is,  it  seems,  nothing  to  the  purpose  ;  since  it  is  not 
substance,  but  consciousness  alone,  which  constitutes 
personality  :  which  consciousness,  being  successive,  can- 
not be  the  same  in  any  two  moments,  nor  consequently 
the  personality  constituted  by  it."  And  from  hence  it 
must  follow,  that  it  is  a  fallacy  upon  ourselves,  to  charge 
our  present  selves  with  any  thing  we  did,  or  to  imagine 
our  present  selves  interested  in  any  thing  which  befell 
us  yesterday  ;  or  that  our  present  self  will  be  interested 
in  what  will  befall  us  to-morrow  :  since  our  present  self 
is  not,  in  reality,  the  same  with  the  self  of  yesterday,  but 
another  like  self  or  person  coming  in  its  room,  and  mis- 
taken for  it ;  to  which  another  self  will  succeed  to-mor- 
row. This,  I  say,  must  follow  :  for  if  the  self  or  person 
of  to-day,  and  that  of  to-morrow,  are  not  the  same,  but 

♦  Locke,  p.  1.52. 
f  See  an  Answer  to  Dr  Clarke's  Third  Defence  of  his  Letter  to  Mr  DodwclU 
2d  edit.  p.  44,  56,  &c. 


Diss.  I.]  O      PERSONAL  IDENTITY.  301 

only  like  persons  ;C the  person  of  to-day  is  really  no  more 
interested  in  what  will  befall  the  person  of  to-morrow, 
than  in  what  will  befall  any  other  person.  It  may  be 
thought,  perhaps,  that  this  is  not  a  just  representation  of 
the  opinion  we  are  speaking  of:  because  those  who  main- 
tain it  allow,  that  a  person  is  the  same  as  far  back  as  his 
remembrance  reaches.  And  indeed  they  do  use  the 
words,  identity^  and  same  person.  Nor  will  language  per- 
mit these  words  to  be  laid  aside  ;  since  if  they  were, 
there  must  be  I  know  not  what  ridiculous  periphrasis 
substituted  in  the  room  of  them.  But  thev  cannot  con- 
sistently  with  themselves,  mean,  that  the  person  is  really 
the  same.  For  it  is  self-evident,  that  the  personality 
cannot  be  really  the  same,  if,  as  they  expressly  assert, 
that  in  which  it  consists  is  not  the  same.  And  as,  con- 
sistently with  themselves,  they  cannot,  so,  I  think  it  ap- 
pears, they  do  not,  mean,  that  the  person  is  really  the 
same,  but  only  that  he  is  so  in  a  fictitious  sense :  in  such 
a  sense  only  as  they  assert,  for  this  they  do  assert,  that 
any  number  of  persons  whatever  may  be  the  same  per- 
son. The  bare  unfolding  this  notion,  and  laying  it  thus 
naked  and  open,  seems  the  best  confutation  of  it.  How- 
ever, since  great  stress  is  said  to  be  put  upon  it,  I  add 
the  following  things. 

First,  This  notion  is  absolutely  contradictory  to  that 
certain  conviction,  which  necessarily  and  every  moment 
rises  within  us,  when  we  turn  our  thoughts  upon  our- 
selves, when  we  reflect  upon  what  is  past,  and  look  for- 
ward upon  what  is  to  come.  All  imagination  of  a  daily 
change  of  that  living  agent  which  each  man  calls  himself, 
for  another,  or  of  any  such  change  throughout  our  whole 
present  life,  is  entirely  borne  down  by  our  natural  sense 
of  things.  Nor  is  it  possible  for  a  person  in  his  wits  to 
alter  his  conduct,  with  regard  to  his  health  or  affairs, 
from  a  suspicion,  that,  though  he  should  live  to-morrow, 
he  should  not,  however,  be  the  same  person  he  is  to-day. 
And  yet,  if  it  be  reasonable  to  act,  with  respect  to  a 
future  life,  upon  this  notion,  that  personality  is  transient ; 
it  is  reasonable  to  act  upon  it,  with  respect  to  the  pre- 
sent. Here  then  is  a  notion  equally  applicable  to  reli- 
gion and  to  our  temporal  concerns ;  and  every  one  sees 


802  OF  PERSONAL  IDENTITY.  [Diss.  T 

and  foels  tlic  inexpressible  absurdity  of  it  in  the  latter 
case  ;  if,  therefore,  any  can  take  up  with  it  in  the  former, 
this  cannot  proceed  from  the  reason  of  the  thing-,  but 
must  be  owing  to  an  inward  unfairness,  and  secret  cor- 
ruption of  heart. 

Secondb/^  It  is  not  an  idea,  or  abstract  notion,  or  qua- 
lity, but  a  being  only,  which  is  capable  of  life  and  action, 
of  happiness  and  misery.  Now  all  beings  confessedly 
continue  the  same,  during  the  whole  time  of  their  exis- 
tence. Consider  then  a  livino;  beino^  now  existinof,  and 
which  has  existed  for  any  time  aiive :  this  living  being 
must  have  done  and  suffered  and  enjoyed,  what  it  has 
done  and  suffered  and  enjoyed  formerly  (this  living  be- 
ing, I  say,  and  not  another),  as  really  as  it  does  and  suf- 
fers and  enjoys,  what  it  does  and  suffers  and  enjoys  this 
instant.  AH  these  successive  actions,  enjoyments,  and 
sufferings,  are  actions,  enjoyments,  and  sufferings,  of  the 
same  living  being.  And  they  are  so,  prior  to  all  consi- 
deration of  its  remembering  or  forgetting  :  since  remem- 
bering or  forgetting  can  make  no  alteration  in  the  truth 
of  past  matter  of  fact.  And  suppose  this  being  endued 
with  limited  powers  of  knowledge  and  memory,  there  is 
no  more  difficulty  in  conceiving  it  to  have  a  power  of 
knowing  itself  to  be  the  same  living  being  which  it  was 
some  time  ago,  of  remembering  some  of  its  actions,  suf- 
ferings, and  enjoyments,  and  forgetting  others,  than  in 
conceiving  it  to  know  or  remember  or  forget  any  thing 
else. 

Thirdli/,  Every  person  is  conscious,  that  he  is  now 
the  same  person  or  self  he  was  as  far  back  as  his  re- 
membrance reaches  :  since  when  any  one  reflects  upon 
a  past  action  of  his  own,  he  is  just  as  certain  of  the  per-* 
son  who  did  that  action,  namely,  himself,  the  person 
who  now  reflects  upon  it,  as  he  is  certain  that  the  action 
was  at  all  done.  Nay,  very  often  a  person's  assurance 
of  an  action  having  been  done,  of  which  he  is  absolutely 
assured,  arises  wholly  irom  the  consciousness  that  he 
himself  did  it.  And  this  he,  person,  or  self,  must  either 
be  a  substance,  or  the  propert)?-  of  some  substance.  If 
he,  if  person,  be  a  substance  ;  then  consciousness  that  he 
is  the  same  person  is  consciousness  that  he  is  the  same 


Diss.  II.]  OF  THE  NATURE  OF  VIRTUE.  303 

substance.  If  the  person,  or  he,  be  the  property  of  a 
substance,  still  consciousness  that  he  is  the  same  pro- 
perty is  as  certain  a  proof  that  his  substance  remains  the 
same,  as  consciousness  that  he  remains  the  same  sub- 
stance would  be  :  since  the  same  property  cannot  be 
transferred  from  one  substance  to  another. 

But  though  we  are  thus  certain,  that  we  are  the  same 
agents,  living  beings,  or  substances,  now,  which  we  were 
as  far  back  as  our  remembrance  reaches;  yet  it  is  asked, 
whether  we  may  not  possibly  be  deceived  in  it?  And 
this  question  may  be  asked  at  the  end  of  any  demonstra- 
tion whatever:  because  it  is  a  question  concerning  the 
truth  of  perception  by  memory.  And  he  who  can  doubt, 
whether  perception  by  memory  can  in  this  case  be  de- 
pended upon,  may  doubt  also,  whether  perception  by 
deduction  and  reasoning,  which  also  include  memory,  or 
indeed  whether  intuitive  perception  can.  Here  then  we 
can  go  no  further.  For  it  is  ridiculous  to  attempt  to  prove 
the  truth  of  those  perceptions,  whose  truth  we  can  no 
otherwise  prove,  than  by  other  perceptions  of  exactly 
the  same  kind  with  them,  and  which  there  is  just  the 
same  ground  to  suspect;  or  to  attempt  to  prove  the  truth 
of  our  faculties,  which  can  no  otherwise  be  proved,  than 
by  the  use  or  means  of  those  very  suspected  faculties 
themselves. 


DISSERTATION    11. 

OF  THE  NATURE  OF  VIRTUE. 

• 

That  which  renders  beings  capable  of  moral  govern- 
ment, is  their  having  a  moral  nature,  and  moral  faculties 
of  perception  and  of  action.  Brute  creatures  are  impress- 
ed and  actuated  by  various  instincts  and  propensions :  so 
also  are  we.  But  additional  to  this,  v^e  have  a  capacity 
of  rejecting  upon  actions  and  characters,  and  making 
them  an  object  to  our  thousrht:  and  on  doino-  this,  we 
Jiaturally  and  unavoidably  approve  some  actions,  under  the 
peculiar  view  of  their  beng  virtuous  and  of  good  desert ; 


304  OF  THE  NATURE  OF  VIRTUE.  [Diss.  H. 

and  disapprove  others,  as  vicious  and  of  ill  desert.  That 
we  have  this  moral  approving  and  disapproving*  faculty, 
is  certain  from  our  experiencing  it  in  ourselves,  and  recog- 
nizing it  in  each  other.  It  appears  from  our  exercising  it 
unavoidably,  in  the  approbation  and  disapprobation  even 
of  feigned  characters  :  from  the  words  right  and  wrong, 
odious  and  amiable,  base  and  worthy,  with  many  others 
of  like  signification  in  all  languages  applied  to  actions  and 
characters  :  from  the  many  written  systems  of  morals 
which  suppose  it;  since  it  cannot  be  imagined,  that  all 
these  authors,  throughout  all  these  treatises,  had  abso- 
lutely no  meaning  at  all  to  their  words,  or  a  meaning 
merely  chimerical :  from  our  natural  sense  of  gratitude, 
which  implies  a  distinction  between  merely  being  the 
instrument  of  good,  and  intending  it :  from  the  like  dis- 
tinction every  one  makes  between  injury  and  mere  harm, 
which,  Hobbes  says,  is  peculiar  to  mankind  ;  and  between 
injury  and  just  punishment,  a  distinction  plainly  natural, 
prior  to  the  consideration  of  human  laws.  It  is  manifest 
great  partf  of  common  language,  and  of  common  beha- 
viour over  the  world,  is  formed  upon  supposition  of  such 
a  moral  faculty;  whether  called  conscience,  moral  reason, 
moral  sense,  or  divine  reason  ;  whether  considered  as  a 
sentiment  of  the  understanding,  or  as  a  perception  of 
the  heart ;  or,  which  seems  the  truth,  as  including  both. 
Nor  is  it  at  all  doubtful  in  the  general,  what  course  of 
action  this  faculty,  or  practical  discerning  power  within 
us,  approves  and  what  it  disapproves.  For,  as  much  as 
it  has  been  disputed  wherein  virtue  consists,  or  whatever 
ground  for  doubt  there  may  be  about  particulars ;  yet,  in 
general,  there  is  in  reality  a  universally  acknowledged 
standard  of  it.  It  is  that,  which  all  ages  and  all  coun- 
tries have  made  profession  of  in  public :  it  is  that,  which 
every  man  you  meet  puts  on  the  show  of:  it  is  that, 

*  This  way  of  speakiiiif  is  taken  from  Epictetns,f  and  is  made  use  of  as  seeming 
the  most  full,  and  least  liable  to  cavil.  And  the  moral  faculty  may  he  understood  to 
Lave  these  two  epithets,  toKifiairriKri  and  kir^oKi/tairriKn,  upon  a  double  account;  be- 
cause, upon  a  survey  of  actions,  whether  before  or  after  they  are  done,  it  determines 
them  to  be  tfood  or  evil;  and  also  because  it  determines  ittelf  to  be  the  guide  of  ac- 
tion and  of  life,  in  contradistinction  from  all  other  faculties,  or  natural  principles  of 
action  ;  in  the  very  same  manner  as  speculative  reason  directly  and  naturally  judi^et 
of  speculative  truth  and  falsehood:  and  at  the  same  time  is  attended  with  a  conscious- 
ness upon  rejiection,  that  the  natural  right  to  judge  of  them  belongs  to  it. 

f  Arr.  Epict.  lib.  i.  cup.  I. 


Diss.  11.]  O^  THE  NATURE  OF  VIRTUE.  305 

which  the  primary  and  fundamental  laws  of  all  civil  con- 
stitutions over  the  face  of  the  earth  make  it  their  business 
and  endeavour  to  enforce  the  practice  of  upon  mankind : 
namely  justice,  veracity,  and  regard  to  common  good. 
It  being  manifest  then,  in  general,  that  we  have  such  a 
faculty  or  discernment  as  this,  it  may  be  of  use  to  remark 
some  things  more  distinctly  concerning  it. 

First,  It  ought  to  be  observed,  that  the  object  of  this 
faculty  is  actions,*  comprehending  under  that  name  active 
or  practical  principles  :  those  principles  from  which  men 
would  act,  if  occasions  and  circumstances  gave  them 
power;  and  which,  when  fixed  and  habitual  in  any  per- 
son, we  call  his  character.  It  does  not  appear,  that 
brutes  have  the  least  reflex  sense  of  actions,  as  distin- 
guished from  events :  or  that  will  and  design,  which 
constitute  the  very  nature  of  actions  as  such,  are  at  all 
an  object  to  their  perception.  But  to  ours  they  are:  and 
they  are  the  object,  and  the  only  one,  of  the  approving 
and  disapproving  faculty.  Acting  conduct,  behaviour, 
abstracted  from  all  regard  to  what  is  in  fact  and  event, 
the  consequence  of  it,  is  itself  the  natural  object  of  the 
moral  discernment ;  as  speculative  truth  and  falsehood 
is  of  speculative  reason.  Intention  of  such  and  such 
consequences,  indeed,  is  always  included;  for  it  is  part 
of  the  action  itself:  but  though  the  intended  good  or  bad 
consequences  do  not  follow,  we  have  exactly  the  same 
sense  of  the  action  as  if  they  did.  In  like  manner  we 
think  well  or  ill  of  characters,  abstracted  from  all  con- 
sideration of  the  good  or  the  evil,  which  persons  of 
such  characters  have  it  actually  in  their  power  to  do. 
We  never,  in  the  moral  way,  applaud  or  blame  either 
ourselves  or  others,  for  what  we  enjoy  or  what  we  suffer, 
or  for  having  impressions  made  upon  us  which  we  con- 
sider as  altogether  out  of  our  power:  but  only  for  what 
we  do,  or  would  have  done,  had  it  been  in  our  power: 
or  for  what  we  leave  undone,  which  we  might  have 
done,  or  would  have  left  undone,  though  we  could  have 
done  it. 

Secondly,    Our  sense   or  discernment  of  actions   as 

*  OuTi  h  a^irvt  ttn)  xKKia — l»  vi'irti,  a,X}LOi    tvsfyj/'a,   M.  AntOD.   lib.   iX.    16,    VirtutiS 
laus  omjiis  ii  actione  consistit.     Cic.  Off.  lib.  i.  cap.  6. 

U 


306  OF  THE  NATURE  OF  VIRTUE.  [VtuAL 

morally  good  or  evil,  implies  in  it  a  sense  or  discern- 
ment of  them  as  of  good  or  ill  discernment.  It  may  be 
difficult  to  explain  this  perception,  so  as  to  answer  all 
the  questions  which  may  be  asked  concerning  it:  but 
every  one  speaks  of  such  and  such  actions  as  deserving 
punishment;  and  it  is  not,  I  suppose,  pretended,  that 
they  have  absolutely  no  meaning  at  all  to  the  expres- 
sion. Now  the  meaning  plainly  is  not,  that  we  conceive 
it  for  the  good  of  society,  that  the  doer  of  such  actions 
should  be  made  to  suffer.  For  if,  unhappily,  it  were 
resolved,  that  a  man,  who,  by  some  innocent  action, 
was  infected  with  the  plague,  should  be  left  to  perish, 
lest,  by  other  people's  coming  near  him,  the  infection 
should  spread ;  no  one  would  say  he  deserved  this  treat- 
ment. Innocence  and  ill  desert  are  inconsistent  ideas. 
Ill  desert  always  supposes  guilt:  and  if  one  be  no  part 
of  the  other,  yet  they  are  evidently  and  naturally  con- 
nected in  our  mind.  The  sight  of  a  man  in  misery 
raises  our  compassion  towards  him ;  and,  if  this  misery  be 
inflicted  on  him  by  another,  our  indignation  against  the 
author  of  it.  But  when  we  are  informed,  that  the  suf- 
ferer is  a  villain,  and  is  punished  only  for  his  treachery 
or  cruelty;  our  compassion  exceedingly  lessens,  and  in 
many  instances  our  indignation  wholly  subsides.  Now 
what  produces  this  effect  is  the  conception  of  that  in  the 
sufferer,  which  we  call  ill  desert.  Upon  considering 
then,  or  viewing  together,  our  notion  of  vice  and  that  of 
misery,  there  results  a  third,  that  of  ill  desert.  And 
thus  there  is  in  human  creatures  an  association  of  the 
two  ideas,  natural  and  moral  evil,  wickedness  and 
punishment.  If  this  association  were  merely  artificial 
or  accidental,  it  were  nothing:  but  being  most  unques- 
tionably natural,  it  greatly  concerns  us  to  attend  to  it, 
instead  of  endeavouring  to  explain  it  away. 

It  may  be  observed  further,  concerning  our  percep- 
tion of  good  and  of  ill  desert,  that  the  former  is  very 
weak  with  respect  to  common  instances  of  virtue.  One 
reason  of  which  may  be,  that  it  does  not  appear  to  a 
spectator,  how  far  such  instances  of  virtue  proceed  from 
a  virtuous  principle,  or  in  what  degree  this  principle  is 
prevalent:  since  a  very  weak  regard  to  virtue  may  be 


SBs.n.]  OF  THE  NATURE  OF  VIRTUE.  307 

sufficient  to  make  men  act  well  in  many  common  in- 
stances. And  on  the  other  hand,  our  perception  of  ill 
desert  in  vicious  actions  lessens,  in  proportion  to  the 
temptations  men  are  thought  to  have  had  to  such  vices. 
For,  vice  in  human  creatures  consisting  chiefly  in  the 
absence  or  want  of  the  virtuous  principle ;  though  a  man 
be  overcome,  suppose,  by  tortures,  it  does  not  from 
thence  appear  to  what  degree  the  virtuous  principle  was 
wanting.  All  that  appears  is,  that  he  had  it  not  in  such 
a  degree,  as  to  prevail  over  the  temptation;  but  possibly 
he  had  it  in  a  degree,  w^hich  would  have  rendered  him 
proof  against  common  temptations. 

Thirdly,  Our  perception  of  vice  and  ill  desert  arises 
from,  and  is  the  result  of,  a  comparison  of  actions  with 
the  nature  and  capacities  of  the  agent.  For  the  mere 
neglect  of  doing  what  we  ought  to  do,  would,  in  many 
cases,  be  determined  by  all  men  to  be  in  the  highest 
degree  vicious.  And  this  determination  must  arise  from 
such  comparison,  and  be  the  result  of  it;  because  such 
neglect  would  not  be  vicious  in  creatures  of  other  na 
tures  and  capacities,  as  brutes.  And  it  is  the  same 
also  with  respect  to  positive  vices,  or  such  as  consist  in 
doing  what  we  ought  not.  For,  every  one  has  a  dif- 
ferent sense  of  harm  done  by  an  idiot,  madman,  or  child, 
and  by  one  of  mature  and  common  understanding ; 
though  the  action  of  both,  including  the  intention,  which 
is  part  of  the  action,  be  the  same:  as  it  may  be,  since 
idiots  and  madmen,  as  well  as  children,  are  capable  not 
only  of  doing  mischief,  but  also  of  intending  it.  Now 
this  difference  must  arise  from  somewhat  discerned  in 
the  nature  or  capacities  of  one,  which  renders  the  action 
vicious;  and  the  want  of  which,  in  the  other,  renders 
the  same  action  innocent  or  less  vicious :  and  this  plainly 
supposes  a  comparison,  whether  reflected  upon  or  not, 
between  the  action  and  capacities  of  the  agent,  previous 
to  our  determining  an  action  to  be  vicious.  And  hence 
arises  a  proper  application  of  the  epithets,  incongruous, 
unsuitable,  disproportionate,  unfit,  to  actions  which  our 
moral  faculty  determines  to  be  vicious. 

Fourthly,  It  deserves  to  be  considered,  whether  men 
are  more  at  liberty,  in  point  of  morals,  to  make  them- 


308  OP  THE  NATURE  OF  VIRTUE.  [Diss.n 

selves  miserable  without  reason,  than  to  make  other 
people  so :  or  dissolutely  to  neglect  their  own  greater 
good,  for  the  sake  of  a  present  lesser  gratification,  than 
they  are  to  neglect  the  good  of  others,  whom  nature  has 
committed  to  their  care.  It  should  seem,  that  a  due 
concern  about  our  own  interest  or  happiness,  and  a  rea- 
sonable endeavour  to  secure  and  promote  it,  which  is,  I 
think,  very  much  the  meaning  of  the  word  prudence,  in 
our  language ;  it  should  seem,  that  this  is  virtue,  and  the 
contrary  behaviour  faulty  and  blamable;  since,  in  the 
calmest  way  of  reflection,  we  approve  of  the  first,  and 
condemn  the  other  conduct,  both  in  ourselves  and  others. 
This  approbation  and  disapprobation  are  altogether  dif- 
ferent from  mere  desire  of  our  own,  or  of  their  happi- 
ness, and  from  sorrow  upon  missing  it.  For  the  object 
or  occasion  of  this  last  kind  of  perception  is  satisfaction 
or  uneasiness:  whereas  the  object  of  the  first  is  active 
behaviour.  In  one  case,  what  our  thoughts  fix  upon 
is  our  condition :  in  the  other,  our  conduct.  It  is  true 
indeed,  that  nature  has  not  given  us  so  sensible  a  dis- 
approbation of  imprudence  and  folly,  either  in  ourselves 
or  others,  as  of  falsehood,  injustice,  and  cruelty:  I  sup- 
pose, because  that  constant  habitual  sense  of  private  in- 
terest and  good,  which  we  always  carry  about  with  us, 
renders  such  sensible  disapprobation  less  necessary,  less 
wanting,  to  keep  us  from  imprudently  neglecting  our 
own  happiness,  and  foolishly  injuring  ourselves,  than  it 
is  necessary  and  wanting  to  keep  us  from  injuring  others, 
to  whose  good  we  cannot  have  so  strong  and  constant  a 
regard:  and  also  because  imprudence  and  folly,  appear- 
ing to  bring  its  own  punishment  more  immediately  and 
constantly  than  injurious  behaviour,  it  less  needs  the  ad- 
ditional punishment,  which  would  be  inflicted  upon  it 
by  others,  had  they  the  same  sensible  indignation 
against  it,  as  against  injustice,  and  fraud,  and  cruelty. 
Besides,  unhappiness  l)eing  in  itself  the  natural  object 
of  compassion;  the  unhappiness  which  people  bring  up- 
on themselves,  though  it  be  wilfully,  excites  in  us  some 
pity  for  them :  and  this  of  course  lessens  our  displeasure 
against  them.  But  still  it  is  matter  of  experience,  that 
we  are  formed  so  as  to  reflect  very  severely  upon  the 


Diss.  II,]  OF  THE  NATURE  Of  VIRTUE.  309 

greater  instances  of  imprudent  neglect  and  foolish  rash- 
ness, both  in  ourselves  and  others.  In  instances  of  this 
kind,  men  often  say  of  themselves  with  remorse,  and  of 
others  with  some  indignation,  that  they  deserved  to  suf- 
fer such  calamities,  because  they  brought  them  upon 
themselves,  and  would  not  take  warning.  Particularly 
when  persons  come  to  poverty  and  distress  by  a  long 
course  of  extravagance,  and  after  frequent  admonitions, 
though  without  falsehood  or  injustice  ;  we  plainly,  do  not 
regard  such  people  as  alike  objects  of  compassion  with 
those,  who  are  brought  into  the  same  condition  by  una- 
voidable accidents.  From  these  things  it  appears,  that 
prudence  is  a  species  of  virtue,  and  folly  of  vice  :  mean- 
ing hy  folly,  somewhat  quite  different  from  mere  inca- 
pacity ;  a  thoughtless  want  of  that  regard  and  attention 
to  our  own  happiness,  which  we  had  capacity  for.  And 
this  the  word  properly  includes  ;  and,  as  it  seems,  in  its 
usual  acceptation  :  for  we  scarcely  apply  it  to  brute  crea- 
tures. 

However,  if  any  person  be  disposed  to  dispute  the 
matter,  I  shall  very  willingly  give  him  up  the  words 
Virtue  and  Vice,  as  not  applicable  to  prudence  and  fol- 
ly: but  must  beg  leave  to  insist,  that  the  faculty  within 
us,  which  is  the  judge  of  actions,  approves  of  prudent 
actions,  and  disapproves  imprudent  ones:  I  say  prudent 
and  imprudent  actions  as  such,  and  considered  distinctly 
from  the  happiness  or  misery  which  they  occasion. 
And,  by  the  way,  this  observation  may  help  to  deter- 
mine what  justness  there  is  in  that  objection  against  re- 
ligion, that  it  teaches  us  to  be  interested  and  selfish. 

Fifthly  J  Without  inquiring  how  far,  and  in  what  sense, 
virtue  is  resolvable  into  benevolence,  and  vice  into  the 
want  of  it;  it  may  be  proper  to  observe,  that  benevo- 
lence, and  the  want  of  it,  singly  considered,  are  in  no 
sort  the  whole  of  virtue  and  vice.  For  if  this  were  the 
case,  in  the  review  of  one's  own  character,  or  that  of 
others,  our  moral  understanding  and  moral  sense  would 
be  indifferent  to  every  thing,  but  the  degrees  in  which 
benevolence  prevailed,  and  the  degrees  in  which  it  was 
wanting.  That  is,  we  should  neither  approve  of  bene- 
v^olence  to  some  persons  rather  than  to  others,  nor  dis- 


310  OF  THE  NATURE  OF  VIRTUE.  pigs.  n. 

approve  injustice  and  falsehood  upon  any  other  account^, 
than  merely  as  an  overbalance  of  happiness  was  fore- 
seen likely  to  be  produced  by  the  first,  and  of  misery 
by  the  second.  But  now,  on  the  contrary,  suppose  two 
men  competitors  for  any  thing  whatever,  which  would 
be  of  equal  advantage  to  each  of  them;  though  nothing 
indeed  would  be  more  impertinent,  than  for  a  stranger 
to  busy  himself  to  get  one  of  them  preferred  to  the 
other;  yet  such  endeavour  would  be  virtue,  in  behalf  of 
a  friend  or  benefactor,  abstracted  from  all  consideration 
of  distant  consequence:  as  that  examples  of  gratitude, 
and  the  cultivation  of  friendship,  would  be  of  general 
good  to  the  world.  Again,  suppose  one  man  should, 
by  fraud  or  violence,  take  from  another  the  fruit  of  his 
labour,  with  intent  to  give  it  to  a  third,  who  he  thought 
would  have  as  much  pleasure  from  it  as  would  balance 
the  pleasure  which  the  first  possessor  would  have  had 
in  the  enjoyment,  and  his  vexation  in  the  loss  of  it; 
suppose  also  that  no  bad  consequences  would  follow: 
yet  such  an  action  would  surely  be  vicious.  Nay, 
further,  were  treachery,  violence,  and  injustice,  no 
otherwise  vicious,  than  as  foreseen  likely  to  produce  an 
overbalance  of  misery  to  society;  then,  if  in  any  case  a 
man  could  procure  to  himself  as  great  advantage  by  an 
act  of  injustice,  as  the  whole  foreseen  inconvenience, 
likely  to  be  brought  upon  others  by  it,  would  amount 
to;  such  a  piece  of  injustice  would  not  be  faulty  or 
vicious  at  all:  because  it  would  be  no  more  than,  in  any 
other  case,  for  a  man  to  prefer  his  own  satisfaction  to 
another^s  in  equal  degrees-  The  fact,  then,  appears  to 
be,  that  we  are  constituted  so  as  to  condemn  falseliood, 
unprovoked  violence,  injustice,  and  to  approve  of  bene- 
volence to  some  preferably  to  others,  abstracted  from  all 
consideration,  which  conduct  is  likeliest  to  produce  an 
overbalance  of  happiness  or  misery.  And  therefore, 
were  the  Author  of  nature  to  propose  nothing  to  himself 
as  an  end  but  the  production  of  happiness,  were  his 
moral  character  merely  that  of  benevolence;  yet  ours  is 
not  so.  Upon  that  supposition  indeed,  the  only  reason 
of  his  giving  us  the  above  mentioned  approbation  of 
benevolence  to  some  persons    rather  than  others,  an<J 


OBt.n.]  OF  THE  NATURE  OF  VIRTUE.  311 

disapprobation  of  falsehood,  unprovoked  violence,  and 
injustice,  must  be,  that  he  foresaw  this  constitution  of 
our  nature  would  produce  more  happiness,  than  forming 
us  with  a  temper  of  mere  general  benevolence.  But 
still,  since  this  is  our  constitution;  falsehood,  violence, 
injustice,  must  be  vice  in  us,  and  benevolence  to  some, 
preferably  to  others,  virtue;  abstracted  from  all  consi- 
deration of  the  overbalance  of  evil  or  good,  which  they 
may  appear  likely  to  produce. 

Now  if  human  creatures  are  endued  with  such  a  moral 
nature  as  we  have  been  explaining,  or  with  a  moral 
faculty,  the  natural  object  of  which  is  actions:  moral 
government  must  consist  in  rendering  them  happy  and 
unhappy,  in  rewarding  and  punishing  them,  as  they 
follow,  neglect,  or  depart  from,  the  moral  rule  of  action 
interwoven  in  their  nature,  or  suggested  and  enforced 
by  this  moral  faculty  ;*  in  rewarding  and  punishing  them 
upon  account  of  their  so  doing. 

I  am  not  sensible  that  I  have,  in  this  fifth  observa- 
tion, contradicted  what  any  author  designed  to  assert. 
But  some  of  great  and  distinguished  merit,  have,  I  think, 
expressed  themselves  in  a  manner,  which  may  occasion 
some  danger,  to  careless  readers,  of  imagining  the  whole 
of  virtue  to  consist  in  singly  aiming,  according  to  the 
best  of  their  judgment,  at  promoting  the  happiness  of 
mankind  in  the  present  state ;  and  the  whole  of  vice,  in 
doing  what  they  foresee,  or  might  foresee,  is  likely  to 
produce  an  overbalance  of  unhappiness  in  it :  than  which 
mistakes,  none  can  be  conceived  more  terrible.  For  it 
is  certain,  that  some  of  the  most  shocking  instances  of 
injustice,  adultery,  murder,  perjury,  and  even  of  perse- 
cution, may,  in  many  supposable  cases,  not  have  the 
appearance  of  being  likely  to  produce  an  overbalance  of 
misery  in  the  present  state;  perhaps  sometimes  may 
have  the  contrary  appearance.  For  this  reflection  might 
easily  be  carried  on,  but  I  forbear.— The  happiness  of 
the  world  is  the  concern  of  him  who  is  the  lord  and  the  , 
proprietor  of  it:  nor  do  we  know  what  we  are  about, 
when  we  endeavour  to  promote  the  good  of  mankind  in 
any  ways,   but  those  which  he  has  directed;    that  is 

*  p.  145. 


312  OF  THE  NATURE  OF  VIRTUE.  [Dtss.U. 

indeed  in  all  ways  not  contrary  to  veracity  and  justice. 
I  speak  thus  upon  supposition  of  persons  really  endea- 
vouring, in  some  sort,  to  do  good  without  regard  to 
these.  But  the  truth  seems  to  be,  that  such  supposed 
endeavours  proceed,  almost  always,  from  ambition,  the 
spirit  of  party,  or  some  indirect  principle,  concealed 
perhaps  in  great  measure  from  persons  themselves. 
And  though  it  is  our  business  and  our  duty  to  endea- 
vour, within  the  bounds  of  veracity  and  justice,  to  con- 
tribute to  the  ease,  convenience,  and  even  cheerfulness 
and  diversion  of  our  fellow  creatures:  yet,  from  our 
short  views,  it  is  greatly  uncertain,  whether  this  endea- 
vour will,  in  particular  instances,  produce  an  overbalance 
of  happiness  upon  the  whole;  since  so  many  and  distant 
things  must  come  into  the  account.  And  that  which 
makes  it  our  duty  is,  that  there  is  some  appearance  that 
it  will,  and  no  positive  appearance  sufficient  to  balance 
this,  on  the  contrary  side ;  and  also,  that  such  benevolent 
endeavour  is  a  cultivation  of  that  most  excellent  of  all 
virtuous  principles,  the  active  principle  of  benevolence. 
However,  though  veracity,  as  well  as  justice,  is  to  be 
our  rule  of  life ;  it  must  be  added,  otherwise  a  snare  will 
be  laid  in  the  way  of.  some  plain  men,  that  the  use  of 
common  forms  of  speech,  generally  understood,  cannot  be 
falsehood;  and,  in  general,  that  there  can  be  no  designed 
falsehood  without  designing  to  deceive.  It  must  like- 
wise be  observed,  that  in  numberless  cases,  a  man  may 
be  under  the  strictest  obligations  to  what  he  foresees 
will  deceive,  without  his  intending  it.  For  it  is  impos- 
sible not  to  foresee,  that  the  words  and  actions  of  men, 
in  different  ranks  and  employments,  and  of  different 
educations,  will  perpetually  be  mistaken  by  each  other: 
and  it  cannot  but  be  so,  whilst  they  will  judge  with  the 
utmost  carelessness,  as  they  daily  do,  of  what  they  are 
not,  perhaps,  enough  informed  to  be  competent  judges 
of,  even  though  they  considered  it  with  great  attention. 


END  OF  ANALOGY. 


THE 


ANALOGY  OF  RELIGION 


NATURAL  AND  REVEALED, 


TO    THE 


CONSTITUTION  AND  COURSE  OF  NATURE. 


CONSISTING    OF 


A    CRITICIS 


OF 


BUTLER'S  TREATISE  ON  THE  SUBJECT, 


TOGETHEH    WITH 


A   VIEW    OF    THE    CONNEXION   OF   THE    ARGUMENTS    OF   THE 
ANALOGY,    WITH    THE    OTHER    MAIN    BRANCHES    OF 
THE    EVIDENCES    OF    CHRISTIANITY,    NOT 
NOTICED    IN   BUTLER'S    WORK. 


B  Y 

DANIEL    WILSON,   D.D. 


BISHOP  OF  CALCUTTA. 


NEW-YORK: 

ROBERT   CARTER,  58   CANAL-STREET. 
PITTSBURG:  56  MARKET-STREET. 


ANALOGY  OF  RELIGION, 

NATURAL  AND  REVEALED. 


SKETCH  OF  THE  DESIGN  OF  BISHOP  BUTLEr's  ANALOGY. 

Bishop  Butler  is  one  of  those  creative  geniuses, 
who  give  a  character  to  their  times.  His  great  work, 
*'  The  Analogy  of  Rehgion,"  has  fixed  the  admiration 
of  all  competent  judges  for  nearly  a  century,  and  will 
continue  to  be  studied  so  long  as  the  language  in  which 
he  wrote  endures.  The  mind  of  a  master  pervades  it. 
The  author  chose  a  theme  infinitely  important,  and  he 
has  treated  it  with  a  skill,  a  force,  a  novelty  and  talent, 
which  have  left  little  for  others  to  do  after  him.  He 
opened  the  mine  and  exhausted  it  himself  A  discre- 
tion which  never  oversteps  the  line  of  prudence,  is  in 
him  united  with  a  penetration  which  nothing  can  es- 
cape. There  is  in  his  writings  a  vastness  of  idea,  a 
reach  and  generalization  of  reasoning,  a  native  simpli- 
city and  grandeur  of  thought,  wiiich  command  and  fill 
the  mind.  At  the  same  time,  his  illustrations  are  so 
striking  and  familiar  as  to  instruct  as  well  as  persuade. 
Nothing  is  violent,  nothing  far-fetched,  nothing  pushed 
beyond  its  fair  limits,  nothing  fanciful  or  weak  :  a  mas- 
culine power  of  argument  runs  through  the  whole.  All 
bespeaks  that  repose  of  mind,  that  tranquillity  which 
springs  from  a  superior  understanding,  and  an  intimate 
acquaintance  with  every  part  of  his  subject.  He  grasps 
firmly  his  topic,  and  insensibly  communicates  to  his 
reader  the  calmness  and  conviction  which  he  possesses 


316  W  I  L  S  0  N  '  S    A  N  A  L  0  G  Y  . 

himself.  He  embraces  with  equal  ease  the  greatest 
and  the  smallest  points  connected  with  his  argument. 
He  olten  throws  out,  as  he  goes  along,  some  general 
principle,  which  seems  to  cost  him  no  labour,  and  yet 
which  opens  a  whole  field  of  contemplation  before  the 
view  of  the  reader. 

Butler  was  a  philosopher,  in  the  true  sense  of  the 
term.  He  searches  for  wisdom  wdierever  he  can  dis- 
cern its  traces.  He  puts  forth  the  keenest  sagacity 
in  his  pursuit  of  his  great  object,  and  never  turns  aside 
till  he  reaches,  and  seizes  it.  Patient,  silent,  unobtru- 
sive investigation  was  his  forte.  His  powers  of  inven- 
tion were  as  fruitful  as  his  judgment  was  sound.  Pro- 
bably no  book  in  the  compass  of  theology  is  so  full  of 
the  seeds  of  things,  to  use  the  expression  of  a  kindred 
genius,  (Lord  Bacon,)  as  the  "  Analogy." 

He  was  a  man  raised  up  for  the  age  in  which  he 
lived.  The  wits  and  infidels  of  the  reign  of  our  Sec- 
ond Charles,  (Butler  was  born  in  the  year  1692,)  had 
deluged  the  land  with  the  most  unfair,  and  yet  plausi- 
ble writings  against  Christianity.  A  certain  fearless- 
ness as  to  religion  seemed  to  prevail.  There  was  a 
general  decay  of  piety  and  zeal.  Many  persons  treat- 
ed Christianity  as  if  it  were  an  agreed  point  amongst 
all  people  of  discernment,  that  it  had  been  found  out 
to  be  fictitious.  The  method  taken  by  these  enemies 
of  Christianity,  w^as  to  magnify  and  urge  objections 
more  or  less  plausible,  against  particular  doctrines  or 
precepts,  which  were  represented  as  forming  a  part  of 
it ;  and  which,  to  a  thoughtless  mind,  were  easily  made 
to  appear  extravagant,  incredible,  and  irrational.  They 
professed  to  admit  the  Being  and  Attributes  of  the  Al- 
mighty ;  but  they  maintained  that  human  reason  was 
sufficient  for  the  discovery  and  establishment  of  this 
fundamental  truth,  as  well  as  for  the  development  of 
those  moral  precepts,  by  which  the  conduct  of  life 
should  be  regulated  ;  and  they  boldly  asserted,  that  so 
many  objections  and  difficulties  might  be  urged  against 
Christianity,  as  to  exclude  it  from  being  admitted  as 
Divine,  by  any  thoughtful  and  enlightened  person. 

These  assertions  Butler  undertook  to  refute.     He 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  317 

was  a  man  formed  for  such  a  task.  He  knew  tho- 
roughly what  he  was  about.  He  had  a  mind  to  weigh 
objections,  and  to  trace,  detect,  and  silence  cavils. 
Accordingly,  he  came  forward  in  all  the  self-possession, 
and  dignity,  and  meekness  of  truth,  to  meet  the  infidel 
on  his  own  ground.  He  takes  the  admission  of  the  un- 
believer, that  God  is  the  Creator  and  Ruler  of  the 
natural  world,  as  a  principle  conceded.  From  this 
point  he  sets  forward,  and  pursues  a  course  of  argument 
so  cautious,  so  solid,  so  forcible ;  and  yet  so  diversified, 
so  original,  so  convincing;  as  to  carry  along  with  him, 
almost  insensibly,  those  who  have  once  put  themselves 
under  his  guidance.  His  insight  into  the  constitution 
and  course  of  nature  is  almost  intuitive  ;  and  the  appli- 
cation of  his  knowledge  is  so  surprisingly  skilful  and 
forcible,  as  to  silence  or  to  satisfy  every  fair  antagonist. 
He  traces  out  every  objection  with  a  deliberation  which 
nothing  can  disturb ;  and  shows  the  fallacies  from 
whence  they  spring,  with  a  precision  and  acuteness 
which  overwhehn  and  charm  the  reader. 

Accordingly,  students  of  all  descriptions  have  long 
united  in  the  praise  of  Butler.  H5  is  amongst  the  few 
classic  authors  of  the  first  rank  in  modern  literature. 
He  takes  his  place  with  Bacon,  and  Pascal,  and  New- 
ton, those  mighty  geniuses  who  opened  new  sources  of 
information  on  the  most  important  subjects,  and  com- 
manded the  love  and  gratitude  of  mankind.  If  his 
powers  were  not  fully  equal  to  those  of  these  most  ex- 
traordinary men,  they  were  only  second  to  them.  He 
was  in  his  own  line,  nearly  what  they  were  in  the  in- 
ventions of  science,  and  the  adaptation  of  mathematics 
to  philosophy  foimded  on  experiment.  He  was  of  like 
powers  of  mind,  of  similar  calm  and  penetrating  saga- 
city, of  the  same  patience  and  perseverance  in  pursuit, 
of  kindred  acuteness  and  precision  in  argument,  of  like 
force  and  power  in  his  conclusions.  His  objects  were 
as  great,  his  mind  as  simple,  his  perception  of  truth  as 
distinct,  his  comprehension  of  intellect  nearly  as  vast, 
his  aim  as  elevated,  his  success  as  surprising. 

The  "Analogy"  was  the  work  of  Butler's  life.  As 
early  as  the  year  1713,  when  he  was  a  student  of  Di- 


18  W  I  L  S  0  N  '  S    A  N  A  L  0  G  Y 


vinity  at  Tewkesbury,  and  only  twenty-one  years  of 
age,  his  powers  of  mind  were  already  directed  to  this 
and  kindred  subjects.  The  sagacity  and  depth  of 
thought  displayed  in  his  letters  to  Dr.  S.  Clarke,  in 
that  year,  attracted,  though  sent  anonymously,  the 
Doctor's  particular  notice,  and  brought  on  a  friendly 
but  most  acute  discussion,  which  has  been  annexed  to 
all  the  subsequent  editions  of  Dr.  Clarke's  "  Demon- 
stration of  the  Being  and  Attributes  of  God."  From 
the  year  1718,  when  he  was  appointed  preacher  at  the 
Roll's  Chapel,  to  the  year  1726,  when  he  published  his 
Fifteen  Sermons,  the  subject  of  the  "  Analogy  "  was 
apparently  uppermost  in  his  mind.  This  volume  con- 
tained in  fiict  the  germ  of  his  great  work.  At  length, 
in  the  year  1736,  when  he  had  attained  the  age  of  forty- 
five,  the  "  Analogy  "  appeared  as  the  result  of  his  ma- 
turest  reflections  during  a  series  of  theological  studies  of 
between  twenty  and  thirty  years.  In  all  his  subsequent 
writings,  after  his  elevation  to  the  Episcopal  Bench  in 
1738,  till  his  death  in  1752,  the  like  train  of  thought  is 
observable  ;  and  even  in  the  last  of  them  his  charge  to 
the  clergy  of  the  diocese  of  Durham,  in  1751,  the  one 
commanding  subject  which  had  occupied  his  life  is  still 
pursued.  Thus  a  long  course  of  forty  years  was  devo- 
ted by  this  surprising  man,  with  a  depth  of  knowledge 
and  a  strength  of  mind  which  were  exactly  suited  to 
so  great  a  theme,  to  the  illustration  of  the  truth  of 
Christianity  from  the  course  and  order  of  God's  natural 
providence. 

The  consequence  is,  nothing  has  ever  been  advanced 
against  his  main  argument.  The  infidel  has  never  ven- 
tured a  reply.*     It  has  long  been  in  every  one's  hands, 

*  An  atterrpt  was  made,  fifteen  years  after  his  death,  to  fix  the  charge  of  su- 
perstition on  Bishop  Butler.  ]t  was  even  insinuated  that  he  died  in  the  commu- 
nion of  the  Church  of  Rome.  These  calumnies  had  no  foundation.  They  were 
refuted  at  the  time  by  his  friend,  Archbisiio])  Seeker,  to  the  satisfaction  of  every 
one.  And  when  the  accusation  and  the  reply  to  it  were  recorded  in  Butler's 
Life,  in  the  Bio^raphia  Britannica,  by  Dr.  Kippis,  Bishop  Halifax  took  occasion 
to  sift  the  matter  again  to  the  bottom,  and  published  the  result  in  his  edition  of 
the  "  Analogy,"  in  1787.  This  set  the  question  completely  at  rest.  The  deci- 
ded opposition  of  Bishop  Butler's  sentiments  to  the  errors  and  corruptions  of  the 
Church  of  Rome,  is  indeed  apparent  in  all  his  writings  ;  and  it  is  now  notv^'orth 
while,  in  fact  it  would  be  obviously  unjust,  to  enter  into  the  details  of  so  wretch- 
ed a  misrepresentation.  This  subject  is  very  properly  omitted  altogether  in  the 
Oxford  University  edition  of  1807  :  nor  would  it  have  been  alluded  to  here,  if 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  319 

and  is  one  of  the  few  works  which  go  into  the  ele- 
ments of  every  well-directed  plan  of  education. 

It  has,  however,  been  generally  admitted,  that  his 
argmnent,  clear  and  convincing  as  it  is  to  a  prepared 
mind,  is  not  obvious  in  all  its  parts  to  the  young  reader, 
whose  experience  of  life  being  small,  and  his  habits  of 
reflection  feeble,  has  not  always  the  furniture  necessary 
for  comprehending  at  first  the  thoughts  and  conclusions 
of  such  a  mind.  The  difficulty  is  increased  by  a  style 
not  always  clear  and  accurate.  His  language,  indeed, 
interests  and  delights  those  who  are  accustomed  to 
his  manner,  and  seems  to  have  flowed  from  him  without 
art  or  contrivance.  The  familiar  expressions  and  illus- 
trations which  continually  occur,  are  not  without  their 
charm.  Even  the  colloquial  turn  of  some  of  the  phrases 
sits  w  ell  upon  the  author.  Still,  as  a  w  hole,  the  style 
is  too  close,  too  negligent,  too  obscure  to  be  suitable  for 
the  young.  It  is  marked  with  that  carelessness  into 
whicli  many  writers  of  the  first-rate  talents  fall,  when 
intent  only  on  their  great  theme,  they  pour  out  their 
thoughts  in  the  words  which  first  present  themselves. 
More  than  one  attempt  has  therefore  been  made  to 
aid  the  inexperienced  reader,  by  short  analysis  of  But- 
ler's argument.  That  prefixed  by  Bishop  Halifax  to 
his  edition  of  1787,  is  the  most  valuable  as  it  is  the 
best  known.  In  the  following  Essay  a  more  detailed 
review^,  or  summary  of  the  work,  is  attempted,  watli  a 
similar  design :  with  what  success  must  be  left  to  the 
judgment  of  the  public.  If  it  aids  in  forming  some 
idea  of  the  general  reasoning  of  the  Work,  it  will  ac- 
complish all  that  was  designed.  It  cannot,  indeed; 
for  nothing  can  give  a  just  impression  of  Butler,  but 
Butler  himself  It  is  not  intended  to  supersede  the 
mighty  master,  whom  it  only  introduces. 

But  besides  the  obscurity  which  is  found  in  "  The 
Analogy"  by  the  youthful  student,  it  has  been  also  re- 
marked, that  Bishop  Butler's  statements  of  Christianity 
itself,  from  whatever  cause,  are  somewhat  restricted. 
The  impression  is  cold.      The  consolation  and  life  of 

the  charge  against  Bishop  Butler  as  well  as  its  answer,  had  not  been  revived 
since,  ia  an  article  of  a  widely-circulated  work.  La  Biographie  Universelle. 


320  WILSON'S    ANALOGY. 

it  are  absent.  Whether  this  arises  from  the  nature  of 
his  argument,  and  the  class  of  opponents  whom  he 
addressed,  or  from  the  turn  of  the  Bishop's  mind  to 
retired  and  contemplative  rather  than  vivid  and  popular 
descriptions  of  truth ;  or  from  somethingof  the  languor 
so  generally  complained  of  in  the  Divinity  of  the  era 
when  he  wrote,  it  is  not  easy  to  say.  Certain  it  is  that 
there  seems  some  ground  for  the  complaint.  The  full 
and  exuberant  grace  and  consolation  of  Christianity  in 
its  particular  doctrines,  and  its  application  to  the  heart 
and  life,  were  not,  indeed,  the  topics  of  our  great 
author ;  but  the  references  which  frequently  occur  to 
the  scheme  and  end  of  revelation,  would  undoubtedly 
have  admitted  of  some  observations  on  these  important 
points,  which  may  now  be  thought  wanting.  Will  we 
be  forgiven,  if  we  suggest,  in  the  proper  place,  what 
we  intend  by  this  remark  more  at  length  ?  The  emi- 
nent station  which  Butler  holds,  makes  it  natural  that 
we  should  offer  without  fear,  after  an  interval  of  nearly 
a  century,  such  reflections  as  honestly  occur  to  us.  A 
Classic  may  always  be  commented  upon. 

In  the  following  pages,  therefore,  it  will  be  our 
design — 

I.  To  state  the  general  argument  which  Bishop  Butler 
pursues  in  the  Analogy ;  and  to  review  the  principal 
steps  of  his  reasoning. 

II.  To  point  out  the  connexion  of  the  argument  of 
the  Analogy,  with  the  other  main  branches  of  the  Evi- 
dences of  Christianity ;  to  notice  its  use  and  importance ; 
and  to  offer  some  remarks  on  Butler's  particular  view 
of  Christianity  itself,  and  on  the  adaptation  of  his  argu- 
ment to  practical  religion  in  all  its  extent.  Each  of 
these  divisions  will  necessarily  draw  us  into  some 
length. 

We  begin  with 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  321 


A    STATEMENT    OF    THE    GENERAL    ARGUMENT   OF   THE 

ANALOGY. 

The  chief  design  of  this  great  work  is  to  answer 
objections  raised   against    Rehgion,  Natural   and  Re- 
vealed, and  to  confirm  the  proof  of  it,  by  considering 
the  analogy  or  likeness  which  that  system  of  religion 
bears  to  the  constitution  and  course  of  the  world  as 
ruled  by  God's  ordinary  Providence.     It  compares  the 
known  state   and  progress   of  things  in   the    natural 
world,  with  w hat  religion  teaches  as  to  the  moral  world ; 
the  acknoAvledged   dispensations  of  Providence,  with 
the  appointments  of  religion  ;  that  government  of  God 
which  we  actually  find  ourselves  under  here,  with  that 
government  of  God  which  religion  binds  us  to  believe 
and  expect  hereafter.     And  it  shows  that  these  two 
schemes  are  in  many,  very  many  respects  alike,  ^lat 
they  are  both  vast  and  incomprehensible  as  to  their 
whole  compass  and  extent,  but  that  still  they  may  both 
be  traced  up  to  the  same  general  laws,  and  resolved 
into  the  same  principles  of  divine  conduct.     It  takes 
for  granted  that  there  is  an  Intelligent  Governor  of  the 
world,  a  supreme  and  perfect  Author  of  nature ;  anc| 
then  argues  from  that  part  of  his  works  and  dispensa- 
tions which  is  known  and  acknowledged,  to  that  part 
which  is   denied  or  objected  to  ;   from  the   world  of 
nature  to  the  world  of  revelation ;  from  the  confessed 
order  of  Providence  to  the  disputed  appointments  of 
Grace ;  from  creation  to  Christianity.     Its  proper  de- 
sign is  not  to  prove  the  truth  of  natural  and  revealed 
religion  by  their  direct  evidences  of  miracles  and  pro- 
phecies.   The  author  of  the  Analogy  takes  other  ground. 
He  supposes  all  these  usual  proofs  to  remain,  and  remain 
in  all  their  force  ;  and  he  attempts  to  confirm  them  in 
the   minds   of  considerate  men,  who  may  have   been 
staggered  by  objections  and  difficulties,  by  taking  up 
the  objector  on  his  own  admission  of  the  supreme  rule 
of  the  Almighty  in  the  world,  and  showing  him  that  his 
21' 


322  WILSON'S    ANALOGY, 

objections  have  no  real  wei(]^ht,  because  they  might  be 

raised  against  the  works  of  God  in  his  ordinary  and 

confessed  government  of  the  kingdom  of  natm'e,  just  as 

plausibly  as  against  the  government  of  the  same  God  in 

the  kingdom  of  religion.     This  is  his  line  of  argument. 

He  reasons  from  that  part  of  the  divine  proceedings 

which  comes  under  our  view  in  the  daily  business  of 

life,  to  that  larger  and  more   comprehensive  part  of 

these   proceedings   which  is   beyond    our   view,  and 

which  religion  reveals.     Thus  he  answers  and  silences 

objections.     God's  ordering  of  the  affairs  of  men  by  his 

Providence  is  a  fact  known  and  admitted,  and  present 

before  our  eyes.     Now  if  it  can  be  shown  that  God's 

ordering  the  conduct  of  men  by  the  laws  and  motives 

of  religion  is  analagous  to  this,  and  liable  to  no  more 

nor  other  objections,  then  we  have  a  probable  argument, 

in  the  first  instance,  and  independently  of  its  direct 

evidences,  in  favour  of  the  truth  of  Christianity.     Thus 

objections  are   satisfactorily  silenced  if  not  removed. 

Tligi  acknowledgment  of  a  perfect  Creator  and  Ruler 

of  the  Universe,  connected  with  the  fact  that  he  does 

such  and  such  things,  acts  by  such  and  such  general 

laws,   brings   about   such   and    such    effects,  attaches 

such  and  such    consequences  to  men's  actions,  deals 

with  them  in  such  and  such  a  manner  in  the  daily  and 

hourly  appointments  of  his  Providence,  gives  us  data  to 

proceed  upon  in  answering  what  is  objected  against  the 

supposed  rule  of  the  same  God  in  religion. 

If  men,  indeed,  will  indulge  in  vain  and  idle  specu- 
lations, and  form  imaginary  models  of  an  universe,  and 
lay  down  plans  for  ruling  the  world  in  a  way  which 
they  suppose  better  than  it  is  at  present,  there  can  be 
no  arguing  with  them.  They  profess  themselves  to  be 
wiser  than  God.  They  take  up  with  airy  notions  which 
have  no  foundation  in  facts.  Tliis  is  to  deny  the  natu- 
ral government  of  God,  which  was  conceded  by  the 
hypothesis.  But  if  men  will  leave  these  presumptuous 
conjectures,  and  come  to  facts — to  the  constitution  of 
nature,  as  it  is  actually  made  known  to  us  by  expe- 
rience, and  as  confessedly  framed  by  an  all-wise  and 
gracious  Governor,  they  will  find  a  surprising  analogy 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  323 

"between  Nature  and  Religion ;  they  will  find  the  pro- 
bability weigh  down  strongly  on  the  side  of  the  truth 
of  Christianity,  even  prior  to  its  direct  proofs  and  evi- 
dences ;  they  will  fnid,  that  the  system  of  Christianity 
is  loaded  with  no  greater  difficulties  than  the  system 
of  nature  is,  and  that  it  is  no  safer  to  spurn  at  the 
scheme  of  religion,  than  to  ridicule  the  constitution  of 
the  same  infinitely  glorious  God,  in  his  temporal  gov- 
ernment of  mankind.  In  short,  our  author  shows,  that 
the  dispensations  of  Providence,  which  w^e  are  under 
now,  as  inhabitants  of  this  lower  world,  and  as  having 
a  momentary  interest  to  secure  in  it,  are  analogous  to, 
and,  in  fact,  of  a  piece  w  ith,  that  further  dispensation 
wdiich  relates  to  us  as  designed  for  another  w^orld,  in 
which  we  have  an  eternal  interest.  The  natural  and 
moral  world  are  thus  seen  to  be  intimately  connected 
together,  i^id  to  be  parts  of  one  stupendous  whole, 
wdiere  our  ignorance  betrays  us  the  instant  we  dare  to 
speculate  and  imagine  things  of  ourselves,  but  where 
common  sense  and  common  prudence  lead  us  on  se- 
curely, if  we  are  modest,  and  practical,  and  sincere. 
And  the  chief  objections  Avhich  are  urged  against  reli- 
gion, are  thus  shown  to  be  false  and  frivolous ;  because 
they  might  have  been  equally  urged  before  experience 
had  taught  us,  against  the  course  and  constitution  of 
nature,  which  ore  admitted  on  all  hands  to  have  come 
from  the  ever-blessed  God.  If,  therefore,  they  are  in- 
conclusive when  raised  against  the  external  and  obvi- 
ous, and,  as  it  were,  tangible  order  of  things  around 
us,  much  more  are  they  inconclusive,  when  raised  against 
the  moral,  and  invisible,  and  mysterious  order  of  things 
which  Christianity  reveals. 

It  is  true,  this  whole  argument  from  analogy  is  only 
a  probable  one.  It  does  not  amount  to  demonstration. 
But  then,  it  is  a  probable  argimient  of  the  highest  kind, 
and  fiir  stronger  than  those  by  which  men  are  every 
day  guided  in  their  most  important  concerns.  There 
are  very  few  things  indeed  for  which  we  have,  or  can 
have,  demonstrative  evidence.  For  such  feeble  crea- 
tures as  we  are,  probability  is  the  guide  of  life.  Every 
thing  turns  upon  it.     Even  a  single,  slight,  prcsumptioii 


324  WILSON'S    ANALOGY. 

may  not  l)e  witlioiit  its  weight;  but  presumptions,  how- 
ever shght  in  tliemsclves,  if  frequently  repeated,  often 
amount  to  a  moral  certainty.  Thus,  if  we  accidentally 
observe  for  one  day  the  ebb  and  flow  of  the  tide,  the 
observation  affords  only  some  sort  of  presumption,  and 
that  perhaps  the  lowest  imaginable,  that  the  same  may 
happen  again  to-morrow ;  but  the  observation  of  this 
event  for  so  many  days,  and  months,  and  ages  together, 
as  it  has  been  observed  by  men  in  all  places  and  coun- 
tries, gives  us  a  full  assurance  that  it  w  ill  happen  to- 
morrow. No  man  in  his  senses  thinks  otherAvise. 
Thus,  also,  no  one  doubts  but  that  the  sun  w  ill  rise  to- 
morrow, and  will  be  seen,  if  seen  at  all,  in  the  figure 
of  a  circle,  and  not  in  that  of  a  square.  So  again,  we 
conclude  that  there  is  no  kind  of  presumption  that 
there  will  not  be  frost  in  England  any  given  day  in 
January  next ;  that  it  is  probable  that  there  wall  on 
some  day  of  that  month,  and  that  there  %  almost  a 
moral  certainty  of  it  in  some  part  or  other  of  the  win- 
ter. In  like  manner,  when  we  observe  in  human  af- 
fairs generally,  that  any  thing  does  regularly  come  to 
pass,  we  infer  that  other  things  which  are  like  to  it,  or 
have  analogy  w ith  it,  will  also  come  to  pass.  Human 
concerns  are  all  carried  on  by  this  natural  process  of 
reasoning.  And  yet  we  have  no  demonstrative  evi- 
dence in  any  such  cases.  Thus  we  believe  that  a  child, 
if  it  lives  twenty  years,  will  grow  up  to  the  strength 
and  stature  of  a  man ;  that  food  will  contribute  to  the 
preservation  of  its  life  ;  and  the  want  of  food  for  a  cer- 
tain number  of  days  be  its  certain  destruction.  It  is 
thus  men  go  on  continually.  They  judge  and  act  by 
what  is  probable,  and  never  dream  of  asking  for  further 
evidence.  The  rule  of  their  hopes  and  fears,  of  their 
calculations  of  success  in  their  pursuits,  of  their  expec- 
tations how  others  will  act  in  such  circumstances,  and 
of  their  judgment  that  such  actions  proceed  from  such 
principles,  all  these  rest  on  the  argument  from  analogy, 
that  is,  on  their  having  observed  before  the  like  things 
with  respect  to  themselves  or  others.  Especially,  if 
any  great  scheme  of  things  is  laid  before  men  claiming 
to  be  the  plan  of  such  and  such  a  person,  and  demand- 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  325 

ing  certain  efforts  and  duties,  they  compare  this  scheme 
with  the  acknowledged  productions  of  that  person,  and 
judge  by  analogy  whether  it  is  his  or  not.     They  com- 
pare the  part  of  this  person's  designs  which  is  known 
and  familiar  to  them,  with  the  new  scheme  at  present 
unknown,  in  order  to  form  a  probable  opinion.     If,  on 
consideration,  they  can  trace  the  same  mind  in  both  plans, 
the  same  ends,  the  same  sort  of  means,  the  same  gen- 
eral laws,  the  same  benevolence  and  wisdom,  the  same 
vastness  of  comprehension,  the  same  apparent  perplex- 
ity working  the  same  good  results,  the  same  moral 
characteristics  and  features,  and,  above  all,  a  depend- 
ence and  connexion  between  the  two ;  they  conclude 
that  they  both  proceed  from  the  same  author.     And  if 
objections  should  be  raised  against  the  new  and  un- 
known scheme,  which,  on  calm  inquiry,  seem  to  lie 
equally  against  the  scheme  already  known  and  acknow- 
ledged to  come  from  the  same  hand,  these  objections 
have  no  weight  with  them,  that  is,  they  are  answered  by 
the  analogy  or  likeness  which  the  one  constitution  and 
scheme  bears  to  the  other.     Persons  w  ho  doubt  of  the 
force  of  a  probable  argument  in  religion,  should  con- 
sider in  this  way  what  evidence  that  is  upon  which 
they  act  every  day  with  regard  to  their  temporal  inte- 
rests.    They  act  in  the  daily  course  of  life  upon  evi- 
dence much  lower  than  what  is  called  probable.     In 
questions  of  the  greatest  consequence,  a  reasonable  man 
marks  the  lowest  probabilities,  such  as  amount  to  no 
more  than  showing  that  one  side  of  a  question  is  as 
supposable  and  credible  as  the  other.     And  any  one 
would  be  thought  mad  who  did  not  do  so,  in  many 
cases.     Men  not  only  guard  against  what  they  fully  be- 
lieve will  happen,  but  also  against  what  they  think  it 
possible  may  happen ;  they  often  engage  in  pursuits 
when  the  probability  is  greatly  against  success ;  they 
make  such  provision  for  themselves  as  it  is  supposable 
that  they  may  have  occasion  for,  though  the  plain  ac- 
knowledged probability  is,  that  they  never  will  have 
such  occasion. 

Indeed  it  is  a  real  imperfection  in  the  moral  charac- 
ter, not  to  be  influenced  in  practice  by  any  degree  of 


326 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY. 


evidence,  even  the  lowest,  Avlien  it  is  discovered.  Men 
are  under  a  formal  and  absolute  oblie^ation  to  act  in 
practical  matters  on  tlie  side  of  the  least  preponderating 
probabihty.  As  when  we  weigh  two  things  in  a  pair  of 
true  scales,  the  smallest  inclination  of  the  beam  enables 
us  to  see  which  is  the  heavier,  and  binds  us  to  act  on 
the  fact  that  it  is  so  :  so,  in  matters  of  practice,  the 
smallest  degree  of  weight  on  one  side  more  than 
another,  enables  us  to  see  what  is  our  duty  and  binds 
us  to  act  accordingly. 

If,  then,  the  analogy  of  nature  only  showed  us  that 
there  was  the  lowest  presumption  of  the  truth  of  reli- 
gion notwithstanding  difficulties,  men  would  be  formally 
and  absolutely  bound  to  believe  and  obey  it.  But  if 
this  analogy  shows  that  there  is  not  merely  a  low  pre- 
sumption, but  the  highest  probability  of  its  truth,  and 
that  the  very  objections  to  it  rest  on  such  matters  as 
are  apparently  inconclusive,  when  applied  to  that  sys- 
tem of  things  in  Providence  which  is  acknowledged  to 
come  from  an  All-wise  and  Almighty  Creator ;  nay  more, 
that  these  very  objections  may,  for  anything  we  know, 
be  really  benefits,  yea,  most  important  instances,  upon 
the  whole,  of  the  Divine  goodness,  the  duty  of  the 
obedience  to  it  becomes  still  more  imperative.  And 
when  it  is  considered  that,  besides  this  argument  from 
analogy  silencing  our  scruples,  the  numerous  direct 
evidences  of  Christianity  remain  what  they  were  before, 
unanswered  and  unanswerable,  the  obligation  to  receive 
the  Christian  doctrine  becomes,  in  fact,  the  first  and 
paramount  duty  of  a  reasonable  and  accountable  crea- 
ture ;  and  the  rashness  and  guilt  of  rejecting  it  becomes 
criminal  and  absurd,  in  a  degree  wliicli  no  words  can 
express. 

This,  then,  is  the  general  design  of  Bishop  Butler. 
He  undertakes  to  show,  that  men  cannot  reject  Chris- 
tianity on  the  footing  of  objections,  without  acting 
against  tliose  rules  of  probability  by  wliicli  they  have 
been  guided  all  their  lives  in  all  their  most  important 
concerns,  and  by  which  they  are  guided  continually, 
and  must  be  guided,  however  they  may  act  with  re- 
gard to  Christianity.     Thus  our  author  leaves  the  un- 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  327 

believer  without  excuse — condemned  by  his  own 
conduct  on  all  like  occasions — condemned  by  the 
universal  experience  of  mankind — and  acting  in  the 
most  important  of  all  subjects  in  an  opposite  manner  to 
what  common  sense  and  common  prudence  compel 
him  to  do  every  day  of  his  life,  on  the  most  momentous, 
as  well  as  the  slightest  occasions.  Such  is  the  scope 
of  this  celebrated  Treatise.  If  we  have  dwelt  longer 
than  might  seem  necessary  in  explaining  it,  let  it  be  re- 
membered, that  it  is  the  key  to  all  that  follows. 


328  WILSON'S    ANALOGY 


ANALYSIS    OF   BISHOP    BUTLER's    ARGUMENT. 

After  this  sketch  of  the  design  of  the  Analogy,  let  us 
now  proceed  to  give  an  idea,  so  far  as  we  may  be 

ABLE,  OF  THE  SEVERAL  STEPS  OF  OUR  AUTHOR's  ARGU- 
MENT. Wc  say,  so  far  as  w^e  may  be  able  ;  for  it  is  no 
easy  task  to  compress  and  simplify  a  series  of  close  and 
profound  reasoning.  However,  some  assistance  may 
be  given.  The  reader's  patience  is  requested.  Such 
an  author  demands  and  rewards  the  utmost  attention, 
and  cannot  be  understood  without  it. 

The  whole  Treatise  is  divided  into  two  parts.  In 
the  First,  the  author  shows,  that  the  things  principally 
objected  against  natural  religion,  are  analogous  to  what 
is  experienced  in  the  course  of  nature,  and,  therefore, 
inconclusive.  In  the  Second,  he  shows  the  same  as  to 
Christianity  or  Revealed  Religion.  In  the  First  Part, 
he  considers,  as  we  shall  presently  see  more  at  length, 
by  a  separate  review  of  each  topic,  that  natural  religion 
teaches,  1.  That  mankind  is  to  live  hereafter  in  a  future 
state.  2.  That  there  every  one  shall  be  rewarded  or 
punished.  3.  That  these  rewards  and  punishments 
will  be  according  to  men's  good  or  evil  behaviour  here. 
4.  That  our  present  life  is  a  probation  or  trial.  5.  That 
it  is  a  state  of  moral  discipline  for  a  future  life.  6.  That 
the  notion  of  necessity  forms  no  valid  objection  against 
these  truths ;  and,  7.  That  as  this  plan  of  religion  is  but 
very  partially  made  known  to  us  in  this  world,  no  ob- 
jections against  its  wisdom  and  goodness  are  of  any 
real  weight.  These  points  we  shall  consider  in  seven 
separate  chapters. 

From  this  view  of  natural  religion,  we  shall  proceed 
with  Butler  in  the  Second  Part  of  his  work,  to  weigh, 
1.  The  importance  of  Christianity  ;  2.  The  objections 
raised  against  it,  on  the  ground  of  its  being  miraculous; 
and,  3.  Our  incapacity  of  judging  what  was  to  be  ex- 
pected in  a  revelation,  and  the  credibility  that  it  would 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  329 

contain  things  apparently  open  to  objections.  4.  We 
shall  next  have  to  consider,  Christianity  as  a  scheme 
imperfectly  comprehended ;  then,  5.  The  particular 
system  itself  of  Christianity,  the  appointment  of  a  Medi- 
ator, and  the  redemption  of  the  world  by  him ;  and,  6. 
The  want  of  univ  ersality  in  revelation,  and  the  supposed 
deficiency  in  the  proof  of  it.  After  this,  we  shall  have 
to  notice,  7.  The  objections  against  the  particular  evi- 
dence for  Christianity;  and  lastly,  8.  The  objections 
which  may  be  made  generally  against  thus  arguing 
from  the  analogy  of  nature  to  religion.  These  will  be 
the  heads  of  eight  chapters.  The  following  review  will 
accordingly  contain  seven  chapters  in  the  first  division 
of  it,  and  eight  in  the  second. 

The  author  begins  his  Treatise  (Part  I.  Chap.  1.) 
with  that  which  is  the  foundation  of  all  our  hopes  and 
all  our  fears ;  all  our  hopes  and  fears  which  are  of  any 
consideration — a  Future  Life.  He  takes  for  granted \ 
that  there  is  an  Intelligent  Author  of  Nature,  whose/ 
moral  will  and  character  is  just  and  good  in  the  very 
highest  degree.  This  Author  of  Nature,  formed  the 
universe  as  it  is,  and  carries  on  the  course  of  it  as  he 
does,  rather  than  in  any  other  manner.  Men,  as  rational 
creatures,  cannot  but  reflect  on  the  mysterious  scheme 
of  things  in  the  midst  of  which  they  find  themselves  ; 
and  cannot  but  inquire  whence  they  came  and  whither 
they  are  going,  and  what  will  be  the  end  or  issue  of 
the  system  in  which  they  are  placed.  Now  it  will  ap- 
pear, in  the  first  place,  from  considering  the  analogy  of 
nature,  that  there  is  nothing  improbable  in  what  religion 
teaches,  that  we  are  to  exist  in  another  life  after  death. 
There  is,  indeed,  a  confused  suspicion,  that  in  the  great 
shock  of  the  unknown  event,  death,  our  living  powers  ' 
will  be  destroyed.  The  sensible  proof  of  our  being 
possessed  of  these  powers  is  removed.  Death  is  terri- 
ble to  us.  Nature  shrinks  from  it.  Yet,  when  we 
come  calmly  to  consider  these  apprehensions,  we  shall 
find  them  to  be  groundless. 

1.  For  it  is  clearly  a  general  law  of  nature,  that  the  [• 
same  creatures  should  exist  here  in  very  different  de- 
grees of  life  and  perception.     We  see  instances  of  this 


oo 


0  WILSON'SANALOGY. 


law  in  the  surprising  change  of  worms  into  flies,  and  in 
birds  and  insects  bursting  their  sliell,  and  entering  into 
a  new  world  furnished  with  new  accommodations  for 
them.  The  states  also  in  which  we  ourselves  formerly 
existed  in  the  womb,  and  in  the  years  of  infancy,  are 
widely  diiferent  from  the  state  of  mature  age.  Nothing 
can  be  imagined  more  different.  Therefore,  that  we 
are  to  exist  hereafter  in  a  state  as  dift'erent  from  our 
present,  as  this  is  from  our  former  one,  is  only  according 
to  the  analogy  of  nature. 

2.  There  is  a  probability,  in  every  case,  that  all 
things  will  continue  as  we  now  find  them,  in  all  re- 
spects, except  those  in  which  we  have  some  positive 
reason  to  think  they  will  be  altered.  This  is  a  general 
law.  Nature  goes  on  as  it  is.  This  seems  our  only 
reason  for  believing  that  the  course  of  the  world  will 
continue  to-morrow,  as  it  is  to-day,  and  as  it  has  done, 
so  far  as  experience  and  history  can  carry  us  back.  If 
then  our  living  powers  do  not  continue  after  death, 
there  must  be  some  positive  reason  for  this,  either  m 
death  if  self,  or  in  the  analogy  of  nature. 

But  there  is  no  positive  reason  in  death  itself,  for  we 
know  not  what  it  is  ;  we  only  know  some  of  its  effects, 
such  as  the  dissolution  of  flesh,  skin,  and  bones; 
and  these  effects  in  nowise  appear  to  imply  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  living  agent.  Sleep,  or  a  swoon,  shows  us 
that  the  living  powers  may  exist  when  there  is  no 
present  capacity  of  exercising  them.  In  fact  we  know 
not  upon  what  the  existence  of  our  living  powers 
depends. 

Nor  does  the  analogy  of  nature  furnish  any  positive 
reason  to  think  that  death  is  our  destruction.  For  we 
have  no  faculties  wherewith  to  trace  any  thing  beyond, 
or  through  death,  to  see  what  becomes  of  those  pow- 
ers. Men  were  possessed  of  these  powers  up  to  the 
period  to  which  we  have  faculties  for  tracing  them ;  it 
is  probable,  therefore,  that  they  retain  them  afterwards. 

3.  For  our  gross  bodies  are  not  ourselves,  and  there- 
fore the  destruction  of  them  may  be  no  destruction  of 
ourselves.  We  see  that  men  may  lose  their  limbs, 
their  organs  of  sense,  and  even  the  greatest  part  of 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  331 

their  bodies,  and  yet  remain  the  same  Uving  agents  as 
before.  Our  organized  bodies  are  merely  large  quan- 
tities of  matter  which  may  be  alienated,  and  actually 
are  in  a  daily  course  of  succession  and  change,  whilst 
we  remain  the  same  living  permanent  beings  notwith- 
stancting.     As,  therefore,  we  have  already  several  times  ' 

over  lost  a  great  part  of  our  body,  or  perhaps  the  whole 
of  it,  according  to  certain  common  established  laws  of 
nature ;  so  when  we  shall  lose  as  great  a  part,  or  the 
whole,  by  another  common  established  law  of  nature, 
death,  why  may  we  not  also  remain  the  same  ?  That 
the  alienation  has  been  gradual  in  one  case,  and  will 
be  more  at  once  in  the  other,  proves  nothing  to  the 
contrary.  ^ 

4.  But,  more  particularly,  our  bodies  are  clearly  only 

organs  and  instruments  of  perception  and  motion.     Our  V  i 

use  of  common  optical  instruments  shows  that  we  see  ^^ 

with  our  eyes  in  the  same  sense,  and  in  no  other,  as  i  ^ 

we  see    with   glasses.     These  glasses,  which  are  no  |r 

part  of  our  body,  convey  objects  towards  the  perceiv-  fv'vh'    k^ 
ing  power,  just  as  our  bodily  organs  do.     And  if  we  • ').     r^ 
see  with  our  eyes  only  in  this  manner,  the  like  may  be    ,^y 
concluded  as  to  all  our  other  senses.     So  with  regard     ' 
to   the  power  of  moving  :    upon  the  destruction  of  a 
limb,  the  active  power  remains  ;  and  we  can  walk  by 
the  help  of  an  artificial  leg,  just  as  we  can  make  use 
of  a  pole  to  reach  things  beyond  the  length  of  the  na- 
tural arm.     We  may  therefore  have  no  more  relation 
to  our  external  bodily  organs,  than  we  have  to  a  mi- 
croscope or  a  staff,  or  any  other  foreign  matter,  which 
we  use  as  instruments  of  perception  or  motion ;  and 
the    dissolution  of  these  organs  by  death  may  be  no 
destruction  of  the  living  agent. 

5.  But  farther,  our  powers  of  reflection  do  not,  even 
now,  depend  on  our  gross  body  in  the  same  manner 
as  perception  by  the  organs  of  sense  does.  In  our 
present  condition,  the  organs  of  sense  are  indeed  ne- 
cessary for  conveying  in  ideas  to  our  reflecting  powers, 
as  carriages,  and  levers,  and  scaffolds  are  in  architec- 
ture ;  but  when  these  ideas  are  once  brought  in,  and 
stored  up  in  the  mind,  w^e  are  capable  of  pleasure  and 


332  WILSON'S    ANALOGY. 

pain  by  reflection,  without  any  further  assistance  from 
our  senses.  Mortal  diseases  often  do  not  at  all  affect 
our  intellectual  powers,  nor  even  suspend  them.  We 
see  persons  under  those  diseases,  the  moment  before 
death,  discover  apprehension,  memory,  reason,  a^l  en- 
tire— the  utmost  force  of  affection,  and  the  highest 
mental  enjoyments  and  sufferings  ;  why  then  should  a 
disease,  when  come  to  a  certain  degree,  be  thought  to 
destroy  those  powers,  which  do  not  depend  on  the 
bodily  senses,  and  which  were  not  affected  by  that 
disease  quite  up  to  that  degree  ? 

6.  Nay,  our  future  existence  may  probably  be  not 
the  beginning,  properly  speaking,  of  any  thing  new,  but 
only  the  continuance,  the  going  on  of  our  present  life  as 
intelligent  agents.  Death  may  only  answer  to  our 
birth,  which  is  not  a  suspension  of  the  faculties  we 
had  before,  nor  a  total  change  of  the  state  of  life  in 
which  we  existed  when  in  the  womb,  but  a  continu- 
ance of  both,  with  such  and  such  great  alterations. 
And  our  present  relation  to  our  bodily  organs  may  be 
the  only  natural  hinderance  to  our  existing  hereafter  in 
a  higher  state  of  being  and  reflection. 

7.  But  even  if  death  suspends  our  living  powers, 
which  does  not  appear,  yet  a  sleep  or  a  swoon  may 
teach  us  that  the  suspension  of  a  power  and  the  de- 
struction of  it,  are  effects  totally  different 

8.  On  the  whole,  the  analogy  of  nature  makes  it 
probable,  that  as  Ave  are  conscious  that  we  are  now 
living  agents,  so  we  shall  go  on  to  be  such,  notwith- 
standing the  event  of  death,  which,  it  is  likely,  may 
only  serve  to  bring  us  into  new  scenes,  and  a  new 
state  of  life  and  action,  just  as  naturally  as  we  came 
into  the  present.  This  will  appear  most  probable,  if 
we  would  only  leave  off  the  delusive  cvistom  of  sub- 
stituting imagination  in  the  room  of  experience,  and 
would  confine  ourselves  to  what  we  really  know  and 
understand. 

Chapter  II.  A  future  state  being  once  granted,  an 
unbounded  prospect  is  opened  to  our  hopes  and  fears. 
The  expectation  of  immortality  is  not  a  matter  of  in- 


WILSON'S   ANALOGY.  333 

difference,  but  a  subject  of  the  deepest  importance. 
For  the  whole  analogy  of  nature  shows  tiiat  there  is 
nothing  incredible  in  the  supposition  that  God  will  re- 
ward and  punish  men  hereafter  for  their  actions  here. 
And  it  is  infinitely  unreasonable  in  men  to  act  upon 
any  other  supposition. 

1.  For  in  the  present  life,  we  see  that  pleasure  and 
pain  are  the  consequences  of  our  actions,  and  that  we 
are  endued  with  capacities  of  foreseeing  these  conse- 
quences, and  acting  accordingly.  This  is  the  constitu- 
tion of  the  Author  of  Nature.  By  prudence  and  care 
we  may  pass  our  days  in  tolerable  quiet ;  by  rashness, 
passion,  wilfulness,  or  even  by  negligence,  (which  is  very 
observable)  we  may  make  ourselves  as  miserable  as 
we  please.  This  is  the  general  course  of  things.  God's 
method  as  the  Governor  of  the  universe,  is  clearly 
to  forewarn  us  of  such  and  such  things,  and  to  give  us 
capacities  of  foreseeing,  that  if  we  act  so  and  so,  we 
shall  have  such  and  such  enjoyments  and  sufferings. 

2.  It  is  then  a  simple  matter  of  fact,  that  we  are 
under  the  dominion  of  God  here,  just  as  we  are  under 
the  dominion  and  rule  of  civil  magistrates;  because 
the  annexing  pleasure  to  some  actions,  and  pain  to 
others,  and  the  giving  notice  of  this  beforehand,  is  the 
proper  formal  notion  of  government.  We  are  thus 
compelled  to  admit,  that  the  Author  of  Nature  acts 
here  as  a  Master  or  Governor:  there  can,  therefore,  be 
nothing  incredible  in  the  general  doctrine  of  religion, 
that  God  will  act  thus  hereafter — that  is,  will  reward 
and  punish  men  for  their  behaviour. 

3.  But  as  divine  punishment  is  what  men  chiefly 
object  against,  and  are  most  unwilling  to  allow,  it  is 
important  to  observe,  not  merely  that  there  is  a  great 
deal  of  misery,  in  the  world,  but  that  there  is  a  great 
deal,  which  men  bring  upon  themselves,  and  which 
they  might  have  foreseen  and  avoided.  Now  the 
circumstances  of  these  natural  punishments  are  such 
as  these. — They  are  often  the  consequences  of  actions 
which  procure  many  present  advantages,  and  bring 
much  present  pleasure.  Again,  they  are  often  much 
greater  than  the  advantages  or  pleasures  of  the  actions 


334  WILSON'S   ANALOGY. 

which  they  follow.  They  are  frequently  delayed  a 
great  while ;  sometnnes  till  long  after  the  actions 
occasioning  them  are  forgot.  They  then  come,  after 
such  delay,  not  by  degrees,  but  suddenly,  with 
violence,  and  at  once.  They  are  often  not  thought  of 
during  the  actions  themselves  :  yet  still  they  inevitably 
follow.  Thus  habits  formed  in  youth  are  utter  ruin  for 
life ;  though,  for  the  most  part,  this  consequence  is 
little  thought  of  at  the  time. 

4.  We  observe  further,  that  the  natural  course  of 
things  gives  us  opportunities,  which,  like  the  seed-time, 
cannot  be  recalled  if  we  once  neglect  them  ;  and  that, 
in  many  cases,  real  repentance  and  reformation  are  of 
no  avail  to  remedy  or  prevent  the  miseries  naturally 
annexed  to  previous  folly ;  that  neglects  from  mere 
inconsiderateness  and  want  of  attention,  are  often  as 
fatal  as  from  any  active  misconduct ;  and  that  many 
natural  punishments  are  mortal,  and  seem  inflicted 
either  to  remove  the  offender  out  of  the  way  of  being 
further  mischievous,  or  as  an  example  to  others. 

5.  Now  these  things  are  not  accidental,  but  are 
matters  of  every  day's  experience,  proceeding  from 
general  laws  by  which  God  obviously  is  governing 
the  world ;  and  they  are  so  analogous  to  what  religion 
teaches  us  concerning  the  future  punishment  of  the 
wicked,  that  both  may  be  expressed  in  the  very  same 
words. 

6.  Especially  we  see,  that  after  men's  neglecting 
repeated  warnings,  and  many  checks,  in  a  course  of 
vice — after  these  have  been  Ions:  scorned — and  after 
the  worst  consequences  of  their  follies  have  been 
delayed  for  a  great  while ;  at  length  their  punishment 
breaks  in  upon  them  irresistibly,  like  an  armed  force ; 
repentance  is  too  late  to  relieve  their  misery — the  case 
is  desperate ;  and  poverty  and  sickness,  remorse  and 
anguish,  infamy  and  death,  overwhelm  them,  as  the 
effects  of  their  own  behaviour,  beyond  the  possibility 
of  remedy  or  escape. 

7.  Not  that  men  are  thus  uniformly  punished  here  in 
proportion  to  their  vices,  but  they  often  are  :  very  many 
such  cases  occur,  and  dreadful  ones  too — cases  quite 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  335 

sufficient  to  show  what  the  laws  of  the  universe  may 
admit,  and  to  answer  all  objections  against  future  pun- 
ishments, from  the  vain  idea,  that  the  frailty  of  nature, 
and  the  force  of  temptations  (as  men  sometimes  speak) 
almost  annihilate  the  guilt  of  human  vices. 

8.  Thus,  on  the  whole,  the  particular  final  causes  of 
pleasure  and  pain  distributed  by  Almighty  God  here, 
prove  that  we  are  under  his  government,  in  the  same 
way  as  subjects  are  under  the  rule  of  civil  magistrates. 
And  future  rewards  and  punishments  are  but  an  ap- 
pointment, analogous  of  the  same  sort  with  what  we 
thus  actually  experience  in  this  world,  in  the  regular- 
course  of  universal  Providence. 

Chap.  III.  But  further;  this  natural  government 
of  God,  under  which  we  now  find  ourselves,  is  a 
moral  or  righteous  government.  It  is  not  merely  a 
government  by  rewards  and  punishments,  like  that 
which  a  master  exercises  over  his  servants,  which  in 
human  affairs  is  often  exercised  tyrannically  and  par- 
tially, but  one  which  renders  to  men  according  to  their 
actions,  considered  as  morally  good  or  evil.  This  is 
the  next  step  in  removing  objections  against  natural 
religion.  • 

Men  have  no  ground  whatever  to  assert  that  God  is 
simply  and  absolutely  benevolent — this  indeed  may  be 
so  upon  the  whole — but  he  clearly  manifests  himself 
unto  us  as  a  righteous  Governor.  This  government, 
indeed,  so  far  as  it  is  seen  here,  and  taken  alone,  is  not 
complete  and  perfect ;  but  still  a  righteous  government 
is  carried  on  here,  quite  sufficiently  to  give  us  the  ap- 
prehension that  it  shall  be  completed  in  a  future  life. 
We  see  now  the  clear  beginnings,  the  rudiments  of  a 
moral  government,  notwithstanding  all  the  confusion 
and  disorder  of  the  world.  This  is  enoucfh  to  answer 
all  objections  against  the  future  judgment,  which  reli- 
gion teaches  us  to  expect. 

1.  For  as  God  is  our  Governor,  no  rule  of  his  govern- 
ment appears  to  creatures  endued  with  a  moral  nature 
as  we  are,  so  natural,  so  unavoidable,  considering  his 
infinite  perfections,  as  that  of  distributive  justice.     The 


336  WILSON'S    ANALOGY. 

expectation  then  of  this  is  not  in  itself  absurd  or  chi- 
merical. 

2.  Next,  as  God  has  endued  us  with  capacities  of 
foreseeini]^  the  good  and  bad  consequences  of  our  beha- 
viour, and  rewards  and  punishes  prudence  and  impru- 
dence respectively,  this  plainly  implies  some  sort  of 
moral  government.  Tranquillity  and. satisfaction  follow 
a  prudent  management  of  our  affairs  ;  and  rashness  and 
negligence  bring  after  them  many  sufferings.  These 
are  instances  of  a  right  constitution  of  things  here ;  just 
as  the  correction  of  children,  when  they  run  into  dan- 
ger, or  hurt  themselves,  is  a  part  of  right  education. 

3.  Again,  the  Author  of  Nature  has  so  appointed 
things,  that  vicious  actions,  as  falsehood,  injustice,  cru- 
elty, &c.,  must  be  punished,  and  are  punished  as  mis- 
chievous to  society.  He  has  put  mankind  under  a 
necessity  of  thus  punishing  them,  just  as  he  has  put 
them  under  a  necessity  of  preserving  their  lives  by 
food.  Thus  men  are,  in  some  respects,  unavoidably 
under  a  moral  government  here,  they  are  punished  or 
rewarded  as  being  mischievous  or  beneficial  to  society. 

4.  Again,  we  are  so  formed  that  virtue,  as  such, 
gives  us  satisfaction,  at  least  in  some  instances ;  vice, 
as  such,  and  on  its  own  account,  in  none.  This  is  a 
proof  not  only  of  government,  but  of  moral  government, 
begun  and  established — moral  in  the  strictest  sense, 
though  not  in  that  perfection  of  degree,  which  religion 
teaches  us  to  expect.  The  sense  of  well  and  ill  doing, 
the  presages  of  conscience,  the  love  which  men  have  to 
good  characters,  and  the  dislike  of  bad  ones;  honour, 
shame,  gratitude ;  vexation  and  remorse,  arising  from 
reflection  on  an  action  done  by  us,  as  being  wrong ; 
disturbance  and  fear,  from  a  sense  of  being  blamewor- 
thy:  and,  on  the  other  hand,  inward  security  and 
peace,  complacency  and  joy  of  heart,  accompanying  the 
exercise  of  friendship,  compassion,  benevolence  ; — all 
this  shows  that  we  are  placed  here  in  a  condition,  in 
which  our  moral  nature  operates  in  favouring  virtue 
and  punishing  vice.  Vice  cannot  at  all  be,  and  virtue 
cannot  but  be,  favoured  on  some  occasions,  and  for  its 
own  sake,  by  ourselves  and  others.     The  one  cannot 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  ^    337 

but  be  miserable  ;  the  other  cannot  but  be  happy  in 
itself,  in  some  degree.  And  though  the  wicked  are  at 
times  prosperous,  in  some  respects  and  externally,  and 
the  righteous  afflicted,  this  cannot,  and  does  not,  drown 
the  voice  of  Providence,  plainly  declaring,  in  the  course 
of  things,  for  virtue  upon  the  whole.  For  it  is  clear 
that  these  disorders  are  brought  about  by  the  perver- 
sion of  passions,  which  were  implanted  in  us  for  other, 
and  those  very  good  purposes. 

5.  Once  more,  there  is,  in  the  natural  course  of 
things,  a  tendency  in  virtue  and  vice  to  produce  their 
good  and  bad  effects  in  a  greater  degree  than  they  do 
in  fact  produce  them.  This  is  a  very  considerable 
thing.  Good  and  bad  men  would  be  much  more 
rewarded  and  punished  here  as  such,  were  not  justice 
eluded  by  various  artifices,  were  not  characters  un- 
known, were  not  many  other  hinderances  presented  by 
accidental  causes.  But  these  hinderances  may  be 
removed  in  a  future  state,  and  virtue  enjoy  its  proper 
and  full  reward.  In  the  mean  time,  these  tendencies 
are  declarations  of  God  in  his  natural  Providence  in 
favour  of  virtue.  To  judge  better  of  the  tendency  of 
virtue  to  produce  happiness,  let  any  one  consider  what 
a  nation  would  become,  if  all  its  citizens  were  perfectly 
virtuous ;  and  that  for  a  succession  of  ages.  Wars 
would  be  unknown ;  passions  w  ould  be  restrained  ; 
crimes,  factions,  envy,  jealousy,  injustice  would  be  ban- 
ished ;  laws  and  j^unishments  would  be  unnecessary ; 
all  would  contribute  to  the  public  prosperity,  and  each 
would  enjoy  the  fruits  of  his  own  virtue.  United 
wisdom  would  plan  every  thing,  and  united  strength 
execute  it.  Such  a  kingdom  would  be  like  heaven  upon 
earth.  If  any  think  the  tendency  of  virtue  to  produce 
these  results  to  be  of  little  importance,  I  ask  him  what 
he  would  think  if  vice  had  essentially  these  advanta- 
geous tendencies. 

6.  The  notion,  then,  of  a  moral  righteous  govern- 
ment is  suggested  by  the  course  of  nature,  and  the 
execution  of  it  is,  as  we  have  seen,  actually  begun ;  and 
there  is  ground  to  believe  that  virtue  and  vice  may  be 
rewarded  and  punished  hereafter  in  a  higher  degree 

22 


338  WILSON'S    ANALOGY, 

# 

than  they  are  here,  because  the  tendencies,  to  tlie  per- 
fection of  this  moral  scheme  are  natural ;  whilst  the 
hinderances  are  only  accidental. 

Chap.  IV.  If  this  be  so — if  there  be  this  moral 
government,  then  it  implies,  in  the  next  place,  that  our 
present  life  is  a  state  of  probation ;  that  our  future  in- 
terest is  appointed  to  depend  on  our  behaviour,  just  in 
the  same  manner  as  our  temporal  interest  is  appointed 
to  depend  on  our  behaviour.  And  this  state  of  proba- 
tion implies,  in  both  cases,  difficulty  in  securing  our 
happiness,  and  the  danger  of  losing  it. 

1.  For  w^e  are  clearly  at  present  in  a  state  of  trial  as; 
to  this  world,  under  God's  natural  government.     So  far 

lis  men  are  tempted  to  any  course  of  action,  which  will 
probably  occasion  them  greater  inconvenience  than 
satisfaction,  they  are  in  a  state  of  trial  as  to  their  tem- 
poral interests,  and  those  interests  are  in  danger  from 
themselves.  Now,  from  the  course  of  things  around  us, 
we  have  innumerable  temptations  to  forfeit  and  neglect 
these  temporal  interests,  and  to  run  ourselves  into . 
misery  and  ruin :  thence  arises  the  difficulty  of  behav- 
ing so  as  to  secure  our  temporal  interests,  and  the 
hazard  of  behaving  so  as  to  miscarry  in  them.  And 
outward  temptations,  concurring,  as  they  always  do,-,^ 
with  inward  habits  and  passions,  as  really  put  men  in 
danger  of  voluntarily  foregoing  their  temporal  interests, 
as  their  future  ones,  and  as  really  render  self-denial 
necessary  to  secure  one  as  the  other :  so  analogous  are 
our  states  of  trial  in  our  temporal  and  religious  capaci- 
ties. 

2.  Again,  as  to  both  states  we  see  that  some  menv 
scarcely  look  beyond  the  passing  day,  so  much  are  they 
taken  up  with  present  gratifications ;  that  others  are 
carried  away  by  passions  against  their  better  judg- 
ment, and  their  feeble  resolutions  of  acting  better ; 
and  that  some  even  avow  pleasure  to  be  their  rule  of  / 
life,  and  go  on  in  vice,  foreseemg  that  it  will  be  their 
temporal  ruin,  and  apprehending  at  times  that  it  may 
possibly  be  their  future  ruin  also.  Thus  the  dangers 
in  both  states  produce  the  same  effects,  as  they  pro- 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  339 

ceed  from  the  same  causes ;  that  is,  they  are  analogous 
and  ahke. 

3.  Further,  in  both  states  our  dangers  are  increased 
by  the  ill  behaviour  of  others,  by  wrong  education,  bad 
example,  corruption  of  religion,  mistaken  notions  con- 
cerning happiness. 

4.  Again,  in  both,  men  by  negligence  and  folly  bring 
themselves  into  new  difficulties,  no  less  than  by  a 
course  of  vice  ;  and  by  habits  of  indulgence  become 
less  qualified  to  meet  them.  For  instance,  wrong 
behaviour  in  youth  increases  the  difficulty  of  right 
behaviour  in  mature  age  ;  that  is,  puts  us  in  a  more 
disadvantageous  state  of  trial. 

5.  In  both,  also,  we  are  in  a  condition  which  does 
not  seem  the  most  advantageous  for  securing  our  true 
interests.  There  are  natural  appearances  of  our  being 
in  a  state  of  degradation.  Yet  we  have  no  ground  of 
complaint;  for  as  meS  may  manage  their  temporal 
affairs  by  prudence,  so  as  to  pass  their  days  in  toler- 
able ease  ;  so  with  respect  to  religion,  no  more  is 
required  than  we  must  be  greatly  wanting  to  ourselves 
if  we  neglect. 

6.  Once  more,  as  thought,  and  self-denial,  and  things 
far  from  agreeable,  are  absolutely  necessary  for  secur- 
ing our  temporal  interests,  all  presumption  against  the 
same  being  necessary  for  securing  our  higher  interests 
is  removed.  ^ 

7.  Had  we  not  experience  as  our  guide,  we  might, 
indeed,  in  speculation,  urge  it  to  be  possible  that  any 
thing  of  hazard  should  be  put  upon  us  by  an  Infinite 
Being,  since  every  thing  which  is  hazardous  in  our 
conception,  is  noAV  already  certain  in  his  foreknowledge.. 
And  indeed  this  may  well  be  thought  a  difficulty  in 
speculation,  and  cannot  but  be  so,  till  we  know  the 
whole,  or  however  much  more  of  the  case.  And  if 
mankind,  as  inhabitants  of  this  world,  really  found 
themselves  always  in  a  settled  state  of  security,  with- 
out any  solicitude  on  their  part,  and  in  no  danger  of 
falling  into  distresses  and  miseries,  by  carelessness  or 
passion,  by  bad  example,  or  the  deceitful  appearances 
of  things, — then  it  would  be  some  presumption  against 


340  WILSON'S    ANALOGY. 

religion,  that  it  represents  us  in  a  state  of  trial  and  dan- 
ger as  to  our  future  happiness.  But  now  the  whole 
course  of  nature  shows  us  that  we  are  in  a  state  of  ex- 
treme hazard  as  to  our  temporal  interests.  And  this 
constitution  of  things  is  settled  by  Almighty  God  as  our 
natural  Governor.  It  is  as  it  is.  This  is  quite  clear. 
And  this  is  sufficient  to  answer  all  objections  against 
the  credibility  of  our  being  in  a  state  of  trial  and  diffi- 
culty, under  the  moral  government  of  the  same  God, 
as  to  our  future  and  eternal  interests. 

Chapter  V.  If  we  go  on  to  ask,  how  we  came  to  be 
placed  in  a  probationary  state  of  so  much  difficulty  and 
hazard,  we  have  already  said  that  we  can  give  no  com- 
plete answer.  Possibly  it  would  be  beyond  our  facul- 
ties, not  only  to  find  out,  but  even  to  understand  the 
whole  reason;  and  even  if  we  liad  faculties,  whether 
it  w  ould  be  of  service  or  prejudice  to  us  to  be  informed 
of  it,  it  is  impossible  to  say.  Still  another  question 
may  be  naturally  put,  to  which  a  satisfactory  reply  may 
be  given.  If  it  be  asked.  What  is  our  main  duty  here, 
as  placed  in  this  state  of  trial  and  difficulty  ?  analogy 
w  ill  help  us  to  answer,  Forjnoral  discipline,  as  pyepar- 
atory  to  a  future  state  of  security  and  happiness.  The 
beginning  of  life  in  the  present  world,  considered  as 
an  education  for  mature  age,  appears  plainly,  at  first 
sight,  analogous  to  this  trial  for  a  fu||kre  one. 

1.  For  our  nature  here  corresponos  to  our  external 
condition,  and  what  we  call  happiness  is  the  result  of 
this  nature  and  this  condition.  Now  as  there  are  some 
determinate  character  and  qualifications  necessary  to 
men's  enjoyment  of  the  present  life;  so  analogy  leads 
us  to  conclude,  that  there  must  be  some  determinate 
character  and  qualifications  to  rendei^Tien  capable  of 
the  future  life  of  the  good  hereafter.  The  one  is  set 
over  against  the  other. 

2.  In  the  next  place,  we  see  that  the  constitution 
and  faculties  of  men  are  such,  that  they  are  capable  of 
naturally  becoming  qualified  for  states  of  life,  for  which 
they  were  at  first  wholly  unqualified.  The  human 
faculties    are    made    for    gradual    enlargement;    habit 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY  341 

gives  us  new  faculties  in  any  kind  of  action,  and  pro- 
duces secret,  but  settled  and  fixed  alterations  in  our 
temper  and  character.  As  habits  of  the  body  are  pro- 
duced by  repeated  acts,  so  habits  of  the  mind  are 
produced  by  carrying  into  act  inward  principles;  such 
as  obedience,  submission  to  authority,  veracity,  justice, 
charity,  attention,  industry,  self-government.  Habit 
forms  men  to  these  virtues ;  just  as  habit  forms  the 
archer  to  skill,  the  porter  to  strength  of  arm,  the  racer 
to  swiftness,  the  artizan  in  every  kind  of  manufacture, 
to  adroitness  and  precision.  Such  is  the  constitution  of 
our  nature.  By  accustoming  ourselves  to  any  course 
of  action,  we  get  an  aptness  to  go  on  m  it:  the  incli- 
nations which  made  us  averse  to  it  grow  weaker;  the 
real  difficulties  of  it  lessen;  the  reasons  for  it  offer 
themselves  of  course ;  and  thus  a  new  character  may 
be  formed,  not  given  us  by  nature,  but  which  nature 
directs  us  to  acquire. 

3.  These  capacities  of  improvement  are  most  impor- 
tant. Man  is  left,  considered  in  his  relation  to  this 
world  only,  an  unformed,  weak,  unfinished  creature, 
wholly  unqualified  for  the  mature  state  of  life  to  which 
he  is  designed.  He  needs  the  acquisitions  of  know-\ 
ledge,  experience,  and  habits,  in  order  at  all  to  attain^ 
the  ends  of  his  creation.  And  he  is  placed,  in  child- 
hood and  youth,  in  a  condition  fitted  for  supplying  his 
deficiencies.  Children  from  their  birth  are  daily  learn- 
ing something  necessary  for  them  in  the  future  scenes 
of  their  duty.  The  first  years  of  life  are  a  course  of 
education  for  the  practice  of  adult  age.  We  are  much 
assisted  in  it  by  example,  instruction,  and  the  care  of  \ 
others,  but  a  great  deal  is  left  to  ourselves  to  do ;  and>^ 
diligence,  care,  the  voluntary  foregoing  many  things 
which  we  desire,  and  the  setting  ourselves  to  many 
things  to  which  we  have  no  inclination,  are  absolutely 
necessary  to  our  doing  this.  All  this  is  clear.  We  see 
it  every  day.  In  like  manner,  then,  our  being  placed 
in  a  state  of  moral  discipline  throughout  this  life,  as  a 
state  of  education  for  another  world,  is  a  plain  provi- 
dential order  of  things,  exactly  of  the  same  kind,  and 


342  WILSON'S    ANALOGY. 

comprehended  under  one  and  the  same  general  law  of 
nature. 

4.  Nor  would  it  be  any  objection  against  this  view  of 
things  if  we  were  not  able  to  discern  in  what  way  the 
present  life  could  be  a  preparation  for  another ;  for  we 
actually  do  not  discern  how  food  and  sleep  bring  about 
the  growth  of  the  body ;  nor  do  children  at  all  think 
that  their  sports  contribute  to  their  health,  nor  that 
restraint  and  discipline  are  so  necessary,  as  we  know 
they  are,  to  fit  them  for  the  business  of  mature  age. 

5.  But  we  are,  in  fact,  able  to  discern  how  the  pre- 
sent life  is  fit  to  be  a  state  of  discipline  for  another.  If 
we  consider  that  God's  government  of  us  is  a  moral 
one,  and  that  consequently  piety  and  virtue  are  neces- 
sary qualifications  for  a  future  state,  then  we  may  dis- 
tinctly see  that  the  present  course  of  things  is  adapted 
to  improve  us  in  virtue,  and  prejmre  us  for  a  future 
world,  just  as  childhood  is  a  natural  state  of  discipline, 
and  a  necessary  preparation  for  mature  age.  Now 
how  greatly  we  want  moral  improvement  by  disci- 
pline is  clear,  from  the  great  wickedness  of  the  world, 
and  the  imperfections  of  the  best  men.  Tliis  every 
one  sees. 

6.  But  all  do  not  see  that  mankind,  not  merely  as 
corrupt,  but  as  finite  creatures,  need  the  habits  of 
virtue,  which  discipline  goes  to  form,  to  keep  them 
from  deviating  from  what  is  right.  Men,  from  the  very 
constitution  of  their  nature,  before  habits  of  virtue  are 
formed,  are  in  danger.  For  the  natural  objects  of  the 
affections,  continue  to  be  such,  whether  they  can  be 
obtained  innocently  or  not;  and  such  affections  have  a 
tendency  to  incUne  us  to  venture  upon  unlawful  means 
of  obtaining  them.  The  practical  principle  of  virtue  is 
then  the  security  against  this  danger;  and  this  princi- 
ple is  strengthened  by  discipline  and  exercise ;  and 
thus  guards  against  the  danger  arising  from  the  very 
nature  of  particular  affections. 

7.  If  such  finite  creatures  as  men,  endued  with  par- 
ticular affections  and  moral  understanding,  had  all  these 
several  parts  upright  or  finitely  perfect,  they  would 
still  be  in  danger  of  falling,  and  would  require  expert- 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  343 

ence  and  habits  to  improve  them,  and  place  them  in  a 
secure  state.  As  these  habits  strengthen,  their  dan- 
gers woukl  lessen,  and  their  security  increase.  For 
virtuous  self-government  is  not  only  right  in  itself,  but 
improves  the  inward  constitution  and  character;  just  as 
vicious  indulgence  is  not  only  criminal  in  itself,  but 
also  weakens  and  depraves  the  inw^ard  constitution  and 
character.  And  thus  we  may  conceive  how  creatures 
without  blemish  may  be  in  danger  of  going  wrong,  and 
may  need  the  additional  security  of  virtuous  habits. 

8.  But  how  much  more  strongly  must  this  hold  with 
respect  to  those  who  have  corrupted  their  natures. 
Upright  creatures  may  want  to  be  improved  ;  depraved 
creatures  want  to  be  renewed.  Discipline  is  expe- 
dient for  the  upright ;  but  absolutely  necessary  for  the 
depraved — and  discipline  of  the  severer  sort  too. 

9.  Now  the  present  world  is  peculiarly  fitted  to  be 
a  state  of  discipline  for  this  purpose.  Temptation, 
experience  of  the  deceits  of  wickedness,  our  past  faults, 
the  vice  and  disorder  of  the  world — pain,  sorrow, 
disappointment,  vexation — all  have  a  tendency  to  bring 
us  to  that  moderation  of  temper  w  hich  is  contrary  to 
the  violent  bent  to  follow  present  inclination,  which 
may  be  observed  in  undisciplined  minds.  Such  ex-  ^ 
perience  gives  a  practical  sense  of  things.  And, 
possibly,  the  security  of  creatures  in  the  highest  state 
of  perfection  may,  in  part,  arise  from  their  having  had 
such  a  sense  of  things  as  this  habitually  fixed  within 
them,  in  a  state  of  probation.  Their  having  passed 
through  the  present  world  Avith  that  moral  attention 
wdiich  a  state  of  discipline  requires,  may  leave  ever- 
lasting impressions  of  this  sort  upon  their  minds.  Now 
when  the  exercise  of  the  virtuous  principle  is  con- 
tinued, often  repeated  and  intense,  as  it  must  be  in 
circumstances  of  danger  and  temptation,  the  habit  of 
virtue  is  proportionably  increased.  Thus  the  present 
world  is  peculiarly  fit  to  be  a  state  of  discipline,  in  the 
same  sense  as  some  sciences,  by  requiring  and  engaging 
the  attention,  not,  to  be  sure,  of  such  persons  as  will 
not,  but  of  such  as  w  ill,  set  themselves  to  them ;  are 

fit  to  form  the  mind  to  habits  of  attention. 


344  WILSON'S    ANALOGY. 

10.  Accordingly  we  find  tliere  are  some  persons  who 
follow  an  inward  principle  of  piety,  and  to  whom  the 
present  world  is  an  exercise  of  virtue  peculiarly  adapted 
to  improve  it — adapted  to  improve  it,  in  some  respects, 
even  beyond  what  it  would  be  by  the  exercise  of  it  in 
a  perfectly  virtuous  society. 

11.  That  the  present  world  does  not  actually  become 
a  state  of  moral  discipline  to  the  generality,  is  no  proof 
that  it  was  not  intended  to  be  so ;  for  out  of  the  immense 
number  of  seeds  of  vegetables,  and  bodies  of  animals 
which  are  adapted  to  improve  to  such  and  such  a  point 
of  maturity  and  perfection,  we  do  not  see  that  perhaps 
one  in  a  thousand  does  thus  improve;  yet  no  one  will 
deny  that  those  seeds  and  bodies  which  do  so  attain 
to  that  point  of  maturity,  answer  the  end  for  which 
they  were  designed  by  nature,  and  therefore  that 
nature  designed  them  for  that  perfection.  And  such 
an  amazing  waste  in  nature,  with  respect  to  these 
seeds  and  bodies,  by  foreign  causes,  is,  to  us  as  unac- 
countable as,  what  is  much  more  terrible,  the  present 
and  future  ruin  of  so  many  moral  agents  by  themselves, 
that  is,  by  vice. 

12.  Further,  these  observations  on  the  active  prin- 
ciple of  obedience  to  God,  ai'e  applicable  to  passive 
obedience  to  his  will,  or  resignation,  which  is  another 
essential  part  of  a  right  character.  For  though  we  may 
have  no  need  of  patience  in  a  future  state,  yet  we  may 
have  need  of  that  temper,  which  patience  has  formed  ; 
and  the  })roper  discipline  for  patience  and  resignation 
is  affliction.  This  resignation,  together  with  the  active 
principle  of  obedience,  makes  up  the  temper  which 
answers  to  God's  sovereignty,  to  his  rightful  authority, 
as  supreme  over  all. 

13.  It  cannot  be  objected  to  all  this,  that  the  trouble 
and  danger  of  this  discipline  might  have  been  spared  us 
by  our  being  made  at  once  the  characters  which  we 
w^ere  to  become ;  for  we  see  by  experience  that  what 
we  are  to  become  is  to  depend  on  what  we  will  do ; 
andftliartht  g^llCTal  lliw^of  llSlcirff  is,  not  to  save  us 
trouble  or  danger,  but  to  make  us  capable, of  going 
through  it. 


WILSON'S   ANALOGY.  345 

14.  The  world,  further,  is  a  state  of  probation,  is 
a  theatre  of  action  for  the  manifestation  of  persons' 
characters,  as  a  means  of  their  being  disposed  of 
suitably  to  those  characters,  and  of  its  being  known 
to  the  creation  by  way  of  example  that  they  are  so 
disposed  of 

15.  It  thus  appears  clearly,  on  the  whole,  that  our 
present  state  of  difficulty  and  trial  is  intended  to  be  a 
school  of  discipline  for  acquiring  the  qualifications 
necessary  for  a  future  state  of  safety  and  happiness. 

Chap.  VI.  Nor  does  the  opinion  of  necessity  weaken 
the  credibility  of  the  general  doctrine  of  religion  thus 
confirmed  by  Analogy.  For  if  any  persons  consider 
the  notion  of  universal  necessity  or  fate  to  be  recon- 
cileable  with  the  acknowledged  condition  of  men 
as  under  God's  natural  government  now,  (and  to  such 
persons  only  does  this  whole  treatise  address  itself) 
they  must  also  consider  it  to  be  reconcileable  with  the 
scheme  of  religion. 

1.  For  necessity  clearly  does  not  exclude  delibe- 
ration, choice,  and  the  acting  from  certain  principles  to 
certain  ends,  as  to  the  things  of  this  present  w  orld ; 
because  all  this  is  matter  of  undoubted  experience. 
For  if  the  instance  of  a  house  be  taken,  the  Fatalist  as 
w^ell  as  others,  would  agree  that  it  was  designed  and 
built  by  an  architect ;  and  they  would  only  differ  upon 
the  question,  whether  the  architect  built  it  in  the 
manner,  which  we  call  necessarily,  or  in  the  manner 
which  we  call  freely.  The  idea  of  necessity  does  not, 
then,  at  all  destroy  the  proof  that  there  is  an  intelligent 
Author  and  Governor  of  nature,  any  more  than  that  the 
house  was  built  by  an  architect. 

2.  Nor  does  necessity  destroy  at  all  the  scheme  of 
religion.  For  as  to  the  things  of  this  world,  suppose  a 
Fatalist  to  bring  up  a  child  in  the  idea  that  he  is  not  a 
subject  of  blame  or  praise  for  his  actions,  because  he 
cannot  help  doing  what  he  does.  The  child  would  be 
vain  and  conceited,  and  go  on  following  his  will  and 
passions  till  he  became  first  the  plague  of  himself  and 
family,  and  then  insupportable  to  society  ;  and  thus  he 


346  WILSON'S   ANALOGY. 

would   soon   do  something,  for  which  he  would  be 
delivered  over  into  the  hands  of  justice.     In  this  way 
the   correction  he  would  meet  with,  and  the  misery 
consequent  upon  it,  would  soon  convince  him,  that 
either  the  scheme  of  necessity,  in  which  he  was  edu- 
cated was  false,   or  that  he  reasoned   inconclusively 
upon  it,  and  somehow  or  other  misapplied  it  to  practice 
and  common  life.     In  like  manner,  what  the  Fatalist 
experiences  of  the  conduct  of  Providence  at  present, 
ought  in  all  reason  to  convince  him,  that  either  his 
scheme  of  necessity  is  false,  or  that  somehow  or  other 
it  is  misapplied,  when  brought  to  practical  duty  and 
religion  in  common  life.     Under  the  present  natural 
government  of  the  world,  we  are  obviously  dealt  with 
as  if  we  were  free  ;  and  therefore  the  analogy  of  nature 
answers  all  objections  to  our  being  dealt  with  as  free, 
with  regard  to  another  world.     Thus  the  notion  of 
necessity,  whether  true  or  not  in  speculation,  is  not 
applicable  to  practical  subjects.     With  respect  to  them 
it  is  as  if  it  were  not  true. 

3.  Again,  we  find,  by  constant  experience,  that 
happiness  and  misery  are  not  necessary  here,  in  such 
a  sense  as  not  to  be  the  consequences  of  our  behaviour, 
for  they  are  the  clear  consequences  of  it ;  and  God 
exercises  over  us  the  same  kind  of  government  in  this 
world,  as  a  father  does  over  his  children,  and  a  civil 
magistrate  over  his  subjects.  These  are  matters  of  fact, 
things  of  experience,  which  cannot  be  affected  by  the 
opinion  about  necessity.  In  like  manner,  God's  moral 
government  over  men,  as  taught  by  religion,  cannot  be 
affected  by  that  opinion. 

4.  Besides,  natural  religion  has  an  external  evidence, 
a  positive  foundation  in  facts  and  data,  which  the  mere 
opinion  of  necessity  cannot  affect. 

5.  And,  if  men  should  say  that.  Necessity  being 
true,  it  is  incredible  that  God  should  govern  us  upon  a 
supposition  of  freedom  which  is  false  :  the  plain  answer 
is,  that  there  must  be  a  fallacy  somewhere  in  this 
conclusion,  for  the  whole  analogy  of  nature  proves  that 
God  does  govern  us  by  rewards  and  punishments  as 
free  agents.     And  the  fallacy  lies,  supposing  necessity 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  347 

to  be  true,  in  taking  it  for  granted  that  necessary  agents 
cannot  be  rewarded  and  punished  for  their  behaviour. 
6.  Thus,  the  notion  of  necessity,  supposing  it  can  be 
reconciled  with  the  constitution  of  things,  and  what  we 
experience  under  God's  rule  here,  is  equally  and 
entirely  reconcileable  with  the  scheme  of  religion  also. 

Chap.  VII.  Still  objections  may  be  insisted  upon 
against  the  wisdom,  equity,  and  goodness  of  the  divine 
government  implied  in  the  notion  of  religion,  to  which 
analogy  (which  can  only  show  that  such  and  such 
tilings  are  credible,  considered  as  matters  of  fact,)  can 
give  no  direct  answer.  But  if  analogy  suggests  that 
the  divine  government  is  a  scheme  or  system,  as  dis- 
tinguished from  a  number  of  unconnected  acts  of 
justice  and  goodness,  and  a  scheme  imperfectly  com- 
prehended, then  this  gives  a  general,  though  indirect 
answer  to  all  objections  against  the  justice  and  goodness 
of  that  government. 

1.  Now  in  this  present  world  and  the  whole  natural 
government  of  it,  there  is  obviously  a  scheme  or  system 
carried  on,  whose  parts  correspond  to  each  other  -,  so 
that  there  is  no  natural  event  so  single  and  unconnected 
as  not  to  have  respect  to  some  other  actions  or  events  : 
just  as  any  work  of  art,  or  any  particular  civil  con- 
stitution of  government,  is  a  scheme,  and  has  various 
correspondent  parts.  Nor  can  we  give  the  whole 
account  of  any  one  thing  whatever  in  nature — of  all 
its  causes,  ends,  and  necessary  adjuncts,  without  which 
it  could  not  have  been.  Things  seemingly  the  most 
insignificant  imaginable,  are  perpetually  discovered  to 
be  necessary  conditions  of  other  things  of  the  greatest 
importance. 

2.  The  natural  world,  then,  being  such  an  incompre- 
hensible scheme,  so  incomprehensible  that  a  man  must 
really,  in  the  literal  sense,  know  nothing  at  all,  who  is 
not  sensible  of  his  ignorance  of  it ;  this  strongly  shows 
the  credibility  that  the  moral  world  may  be  so  too. 
Indeed  the  natural  and  moral  world  are  so  connected, 
as  probably  to  make  up  together  but  one  scheme ;  and 
thus  the  first  may  be  carried  on  in  subserviency  to  the 


348  WILSON'S    ANALOGY. 

second;  as  the  vegetable  world  is  for  the  animal,  and 
the  animal  for  the  rational. 

3.  In  this  way  every  act  of  Divine  justice  and  good- 
ness may  look  much  beyond  itself,  and  may  have  some 
reference  to  a  general  moral  system;  yea,  may  have 
such  respect  to  all  other  acts,  as  to  make  up  altogether 
a  whole,  connected  and  related  in  all  its  parts,  which 
is  as  properly  one  as  the  natural  world  is.  And  if  so, 
then  it  is  most  clear  that  we  are  not  at  all  competent 
judges  of  this  vast  scheme,  from  the  small  parts  of  it, 
which  come  within  our  view  in  the  present  life,  and 
that  objections  against  any  of  these  parts  are  utterly 
unreasonable.  Yet  this  ignorance,  which  is  univer- 
sally acknowledged  on  other  like  occasions,  is,  if  not 
denied,  yet  universally  forgotten  on  the  subject  of  reli- 
gion where  it  is  most  strikingly  applicable.  Even 
reasonable  men  do  not  make  allowance  enough  for  it. 
And  this  ignorance  answers  all  objections  against 
religion;  because  if  religion  be  a  scheme  incompre- 
hensible to  us,  some  unknown  relation,  or  some  un- 
known impossibility,  may  render  the  very  things 
objected  to,  just  and  good;  nay^  just  and  good  in  the 
highest  practicable  degree. 

4.  But  more  particularly,  we  see  in  the  natural 
world,  that  as  no  ends  are  accomplished  without  means, 
so  means  very  undesirable  are  found  to  bring  about 
ends  so  desirable  as  to  overbalance  much  the  previous 
disagreeableness — means  which,  before  experience,  we 
should  have  thought  to  have  a  contrary  tendency. 
Thus,  in  the  moral  world,  things  which  we  call  irregu- 
larities may  not  be  so,  but  may  be  means  of  accom- 
plishing wise  and  good  ends  more  considerable  than 
the  apparent  irregularities :  yea,  the  only  means  by 
which  those  ends  are  capable  of  being  accomplished. 

5.  This,  however,  is  no  argument  to  show  that  it  is 
not  infinitely  obligatory  on  us,  and  beneficial  to  abstain 
from  what  is  evil.  For  thus,  in  the  wise  and  good  con- 
stitution of  the  natural  world,  there  are  disorders,  which 
bring  their  own  cures;  yea,  some  diseases,  which  are 
remedies.  As  many  men  would  undoubtedly  have 
died  had  it  not  been  for  the  gout  or  a  fever ;  yet  it 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  349 

would  be  thought  madness  to  say  that  sickness  is  a 
better  state  than  health ;  though  men  have  asserted  the 
like  absurdity  to  this,  with  regard  to  the  moral  world 
and  moral  evil. 

6.  Again,  the  natural  world  is  carried  on  by  general 
laws,  and  not  by  particular  interpositions  to  prevent  or 
remedy  irregularities,  as  the  moral  world  may  also  be; 
and  in  both  there  may  be  the  wisest  reasons  for  this 
scheme,  for  any  thing  we  know.  Perpetual  interposi- 
iion  would,  for  instance,  clearly  encourage  indolence, 
and  render  the  rule  of  life  dubious,  which  is  now 
ascertained  by  this  very  thing,  that  the  course  of  the 
world  is  carried  on  by  general  laws.  And  if  this  be 
the  case,  then  the  not  interposing  on  every  particular 
occasion,  is  so  far  from  being  a  ground  of  complaint, 
that  it  is  an  instance  of  goodness.  This  is  intelligible 
and  sufficient;  and  going  farther  seems  beyond  the 
utmost  reach  of  our  faculties.  It  is  to  go  on  quite  at 
random  and  in  the  dark. 

7.  Thus  our  ignorance  answers  all  objections  against 
the  scheme  of  religion,  as  we  have  shown ;  because  it 
is  not  a  total  ignorance,  as  some  have  said,  of  the  whole 
subject,  which  would  preclude  equally  all  proof  and  all 
objection,  but  a  partial  ignorance,  which  allows  us  to 
u.nderstand  that  the  end  of  the  scheme  is  moral,  but 
does  not  allow  us  to  comprehend  what  means  are  best 
to  accomplish  this  end.  Therefore,  our  ignorance  is  an 
answer  to  objections  against  Providence  in  permitting 
irregularities,  as  seeming  contradictory  to  this  end. 
Analogy  shows  that  it  is  not  at  all  incredible,  that  if 
we  could  know  the  wliole,  we  should  find  the  things 
objected  to  consistent  with  justice  and  goodness,  yea, 
instances  of  it.  Thus  we  do  not  argue  from  our  igno- 
rance properly  speaking,  but  from  something  which 
analogy  shows  us  concerning  that  ignorance.  For 
analogy  positively  shows  us  that  our  ignorance  of  the 
various  relations  of  things  in  nature,  makes  us  incom- 
petent judges  in  cases  similar  to  this  of  religion,  in 
which  we  pretend  to  judge. 

8.  Finally,  we  are  thus  led  to  consider  this  little 
scene  of  human  life  in  which  we  are  so  busy,  as  having 


350  WILSON'S    ANALOGY. 

a  reference  to  a  much  larger  plan  of  things.  Whether 
we  are  related  to  the  more  distant  parts  of  the  bound- 
less universe,  is  altogether  uncertain.  But  it  is  evident 
that  we  are  placed  in  the  middle  of  a  progressive 
scheme,  incomprehensible  with  respect  to  what  has 
been,  what  now  is,  and  what  shall  be  hereafter.  Thus 
all  short-sighted  objections  against  God's  moral  govern- 
ment are  answered ;  and  it  is  absurd — absurd  to  the 
degree  of  being  ridiculous,  if  the  subject  were  not  of 
so  serious  a  kind,  for  men  to  lay  any  stress  on  these 
objections,  and  think  themselves  secure  in  a  vicious 
life,  or  even  in  that  immoral  thoughtlessness  into  which 
far  the  greatest  part  of  men  are  fallen. 

PART  II.— Chap.  I.  The  chief  difficulties  against 
natural  religion,  as  implying  a  moral  government,  and  a 
state  of  trial  and  discipline  preparatory  for  a  future 
world,  being  removed,  we  proceed  to  consider  Chris- 
tianity, and  the  objections  raised  against  it.  And  we 
begin  by  showing  the  vast  importance  of  Christianity 
itself 

1.  To  say  that  mankind  do  not  want  a  revelation,  is 
as  extravagant  as  it  would  be  to  say,  that  they  are  so 
completely  at  ease  and  happy  in  the  present  life,  that 
their  condition  could  not  be  made  better.  Those  who 
consider  the  state  of  reliofion  in  the  heathen  world 
before  revelation,  and  the  present  state  of  it  where  reve- 
lation is  unknown,  cannot  in  seriousness  think  revela- 
tion incredible,  upon  pretence  of  its  being  unnecessary. 

2.  But  many  admit  Christianity  to  be  true,  but  object 
to  the  importance  of  it,  on  the  ground,  that  to  act  on 
the  principles  of  natural  religion  is  enough,  as  Chris- 
tianity is  only  designed  to  enforce  the  practice  of 
virtue.  This  is  to  suppose  that  it  is  a  matter  of  indif- 
ference whether  we  obey  God's  commands  or  not,  of 
which  there  may  be  infinite  reasons  with  which  we  are 
not  acquainted. 

3.  But  the  high  importance  of  Christianity  will 
appear,  if  we  consider,  1st,  That  it  is  a  republication  of 
natural  religion,  teaching  it  in  its  genuine  purity, 
investing  it  with  the  additional  evidence  and  authority 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  351 

arising  from  miracles  and  prophecy,  affording  a  proof  of 
God's  general  providence  as  Governor  of  the  world, 
with  a  degree  of  force  to  which  that  of  nature  is  but 
mere  feebleness,  erecting  a  visible  church,  as  a  stand- 
ing memorial  to  the  world  of  its  duty  to  its  Maker, 
giving  men  the  written  oracles  of  God,  which  cast  the 
light  of  revelation  on  the  darkness  of  nature,  as  to  the 
most  important  subjects ;  and  establishing  a  regular 
education  of  youth  in  the  principles  and  habits  of  piety. 

4.  If  men  object  to  this,  that  Christianity  has  been 
perverted,  and  has  had  but  little  good  influence,  we 
answer,  that  the  law  of  nature  has  been  perverted  and 
rendered  ineffectual  in  the  same  manner ;  and  yet  this 
is  allowed  to  be  from  God.  And  it  may  be  truly  said, 
that  the  good  effects  of  Christianity  have  not  been 
small ;  nor  its  supposed  ill  effects,  any  effects  at  all  of 
it,  properly  speaking.  Perhaps  too,  the  perversions 
themselves  imputed  to  it  have  been  aggravated ;  and  if 
not,  Christianity  has  often  been  only  a  pretence;  and 
the  same  evils  would  have  been  done,  in  the  main,  upon 
some  other  pretence.  However,  they  are  no  argu- 
ments against  Christianity.  For  one  cannot  proceed  a 
step  in  reasoning  upon  natural  religion,  any  more  than 
upon  Christianity,  without  laying  it  down  as  a  first  prin- 
ciple, that  the  dispensations  of  Providence  are  not  to  be 
judged  of  by  their  perversions,  but  by  their  genuine 
tendencies :  not  from  what  they  actually  effect,  but 
from  what  they  would  effect,  if  mankind  did  their  part. 

5.  Thus  Christianity  is  most  important,  and  the  guilt 
of  neglecting  it  is  great,  only  considered  as  a  superna- 
tural aid  to  decayed  natural  religion,  and  a  new  pro- 
mulgation of  God's  general  providence,  as  righteous 
Governor  of  the  world.  Especially  as  this  neglect 
further  involves  in  it  the  omitting  to  do  what  is 
expressly  enjoined  us  by  God,  for  continuing  the  bene- 
fits of  it  to  the  world,  and  transmitting  them  down  to 
future  times. 

6.  But,  2dly,  Christianity  contains  besides,  an  ac- 
count of  a  dispensation  of  things  not  at  all  discoverable 
by  reason ;  a  dispensation  carrying  on  by  the  Son  of 
God  and  the  Holy  Spirit  for  the  recovery  of  man,  whom 


352  WILSON'S   ANALOGY. 

the  Scriptures  every  where  take  for  granted  to  be  in  a 
state  of  ruin.  In  consequence  of  this,  many  obliga- 
tions of  duty,  unknown  before,  are  revealed  ;  and  these 
obligations  of  duty  to  the  Son  and  Spirit,  arise  from  the 
offices  which  belong  to  these  Divine  Persons,  and  from 
the  relations  in  which  they  stand  to  us;  and  are  infi- 
nitely important.  For  these  reasons,  we  are  com- 
manded to  be  baptized  in  the  name  of  the  Father,  and 
of  the  Son,  and  of  the  Holy  Ghost.  By  natural  reli- 
gion we  know  the  relation  in  which  God  the  Father 
stands  to  us ;  and  hence  arises  the  bond  of  duty  which 
we  are  under  to  Him.  In  Scripture  are  revealed  the 
relations  in  which  the  Son  and  Spirit  stand  to  us  ;  and 
hence  arise  the  bonds  of  duty  which  we  are  under  to 
them.  It  being  once  admitted  that  God  is  the  Gover- 
nor of  the  world  upon  the  .evidence  of  reason,  and  that 
Christ  is  the  mediator  between  God  and  man,  and  the 
Holy  Ghost  our  guide  and  sanctifier,  upon  the  evidence 
of  revelation,  it  is  no  more  a  question  whether  it  be 
our  duty  to  obey,  and  be  baptized  into  the  name  of  the 
Son,  and  of  the  Holy  Ghost,  than  whether  it  be  our 
duty  to  obey,  and  be  baptized  into  the  name  of  the 
Father. 

7.  The  essence  of  natural  religion  may  be  said  to 
consist  in  religious  regards  to  God  the  Father ;  and  the 
essence  of  revealed  religion,  in  religious  regards  to  the 
Son  and  Holy  Ghost,  to  whom  reverence,  honour,  love, 
trust,  gratitude,  fear,  hope,  are  due,  from  the  several 
relations  in  which  they  stand  to  us.  Thus  Christianity 
appears  most  important.  It  informs  us  of  something 
wholly  new-  in  the  state  of  the  world  and  in  the  gov- 
ernment of  it,  of  some  relations  in  which  we  stand, 
which  could  not  otherwise  have  been  known.  And 
these  relations  being  real,  the  neglect  of  behaving  suita- 
bly to  them  will  be  followed  with  the  same  kind  of  con- 
sequences under  God's  government,  as  neglecting  to 
behave  suitably  to  any  other  relations.  If  Christ,  then, 
be  our  Mediator,  our  Lord,  and  our  Saviour,  the  conse- 
quences not  only  of  an  obstinate,  but  of  a  careless  dis- 
regard to  him  in  those  high  relations,  may  follow  in  a 
future  world,  as  surely  in  a  way  of  judicial  punishment, 


WILSON'S   ANALOGY.  353 

and  even  of  the  natural  consequences  of  vice,  as  those 
kinds  of  consequences  follow  vice  in  this  w^orld. 

8.  Again,  if  the  nature  of  man  is  corrupt,  and  needs 
the  assistance  of  God's  Holy  Spirit  to  renew  it,  it  can- 
not be  a  slight  matter  to  neglect  the  means  appointed 
of  God  for  obtaining  this  assistance.  All  analogy 
shows  us,  that  we  cannot  expect  benefits  without  the 
use  of  the  commanded  means — every  thing  in  God's 
government  being  conducted  by  means. 

9.  The  conclusion  from  all  this  is,  that  Christianity 
being  supposed  credible,  it  is  unspeakable  irreverence, 
and  really  the  most  presumptuous  rashness  to  treat  it 
as  a  light  matter,  and  unimportant. 

10.  Before  we  go  on  to  the  next  topic,  we  may  stop 
here  to  point  out  the  distinction  between  what  is  posi- 
tive and  what  is  moral  in  religion.  Moral  precepts  are 
those  of  which  we  see  the  reason — positive,  of  which 
we  do  not :  moral  arise  out  of  the  nature  of  the  case — 
positive  from  external  command.  But  the  mere  man- 
ner in  which  the  reason  of  the  precept,  and  the  nature 
of  the  case  are  made  known  to  us,  makes  no  diiference 
in  our  duty.  Gratitude  and  love  are  as  much  due  to 
Christ  as  moral  precepts,  as  they  are  due  to  the 
Father;  though  the  first  are  derived  from  revelation 
making  Christ  known  to  us  as  our  Mediator;  the 
second,  from  reason  teaching  us  that  the  Father  is  our 
Creator,  and  the  Fountain  of  all  good. 

11.  From  this  distinction  between  positive  and  moral 
precepts,  we  may  observe,  that  we  see  the  ground  of 
that  preference  which  the  Scripture  gives  to  moral  pre- 
cepts over  positive,  if  the  two  are  incompatible.  We 
are  to  prefer  the  moral,  because  we  see  the  reason  of 
them,  and  because  the  positive  are  only  means  to  a 
moral  end,  and  are  of  no  value,  except  as  proceeding 
from  a  moral  principle.  Men  are  prone  to  place  their 
religion  in  positive  rites,  as  an  equivalent  for  moral 
duty;  and,  therefore,  the  Scriptures  always  lay  the 
stress  on  morals,  ^  where  they  are  mentioned,  together 
with  positive  rites;  and  our  Lord  expresses  the  general 
spirit  of  religion  when  he  says,  *  I  will  have  mercy,  and 
not  sacrifice.' 

23 


354  WILSON'S    ANALOGY. 

Still  ue  are  not  to  omit  positive  institutions;  because, 
when  admitted  to  come  from  God,  they  lay  us  under 
a  strict  moral  obi i ration  to  obey  them. 

12.  To  these  remarks  should  be  added,  that  the 
view  we  have  thus  given  of  Christianity,  teaches  us, 
not  to  determine  beforehand  from  reason  what  the 
scheme  of  it  must  be,  but  to  search  the  Scriptures  for  it ; 
for  it  is  no  presumption  against  an  interpretation  of 
Scripture,  that  it  contains  a  doctrine  which  the  light  of 
nature  cannot  discover,  or  a  precept  to  which  the  law 
of  nature  does  not  oblige. 

13.  All  these  considerations  serve  to  heighten  the 
importance  of  Christianity,  as  not  consisting  of  positive 
commands  merely,  but  as  revealing  new  duties  resting 
on  new  relations,  and  being  in  the  strictest  sense  moraL 

Chap.  II.  The  importance  of  Christianity  having 
been  thus  shown,  let  us  next  inquire  what  presumptions 
or  objections  there  appear  to  be  against  revelation  in 
general,  or  at  least  against  miracles,  as  if  they  required 
stronger  evidence  than  other  matters  of  fact  do. 

These  presumptions  must  arise  either  from  Chris- 
tianity not  being  discoverable  by  reason  and  experience, 
or  because  it  is  unlike  the  course  of  nature  as  it  now  is. 

1.  But  there  is  no  presumption  against  it,  because 
not  discoverable  by  reason ;  for  suppose  any  one  to  be 
acquainted  with  what  is  called  the  system  of  natural 
philosophy  and  natural  religion,  he  would  feel  that  he 
knew  but  a  small  part  of  them,  and  that  there  must  be 
iniuuBerable  things  of  which  he  was  wholly  ignorant. 
The  scheme  of  nature  is  vast  beyond  all  possible 
imagination,  and  what  we  know  of  it  is  but  as  a  point 
in  comparison  of  the  whole.  Therefore,  that  things  lie 
beyond  the  reach  of  our  faculties  in  Christianity,  is  no 
sort  of  presumption  against  it,  because  it  is  certain 
there  are  innumerable  things  in  nature  which  do  so. 

2.  Nor  is  there  any  presumption  against  Christianity, 
from  the  present  course  of  nature,  for  analogy  by  no 
means  leads  us  to  suppose,  that  the  whole  course  of 
things  unknown  to  us,  and  every  thing  in  it,,  is  like  to 
any  thing  in  that  course  of  things  which  is  known. 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  355 

Even  in  the  natural  course  of  the  world,  we  see  things 
extremely  unlike  one  another.  But  the  truth  is,  the 
scheme  ol'  Christianity  is  not  wholly  unlike  the  scheme 
of  nature,  as  we  shall  show  hereafter. 

3.  Nor  is  there  any  presumption  from  analogy  against 
some  operations  wliich  we  should  call  miraculous, 
particularly  none  against  a  revelation  at  the  beginning 
of  the  world  ;  for  then  there  had  been  no  course  of 
nature,  and  therefore  the  question  of  a  revelation,  at 
that  time,  is  only  a  common  question  of  fact.  Creation 
was  wholly  different  from  the  present  course  of  nature ; 
and  whether  this  power  stopped  after  forming  man,  or 
went  on  and  gave  him  a  revelation,  is  a  question  of 
simple  fact. 

4.  Nor  is  there  any  presumption  against  miracles, 
after  the  settlement  of  the  course  of  nature.  For  we 
have  no  single  parallel  case  of  a  world  Hke  our  own, 
to  deduce  an  argument  from  ;  and  if  we  had  a  case, 
an  argument  from  the  analogy  of  that  single  instance 
would  have  little  weight.  We  require  the  history  of 
many  similar  worlds  from  which  to  raise  any  thing  like 
a  presumption. 

5.  Besides,  we  know  there  is  often  a  presumption 
against  the  commonest  facts  before  the  proof  of  them, 
which  yet  almost  any  proof  overcomes.  And  we  are  in 
such  ignorance,  that  it  is  not  improbable,  that  five  or  six 
thousand  years  may  have  given  scope  for  adequate 
causes  for  miracles,  even  leaving  out  the  consideration 
of  religion.  But  if  we  take  in  the  consideration  of 
religion,  we  then  see  distinct  reasons  for  miracles, 
which  give  a  real  credibility  to  them.  At  all  events, 
miracles  must  not  be  compared  to  common  natural 
circumstances  and  phenomena,  but  to  the  extraor- 
dinary phenomena  of  nature, — comets,  the  powers  of 
electricity,  &c.  And  let  any  one  reflect  what  would 
be  the  presumption,  for  instance,  against  the  powers 
of  electricity,  in  the  mind  of  one  acquainted  only  with 
the  common  powers  of  nature. 

6.  There  is,  therefore,  no  such  presumption  against 
miracles  as  to  render  them,  in  any  wise  incredible ; 
nay,  there  is  a  positive  credibility  for  them,  where  we 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  356 

discern  reasons  for  them  ;  and  there  is  no  presumption 
at  all  from  analogy,  even  in  the  lowest  degree,  against 
them,  as  distinguished  from  other  extraordinary  phe- 
nomena. 

Chap.  III.  We  come  now  to  consider  objections 
against  the  Christian  revelation  in  particular,  as  distinct 
from  objections  against  miracles — objections  drawn 
from  things  in  it,  appearing  to  men  "foolishness;"  from 
its  containing  matters  of  ofl'ence,  leading,  as  it  is 
alleged,  to  enthusiasm,  superstition,  and  tyranny;  from 
its  not  being  universal ;  and  from  its  evidence  not 
being  so  convincing  as  it  might  have  been. 

1.  Now  it  is  credible  from  analogy  that  we  should  be 
incompetent  judges  of  a  revelation  to  a  great  degree, 
and  that  it  would  contain  many  things  appearing  to  us 
liable  to  objection.  There  is  no  more  ground  to 
expect  that  Christianity  should  appear  free  from  objec- 
tions, than  that  the  course  of  nature  should.  And  the 
fact  is,  that  men  fall  into  infmite  follies  and  mistakes, 
when  they  pretend  to  judge  of  the  ordinary  constitu- 
tion and  course  of  nature,  and  of  what  they  should 
expect  it  to  be.  It  is  therefore  probable  that  men 
would  err  much  more  when  they  pretend  to  judge  of 
the  extraordinary  constitution  and  scheme  of  Chris- 
tianity, and  of  what  they  should  expect  it  to  be.  For 
if  a  man,  in  the  things  of  this  present  world,  is  not  a 
competent  judge  of  the  ordinary  goveniment  of  a 
Prince  ;  much  less  Avould  he  be  so  of  any  extraordinary 
exigencies  on  which  that  Prince  should  suspend  his 
known  and  ordinary  laws.  Thus  objections  against 
Christianity  are  really  frivolous.  If  men  fancy  there 
lie  great  objections  against  the  scheme  of  Providence 
in  the  ordinary  and  old  laws  of  nature,  much  more  may 
they  fancy  there  lie  objections  against  the  scheme  of 
Christianity  in  the  extraordinary,  and  new  laws  of  reli- 
gion. Both  schemes  are  from  the  same  God.  And 
the  objections  against  Christianity  go  upon  supposi- 
tions which,  when  applied  to  the  course  of  nature, 
experience  shows  to  be  inconclusive.  They  mislead  us 
to  think  that  the  Author  of  nature  would  not  act,  as  we 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  357 

find  by  experience  he  actually  does,  or  would  act  in 
such  and  such  a  manner,  as  we  experience,  in  like 
cases,  he  does  not. 

2.  For  instance,  we  are  no  sort  of  judges  before- 
hand, by  what  laws,  in  what  degree,  or  by  what  means 
it  were  to  have  been  expected  that  God  would  instruct 
us  naturally  in  his  ordinary  Providence ;  how  far  he 
would  enable  men  to  communicate  it  to  others ; 
whether  the  evidence  of  it  w^ould  be  certain,  highly 
probable,  or  doubtful ;  whether  it  would  be  given  with 
equal  clearness  to  all;  whether  at  once,  or  gradually. 
In  like  manner,  supposing  God  afforded  us  an  addi- 
tional instruction  by  a  revelation,  we  must  be  equally 
ignorant  beforehand  whether  the  evidence  of  it  would 
be  certain,  whether  all  would  have  the  same  degree  of 
evidence,  whether  it  would  be  revealed  at  once  or 
gradually,  &c. 

Now  if  we  are  incompetent  to  judge  beforehand  of 
revelation,  it  is  mere  folly  to  object  afterwards  against 
its  being  left  in  one  way  rather  than  another. 

3.  The  only  fair  question  is,  whether  Christianity  be 
a  real  revelation,  and  whether  the  book  containing  it 
be  of  divine  authority;  and  scarcely  at  all  whether  it 
be  a  revelation,  and  a  book  of  such  and  such  a  sort. 
So  that,  what  men  object  against  the  Scriptures  as 
being  obscure,  as  written  in  an  inaccurate  style,  as 
having  various  readings,  and  being  the  subject  of  dis- 
pute, has  no  sort  of  force,  unless  it  can  be  shown  that 
the  sacred  authors  had  promised  that  the  book  should 
be  secure  from  these  things.  We  are  no  judges 
whether  it  were  to  have  been  expected  that  these 
things  should  be  found  in  it  or  not.  In  human  writings 
we  should  indeed  be  judges,  but  not  at  all  in  divine. 

4.  However,  if  men  will  pretend  still  to  judge  of  the 
Scriptures,  and  of.  Christianity,  by  previous  expecta- 
tion, then  the  analogy  of  nature  shows,  that  probably 
they  will  imagine  they  have  strong  objections  against 
them.  For  so,  prior  to  experience,  they  would  think 
they  had  against  the  instruction  afforded  in  the  ordi- 
nary course  of  nature.  For  instance,  it  would  have 
been  thought  incredible  that  men  should  have  been  so 


358  W  I  L  S  0  N '  S    A  N  A  L  0  G  Y. 

much  more  capable  of  discovering,  even  to  a  certainty, 
the  general  laAvs  of  matter,  and  the  magnitudes  and 
revolutions  of  the  heavenly  bodies,  than  tlie  cure  of 
diseases,  and  many  other  things  in  which  human  life  is 
so  much  more  nearly  concerned.  The  method  of 
invention  again,  by  which  men  discover  things  of  the 
greatest  moment  in  an  instant,  when  perhaps  they  are 
thinking  of  something  else,  which  they  have  in  vain 
been  searching  after  for  years,  would  be  thought  most 
n'regular  and  capricious.  So  likewise  the  imperfec- 
tions attending  the  only  method  we  have  of  communi- 
cating our  tlioughts  to  each  other,  language,  would  be 
judged  utterly  incredible.  It  is  inadequate,  ambiguous, 
liable  to  infinite  abuse.  Now  no  objections  against  the 
manner  in  which  Christianity  teaches  in  the  Scriptures, 
are  of  greater  weight  than  these,  which  analogy  shows 
us  to  have  really  no  force  at  all. 

5.  To  apply  these  remarks  to  a  particular  instance. 
The  abuse  of  miraculous  powers  is  made  an  objection 
against  their  being  really  miracles ;  but  we  see  in  the 
natural  course  of  things  daily,  that  remarkable  gifts  of 
memory,  eloquence,  knowledge,  are  not  always  conferred 
on  persons  Avho  use  them  with  prudence  and  propriety. 

6.  Again,  as  in  natural  and  civil  knowledge,  there 
are  common  and  obvious  rules  of  conduct,  and  parts 
requiring  very  exact  thought ;  so,  in  Christianity  the 
necessary  matters  of  laith  and  practice  are  a  plain  and 
obvious  thing ;  whilst  many  other  parts  demand  careful 
investigation.  And  as  natural  knowledge  is  acquired 
by  particular  persons  comparing  and  pursuing  obscure 
hints  dropped  us  by  nature,  as  it  were,  accidentally,  or 
which  seem  to  come  into  our  minds  by  chance ;  so 
probably  the  entire  scheme  of  Christianity  in  the 
Scriptures  will  only  be  gradually  understood,  by  par- 
ticular pei-sons  attending  to  intimations  scattered  up 
and  down  in  it,  and  which  most  persons  disregard. 
Nor  is  it  incredible  that  a  book  so  long  known  should 
contain  many  truths  not  yet  conq^letely  discovered ; 
for  nature  has  been  open  to  the  investigation  of  man 
for  7nany  thousand  yeai's,  and  yet  great  discoveries  are 
continually  made. 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  359 

7.  And  if  men  object  against  Christianity,  that  it  is 
not  universally  known,  we  reply,  that  many  most 
valuable  remedies  for  natural  diseases  were  unknown 
for  ages,  and  are  known  now  but  to  few ;  that  proba- 
bly many  are -not  known  yet;  that  the  application 
of  them,  when  known,  is  difficult ;  that  if  used  amiss, 
they  often  create  new  diseases ;  that  they  are  often 
not  effectual ;  and  that  the  regimen  required  is  often 
so  disagreeable  that  men  will  not  submit  to  it,  but 
satisfy  themselves  with  the  excuse,  that  if  they  did 
submit,  it  is  not  certain  they  should  be  cured.  These 
natural  remedies  are  neither  certain,  perfect,  nor  uni- 
versal ;  and  the  principles  of  arguing  which  would  lead 
us  to  conclude  they  must  be  so,  would  not  only  be 
contrary  to  fact,  but  would  also  lead  us  to  conclude 
that  there  would  be  no  diseases  at  all.  It  is  therefore 
not  at  all  incredible  that  the  like  things  should  be  found 
in  the  remedy  for  moral  diseases,  Christianity,  if  it 
proceeds  from  the  same  divine  hand  as  natural  reme- 
dies do. 

Chap.  IV.  The  objections  against  Christianity  are 
thus  merely  what  we  might  have  expected.  But 
further,  these  objections  receive  a  full  answer  from  the 
consideration  that  Christianity  is  a  scheme  imperfectly 
comprehended,  in  which  a  system  of  means  is  estab- 
lished, and  which  is  carried  on  by  general  laws  ;  just  as 
objections  against  natural  religion  were  shown  to  be  thus 
silenced.  For  this  shows  that  the  things  objected  to 
may,  in  each  case,  not  only  be  consistent  with  wisdom 
and  goodness,  but  instances  of  them. 

1-  Now  Christianity  is  a  scheme  quite  beyond  our 
comprehension.  It  is  a  mysterious  economy,  still  car- 
rying on  for  the  recovery  of  the  world  by  a  divine 
person,  the  Messiali,  who,  after  various  preparatory 
dispensations,  became  incarnate,  and  died  as  a  Sacrifice 
for  sin.  Parts  likewise  of  this  scheme  are  the  miracu- 
lous and  ordinary  mission  of  the  Holy  Ghost,  Christ's 
invisible  government  over  his  church,  and  his  second 
advent  to  judgment.  Now  the  Scriptures  assert  this 
to  be  a  mystery ;  indeed,  what  is  revealed  of  it,  leaves 


360  WILSON'S   ANALOGY. 

SO  much  unrevealed,  that  one  cannot  read  a  passag^e 
but  wluit  it  runs  up  into  something  which  shows  us  our 
ignorance  about  it ;  so  that  to  ail  pui'[3(>ses  of  objecting, 
we  know  as  little  of  it,  as  we  know  of  the  vast  scheme 
of  the  natural  world,  where  every  step  shows  us  our 
ignorance,  short-sightedness,  and  incompetence  to 
judge. 

2.  In  the  Christian  scheme,  again,  as  in  the  course  of 
nature,  means  which  appear  foolish,  though  they  may 
possibly  be  the  very  best,  are  used  to  accomplish  ends ; 
and  their  appearing  foolish  is  no  presumption  against 
them,  in  a  scheme  so  greatly  beyond  our  comprehension. 

3.  Christianity  is  also  probably  carried  on  by  general 
laws.  The  course  of  nature  is  confessedly  so;  and 
yet  we  know  but  little  of  these  general  laws.  We 
know  not  by  what  laws,  storms,  famine,  pestilence,  &c., 
destroy  mankind  ;  nor  wdiy  men  are  born  in  such  places 
and  times,  and  with  such  talents ;  nor  how  it  is  that 
such  and  such  trains  of  thought  enter  the  mind.  We 
therefore  call  these  things  accidental ;  tliough  all 
reasonable  men  believe  there  is  no  such  thing  as 
accident.  We  see  but  a  little  way  ;  and  it  is  only  from 
seeing  that  the  part  of  the  course  of  nature  which  is 
known  to  us,  is  governed  by  general  laws,  that  we 
conclude  the  whole  to  be  so  governed,  though  the  laws 
of  innumerable  things  are  unknown  to  us.  In  like 
manner,  that  miraculous  powers  should  be  exerted  at 
such  occasions,  for  such  reasons,  before  such  persons, 
under  such  circumstances,  &c.,  may  have  been  also  by 
general  laws  though  unknown  to  us,  as  the  laws  of  the 
things  above  instanced  in  natiu'e  are  unknown  to  us. 
And  there  is  no  more  reason  to  expect  that  every 
exigency  as  it  arises  should  be  provided  for  by  these 
general  laws,  than  that  every  exigency  in  nature 
should. 

4.  In  the  next  place,  let  us  see  the  force  of  the 
common  objection  raised  against  the  whole  scheme  of 
Christianity,  as  being  what  some  are  pleased  to  call  a 
round-about  way,  a  perplexed  contrivance  for  the 
salvation  of  the  world,  as  if  God  was  reduced  to  the 
necessity  of  using  a  long  series  of  intricate  means  to 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  361 

accomplish  his  ends.  Now  it  is  obvious,  that  in  the 
course  of  nature  God  uses  various  means  which  we  think 
tedious,  to  arrive  at  his  ends.  Indeed  there  is  some- 
thing in  this  matter  quite  beyond  our  comprehension : 
but  the  mystery  is  as  great  in  nature  as  in  Christianity. 
Perhaps  many  things  which  we  call  means,  may  be 
ends.  However,  it  is  clear  the  whole  natural  world  is 
a  progressive  system,  in  which  the  operation  of  means 
takes  up  a  great  length  of  time.  One  state  of  things  is 
a  preparation  for  another,  and  that  state  the  means  of 
attaining  to  another  succeeding  one.  Men  are  for 
precipitating  things;  but  God  in  the  natural  world 
appears  ever  deliberate,  reaching  his  ends  by  slow- 
steps.  The  change  of  seasons,  the  ripening  the  fruits 
of  the  earth,  the  growth  of  a  flower,  the  gradual  ad- 
vances of  vegetable  and  animal  bodies,  and  the  progress 
of  knowledge  in  men  with  their  growing  faculties  and 
powers,  are  instances  of  this.  Thus  in  nature  God 
operates  as  he  does  in  Christianity,  by  making  one 
thing  subservient  to  another,  through  a  series  of  means 
wiiich  extends  backward  and  forward  beyond  our 
utmost  view.  Objections,  therefore,  against  the  whole 
plan  of  Christianity,  as  intricate  and  round-about,  and 
perplexed,  have  no  sort  of  force. 

Chap.  V.  This  general  objection  having  been  an- 
swered, let  us  next  consider  the  particular  one  most 
urged,  namely,  that  against  the  Mediation  of  Christ. 

1.  Now,  in  the  first  place,  the  visible  government  of 
God  in  nature  is  carried  on  by  the  instrumentality  and 
mediation  of  others.  Every  comfort  of  life  comes  to 
us  in  this  way.  God  appoints  men  as  instruments,  that 
is,  mediators  of  good  or  evil  to  us.  So  that  there  is  no 
presumption  from  analogy  against  the  general  notion  of 
a  Mediator. 

2.  In  the  next  place,  it  is  suppbsable  and  credible 
that  the  punishments  which  God  inflicts  as  a  moral 
governor,  may  be  appointed  to  follow  wickedness  in 
the  way  of  natural  consequence ;  in  a  like  manner  as  a 
man  trifling  upon  a  precipice,  in  the  way  of  natural 
consequence  falls  down,  and,  without  help,  perishes. 


o62  WILSON'S    ANALOGY. 

3.  But  it  is  most  important  to  remark,  that,  in  the 
course  of  natural  Providence,  provision  is  made  that  all 
the  natural  bad  consequences  of  men's  actions  sliould 
not  always  actually  follow.  We  might,  indeed,  pre- 
sumptuously have  thought  that  the  world  Avould  have 
been  so  constituted  as  that  there  should  not  have  been 
any  such  thing  as  misery  or  evil.  But  in  fact  we  find 
that  God  permits  it ;  but  that  he  has  provided  at  the 
same  time  relief,  and  in  many  cases  perfect  remedies 
for  it,  CA^en  for  that  evil  which  would  have  justly  ended 
in  our  ruin.  If,  indeed,  all  the  consequences  of  bad 
conduct  had  always  followed,  no  one  could  have  had  a 
right  to  object ;  no  one  can  say  whether  such  a  more 
severe  constitution  of  things  might  not  yet  have  been 
really  good.  But  that,  instead  of  this,  provision  is 
made  by  nature  to  remedy  these  consequences,  may 
properly  be  called  mercy  or  compassion  in  the  original 
constitution  of  the  world,  as  distinct  from  goodness  in 
general.  It  is  agreeable,  then,  to  the  whole  analogy 
of  nature,  to  hope  that  provision  may  have  been  made 
for  remedying  the  natural  consequences  of  vice  in 
God's  moral  government,  at  least  in  some  cases.  There 
is  a  union  of  severity  and  indulgence  in  the  course  of 
nature  ;  there  may  possibly  also  be  a  union  of  justice 
and  compassion  in  the  scheme  of  religion. 

4.  Some  will  wonder  at  this  being  made  a  question 
of;  for  they  neglect  and  despise  all  ideas  of  future 
punishment.  But  as  we  actually  experience  ill  conse- 
quences from  wickedness  and  folly  here,  so  the  analogy 
of  the  cases  teaches  us  to  apprehend  worse  evil  conse- 
quences hereafter,  from  disorders  committed  by  moral 
agents,  presumptuously  introducing  confusion  and  misery 
into  the  kingdom  of  God,  their  Sovereign  Creator. 
Nay,  it  is  by  no  means  uituitiv  ely  certain  whether  these 
consequences  could,  in  the  nature  of  the  thing,  be  pre- 
vented, that  is,  consistently  with  the  eternal  rule  of 
right.  The  utmost  we  could  hope  for  is,  that  there 
would  probably  be  some  way  in  God's  universal  gov- 
ernment for  preventing  the  penal  consequences  of 
vice. 

5.  Further,  it  is  not  probable   that  any  thing  we 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  363 

could  do  of  ourselves,  would  prevent  these  ill  conse- 
quences. For  sorrow  and  reformation  will  not  of  them- 
selves prevent  the  natural  consequences  of  our  disorders 
here,  and  the  assistance  of  others  is  often  indispensa- 
ble to  such  prevention.  The  like  then  may  be  the  case 
under  God's  moral  government.  In  fact,  it  is  contrary 
to  all  our  notions  of  government,  as  well  as  to  the 
course  of  nature,  to  suppose  that  doing  well  for  the 
future,  should  always  prevent  or  remedy  the  conse- 
quences annexed  to  disobedience.  And  though  men 
in  the  present  day  boast  of  the  efficacy  of  repentance, 
yet,  the  prevalence  of  propitiatory  sacrifices  over  the 
heathen  world,  shows  that  the  general  sense  of  man- 
kiiul  is  against  the  idea  of  repentance  being  sufficient  to 
expiate  guilt. 

6.  In  this  darkness  or  light  of  nature,  call  it  which 
you  please,  revelation  comes  in,  teaches  us  our  state  of 
guilt,  confirms  every  fear  as  to  the  I'uture  consequences 
of  sin,  declares  that  God's  government  will  not  pardon 
on  mere  repentance ;  but  that  still  his  government  is 
compassionate,  and  that  He  has  mercifully  provided 
that  there  should  be  an  interposition  to  prevent  the 
utter  ruin  of  man.  God  so  loved  the  ivorld,  that  he  gave 
his  onhj  begotten  Son,  that  whosoever  helieveth  in  him  should 
not  iierish :  gave  his  Son  in  the  same  way  of  goodness 
to  tlie  world,  as  he  affords  to  particular  persons  the 
friendly  assistance  of  their  fellow-creatures ;  when, 
without  it,  their  tenq^oral  ruin  would  be  the  certain 
consequence  of  their  follies;  in  the  same  way  of  good- 
ness, I  say,  though  in  a  transcendent  and  infinitely 
higher  degree.  And  the  Son  of  God  loved  us  and  gave 
himself  for  us,  with  a  love  which  he  compares  to  that  of 
human  friendship ;  though  in  this  case,  all  comparisons 
must  fall  infinitely  short  of  the  thing  intended  to  be 
illustrated  by  them. 

7.  Now,  if  the  constitution  of  things  had  been  such 
that  the  whole  creation  must  have  perished,  but  for 
somewhat  which  God  had  appointed  should  take  plaCe 
to  prevent  that  ruin,  this  supposition  would  not  be  in- 
consistent in  any  degree  with  perfect  goodness  and 
compassion,  whatever  men  may  object. 


364  WILSON'S  a'nalogy. 

8.  Nor  can  men  object  to  tlie  Scriptures  as  repre- 
senting- mankind  by  tliis  whole  scheme  as  in  a  de^jraded 
state ;  for  it  is  not  Christianity  which  has  put  us  in  this 
state ;  and  all,  even  moralists,  are  Compelled  to 
acknowledge  the  extreme  wickedness  and  misery 
which  are  in  the  world.  And  the  crime  of  our  first 
parents  bringing  us  into  a  more  disadvantageous  condi- 
tion, is  particularly  agreeable  to  all  analogy. 

9.  The  particular  manner  of  Christ's  mediation  is  by 
his  becoming  w^hat  the  Scripture  calls  the  Prophet  of 
mankind,  to  declare  the  Divine  will;  the  King,  by 
founding  and  governing  a  church ;  and  the  High  Pi'iest, 
by  a  propitiatory  sacrifice ;  which  sacrifice,  be  it  well 
noted,,  is  not  spoken  of  merely  in  allusion  to  the  Mosaic 
sacrifices,  but  as  the  original  and  great  sacrifice  itself, 
to  wiiich  the  Mosaic  were  themselves  only  allusions, 
and  of  which  they  were  types.  The  Scriptures  declare 
in  all  sorts  of  Avays  an  efficacy  in  what  Christ  suffered 
for  us,  beyond  mere  example  or  instruction. 

10.  Further,  as  we  know  not  by  what  means  future 
punishment  would  have  been  inflicted  on  men,  nor 
all  the  reasons  why  its  infliction  would  have  been 
needful,  if  it  had  not  been  prevented  by  Christ's 
sacrifice ;  it  is  most  evident  w^e  are  not  judges,  ante- 
cedently to  revelation,  whether  a  Mediator  was  or  was 
not  necessary  to  prevent  that  punishment ;  and  upon 
the  supposition  of  a  Mediator,  we  are  not  judges 
beforehand  of  what  it  was  fit  to  be  assigned  to  him  to 
do,  nor  of  the  whole  nature  of  his  office.  To  object, 
therefore,  to  any  particular  parts  of  this  mediation, 
because  w^e  do  not  see  the  expediency  of  them  is 
absurd.     And  yet  men  commonly  do  this. 

11.  Again  ;  if  men  object  to  the  satisfaction  of  Christ, 
that  it  represents  God  as  indifferent  whether  he  punishes 
the  innocent  or  guilty,  we  answer,  that  they  might 
equally  object  to  the  daily  course  of  natural  Providence, 
in  which  innocent  people  are  continually  forced  to 
suffer  for  the  faults  of  the  guilty,  and  do  suffer  for  them 
in  various  ways ;  w  hereas,  Christ's  sufferings  were 
undertaken  by  him  voluntarily.  And  though  upon  the 
whole,  and  finally,  every  one  shall  receive  according  to 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  365 

liis  deserts,  yet  during  the  progress,  and  in  order  to 
the  completion,  of  this  moral  scheme,  punishments 
endured  by  the  innocent  in  some  way  instead  of  the 
guilty,  that  is,  vicarious  punishments,  may,  for  aught 
we  know,  be  fit  and  absolutely  necessary. 

12.  Besides,  there  is  an  apparent  tendency  in  this 
method  of  our  redemption  by  the  sacrifice  of  Christ, 
to  vindicate  the  authority  of  God's  law,  and  deter  men 
from  sin. 

13.  Let  not,  then,  such  poor  creatures  as  we  are, 
object  against  an  infinite  scheme,  that  we  do  not  see 
the  usefulness  and  necessity  of  all  its  parts.  The 
presumption  of  this  kind  of  objections  seems  almost 
lost  in  the  folly  of  them. 

14.  It  heightens  the  absurdity  of  these  objections, 
that  they  are  made  against  those  parts  of  Christ's 
mediation  which  we  are  not  actively  concerned  in. 
Now  the  whole  analogy  of  nature  teaches  us  not  to 
expect  the  like  information  concerning  the  Divine 
conduct,  as  concerning  our  duty.  The  objections  are 
made,  as  we  have  seen,  to  God's  appointment  of  a 
Mediator,  and  to  the  Mediator's  execution  of  his  office  : 
not  to  what  is  required  of  man  in  consequence  of  this 
gracious  dispensation,  which  is  plain  and  obvious,  and 
which  is  all  we  need  to  know.  Thus,  in  the  natural 
world,  it  is  almost  an  infinitely  small  part  of  natural 
Providence  which  men  can  understand,  and  yet  they 
are  sufficiently  instructed  for  the  common  purposes  of 
life. 

Chap.  VI.  A  principal  objection  against  Chris- 
tianity, further,  is,  that  it  is  thought  to  rest  on  doubtful 
evidence,  and  that  its  benefits  are  not  universal ;  which, 
in  other  words,  is  as  much  as  to  say,  that  God  would 
not  have  bestowed  upon  us  any  favour  at  all,  unless  in 
the  degree  which  we  imagine  best,  and  that  he  could 
not  bestow  a  favour  upon  any,  unless  he  bestowed  the 
same  on  all — an  objection  which  the  whole  analogy  of 
nature  contradicts. 

1.  For  how  doubtful  is  the  evidence  on  which  men 
act  in  their  most  important  concerns  in  this  world 


366  WILSON'S    ANALOGY. 

— how  difficult  to  balance  nice  probabilities,  to  make 
due  allowances  for  accidents  and  disappointments,  to 
see  on  which  side  the  reasons  preponderate.  How 
often  do  strong-  objections  lie  against  their  schemes, 
objections  which  cannot  be  removed  or  answered,  but 
yet  which  seem  overbalanced  by  reasons  on  the  other 
side.  And  how  much  are  men  deceived  at  last  by  the 
falsehood  of  others,  by  the  false  appearances  of  things, 
and  the  strong  bias  from  within  themselves  to  favour 
the  deceit.  And  as  to  revelation  not  being  universal, 
we  see  the  Author  of  nature  perpetually  bestowing  those 
gifts  of  health,  prudence,  knowledge,  riches,  upon  some, 
which  he  does  not  on  others.  Yet,  notwithstanding 
these  uncertainties  and  varieties,  God  does  exercise  a 
natural  government  over  the  world,  and  there  is  such  a 
thing  as  a  prudent  and  imprudent  course  of  conduct. 

2.  There  have  been  different  degrees  of  evidence  to 
Jews  and  Christians.  The  first  Christians  had  a  higher 
evidence  of  miracles  than  we,  and  a  stronger  presump- 
tion in  favour  of  Christianity  from  the  lives  of  Christians  : 
and  we  or  future  ages  may  have  a  higher  evidence  of 
the  fulfilment  of  prophecy.  And  the  Heathens,  Mahom- 
medans,  Papists  and  Protestants,  have  now  different 
degrees  of  evidence  of  natural  and  revealed  religion, 
from  the  faintest  glimmering  of  probability,  to  the  clear 
light  of  truth  and  conviction :  but  all  this  most  ob- 
viously resembles  the  constant  order  of  Providence  as 
to  our  temporal  affairs.  And  we  are  to  remember, 
that  each  one  will  be  judged  at  last,  by  what  he  hath, 
and  not  by  what  he  hath  not,  so  that  there  is  no 
shadow  of  injustice  in  this  constitution  of  things, 
though  what  is  the  particular  reason  of  it,  we  are 
altogether  in  the  dark  about.  We  know  but  little  even 
of  our  own  cases ;  scarcely  any  thing  more  than  is 
just  necessary  for  practice.  We  are  in  the  greatest 
ignorance  as  to  what  woidd  satisfy  our  curiosity.  We 
have  only  light  to  teach  us  our  duty,  and  encourage  us 
in  tlie  discharge  of  it. 

3.  Besides,  if  revelation  were  universal,  men's  dif- 
ferent understandings,  educations,  tempers,  bodily 
constitutions,    lengths   ol    lives,    external  advantages, 


WILSON'SANALOGY.  ,  367 

would  soon  make  their  situation  perhaps   as  widely 
different  as  it  is  at  present. 

4.  But  ^ye  may  observe  more  particularly,  that  the 
evidence  of  religion  not  appearing  certain,  may  be  the 
especial  trial  of  some  men's  characters  and  state  of 
mind.  Men  may  be  as  much  in  a  state  of  probation 
with  regard  to  the  exercise  of  their  understanding  on 
the  evidence  of  religion,  as  they  are  with  regard  to 
their  conduct.  The  same  inward  principle  which  leads 
men  to  obey  religion  when  convinced  of  its  truth, 
would  lead  them  to  examine  it,  when  they  were  first 
presented  with  its  evidences.  Negligence  about  such  a 
serious  matter  as  religion,  is  as  criminal  before  distinct 
conviction,  as  careless  practice  is  after.  That  religious 
evidence,  then,  is  not  forced  upon  men,  nor  intuitively 
true,  but  left  to  be  collected  by  a  heedful  attention  to 
premises,  may  as  much  constitute  religious  probation  as 
any  thing  else. 

5.  Again,  even  if  Christianity  should  be  supposed 
to  be  extremely  doubtful  to  some  persons,  yet  it  puts 
them  in  a  state  of  probation  as  to  character.  For  if 
Christianity  be  once  supposed  by  them  to  be  possible, 
this  demands  religious  suspense,  moral  resolution,  self- 
government,  inquiry,  abstinence  from  what  would  be 
impediments,  readiness  to  receive  fresh  light,  care  of 
what  use  they  make  of  their  influence  and  example 
upon  others.  For  doubting  is  not  a  positive  argument 
against  religion,  but  for  it ;  a  doubt  presupposes  a 
low'er  degree  of  evidence,  just  as  much  as  belief 
does  a  higher.  And  in  proportion  to  the  corruption  of 
the  heart,  men  acknowledge  no  evidence,  however 
real,  if  it  be  not  overbearing. 

6.  The  difficulties  which  are  said  to  be  found  in  the 
evidence  of  Christianity,  is  no  more  a  ground  of  com- 
plaint, than  difficulties  from  external  temptation  as  to 
the  practice  of  it.  Such  speculative  difficulties  may, 
to  persons  of  a  deep  sense,  and  reflecting  minds,  and 
who  h.ave  small  temptations  to  gross  outward  sins, 
constitute  the  principal  part  of  their  trial.  For  we 
see,  in  the  things  of  this  world,  that  the  chief  trial  of 
some  men  is  not  so  much  the  doing  what  is  right  when  it 


368  WILSON'S   ANALOGY. 

is  known,  as  the  attention,  suspense,  care,  the  bein^^ 
on  their  guard  against  false  appearances,  the  weigliing 
of  contrary  reasons,  and  informing  themselves  of  what 
is  really  prudent. 

7.  In  these  remarks,  we  have  taken  it  for  granted 
that  men  are  not  neglecting  the  subject  of  religion 
altogether,  nor  entertaining  prejudices  against  it.  For 
if  they  never  examine  it  in  earnest,  if  they  wish  it  not 
to  be  true,  if  they  attend  more  to  objections  than  to 
evidence,  if  they  consider  things  with  levity,  if  they 
indulge  in  ridicule,  and  put  human  errors  in  the  place 
of  Divine  truth,  all  this  will  hinder  men  from  seeing 
evidence,  just  as  a  like  turn  of  mind  hinders  them 
from  weighing  evidence  in  their  temporal  capacities. 
And  possibly  the  evidence  of  Christianity  was  left,  so 
as  that  those  who  are  desirous  of  evading  moral 
obligation  should  not  see  it,  whilst  fair  and  candid 
persons  should. 

8.  Further,  the  evidences  of  Christianity,  as  they 
are,  may  be  sufficiently  understood  by  common  men,  if 
they  will  only  pay  the  same  sort  of  attention  to  religion 
which  they  pay  to  their  temporal  affairs.  But  if  men 
will  handle  objections  which  they  have  picked  up,  and 
discuss  them  without  the  necessary  preparation  of 
general  knowledge,  they  must  remain  in  ignorance  or 
doubt,  just  as  men  who  neglect  the  means  of  informa- 
tion in  common  life  do. 

9.  But,  perhaps,  it  will  be  said,  that  a  prince  would 
take  care  to  give  directions  to  a  servant  which  would 
be  impossible  to  be  misunderstood  or  disputed.  To 
this  we  answer,  that  it  is  certain  we  cannot  argue  thus 
as  to  God,  because  in  point  of  fact  he  does  not  afford 
us  such  information  as  to  our  temporal  affairs,  as  a 
matter  of  course,  without  care  of  our  own.  And  if  a 
prince  wished  not  merely  to  have  certain  acts  done,  but 
also  to  prove  the  loyalty  and  obedience  of  his  servant, 
he  might  not  always  give  his  directions  in  the  plainest 
possible  manner. 

On  the  whole,  the  analogy  of  nature  refutes  all 
objections  against  Christianity  as  resting  upon  doubtful 
evidence,  and  as  not  universal. 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  369 


Chap.  VII.  The  objections  against  the  particular 
scheme  of  Christianity  being  removed,  it  remains  that 
we  consider  what  the  analogy  of  nature  suggests  as  to 
the  positive  evidence  for  it,  and  as  to  the  objections 
raised  against  that  evidence. 

Now,  the  evidence  of  Christianity  embraces  a  long 
series  of  things,  reaching  from  the  beginning  of  the 
world  to  the  present  time,  of  great  variety  and  compass, 
and  making  up  one  argument,  the  conviction  arising 
from  which  is  like  what  we  call  effect  in  architecture, 
a  result  from  a  great  number  of  things,  so  and  so 
disposed,  and  taken  into  one  view ;  and  this  is  the  kind 
of  proof  on  which  we  determine  questions  of  difficulty, 
in  our  most  important  affairs  in  this  world. 

Let  us  then,  1st,  consider  the  direct  proof  of  Chris- 
tianity, from  Miracles  and  Prophecy ;  and  then  2d,  the 
general  argument  arising  from  this  proof,  together  with 
many  collateral  things,  as  making  up  one  argument. 

I. — 1.  The  Scriptures  of  the  Old  and  New  Testa- 
ment afford  us  the  same  evidence  of  the  miracles 
wrought  in  attestation  of  revelation,  as  it  does  of  its 
ordinary  history  ;  for  these  miracles  are  not  foisted  into 
it,  but  form  a  part  of  it,  and  are  related  in  the  same  un- 
adorned manner  as  the  rest  of  the  narrative,  and  stand 
on  the  same  footing  of  historical  evidence.  And  some 
parts  of  Scripture,  containing  the  account  of  miracles, 
are  quoted  as  genuine  from  the  Very  age  in  which  thev 
were  said  to  have  been  written.  And  the  establish- 
ment of  the  Jewivsh  and  Christian  religions  are  just 
what  might  have  been  expected,  if  such  miracles  were 
wrought,  and  can  be  accounted  for  on  no  other  suppo- 
sition. The  Scripture  history,  then,  must  be  consid- 
ered as  genuine,  unless  something  positive  can  be 
alleged  to  invalidate  it.  Mere  guesses  can  prove 
nothing  against  historical  evidence. 

Further,  the  Epistles  of  St.  Paul,  being  addressed  to 
particular  churches,  carry  in  them  a  greater  evidence  of 
being  genuine,  than  if  they  had  been  merely  narratives 
addressed  to  the  world  at  large.  And  the  first  epistle 
to  the  Corinthians  is  quoted  by  Clemens  Romanus,  a 
24 


370  WILSON'S    ANALOGY. 

contemporary,  in  a  letter  to  the  same  clmrcli.  And  St. 
Paul  mentions,  in  this  epistle,  the  miraculous  gifts,  as 
possessed  by  the  very  Christians  to  whom  he  wrote ; 
and  he  mentions  them  incidentally,  and  in  order  to 
depreciate  them,  and  to  reprove  the  abuse  of  them.. 
He  speaks  of  them  in  the  manner  any  one  would  speak 
of  a  thing  familiar,  and  known  to  the  persons  he  is 
writing  to.  Against  this  evidence,  general  doubts 
have  no  force,  because  any  fact  of  such  a  kind,  and  of 
such  antiquity,  may  have  general  doubts  throw^n  out 
concerning  it,  from  the  very  nature  of  human  affairs 
and  human  testimony. 

Again,  Cliristianity  presented  itself  to  mankind  at 
first,  and  was  received,  on  tlie  footing  of  these  miracles 
at  the  time  wiien  they  were  Avrought ;  which  is  the 
case  wdth  no  other  religion,  Mahommedanism  was 
propagated  by  the  sword ;  and  Popish  and  Mahomme- 
dan  miracles,  said  to  be  wrought  after  parties  were 
formed,  and  when  power  and  political  interests  sup- 
ported them,  are  easily  accounted  for. 

Once  more,  the  reception  of  such  a  doctrine  as 
Christianity,  demanding  such  a  total  change  of  life,  by 
such  vast  numbers,  can  only  be  accounted  for  on  the 
supposition  of  their  belief  in  the  Christian  miracles, 
which  they  were  fully  competent  to  judge  of,  as  mat- 
ters of  fact.  For,  credulous  as  mankind  are,  they  are 
suspicious,  and  backward  to  believe  and  act  against 
their  prejudices,  passions,  and  temporal  interest;  and 
education,  prejudice,  power,  habits,  laws,  authority, 
were  all  then  against  Christianity. 

Enthusiasm,  indeed,  may  give  rise  to  opinions,  and 
to  zeal  in  support  of  them.  But  there  is  a  wide 
difference  between  opinions  and  facts ;  and  testimony, 
though  no  proof  of  enthusiastic  opinions,  yet  is  allowed, 
in  all  cases,  to  be  a  proof  of  facts;  and  there  is  no 
appearance  of  enthusiasm  in  the  conduct  of  the  Apostles 
and  first  Christians,  but  quite  the  contrary.  And  if 
great  numbers  of  men  of  plain  understanding  affirm, 
that  they  saw  and  heard  such  and  such  things  with 
their  eyes  and  ears,  such  testimony  is  the  strongest 
evidence  we  can  have  for  any  matter  of  fact.    The 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  371 

mere  vague  charge  of  enthusiasm,  in  such  a  case,  is 
frivolous. 

However,  as  religion  is  supposed  to  he  peculiarlv 
liable  to  enthusiasm,  let  us  observe  that  prejudices, 
romance,  affectation,  humour,  party  spirit,  custom,  little 
competitions,  &c.,  influence  men  in  common  matters, 
just  as  enthusiasm  may  do  ;  and  yet,  human  testimony, 
common  matters,  is  believed  and  acted  on  notwith- 
standing. The  fact  is,  mankind  have  undoubtedly  a 
capacity  of  distinguishing  truth  and  falsehood  in  com- 
mon matters,  and  have  a  regard  to  truth  in  what  they 
say,  except  when  prejudiced,  biassed,  or  deceived. 
And,  therefore,  human  testimony  remains  a  natural 
ground  of  assent,  and  this  assent,  a  natural  principle 
of  action,  notwithstanding  all  the  error  and  dishonesty 
which  are  in  the  world.  People,  therefore,  do  not 
know  what  they  say,  when  they  pretend  that  enthu- 
siasm destroys  the  evidence  for  the  truth  of  Christi- 
anity. It  never  can  be  sufficient  to  overthrow  direct 
historical  testimony,  indolently  to  say.  Men  are  so  apt 
to  deceive  and  be  deceived  in  religion,  that  we  know 
not  what  to  believe.  All  analogy  shows,  that  men  do 
not  thus  act  in  their  temporal  affairs. 

Besides,  the  vast  importance  of  Christianity,  and 
the  strong  obligations  to  veracity  which  it  enjoins, 
strengthen  the  presumption  that  the  Apostles  could 
not  either  intend  to  deceive  others,  or  be  deceived 
themselves.  The  proof  from  miracles,  therefore,  re- 
mains untouched ;  for  there  is  no  testimony  whatever 
contradicting  it,  and  strong  historical  testimony  in  its 
favour. 

2.  As  to  the  evidence  from  prophecy,  a  few  remarks 
may  be  made.  If  some  parts  of  it  are  obscure,  this 
does  not  lessen  the  proof  of  foresight  from  the  fulfil- 
ment of  those  parts  which  are  clear.  Thus,  in  a 
writing,  if  part  of  it  were  in  cyphers,  and  other  parts 
in  words  at  length,  and  if,  in  the  parts  understood, 
many  known  facts  were  related  ;  no  one  would  ima- 
gine, that  if  he  could  make  out  the  part  in  cypher,  he 
should  find  that  the  writer  did  not  know  the  plain 
facts  which  he  had  related. 


372  WILSON'S    ANALOGY. 

Again,  if,  from  the  deficiency  in  civil  history,  -sve  can- 
not make  out  the  minute  fulfihnent  of  every  prophecy, 
yet  a  very  strong  proof  of  foresiglit  may  arise  from  a 
general  completion  of  })rophecy,  as  illustrated  by  civil 
history;  perhaps  as  much  proof  as  God  intended  should 
be  afford  ed  hy  such  prophecy. 

Further,  if  a  long  series  of  prophecy  is  naturally 
applicable  to  such  and  such  events,  this  is,  of  itself, 
a  presumpti\e  proof  that  it  was  intended  of  them. 
Thus,  in  mythological  and  satirical  writings,  we  con- 
clude that  we  understand  their  concealed  meaning,  in 
proportion  to  the  number  of  particulars  clearly  ap- 
plicable in  such  and  such  manner. 

Add  to  this,  that  the  Jews  a])plied  the  prophecies  of 
Christ  to  the  Messiah  before  his  coming,  in  much  the 
same  manner  as  Christians  do  now ;  and  the  primitive 
Christians,  those  of  the  state  of  the  church,  and  of  the 
world,  in  the  last  ages,  in  much  the  same  Avay  as  we 
do  now,  and  as  the  event  seems  to  verify.  This  is 
important. 

Nor  is  it  any  argument  against  all  this,  if  we 
suppose  the  prophets  to  jiave  applied  some  of  those 
prophecies,  at  the  time,  to  other  immediate  events  ; 
for  they  were  only  amanuenses,  not  the  original  authors 
of  their  predictions  ;  that  is,  they  merely  wrote  as 
they  were  moved  by  the  Holy  Ghost. 

Thus,  the  argument  from  prophecy  has  great  weight, 
though  we  should  not  be  able  to  satisfy  ourselves  on 
every  point.  It  is,  indeed,  very  easy  to  determine  at 
once  with  a  decisive  air,  and  say.  There  is  nothing  in 
it :  and  this  suits  the  presumption  and  wilfulness  of 
men.  But  the  true  proof  of  modesty  and  fiiirness  is 
to  say,  There  is  certainly  something  in  it ;  and  it  shall 
have  influence  upon  us  in  proportion  to  its  apparent 
reality  and  weight.  And  this  all  analogy  suggests  to 
be  the  reasonable  course.  ' 

II.  I>et  us  now  consider  this  direct  evidence  of 
miracles  and  prophecy,  in  connexion  with  those  circum- 
stantial and  collateral  proofs,  which  go  to  make  up 
one  argument.  For  thus,  in  daily  life,  we  judge  of 
things  by  evidence  arising  from  various  coincidences, 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  373 

which  confirm  each  other.  And  though  each  of  these 
things,  separately,  may  have  Uttle  weight,  yet  when 
they  are  considered  together,  and  united  in  one  view, 
they  may  have  the  greatest.  The  proof  of  revelation 
is  not  some  direct  and  express  things  only,  but  a  great 
variety  of  circumstantial  things  also,  in  the  result  of 
which  the  proper  force  of  the  evidence  consists. 

1.  Now  revelation  may  be  considered  as  wholly 
historical ;  for  prophecy  is  anticipated  history,  and 
doctrines,  and  precepts,  may  be  viewed  as  matters  of 
fact.  The  general  design  of  this  history,  is  to  give  us 
an  account  of  the  world,  in  this  one  single  view,  as 
God's  world  ;  and  by  this  it  is  essentially  distinguished 
from  all  other  books.  After  the  history  of  the  creation, 
it  gives  an  account  of  the  world  in  this  view,  during 
that  state  of  apostacy  and  wickedness  which  it  repre- 
sents mankind  to  lie  in.  It  considers  the  common 
affairs  of  men,  as  a  scene  of  distraction,  and  only  refers 
to  them  as  they  affect  religion. 

2.  This  narrative,  comprehending  a  period  of  nearly 
6000  years,  gives  the  utmost  scope  for  objections  against 
it ;  from  reason,  common  history,  or  any  inconsistency 
in  its  parts.  And  undoubtedly  it  must,  and  would 
have  been  confuted,  if  it  had  Ijeen  false,  as  all  false 
religions  have  been  over  and  over  again ;  and,  there- 
fore, that  it  has  not  been  confuted,  nor  pretended  to 
have  been  confuted,  cluring  the  lapse  of  so  many  ages, 
implies  a  positive  argument  that  it  is  true. 

3.  Further,  the  Scriptures  contain  a  particular  history 
of  the  Jews,  God's  peculiar  people — the  promises  of 
the  Messiah,  as  a  Saviour  for  Jews  and  Gentiles — the 
narrative  of  the  birth  of  this  Messiah,  at  the  time 
foretold — and  of  the  propagation  of  his  religion — and 
of  his  being  rejected  by  the  Jewish  people. 

4.  Let  us  now  suppose  a  person  to  read  the  Scrip- 
tures thoroughly,  and  remark  these  and  other  historical 
facts  contained  in  them,  without  knowing  whether  it 
was  a  real  revelation  from  Heaven  or  not.  Then  let 
this  person  be  told  to  look  out  into  the  world,  and 
observe  if  the  state  of  things  seem  at  all  to  correspond 
with  these  facts.     Let  him  be  informed  how  much  of 


374  WILSON'S    ANALOGY. 

natural  religion  was  owing  to  tliis  book,  and  liow  many 
nations  received  it  as  divine,  and  under  wliat  circum- 
stances. Then  let  him  consider  of  what  importance 
religion  is  to  mankind;  and  he  would  see  thatthis 
supposed  revelation  having  had  this  influence,  and 
havinc;  been  received  in  the  world  as  it  was,  is  the  most 
conspicuous  event  in  the  history  of  mankind;  and  that 
a  book  thus  recommended  demands  his  attention  as  by 
a  voice  from  Heaven. 

5.  Let  such  a  person  be  next  informed,  that  the 
history  and  chronology  of  this  book  is  not  contradicted, 
but  confirmed,  by  profane  history — that  the  narrative 
contains  all  the  internal  marks  of  truth  and  simplicity — 
and  that  the  New  Testament  in  particular,  is  confirmed 
in  all  its  chief  facts  by  heathen  authors — and  that  this 
credibility  of  the  common  history  in  Scripture,  gives 
some  credibility  to  its  mii-acles,  as  they  are  interwoven 
and  make  up  one  narrative. 

6.  Let  him  next  be  told  that  there  was  such  a  nation 
as  the  Jews,  whose  existence  depended  on  the  law 
said,  in  this  book,  to  have  been  given  them  by  Moses — 
that  at  the  time  when  the  prophecies  had  led  this 
people  to  expect  the  Messiah,  one  claiming  to  be  the 
Messiah  appeared,  and  was  rejected  by  them,  as  fore- 
told— that  the  religion  was  received  by  the  Gentiles  on 
the  authority  of  miracles,  and  that  the  Jews  remain  as 
a  separate  people  to  this  present  day,  which  seems  to 
look  forward  to  other  prophecies  of  their  future  con- 
version. 

Let  him,  I  say,  first  gather  his  knowledge  entirely 
from  Scripture,  and  then  compare  it  fact  by  fact  with 
the  corresponding  history  of  the  world ;  and  the  joint 
view  must  appear  to  him  most  surprising. 

7.  All  these  points  make  up  an  argument  from  their 
united,  not  separated,  force.  Then  add  to  these,  the 
appearances  of  the  world,  as  answering  still  to  the 
prophetic  history,  and  numerous  other  particulars,  and 
the  result  of  the  whole  must  be  allowed  to  be  of  the 
greatest  w^eight. 

8.  Then  we  should  remember,  that  a  mistake  in 
rejecting  Christianity,  is  much  more  dangerous  in  its 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  375 

consequences,  than  one  in  favour  of  it ;  and  that  in 
temporal  affairs,  we  always  consider  which  side  is  most 
safe. 

9.  We  should  also  hear  in  mind  that  the  truth  of 
Christianity  is  proved,  like  that  of  any  connnon  event, 
not  only  if  any  one  of  the  points  adduced  clearly  imply 
it,  but  if  the  whole  taken  together  do,  though  no  one 
singly  should.  No  one  who  is  serious,  can  possibly 
think  these  things  to  be  of  little  weight,  if  he  considers 
the  importance  of  collateral  things,  and  less  circum- 
stances, in  the  evidence  of  probability,  as  distinguished 
in  nature  from  the  evidence  of  demonstration. 

10.  It  should  be  just  observed,  that  the  nature  of 
this  evidence  gives  a  great  advantage  to  persons  who 
choose  to  attack  Christianity  in  a  short,  lively  manner 
in  conversation ;  because  an  objection  against  particular 
points  is  easily  shown,  whereas  the  united  force  of  the 
whole  argument,  requires  much  time  and  thought. 

Chap.  VIII.  Lastly,  some  persons  may  object  to  this 
wiiole  argument,  from  the  analogy  of  nature,  and  say, 
it  is  a  poor  thing  to  solve  difficulties  in  revelation,  by 
•asserting  that  there  are  like  difficulties  in  natural 
religion. 

1.  Now^  men's  wanting  to  have  all  difficulties  cleared 
in  revelation,  is  the  same  for  any  thing  they  know",  as 
requiring  to  comprehend  the  divine  nature.  And  it  is 
no  otherwise  a  poor  thing  to  argue  from  natural  to 
revealed  religion,  than  it  is  a  poor  thing  for  a  physician 
to  have  so  little  knowledge  in  the  cure  of  diseases; 
which  is  yet  much  better  than  having  no  skill  at  all. 
Indeed,  the  epithet  poor,  may  be  applied  as  properly  to 
the  whole  of  hiiman  life. 

Further,  it  is  unreasonable  for  men  to  urge  objec- 
tions against  Christianity  which  are  of  equal  weight, 
against  natural  religion,  whilst  they  profess  to  admit 
the  truth  of  natural  religion.     This  is  unfair  dealing. 

2.  But  again,  religion  is  a  practical  thing,  and  if  men 
have  the  like  reason  to  believe  the  truth  of  it,  as  they 
have  in  what  they  do  in  their  temporal  affairs,  then 
they  are  so  much  the  more  bound  to  act  on  it,  as  the 


376  WILSON'S    ANALOGY. 

interest  is  infinitely  greater.  This  is  plainly  unan- 
swerable. If  they  believe  that  taking  care  of  their 
temporal  interest  will  be  for  their  advantage,  then 
there  is  equal  reason  for  believing,  that  obeying  Chris- 
tianity, and  taking  care  of  their  futin-e  interests,  will  be 
for  their  advantage.  It  is  according  to  the  conduct 
and  character  of  the  Author  of  nature,  that  we  should 
act  upon  such  probable  evidence.  All  analogy  clearly 
shows  this. 

3.  The  design  of  the  analogical  argimient,  is  not  to 
vindicate  the  character  of  God,  but  to  show  the  obliga- 
tions of  men.  Nor  is  it  necessary  to  prove  the  reason- 
ableness of  every  thing  enjoined  us  in  Christianity ; 
the  reasonableness  of  the  practice  of  our  duty  is 
enough.  And  though  analogy  does  not  pretend  imme- 
diately to  answer  objections  against  the  wisdom  and 
goodness  of  the  doctrines  and  precepts  of  Christianity, 
yet  it  does  this  indirectly,  by  showing  that  the  things 
objected  against  are  not  incredible. 

4.  It  is  readily  acknowledged,  that  this  treatise  is 
not  what,  is  called  satisfactory — very  for  from  it — ^l3ut 
then  no  natural  institution  of  life  would  appear  so,  if 
reduced  into  a  system  together  with  its  proof.  The» 
unsatisfoctory  evidence  with  which  we  put  up  in  com- 
mon life,  is  not  to  be  expressed.  Yet  men  do  not 
throw  away  life  on  account  of  this  doubtfulness.  And 
religion  pre-supposes,  in  all  avIjo  would  embrace  it, 
some  integrity  and  honesty,  a  willingness  to  follow  the 
probability  of  things ;  just  as  speaking  to  a  man  sup- 
poses him  to  understand  the  language  in  which  you 
speak.  The  question  then  is,  not  whether  the  evidence 
of  Christianity  be  what  is  called  satisfoctory,  but 
whether  it  be  sufficient  to  prove  and  discipline  that 
virtue  and  integrity  of  mind,  which  it  pre-supposes, 
though  it  be  not  sufficient  to  remove  every  objection,  or 
gratify  curiosity. 

5.  As  to  the  little  influence  which  this  whole  argu- 
]uent  ma}^  actually  have  on  men,  which  is  made  an 
ol)jection  to  it,  the  true  question  is,  not  how  men  will 
actually  behave,  but  how  they  ought  to  behave.  It  is 
no  objection  to  this  argument,  that  it  may  fail  of  con- 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  37T 

vincing  men.  Religion  as  a  probation,  has  its  end  on 
all  to  whom  it  has  been  proposed  with  sufficient 
evidence,  let  them  behave  as  they  will  concerning  it. 

On  the  whole,  the  proof  of  Christianity  is  greatly- 
strengthened  by  these  consideratioas  from  analogy; 
though  it  is  easy  to  cavil  at  them,  and  to  object  that 
they  are  not  demonstrative,  which  it  was  never  pre- 
tended they  w^ere,  nor  could  be.  They  are  of  the 
nature  of  probable  arguments ;  but  then  they  are  so 
forcible  and  just,  that  it  is  impossible  to  answer  them, 
or  evade  them  fairly. 

Conclusion.  In  this  treatise  we  have  considered 
Christianity  as  a  matter.of  fact  merely,  and  have  argued 
with  unbelievers  on  their  own  ground.  We  have, 
therefore,  neither  argued  from  the  liberty  of  man,  nor 
from  the  moral  fitness  of  things  ;  both  of  which  would 
have  strengthened  my  argument,  and  both  of  which 
we  believe  to  be  true.  But  we  have  taken  up  things 
on  the  lowest  ground,  and  given  every  advantage  we 
could  to  our  adversary. 

In  the  first  part,  a  view  has  been  given  of  natural 
religion,  and  the  chief  difficulties  concerning  this  have 
been  answered  by  the  analogy  of  God's  government  of 
the  universe.  Thus,  the  objections  against  a  future 
life  of  moral  and  righteous  retribution,  wherein  God 
w^ill  reward  or  punish  men  according  to  their  behaviour 
here,  and  for  which  this  world  is  a  state  of  discipline 
and  preparation,  have  been  silenced,  or  refuted ;  and 
the  general  notion  of  religion  has  been  shown  to  be 
throughout  agreeable  to  the  obvious  course  of  things  in 
this  present  world. 

For,  indeed,  natural  religion  carries  in  it  much 
evidence  of  truth,  on  barely  being  proposed  to  our 
thoughts.  To  an  unprejudiced  mind,  ten  thousand 
thousand  instances  of  design,  cannot  but  prove  a  De- 
signer. And  it  is  intuitively  manifest,  that  creatures 
ought  to  live  under  a  dutiful  sense  of  their  Maker ;  and 
that  justice  and  charity  must  be  his  laws,  to  creatures 
such  as  we  are,  whom  he  has  formed  social,  and  placed 
in  society.  The  neglect,  therefore,  of  men  towards  it, 
must  arise  from  objections  against  all  religion  generally ; 


378  WILSON'S   ANALOGY. 

which  objections  liave  been  met  in  tlie  first  part  of  this 
work.  Natural  religion  has  been  there  cleared  of  its 
difficulties,  and  its  credibility  shown. 

In  the  second  part,  the  particular  scheme  of  Chris- 
tianity has  been  considered ;  and  the  objections  against 
its    importance,    against    the    miracles    on   A^shich    its 
evidence  rests,  and  against  its  provision  of  a  Mediator, 
have  been  proved  to  be  invalid.     The  difficulties  raised 
concerning  it,  because  it  is  not  universal,  and  because 
its  evidence  is  not  overbearing,  have  also  been  removed, 
Some   observations   have,  lastly,  been   made    on    the 
objections  to  the  special  evidences  of  Christianity;   as 
consisting  of  miracles,  prophci^ies,  and  a  great 'many 
other  collateral  circumstances,  united  in  one  argument. 
I'hus  we  have  endeavoured  to  strengthen  the  evi- 
dences  of  Christianity  to  those  who  believe  it  to  be 
true ;  and  to  show  its  probability  to  those  who  do  not 
believe    it.     The    treatise    is    especially  addressed  to 
those  who  imagine  that  the  evidences  of  natural  and 
revealed  religion,  if  true,  would   have  been   stronger 
than    they  are,  or   irresistible ;   and  who  think   that 
doubting  about  Christianity,  is  in  a  manner  the  same 
thing  as  being  certain  against  it.     If  these  persons  are 
not  willing  to  weigh  seriously  the  force  of  the  analogical 
arguments  we  have  produced,  but  will  still  go  on  to 
disregard  and  vilify  Christianity,  there  is  no  reason  to 
think  they  would  alter  their  behaviour  to  any  purpose  ; 
though  there  were  a  demonstration,  instead  of  what 
there  is,  a  high  probability,  and  moral  certainty  of  its 
truth. 

Such  are  the  chief  steps  in  the  reasoning  of  Bishop 
Butler,  in  this  great  work. 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  379 


CONNEXION    OF     BISHOP     BUTLEr's    ARGUMENT     WITH 

OTHER  BRANCHES  OF  EVIDENCE,  THEORETICAL 

AND     PRACTICAL. 

Having  thus  given  a  general  draught  of  the  main 
argument,  as  well  as  of  the  particular  reasoning  of  the 
Analogy,  we  come  to  the  second  general  division  of 
this  Essay,  and  offer,  as  was  proposed,  some  observa- 
tions on  THE  CONNEXION  OF  THIS  ARGUMENT  WITH  THE 
OTHER  BRANCHES  OF  THE  CHRISTIAN  EVIDENCE,  AND  ON 
ITS  PECULIAR  USE  AND  IMPORTANCE  ;  AND  ALSO  ON  OUR 
author's  view  of  practical  CHRISTIANITY,  AND  ON 
THE  ADAPTATION  OF  HIS  ARGUMENT  TO  THE  CHRISTIAN 
RELIGION  IN  ALL  ITS  EXTENT. 

1.  We  begin  with  the  connexion  of  the  Analogical 
argument  with  the  other  branches  of  the  Christian  evidence, 
and  on  its  peculiar  use  and  importance.  For  the  argu- 
ment from  analogy  does  not  stand  alone.  It  is  rather 
the  completion,  and,  as  it  were,  the  crown  of  all  the 
other  evidences  for  the  truth  of  Christianity.  It  comes 
in  to  remove  objections  after  the  usual  proofs  have 
been  admitted.  For  the  External,  the  Internal, 
and  what  I  may  call  the  Analogical  evidences  of 
Christianity,  are  three  distinct  divisions  of  one  great 
argument.  The  external  evidences  are  those  which 
should  be  first  studied.  Indeed  they  are  the  only 
ones  that  can  be  considered  in  the  first  instance  as 
essential ;  because  they  undertake  to  show  the  creden- 
tials of  the  messenger  who  professes  to  come  with  a 
revelation  from  heaven.  Christianity  claims  a  divine 
origin,  I  have  therefore  a  right,  indeed  I  am  bound, 
soberly  and  impartially  to  inquire,  what  proofs  she 
brings  of  this  high  claim.  And  when  she  refers  me  to 
the  holy  Scriptures  as  containing  all  her  records,  I  liave 
a  right  to  ask  what  evidence  there  is  of  the  genuine- 
ness and  authenticity  of  these  books,  and  what  footing  ■ 


380  WILSON'S    ANALOGY. 

they  place  the  religion  upon,  Avhich  they  wish  to  incul- 
cate on  mankind.  The  answer  to  all  these  questions 
is  fouml  on  what  we  call  the  External  Evidences  of 
Christianity.  These  show  the  acknowledged  facts  on 
which  the  religion  rests.  They  prove  that  the  books 
were  written  by  the  persons  whose  names  they  bear, 
and  do  contain  a  true  and  credible*  history.  They 
prove  that  the  revelation  itself  was  founded  on  une- 
quivocal and  numerous  miracles ;  that  it  was  accom- 
panied (as  it  is  accompanied  still)  with  the  distinct 
lulhlment  of  an  amazing  scheme  of  prophecy,  embracing 
all  the  chief  events  of  the  world ;  and  that  it  was  pro- 
pagated in  the  face  of  opposition  and  difficulty  Avith  a 
triumphant  success,  which  nothing  but  the  hand  of  God 
could  have  effected.  These  evidences  also  show  the 
positive  good  effects  produced  by  this  heavenly  doc- 
trine, and  which  are  still  being  produced,  in  the 
melioration  of  society  and  the  advancement  of  human 
happiness  and  virtue  in  all  the  nations  where  it  has 
been  received.  We  have  no  right  to  go  further  than 
this  in  the  first  place.  The  moment  the  messenger  is 
sufficiently  proved  to  have  divine  credentials,  we  have 
but  one  duty  left,  that  of  receiving  and  obeying  his 
message,  that  of  reading  and  meditating  on  the  revela- 
tion itself,  in  order  to  conform  ourselves  to  it  witl\ 
devout  and  cheerful  submission.  We  have  no  right  at 
all  to  examine  the  nature  of  the  discoveries,  or  doc- 
trines, or  precepts  of  Christianity,  with  the  view  of 
determining  whether  they  seem  to  us  becoming  the 
wisdom  of  God,  and  agreeable  to  the  reason  of  man. 
It  is  proved  that  the  revelation  is  from  heaven.  This 
is  enough.  The  infinitely  glorious  Creator  and  Sove- 
reign of  the  universe  has  full  power  to  do  what  he 
will  with  his  own,  and  to  lay  down  laws  for  his 
creatures.  We  have  no  business,  strictly  speaking, 
with  the  contents  and  tenor  of  these  laws,  except  to 
understand  them  and  obey  them. 

Great  mischief  has  been  done  to  the  Christian  cause 
by  taking  another  method.  Men  have  allowed  them- 
selves to  be  entangled  with  discussions  on  the  possi- 
bility and  credibility  of  a  revelation  being   given  to 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  381 

man,   on   tlie  nature  and  tendency  of  the    Christian 
doctrine,   on  the  reasonableness  of  its  particular  in- 
junctions— questions  every  one  of  them  out  of  place  in 
examining  the  evidence   of  a  divine  religion.     Let  it 
fairly  be  made  out  to  come  from  God,  and  it  is  enough. 
More   than  this  is  injurious.      We  are  sure,  indeed, 
that  the  contents  of  it  must  be  most  worthy  of  its 
perfect  Author ;   but  we  are  no  adequate  judges  of 
what  is  worthy  or  what  is  not  worthy  of  an  Infmite 
being.     We  have  no  right  to  call  the  Almighty  Creator 
to  the  bar  of  our  feeble  reason,  and  suspend  obedience 
to  his  commands  on  the  determination  whether  those 
commands  are  in  our  opinion  just  and  good  or  not. 
To  receive  a  revelation  on  the  ground  of  its  proper 
credentials,  and  then  to  trace  out  with  reverence  the 
wisdom  and  goodness  of  its  contents,  is  one  thing; 
but  to  sit  in  judgment  on  those  contents  previously 
to  an  examination  of  its  credentials,  and  in  order  to 
,  decide  whether  we  shall  receive  the  professed  revela- 
tion or  not,  is  quite  another.      We  are  competent  to 
understand  the  simple  and  commanding  language  of 
the  Almighty,  attesting  by  miracles  and  prophecy,  and 
the    extraordinary  propagation  of  the  gospel  and  its 
visible  good  effects  on  mankind,  the  truth  of  a  super- 
natural revelation ;  and  yet  are  no  competent  judges 
'whatever  of  the  particular  things  the  Almighty  may  see 
fit  to  communicate  in  that  revelation.     Evidences  are 
level  to  a  candid  and  fair  understanding ;  divine  doc- 
trines may  not  be    so.      Evidences  are  addressed   to 
man's  reason,  and  warrant  the  modest  exercise  of  it; 
doctrines  are  addressed  to  faith,  and  demand  not  discus- 
sion, but  obedience. 

The  danger  of  acting  in  the  way  which  I  am  now 
venturing  to  condemn,  is  greater,  because  the  door 
being  once  opened  to  such  reasoning,  it  is  quite  certain 
that  the  minds  of  men  will  too  often  employ  it  amiss. 
The  infidel  is  the  person  just  the  least  capable  to  act 
aright  in  such  a  case.  The  pious  well-trained  judg- 
ment of  a  sincere  Christian,  might  indeed  form  a  better 
estimate  of  the  internal  character  of  a  revelation  from 
heaven :  but  the  unsubdued  mind  of  an  unbeliever  can 


382  WILSON'S    ANALOGY. 

only  come  to  a  wrong  decision  upon  it.     He  wants  ali 
the  preparation  necessary. 

But  although  the  External  proofs  of  Christianity  are 
thus  all  that,  in  the  first  examination,  is  required,  yet 
the  INTERNAL  EVIDENCES  may  afterwards  he  profitably, 
most  profital)ly  studied.     Christianity  shrinks  from  no 
scrutiny.     She  courts  the  light.     When  the  outward 
credentials  of  the  heavenly  messenger  have  once  been 
investigated,  and  the  message  been  received  on  this  its 
proper  footing ;  then  if  it  be  asked,  whether  the  con- 
tents of  the  revelation  seem  to  conhrin  the  proof  of  its 
divine  original ;  whether  the  sincere  believer  will  find 
them  adapted  to  his  wants ;  whether  the  morals  incul- 
cated,   the    end   proposed,   the    means    enjoined   are 
agreeable  to  man's  best  reason  and  the  dictates  of  an 
enlightened  understanding  and   conscience,  whether 
the   character   of  Christ   be   worthy   of  his  religion, 
whether  the  influence   of  grace,  said   to   accompany 
Christianity,  may  be  obtained  by  prayer,  whether  the 
lives  and  deaths  of  Christians  as  compared  with  those 
of  professed  Infidels,  illustrate  the  excellency  of  their 
faith;  whether,  in  short,  the  promises  and  blessings  of 
Christianity  are  verified  in  those  who  make  a  trial  of 
them,  by  submitting  to  the  means  appointed  for  their 
attainment:  when  such  questions  are  put  with  candour, 
by  those  who  have  embraced  Christianity,  we  answer 
them  by  referring  to  the  Internal  evidences  of  Revela- 
tion.    These  Internal  evidences  are  now  our  appro- 
priate study.     They  show  us  the  adaptation  of  the  reli- 
gion to  the  situation  and  wants  of  man,  the  purity  and 
sublimity  of  its  doctrines  and  precepts,  the  character  of 
its  founder,  the  sanctifying  and  consoling  effect  of  the 
influence   which   accompanies  it,  the  holy  lives  and 
happy  deaths  of  its  genuine  followers,  and  the  trial 
which  every  one  may  make  of  its  promises  and  bles- 
sings,   by   fulfilling   the    terms    on    which    they   are 
proposed.     Each  of  these  topics  admits  of  large  illus- 
tration.    The  whole  of  the  Internal  evidences  form  an 
argument  in   favour  of  Christianity,  as  complete  and 
satisfactory  in  its  particular  province,  as  the  whole  of 
the  External.     Indeed,  they  are,   in  some   respects. 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  383 

more  persuasive,  though  they  come  after  them  and  are 
secondary  to  them.  The  External  evidences  enforce 
conviction,  the  Internal  induce  to  love.  The  External 
bring  to  light  the  potent  remedy,  the  Internal  apply  it 
to  the  sufferer,  and  produce  the  actual  cure.  The  first 
require  an  exercise  of  the  understanding  on  plain 
facts  stated,  the  second  the  submission  of  the  affections 
to  a  benefit  conferred.  By  the  one  we  know  religion 
to  be  true,  by  the  other  we  feel  it  to  be  good.  The 
External  evidences  awaken  attention  to  a  new  doc- 
trine, the  Internal  attract  the  heart  to  an  incalculable 
blessing. 

Accordingly,  no  class  of  persons  is  excluded  from 
that  conviction  of  the  truth  of  Christianity  which 
springs  from  a  perception  of  its  effects  in  themselves 
and  others.  The  External  evidences  indeed  are  simple 
as  they  are  majestic ;  but  to  the  unpractised  and  uned- 
ucated mind,  they  necessarily  lose  much  of  their  force. 
The  great  body  of  mankind  must  be  indebted  to  their 
instructors  in  a  large  measure,  for  their  f^iith  in  the 
historical  evidences  of  religion;  but  they  can  feel  it  in 
its  sacred  fruits  as  keenly,  and  perhaps  even  more 
keenly,  than  any  other  description  of  persons.  They 
are  incapable  of  following  a  train  of  reasoning,  or  of 
judging  of  distant  and  remote  facts ;  but  they  are  quite 
capable  of  perceiving  the  blessedness  of  obeying  Chris- 
tianity, and  of  relying  on  its  promises.  Thus  a  source 
of  faith  is  opened  to  them,  abundant  in  proportion  as 
they  advance  in  piety  and  virtue.  And  though,  as  we 
have  already  observed,  the  unbeliever  has  no  right  to 
sit  in  judgment  on  the  internal  character  of  Chris- 
tianity, but  should,  and  must,  in  all  reason,  be  con- 
tented at  first  Avith  the  proper  external  evidences  that 
it  really  comes  from  God ;  yet  when  he  has  once 
received  the  Christian  doctrine  aright,  and  has  begun 
to  be  moulded  into  its  form,  and  take  its  impression, 
he  will  discover  to  his  surprise  new  traces  of  a  divine 
hand  daily  in  all  its  parts,  he  will  feel  that  it  is  salutary 
in  all  its  doctrines  and  in  all  its  precepts,  in  all  its 
bearings  and  all  its  tendencies,  in  all  its  discoveries 
and  declarations,  in  all  its  effects  and  fruits.     Like  the 


384  WILSON'S    ANALOGY. 

li^ht  of  the  sun,  it  will  speak  its  author  and  source. 
The  conlirmation  which  the  faith  of  the  sincere  believ  er 
thus  receives  is  indescribable.  He  has  now  entered 
the  temple,  of  Avhich  he  had  before  sun-eyed,  from 
without,  the  proportions  and  magnificence.  He  has 
now  partaken  of  the  feast,  of  which  he  had  before 
heard  the  tidings  and  listened  to  the  invitation.  He 
has  now  experienced  the  skill  and  tenderness  of  the 
Physician,  of  whose  fame  and  powers  he  had  before 
been  convinced  only  by  testimony.  He  has  now 
shared  the  unspeakable  gift  which  had  before  been 
offered  to  him.  He  was  well  persuaded,  on  first 
embracing  Christianity  on  its  due  external  authority, 
that  every  thing  taught  by  it  would  be  found  most 
agreeable  to  the  attributes  and  glory  of  its  divine 
author.  But  he  has  now  a  conviction  resulting  from 
the  benefits  conferred,  of  a  kind  higher  in  its  degree, 
and  more  consoling  in  its  effects,  than  any  external 
proof  could  communicate,  and  which,  though  incapable 
of  being  known,  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  previ- 
ously to  experience,  yet  when  once  known  sways  and 
bears  away  the  heart. 

The  two  branches  of  evidence  thus  concurring  to 
one  result,  the  External  proving  the  truth  of  the  mes- 
senger, and  the  Internal  confirming  afterwards  that 
truth  by  an  experience  of  the  excellency  and  suitable- 
ness of  the  message  itself,  the  Christian  believer  has 
a  continually  growing  conviction  of  the  firm  grounds  of 
his  faith. 

He  is  now  prepared  for  considering,  to  the  best 
advantage,  the  third  branch  of  the  evidences  in  favour 
of  Christianity — that  arising  from  the  analogy  be- 
tween   THIS    RELIGION,    AND     THE     CONSTITUTION     AND 

COURSE  OF  NATURE.  Tliis  briusfs  us  to  the  immediate 
subject  of  Butler's  treatise,  of  which  we  have  already 
given  a  review.  We  have  no  right,  indeed,  (for  the 
idea  is  too  important  not  to  be  repeated,)  to  call  for  this 
species  of  proof,  any  more  than  we  have  a  right  to  call, 
in  the  first  instance,  for  an  examination  of  the  internal 
character  of  Christianity,  or  rather  to  call  for.  it  at  all. 
All  we  have  any  fair  right  to  ask  for,  is  the  credentials 


WILSON'S   ANALOGY.  385 

of  the  ambassador  who  professes  to  come  to  us  in  the 
name  of  our  absent,  though  ever-present,  Sovereign 
and  Lord.  It  is  perfectly  true,  that  the  analogy  of 
mature,  as  formed  by  the  same  hand,  will  have  traces  of 
the  same  system  and  scheme  of  Christianity,  just  as  it 
is  true,  that  a  revelation  from  heaven  will  possess  every 
internal  mark  of  holiness  and  goodness  and  truth ;  but 
we  have  no  right  to  stop,  and  pretend  to  follow  out  all 
these  matters,  before  w^e  receive  the  Christian  doctrine 
as  divine.  Christianity  does  not  submit  to  plead  at 
such  a  bar.  The  capacity  of  receiving  advantage  from 
these  auxiliary  evidences,  depends  on  our  first  admit- 
ting, on  the  plain  grounds  of  its  miracles,  and  prophe- 
cies, and  propagation,  and  mighty  effects,  the  truth  of 
the  revelation  by  which  these  additional  proofs  are  to 
be  created  and  communicated,  and  without  which 
they  cannot  be  employed  to  any  purpose. 

Still,  after  we  have  sincerely  embraced  the  gospel, 
we  may  humbly  inquire,  whether  the  difficulties  which 
are  raised  against  it  by  unbelievers,  or  which  occur  to 
our  own  minds,  may  be  relieved  by  an  appeal  to  the 
works  of  God  in  nature,  and  His  order  and  government 
therein.  This  is  the  argument  from  Analogy,  which 
rises  still  a  step  above  the  two  preceding  branches  of 
the  subject,  not  as  in  itself  necessary  to  the  first  recep- 
tion of  Christianity,  but  as  furnishing  the  subsequent 
confirmation  of  it,  and  removing  scruples  and  objections 
arising  from  the  ignorance  and  presumption  of  man.  It 
is,  indeed,  a  glorious  thing  thus  to  discern  the  harmony 
between  Christianity,  the  greatest  of  the  Almighty's 
works,  and  all  the  other  known  productions  of  the 
same  divine  Architect.  To  see  that  the  natural  and 
moral  government  of  God  are  parts  of  one  stupendous 
wdiole,  sums  up,  and  finishes,  and  absolves  the  subject. 
Nothing  more  can  be  said.  All  this,  what  we  might 
be  sure  it  would  be,  complete  and  adequate.  The 
force  of  External  evidences  is  to  compel  assent ;  the 
effect  of  the  Internal  to  produce  love ;  the  chief  efficacy 
of  the  Analogical  to  silence  objections.  By  the  first,  a 
message  is  proved  to  come  from  heaven ;  by  the 
second,  the  salutary  effects  of  this  message  are  felt  and 


386  WILSON'S    ANALOGY, 

understood  ;  by  the  third,  it  is  shown  to  be,  in  itself, 
most  agreeable  to  all  the  known  dispensations  of  the 
divine  Author.  The  first  is  the  proper  evidence  which 
such  a  case  indispensably  demands;  the  next  confirms, 
by  actual  experience,  this  satisfactory  ground  of  belief; 
the  last  excludes  all  contradictory  assertions,  and 
creates  a  silence  and  repose  of  mind,  when  objections 
are  urged  by  others,  or  arise  in  our  own  thoughts. 
External  evidences,  by  their  simple  majesty,  address 
the  reason  of  mankind,  and  overwhelmn  objections  and 
surmises ;  Internal,  by  the  influences  of  truth  on  the 
heart,  indispose  men  to  listen  to  those  objections; 
Analogical,  by  showing  that  such  objections  lie  equally 
against  the  constitution  and  course  of  nature,  deprive 
them  of  all  their  force,  and  turn  them  into  proofs  of 
divine  goodness  and  power. 

In  thus  assigning  to  the  three  branches  of  evidence 
a  particular  position,  we  are  far  from  insinuating  that 
they  may  not  be  considered  in  a  different  order.  We 
merely  wish  to  claim  for  the  external  evidences  the 
rank  to  which  they  are  entitled  in  fair  argument,  and 
to  protest  against  the  additional  and  auxiliary  evidences 
being  improperly  resorted  to,  in  the  first  instance,  to 
the  neglect  of  the  palpable  credentials  of  the  Christian 
message.  To  maintain  this  is  a  matter  of  real  moment. 
It  places  the  various  branches  of  the  inquiry  in  their 
true  and  natural  light.  Still  we  object  not  to  any  part 
of  them  being  separately  considered,  according  to  the 
disposition,  age,  talents,  information,  and  circumstances 
of  men.  The  Christian  evidence  in  each  division,  and 
each  subdivision  of  it,  is  so  clear  and  convincing  to  a 
fair  and  sincere  inquirer,  as  to  admit  of  a  distinct  dis- 
cussion and  exhibition,  if  it  be  conducted  with  good 
faith.  But  if  men  wish  to  seize  what  seems  to  them  a 
feeble  part  of  the  Internal  or  Analogical  argument,  and 
press  this  out  of  its  place,  disregarding  the  plain  and 
direct  proofs  of  Christianity  from  miracles,  prophecy, 
&c.,  we  then  recall  them  to  the  consideration  of  the 
real  state  of  the  argument.  We  tell  them  they 
are  no  adequate  judges  of  what  a  divine  revelation 
should  contain.     We  appeal  to  the  proper  and  unan- 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  387 

swerable  proofs  of  a  divine  religion,  in  the  extraordinary 
manifestations  of  Almighty  God  in  its  favour.  And  we 
bid  them  postpone  the  examination  of  the  subsidiary 
CA^dences,  till  they  have  weighed  the  primary  ones, 
and  received  the  religion  which  they  attest.  Thus  to 
a  serious  candid  mind,  we  are  willing  to  open  at  once 
any  part  of  the  Avide  subject  of  the  evidences  of  Chris- 
tianity ;  whilst  to  a  captious  and  unreasonable  inquirer, 
we  propose  the  strict  rules  of  debate,  and  demand  the  -^ 
orderly  examination  of  the  credentials  of  the  religion. 

If,  however,  after  all,  men  will  unreasonably  demand 
an  exposition  of  the  internal  character  of  Christianity 
in  the  first  place,  or  will  dwell  on  objections  raised 
against  its  particular  constitution,  we  descend  on  the 
ground  they  have  chosen,  and  without  relinquishing 
our  right  to  assume  a  higher  position  and  to  insist  only 
on  the  direct  proofs  of  it,  we  meet  them  where  they 
stand,  and  show  them  the  inward  excellencv  of  our 
religion  from  the  Internal  evidences,  or  the  weakness 
and  inconclusiveness  of  their  objections  from  the  Ana- 
logical. Thus  Christianity  stoops,  so  far  as  it  can,  to  the 
fancies  of  men,  and  argues  with  them  on  their  own 
principles.  This  is  particularly  the  case  with  the 
evidence  from  analogy. 

It  is  indeed  one  of  the  most  valuable  branches  of  the 
whole  Christian  argument,  because  objections  are  the 
ground  commonly  taken  by  unbelievers.  For  weak, 
and  inconclusive,  as  these  objections  are,  they  are 
sufficient,  when  listened  to,  to  steel  the  heart  against 
the  force  of  truth,  and  bar  up  the  first  entrance  to  the 
Christian  doctrine.  The  young  and  inexperienced  are 
thus  ofraduallv  seduced  and  hardened.  It  is  not  that 
men  have  found  out  that  the  External  Evidences  of 
Christianity  are  insufficient,  for  they  have  never  studied 
them — it  is  not  that  they  have  discovered  the  fallacy 
of  the  Internal  Evidences,  for  they  have  never  been  in 
a  situation  to  judge  of  them.  But  they  have  heard  bold 
things  flippantly  said  against  Christianity  ;  things  which 
they  were  not  sufficiently  informed  on  the  subject  to 
answer ;  these  have  sunk  into  their  memories,  and 
acquired  force  by  lapse  of  time ;  and  thus  their  minds  . 


388  WILSON'S   ANALOGY. 

became  gradu.illy  tainted  and  poisoned.  Their  pas- 
sions, impatient  of  the  restraints  of  Christianity,  aided 
the  delusion.  Their  pride  of  intellect,  ambitious  of 
forsaking  the  common  track,  listened  to  the  flattering 
tale.  The  opinions  and  example  of  others,  as  little 
competent  to  judge  as  themselves,  attracted  them 
onwards.  Ridicule,  unanswerable  ridicule,  came  in  to 
their  overthrow.  The  love  of  novelty  was  not  without 
its  force.  They  had  no  inclination  to  the  patient 
inquiry  which  such  a  subject  as  religion  demands  ; 
whereas  an  objection  was  seized  at  once.  Thus, 
insensibly,  the  impressions  of  a  pious  education  were 
effaced,  and  the  unhappy  youth  entered  on  the  mazes 
of  infidelity,  and  came,  at  last,  to  scoff  at  the  very 
religion  which  he  once  reverenced,  if  he  did  not  obey. 
Here,  then,  the  argument  from  analogy  may  be  of 
the  greatest  service.  We  insist  not  with  such  a  youth, 
on  an  examination  of  the  External  Evidences  of  reli- 
gion, to  which  we  see  he  would  not  attend,  and  we 
come  at  once  to  his  objections.  We  show  him,  in  the 
manner  of  the  preceding  treatise,  that  we  may  well 
expect  to  find  the  same  sort  of  character  in  a  revela- 
tion, proceeding  from  the  Author  of  nature,  as  is  found 
in  the  constitution  and  order  of  nature  itself;  that  our 
ignorance,  with  respect  to  natural  things,  is  such,  that 
we  cannot  go  on  a  single  step,  except  as  facts  and 
experiments  lead  us  by  the  hand ;  and,  that  as  this 
ignorance  is  the  proper  answer  to  presumptions  and 
difficulties,  derived  from  our  opinion  of  things  before- 
hand, so  is  this  much  more  the  case  in  religion,  where 
we  find  only  the  same  kind  of  difficulties  which  meet 
us  perpetually  in  the  works  of  the  same  hantl  in  the 
course  of  nature.  So  that,  in  short,  he  that  rejects 
Christianity,  on  account  of  these  difficulties,  may  for  the 
very  same  reason,  deny  the  world  to  have  been  formed 
by  an  intelligent  Creator.  Thus  all  objections  against 
the  Scriptures,  drawn  from  what  is  similar  or  analogous 
in  the  order  of  the  world,  which  is  acknowledged  by 
the  objector  himself  to  proceed  from  an  Almighty 
Governor,  are  satisfactorily  silenced;  and  the  mind, 
freed  from   harassing  and  frivolous    objections,  is   at 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  389 

liberty  to  weigh  impartially  the  direct  proof  of  Chris- 
tianity, and  then  to  seek  the  best  confirmation  of  a 
wavering  faith,  in  its  salutary  effects  in  pardoning  guilt, 
tranquillizing  conscience,  sutjduing  pride,  regulating  the 
affections  and  appetites,  and  changing  the  whole 
character  from  that  of  a  discontented,  captious,  selfish, 
creature,  to  that  of  a  patient,  docile,  thankful,  benevo- 
lent one. 

Thus  all  the  several  branches  of  the  Evidences  of 
Christianity  are  ultimately  studied,  though  not  in  the 
order  which  the  strict  rules  of  the  case  would  lay 
down.  The  great  object  is  gained  if  the  unbeliever  is 
convinced:  but  if,  on  the  contrary,  he  refuses  to  listen 
to  our  argument  from  analogy,  or  professes  himself  dis- 
satisfied with  it,  we  are  still  at  liberty  to  remind  him, 
that  the  only  proofs  which  he  can  claim  in  the  first 
instance,  are  the  direct  and  proper  credentials  of 
miracles  and  prophecy,  and  other  External  Evidences ; 
and  that  this  paramount  duty  is  to  submit  to  the  reve- 
lation thus  attested,  and  not  yield  to  objections  and 
difficulties  resting  on  mere  conceptions  and  opinions. 

But  the  use  and  importance  of  the  argument  from 
analogy  may  be  frequently  observed  in  the  case  of  the 
sincere  Christian.  How  often  is  the  thoughtful  believer 
harassed  by  objections.  The  best  men  are  still  weak 
and  defective  ;  and  notwithstanding  the  clearest  deduc- 
tions of  reason,  and  the  avowed  subjection  of  the  heart 
to  the  Gospel,  doubts,  and  embarrassments,  and  appre- 
hensions, will  haunt  the  mind.  There  are  few  who 
have  not  felt  this.  The  imagination  roves  on  forbidden 
topics — thoughts  the  most  unwelcome  intrude — argu- 
ments fail  to  satisfy — exploded  objections  recur.  Espe- 
cially if  circumstances  require  a  Christian  to  treat  with 
infidels,  and  examine  and  refute  their  arguments,  the 
infirmity  of  his  faith  will  sometimes  be  an  occasion 
of  surprise  and  distress  to  him.  In  such  seasons,  no 
source  of  relief  is  more  plenteous  than  that  springing 
from  the  clear  and  striking  similarity  between  the 
objections  raised  against  revelation,  and  those  which 
may  be  raised  against  the  government  and  order 
of  God  in  natural  providence.     When  the  External 


390  WILSON'S    ANALOGY. 

and  Internal  Evidences  of  Christianity  seem  cold,  and 
ineffective,  and  barren,  the  Analogical  precisely  meet 
his  feelings.  The  full  and  adequate  repose  which  they 
inspire,'  is  a  calm  after  a  storm.  The  relief  is  more 
sensible  from  being  unexpected.  For,  somehow  or 
other,  the  mind,  at  times,  appears  quite  hedged  in  with 
fears  and  specidations.  The  state  of  misery  in  which 
the  world  lies — the  prevalence  of  moral  evil — the 
immense  majority  of  the  human  race,  sunk  in  Pagan 
ignorance — the  trials  of  good  men — the  prosperity  of  the 
wicked — the  slow  progress  of  truth  and  reason ;  these, 
and  a  thousand  like  matters,  perplex,  too  frequently, 
the  benevolent  and  reflecting  mind  of  the  Christian. 
He  is  quite  astonished  that  an  all-vvise  and  all-gracious 
Creator  should  leave  a  revelation  with  so  little  efficacy 
attending  it.  He  thinks  that  he  can  never  obtain  satis- 
faction upon  these  questions.  He  has  forgotten  the 
arguments  which  formerly  silenced  his  scruples,  and  his 
faith  is  ready  to  fail  him.  The  analogical  argument 
then  occurs  to  his  distracted  thoughts — he  reads  it  as  if 
he  had  never  read  it  before — it  seems  new,  forcible, 
conclusive — his  proud  reasonings  sink — faith  resumes 
her  sw^ay — humility  acknowledges  the  ignorance  and 
littleness  of  man,  before  the  incomprehensible  plans  of 
the  infinite  God — his  state  of  probation  and  discipline, 
forces  itself  upon  his  notice — the  traces  of  the  same 
divine  Governor,  in  the  natural  and  moral  world,  are 
again  seen  and  recognized — and  the  satisfaction  he 
thus  regains  is  more  than  can  be  expressed.  In 
proportion  as  the  difficulties  appeared  insuperable,  is 
the  removal  of  them  consoling  and  vivifying. 

There  is  this  further  to  be  noticed,  as  to  the  impor- 
tance of  the  ai-gument  from  analogy,  that  it  is  capable 
of  indefinite  ramification.  The  fruitfulness  of  it  is 
such,  that  each  Christian,  throughout  the  whole  course 
of  life,  may  multiply  his  observations  without  exhaust- 
ing the  inquiry.  There  is  an  inherent  freshness  and 
life  in  it,  which  makes  it  always  new  and  interesting. 

Indeed,  we  must  observe,  before  we  quit  this  topic, 
that  the  variety  of  the  Christian  argument  generally, 
is  one  striking  confirmation  of  its  truth.    The  evidences 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  391 

for  revelation  may  be  truly  said  to  be  diversified,  and 
extensive  beyond  any  thing  that  could  have  been 
conceived,  we  do  not  say,  on  a  like  subject,  but  on  any 
subject  whatever.  If  a  man  were  allowed  to  point  out 
beforehand,  the  proofs  of  a  divine  religion  to  be  ad- 
dressed to  a  reasonable  and  accountable  being,  lie 
could  not  name  any  different  in  kind  from  those  whicJi 
we  possess.  For  what  could  a  man  demand,  but  either 
the  conspicuous  display  of  a  clearly  miraculous  power 
in  attestation  of  it,  or  the  incontrovertible  fulfilment  of 
prophecy — or  the  triumplmnt  and  supernatural  spread 
of  the  doctrine  itself — or  the  visible  and  mighty  effects 
on  all  who  receive  it  ?  And  where  the  revelation  is 
admitted  and  obeyed,  what  internal  confirmation  of  its 
truth  could  he  desire,  beyond  tlie  adaptation  of  it  to  the 
state  and  wants  of  man — the  purity  and  sublimity  of 
its  doctrines  and  precepts — the  untainted  benevolence 
of  its  founder — the  attendant  influence  of  grace — and 
the  actual  accomplishment  of  its  promises  to  all  who 
apply  duly  for  them  ?  And  if  objections  be  afterwards 
raised  against  this  scheme,  what  could  he  wish  further, 
than  to  see  them  extinguished  by  considerations  de- 
rived from  the  ignorance  of  man,  and  tlie  incomprehen- 
sibility of  God  ?  In  this  diversity  of  proof  all  the 
attributes  of  the  Almighty  are  pledged,  as  it  were, 
to  the  sincere  believer.  The  miracles  give  him  the 
pledge  of  the  sovereign  power  of  God — the  prophecies, 
of  his  Omniscience — the  supernatural  propagation  of 
the  Gospel,  of  his  supreme  providence — the  effects 
produced,  of  his  fidelity — the  adaptation  to  the  state 
of  man,  of  his  wisdom — the  purity  of  the  doctrine  and 
morals,  of  his  holiness — the  character  of  Christ,  of  his 
condescension — the  accompanying  influence,  of  his 
grace  and  goodness — the  fulfilment  of  the  promises,  of 
his  A^eracity.  Thus  the  evidences  of  Christianity  have 
an  impression  of  the  divine  glory  irradiating  them.* 

But  it  is  not  merely  the  diversity  of  these  topics,  but 
the  DISSIMILARITY  of  them   from  each  other,  which 

*We  are  indebted  for  some  thoughts  in  this  part  of  the  Essay,  to  Mr. 
Davidson's  admirable  Warburtonian  Lectures — a  work  of  deep  research,  and  full 
of  fine  reflectious  ;  especially  on  the  structure  of  prophecy. 


C92  TVILSON'S    ANALOGY. 

gives  tiiein  ilicir  inconipamble  weight.  Tliey  are  not 
all  of  a  kind.  The  impostor  who  could  be  imagined 
to  feign  one  brancli  of  them,  would  be  incapacitated 
by  that  very  attempt  from  feigning  the  rest.  They 
would  each  demand  a  separate  scheme,  distinct  powers, 
a  new  reach  of  intellect,  different  combinations.  The 
independence  of  these  different  evidences  upon  each 
other,  indescribably  augments  their  force.  In  fact,  the 
annals  of  mankind  never  exhibited  such  a  religion  as 
Christianity  surrounded  with  her  credentials,  nor  any 
thino-  like  it.  The  svstems  of  Heathenism  and  Mahom- 
medanism  reflect  a  glory  on  revelation  by  the  contrast 
which  they  exhibit  in  these  respects,  as  well  iis  iti 
every  other. 

And  yet  the  simplicity  of  these  different  evidences 
of  our  religion  is  as  remarkable  as  their  number  and 
diversity.  For  they  are  level  to  every  understanding. 
They  address  themselves  to  the  faculty  of  judgment 
with  ^^diich  we  are  endowed.  The  reader  of  history, 
the  student  of  nature,  the  scholar,  the  contemplative 
philosopher,  the  uneducated  incpiirer,  the  candid  mind 
of  every  class,  may  fmd  obvious  and  satisfactory  proofs 
adapted  to  his  habits  and  capacities,  if  there  is  no 
bad  faith,  every  one  that  investigates  this  great  ques- 
tion, will  hnd  the  satisflictioii  he  seeks  for. 

We  only  observe,  further,  that  the  proper  force  and 
strength  of  these  evidences,  lies  in  the  union  of  all  the 
parts  of  the  argument.  This  Bishop  Butler  has  pointed 
out,  chiefly  in  respect  of  the  analogical  argument ;  but 
it  is  important  to  be  applied  to  the  entire  subject. 
One  point  may  more  forcibly  strike  the  conviction  of 
one  inquirer,  and  another  point  of  another ;  a  separate 
argument  may  be  weakly  stated  by  the  Christian 
advocate;  mistakes  may  be  made  in  deducing  a  par- 
ticular historical  proof,  or  alleging  a  particular  fact. 
But  the  cause  of  Christianity  does  not  rest  on  any  one 
division  of  the  subject,  but  on  the  whole.  Each  separate 
branch  is,  indeed,  firm  enough  to  sustain  the  entire 
edifice ;  but  we  are  not  allowed  to  let  it  rest  there. 
We  must  remind  the  sincere  inquirer  that  it  is  the 
combined  effect  of  the  various  topics,  which  he  is  called 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  393 

on  to  observe.  And  if  this  be  done,  we  fear  not  to 
assert  that  no  such  inquirer  shall  fail  of  all  the  satis- 
faction which  a  moral  certainty  can  produce.  The 
infidel  attacks  Christianity  generally  on  some  single 
isolated  point  of  evidence ;  and  if  he  can  contrive  to 
obscure  the  brightness  of  this,  triumphs  as  if  he  had 
proved  the  religion  to  be  fictitious.  And  not  only  so, 
but  if  he  can  onlv  raise  a  doubt  about  the  truth  of  this 
single,  and  perhaps  subordinate  point,  he  turns  this 
doubt  into  what  he  calls  a  positive  argument  against 
Christianity.  But  this  is  unfair  and  disingenuous. 
Christianity  reposes  on  the  entire  structure  of  her 
evidences — a  structure  which  has  never,  as  yet,  been 
fairly  assailed,  much  less  weakened  or  destroyed  ;  and 
which  rears  its  front  in  undiminished  stability  and 
g]ory,  mocking  at  its  feeble  and  discomfited  opponents. 

Having  thus  given  a  view  of  the  connexion  of  the 
Analogical  argument,  with  the  other  branches  of  the 
Christian  evidence,  and  of  its  particular  use  and  impor- 
tance, we  now  proceed,  2dly,  To  offer  some  remarks  on 
Butler's  particular  view  of  Christianitij ,  and  on  the 
adaptation  of  his  argument  to  practical  religion  in  all  its 
extent. 

For  the  reader  will  have  observed,  that  the  great 
argument  of  the  analogy  is  designed  rather  to  silence 
objections,  than  to  expound  or  defend  the  minute  and 
interior  topics  of  Christianity,  on  which  the  life  and 
influence  of  piety,  as  a  practical  principle,  very  much 
depend.  Indeed  the  end  of  all  treatises  on  the  Evi- 
dences of  religion,  must  be  the  establishment  of  the 
truth  of  it  generally,  and  not  the  particular  develop- 
ment of  its  parts.  Such  treatises  meet  the  unbeliever, 
as  much  as  possible  on  his  own  ground,  and  attempt  to 
gain  his  assent  to  the  credentials  of  the  divine  doctrine, 
leaving  the  details  of  that  doctrine  to  the  ordinary 
teachers  of  Christianity,  or  the  various  practical  works, 
which  treat  professedly  of  them.  The  general  features, 
therefore,  of  the  Christian  religion  are  all  that  it  falls 
within  the  province  of  the  writer  on  Evidences  to 
delineate  fully ;  taking  care  that  his  allusions  to  the 
inward  grace  and  power  of  it  be  calculated  to  lead  the 


394  WILSON'S    ANALOGY. 

reader  on  to  ade([uate  views  of  the  whole.  These 
features  Bisliop  Butler  has  seized  with  a  master's  eye. 
The  moral  goverunieut  of  God  by  rewards  and  punish- 
ments, the  state  of  discipline  which  this  world  is  for  a 
future  one;  the  corruption  of  man,  the  guilt  of  sin,  the 
mediation  of  Christ,  the  propitiatory  Sacrifice  of  his 
death,  and  his  invisible  government  of  his  church ;  the 
assistance  and  grace  of  the  Holy  Spirit ;  the  second 
advent  of  our  Lord  to  judgment ;  the  seriousness  of 
mind  which  the  subject  of  religion  demands — these 
commanding  truths  are  the  first  elements  and  charac- 
teristics of  Christianity,  and  are  nobly  defended  and 
cleared  from  objections  by  our  Author. 

At  the  same  time,  it  cannot,  and  need  not  be  con- 
cealed, that  the  occasional  hints  which  fall  from  him, 
on  the  particular  grace  of  the  Christian  religion,  and  its 
operation  on  the  heart,  are  far  from  being  so  explicit. 
His  references  to  the  precise  nature  of  our  justification 
before  God — to  the  extent  of  the  fall  and  ruin  of  man 
by  sin — to  the  work  of  the  Holy  Spirit  in  regeneration 
and  sanctifi cation — and  to  the  consolatory,  cheering, 
vivifying  effects  of  peace  of  conscience,  and  commu- 
nion with  God,  and  hope  of  rest  and  joy  in  heaven,  do 
not  correspond  with  the  largeness  of  the  case.  They 
are  partial  and  defective.  They  might  and  should  have 
embraced,  incidentally  at  least,  some  intimations  of  the 
peculiar  structure  and  design  of  spiritual  religion.  The 
powerful  argument  in  hand  should  at  times  have  been 
carried  out  to  its  consequences.  The  inexperienced 
theological  student  would  not  then  have  been  in 
danger  of  drawing  erroneous  conclusions,  on  some  prac- 
tical points  of  great  importance. 

It  is  therefore  to  guard  the  youtliful  reader  from  error 
as  to  the  nature  of  practical  Christianity,  that  the  fol- 
lowing reflections  are  offered,  some  of  which  will  only 
go  to  explain  what  may  be  misapprehended  in  our 
Author's  language  and  argument;  others  will  attempt 
to  suggest  some  additional  thoughts  on  topics  which 
may  appear  deficient.  Some  notice  will  then  be  taken 
of  the  easy  adaptation  of  his  argument  to  the  .practice 
and  experience  of  religion  in  all  its  extent. 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  395 

1.  Let  us  first  suggest  a  hint  on  the  'nature  and  impor- 
tance of  Natural  Religion  as  stated  by  Bisho]?  Butler. 
Various  mistakes  have  arisen,  both  as  to  what  is  meant 
by  this  term,  and  as  to  its  efficacy,  independently  of 
Christianity.  Nor  have  there  been  wanting  those  who 
have  denied  altogether  its  existence,  and  its  subser- 
viency to  the  Christian  doctrine. 

By  Natural  Religion,  Bishop  Butler  understands 
religion  generally,  as  distinguished  from  those  modifi- 
cations of  it  which  revelation  superinduced.  Natural 
Religion  is  that  service,  and  those  religious  regards  to 
Almighty  God,  which  men  owe  to  Him,  as  their 
Creator  and  Benefactor,  and  which  arise  out  of  the 
relations  in  which  they  stand  to  Him,  as  the  rational 
and  accountable  beings  whom  he  formed  for  his  glory, 
and  governs  by  his  law.  These  primitive  obligations 
may  plainly  be  distinguished  from  Christianity,  Avhich 
is  an  additional  dispensation,  revealing  the  divine  and 
stupendous  scheme  of  the  recovery  of  man  from  his 
state  of  ruin  and  guilt,  by  the  Son  and  Spirit  of  God. 
Indeed  Natural  Religion  is,  properly  speaking,  distinct 
from  those  anticipations  of  the  Christian  redemption, 
wdiich  the  early  revelations  to  our  first  parents,  to  the 
patriarchs  and  to  the  Jewish  people  comprised.  The 
traditions,  it  is  true,  of  these  early  revelations,  mingled 
with  the  faint  traces  of  man's  moral  nature  which  have 
survived  the  fall,  constitute  the  religion  of  nature,  as 
now  seen  in  the  various  heathen  nations,  where  the 
bright  light  of  the  last  revelation,  the  Christian,  has 
not  reached.  But  Butler,  usually  restrains  the  meaning 
of  the  term  to  the  doctrine  of  a  future  state,  where 
every  one  shall  be  rewarded  or  punished  according  to 
his  deserts ;  and  to  those  duties  which  man  owes  to 
God,  as  his  moral  and  righteous  Creator  and  Governor. 

This  religion  was  originally  impressed  on  the  heart 
of  man,  as  "  created  in  righteousness  and  true  hohness," 
and  consists  of  those  habits  and  acts  of  subjection, 
obedience,  reverence,  love,  adoration,  gratitude,  trust, 
prayer,  communion,  resignation,  and  praise,  which  an 
upright,  but  finite  and  dependant  being,  owed  to  its 
Sovereign  and  its  Benefactor,  and  the  reward  conse- 


396  WILSON'S    ANALOGY. 

quent  on  which  was  to  be  eternal  life.  This  divine 
impression  on  the  heart  was  eilliced  by  the  fall ;  and 
now  these  habits  and  affections  are  only  to  be  acquired 
by  the  li^ht  and  grace  of  Christianity.  It  is  this  reve- 
lation which  has  repaired  the  ruins  of  the  fall,  brought 
in  a  remedy  for  the  apostacy  and  wickedness  of  man- 
kind, restored  the  enfeebled,  and  almost  extinguished 
powers  of  natural  religion,  added  surprising  discoveries 
of  divine  wisdom  and  mercy,  in  the  sacrifice  of  the 
Son  of  God,  and  the  mission  of  the  Holy  Spirit, 
enjoined  important  correspondent  duties  and  obliga- 
tions ;  and  thus  modified  the  original  scheme  of  reli- 
gion by  these  new  characteristics. 

It  is,  therefore,  very  fair  for  a  Christian  writer,  like 
our  Bishop,  to  distinguish,  in  his  course  of  reasoning, 
the  two  series  of  habits  and  feelings  ;  those  which  con- 
stitute religion  as  springing  from  our  relation  to  God, 
as  our  heavenly  Creator  and  Lord,  and  those  which 
constitute  religion,  as  springing  from  our  relation  to 
Christ,  as  our  Mediator,  and  to  the  Holy  Spirit,  as  our 
Sanctifier,  and  to  our  heavenly  Father,  as  being  the 
Father  of  mercies,  and  the  God  of  all  consolation.  It 
is  thus  the  apostle  Paul  speaks  of  the  Gentiles,  which 
*'  have  not  the  law,  being  a  law  unto  themselves,  which 
show  the  work  of  the  law  written  in  their  hearts."  It 
is  thus  the  same  apostle  expounds  the  chief  truths  to 
be  learned  from  the  law,  to  be  "  God's  eternal  power 
and  Godhead,  wdiich  might  be  clearly  seen  by  the 
things  which  were  made ;"  and  charges  the  heathens 
with  "  not  liking  to  retain  God  in  their  knowledge," 
and  with  "  becoming  fools,  while  professing  themselves 
to  be  wise  ;"  and,  indeed,  with  committing,  and  glory- 
ing in  those  vices,  and  crimes,  and  passions,  which 
"  they  knew  were,  by  the  judgment  of  God,  worthy  of 
death."  The  same  apostle's  argument  at  Athens,  and 
his  discourse  to  the  Lacaonians,  proceed  on  this  suppo- 
sition, that  there  was  such  a  thing  as  the  light  and  reli- 
gion of  nature,  independently,  not  of  revelation,  in  the 
first  instance,  but  of  the  Christian,  or  last  revelation  by 
the  Gospel. 

Accordingly,  in  the  present  age,  as  well  as  in  all  pre- 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  397 

ceclini^  ones,  the  vestiges  of  natural  conscience  may  be 
traced,  however  corrupted.  Some  notion  of  a  Supreme 
Being,  and  of  worship  being  due  to  him — some  glim- 
merinos  of  the  doctrine  of  a  future  state — some  idea  of 
the  efficacv  of  sacrifices — some  acknowledgment  of  the 
obligations  of  veracity  and  justice — some  remains,  in 
short,  of  a  moral  sense,  are  discovered,  in  greater  or 
less  force,  amidst  the  scattered  fragments  of  the  Pagan 
superstitions.  There  is  every  where  in  man,  the  capa- 
city of  being  restored  to  all  that  Christianity  designs 
and  promises. 

All  this  is  clear  and  unembarrassed  ground.  The 
disputed  territory  lies  beyond.  For  when  we  come  to 
inquire,  whether  men,  since  the  fall,  ever  discovered 
these  natural  truths  originally,  or  regained  them  when 
lost,  or  acted  upon  them  efficiently  in  their  conduct,  we 
have  a  host  of  assailants  to  contend  with.  And  yet, 
vSurely,  no  doubt  can  be  fairly  said  to  rest  on  these 
questions.  All  experience  declares,  that  natural  reli- 
gion, unless  illuminated  and  guided  by  the  light  of 
Christianity,  is  impotent  and  helpless.  All  experience 
declares,  that  men,  destitute  of  Christianity,  grow 
worse  and  worse.  No  example  has  been  ever  pro- 
duced, either  of  a  Pagan  nation  acting  up  to  the  scat- 
tered notices  of  religion  which  it  possessed,  or  recover- 
ing the  purity  of  it  when  once  lost  by  the  lapse  of  time, 
or  the  progress  of  vice.  And  the  high  probability  is, 
setting  aside,  for  the  sake  of  argument,  the  testimony 
of  Scripture,  that  the  flint  light  which  nature  possesses, 
was  an  irradiation  from  the  first  revelation  of  God  to 
man. 

Butler  is  decidedly  of  opinion  that  this  is  the  case. 
He  says,  "  As  there  is  no  hint  or  intimation  in  history, 
that  this  system  (of  iiutural  religion)  was  first  reasoned 
out ;  so  there  is  express  historical,  or  traditional  evi- 
dence as  ancient  as  history,  that  it  was  taught  first  by 
revelation."  He  seems  likewise,  to  hold  strongly,  that 
such  faint  traces  of  this  original  revelation  as  remain, 
aided  by  the  fragments  of  man's  moral  nature,  are  so 
inefficient,  from  the  want  of  essential  parts,  from  the 
absence  of  authority  and  sanction,  and  from  the  inter- 


398  WILSON'S    ANALOGY. 

mixture  of  gross  errors  and  idolatries,,  as  rather  to 
strengthen  than  curb,  much  less  subdue,  tlie  passions 
and  vices  of  mankind.  Those  relics  of  truth,  therefore, 
being  thus  impotent  of  themselves,  and  being  unac- 
companied by  any  assurance  of  pardon,  or  any  promises 
of  grace  and  assistance,  only  demonstrate,  in  every 
age,  and  in  every  quarter  of  the  world,  by  the  state  in 
vrhich  they  leave  men,  the  indispensable  necessity  and 
infinite  importance  of  Christianity. 

On  the  whole,  there  appears  no  objection  to  the  term 
Natural  Religion  in  the  sense  explained.  Whether 
any  better,  and  more  distinctive  expression  could 
have  been  devised  to  convey  the  idea  of  essential  and 
primitive  religion,  as  different  from  revealed  and  super- 
induced religion,  is  scarcely  worth  the  inquiry.  The 
use  of  the  present  term  has  prevailed ;  and  it  needs 
only  to  be  employed  aright,  in  order  to  stand  free  from 
just  exception. 

Natural  religion,  in  subserviency  to  Christianity,  is 
of  great  importance.  It  is  everywhere  taken  for 
granted  in  Scripture,  and  confirmed  and  strengthened 
by  the  manner  in  which  truth  is  addressed  to  man. 
All  the  evidences  of  revealed  religion  appeal  to  our 
moral  nature,  and  meet  precisely  the  faculty  of  judging 
which  we  still  possess  ;  and  would  have  no  medium  of 
proof — and,  therefore,  no  authority  to  convince — if  this 
moral  sense  should  be  denied.  Moreover,  it  becomes 
yet  more  important,  in  proportion  as  the  light  of  Chris- 
tianity, diffused  around  it,  illuminates,  in  some  faint 
degree,  its  grosser  darkness,  and  dispels  its  baser  cor- 
ruptions and  superstitions.  In  Christian  countries,  men 
wdio  reject  Christianity  insensibly  repair  the  decayed 
and  dilapidated  temple  of  nature  with  the  materials 
which  it  supplies.  And  it  is  with  natural  religion,  in 
this  form,  that  we  have  chiefly  to  treat  in  this  country. 
It  then  serves  to  show  men,  that  their  consciences  are 
bound,  not  only  by  the  law  of  Christianity  which  they 
spurn  and  reject,  but  by  the  law  of  nature,  of  which 
they  cannot  divest  themselves ;  not  only  by  the  infinite 
benefits  and  stupendous  discoveries  of  the  revelation  of 
the  Gospel,  to  which  they  ought  to  bow,  but  by  the 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  399 

truths  impre.ssed  originally  on  the  nature  of  man,  and 
sanctioned  and  enlarged  in  the  primitive  revelations  of 
the  Creator  to  him — revelations,  of  which  every  glim- 
mering ray  of  knowledge,  every  feeble  emotion  of  con- 
science, every  remaining  barrier  between  virtue  and 
vice,  every  impression  of  the  responsibility  of  man, 
every  anticipation  of  future  judgment,  every  relic  and 
trace  of  an  immortal  and  accountable  spirit,  are  proofs 
and  consequences.  Thus  men  are  reminded,  that  they 
do  not  escape  from  moral  government  by  rejecting 
Christianity,  but  fall  back  on  a  ruined  and  unaided 
principle,  which  leaves  them  just  as  responsible  to  God, 
the  Creator  and  Judge,  as  before — only  with  the  accu- 
mulated guilt  of  having  spurned  the  only  way  of  pardon 
and  grace  which  the  infinite  mercy  of  God  had  provided 
for  them. 

The  consideration  of  natural  religion  is  also  valuable, 
as  it  points  out  the  grounds  of  those  exhortations, 
warnings,  reproofs,  invitations,  and  commands  which 
constitute  so  very  large  a  proportion  of  the  whole 
Scriptures,  and  on  which  revealed  religion  proceeds, 
and  by  which  it  works.  The  duty  of  man  remains  un- 
altered, notwithstanding  his  sinfulness  and  moral  impo- 
tency ;  his  capacity  of  receiving  instruction,  and  being 
the  subject  of  persuasion  and  alarm  remains  the  same, 
though  he  has  liilien  from  his  original  rectitude;  his 
guilt  in  rejecting  the  invitations  of  mercy,  and  the 
remonstrances  of  conscience,  remain  undiminished, 
though  his  power  of  complying  with  them  must  be 
sought  for  from  above.  Further,  the  use  of  all  the 
means  of  grace  as  adapted  to  his  reasonable  and  moral 
nature — the  exhibition  and  application  of  all  the  terrors 
of  the  law,  and  of  ail  the  grace  of  the  Gospel,  as  the 
proper  object  of  his  aflfections,  together  with  the  earn- 
estness and  importunity  with  which  these  topics  should 
be  enforced — all  rest  on  the  plain  footing,  that  some 
remains  of  feeling,  and  conscience,  and  light,  rest  with 
man,  by  which  it  pleases  God  to  work  in  the  dispen- 
sation of  his  Spirit. 

Nor  is  the  religion  of  nature  less  important,  as  fixing, 
in  some  measure,  the  ends,  and  guiding  the  course,  of 


400  WILSON'S    ANALOGY. 

that  which  is  revealed.  All  the  chief  ahiises  of  the 
scheme  of  grace  in  the  Gospel  would  be  guarded 
against,  if  not  excluded,  if  natural  religion  were  allowed 
its  subordinate  influence.  Such  abuses  spring  from  the 
desire,  often  laudable  in  its  apparent  object,  of  carrying 
the  doctrines  of  the  Gospel  to  their  full  measure,  and 
applying  them  to  the  heart  in  their  exuberant  consola- 
tion. Hence  men  come  first  to  deny  natural  religion — 
then  to  object  to  the  practical  exhortations  of  the 
Gospel;  next  to  assert,  that  the  state  of  death  in 
trespasses  and  sins  in  which  men  lie,  makes  all  pre- 
cepts contradictory,  and  all  warnings  fruitless;  and, 
lastly,  to  spurn  the  authority  and  obligation  of  the 
moral  law  of  God,  aud  reject  all  the  doctrines  of  Chris- 
tian morals  and  Christian  obedience.  Thus  an  opening- 
is  made,  insensibly,  to  the  worst  abuses  of  the  Divine 
mercy  and  grace — abuses  which  a  more  implicit  regard 
to  the  Scriptures,  on  the  subject  of  the  essential  nature 
of  religion,  would  have  prevented.  The  end  of  Chris- 
tianity is  to  make  us  holy — to  bring  us  back  to  the  purity 
from  Avhich  we  fell — to  make  natural  religion  practica- 
ble, possible,  delightful ;  to  infuse  into  it  the  humility 
which  becomes  a  fallen  condition — the  faith  in  an  atone- 
ment Avhich  the  sacrifice  of  the  cross  demands — the 
gratitude  and  love  Avhich  the  benefits  of  that  cross 
require — the  dependance  on  the  blessed  Spirit  which 
our  feebleness  makes  indispensable — the  joy  which  the 
hope  of  heaven  warrants  and  bestows.  Thus  Chris- 
tianity modifies,  indeed,  the  essential  religion  first 
taught  in  the  original  revelation  to  man,  and  impressed 
on  his  heart ;  but  never  contradicts  it — never  swerves 
from  the  same  end — never  releases  from  its  main  obli- 
gations— never  violates  its  primary  principles  and 
dictates.  Man  is  only  bound  more  strongly,  by  all  the 
benefits  of  Christianity  to  the  obedience  Avliich  he  was, 
by  nature,  formed  and  designed  to  render  to  his  God ; 
and  the  moment  he  views  those  benefits  in  a  manner  to 
loosen,  instead  of  confirming,  the  bonds  of  this  obedi- 
ence, he  may  conclude  he  is  mistaking  the  whole  end 
and  object  of  the  Christian  revelation. 

2.  But  this  leads  us  to  make  an  observation  on  some 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  401 

of  our  great  Author's  expressions  and  sentiments,  on  the 
remains  of  Natural  Religion,  and  on  the  grounds  of  our 
justification  and  acceptance  ivith  God,  which  seem  open  to 
exception.  For  whilst  we  thus  claim  for  natural  reli- 
gion, what  the  Scriptures  clearly  imply,  or  rather  incul- 
cate, and  defend  Butler  on  this  point,  we  must  cautiously 
avoid  the  dangerous  error  of  attributing  to  it  a  power, 
which,  in  the  fallen  state  of  man,  it  does  not  and  cannot 
possess,  and  which  may  militate  against  what  the  same 
Scriptures  teach  of  the  extent  of  man's  depravity,  and 
the  necessity  of  divine  grace,  in  order  to  his  doing  any 
thing  spiritually  good.  And,  therefore,  the  language 
which  occurs  in  some  parts  of  the  Analogy,  on  the 
nature  and  powers  of  man,  may  appear  to  be  too 
strong,  too  general,  too  unqualified.  We  speak  here 
with  hesitation,  because,  considering  the  line  of  argu- 
ment pursued  by  this  most  able  writer,  and  the  class 
of  persons  he  addressed,  it  may  be  doubted  whether 
this  remark  is  applicable  in  fairness  or  not.  Still  we 
cannot  but  think,  that  he  sometimes  attributes  too 
much  to  the  unaided  nature  of  man,  allows  too  much  to 
his  moral  sense  and  feeling,  dwells  too  largely  on  his 
tendencies  to  virtue  and  goodness,  and  speaks  too 
ambiguously  on  the  ground  of  his  justification  before 
God.  Such  expressions  as  the  following,  considering 
the  connexion  in  which  they  stand,  are  open  to  abuse  : 
"  Moral  nature  given  us  by  God  " — "  falling  in  with  our 
natural  apprehension  and  sense  of  things  " — "  There  is 
nothing  in  the  human  mind  contradictory  to  virtue  " — 
*'  The  moral  law  is  interwoven  in  our  nature  " — "  Men 
may  curb  their  passions  for  temporal  motives  in  as  great 
a  degree  as  piety  commonly  requires  " — "  Natural  reli- 
gion is  the  foundation  and  principal  part  of  Chris- 
tianity"— "Men's  happiness  and  virtue  are  left  to 
themselves,  are  put  in  their  own  power  " — "  Religion 
requires  nothing  which  men  are  not  well  able  to  per- 
form " — "  The  relation  in  which  we  stand  to  God  the 
Father,  is  made  known  to  us  by  reason."  Such  lan- 
guage continually  occurring,  together  with  the  terms, 
"virtue,  vice,  honest  man,  satisfaction  of  virtue,  vicioiLS- 
ness  of  the  world,"  &c.  (instead  of  the  scriptural  terms, 
26 


402  WILSON'S    ANALOGY, 

"holiness,  sin,  renewed  man,  peace  of  conscience, 
corruption  and  wickedness  of  the  Avorld,")  may  have 
the  tendency  to  exalt  too  highly  the  present  fiillen  and 
corrupted  powers  of  man,  and  prevent  that  deep  and 
thorough  humiliation  which  are  necessary  to  a  due 
appreciation  and  reception  of  the  grace  of  the  gospel. 
They  tend  also  to  lessen  the  guilt  of  man  hefore  God, 
and  lower  the  standard  of  that  holiness  which  the  Chris- 
tian doctrine  requires  and  produces.  Some  most 
excellent  observations  and  statements  are  indeed  made, 
in  the  course  of  the  work,  on  the  mediation  of  Christ, 
and  the  influences  of  the  Spirit,  which  go  to  correct 
the  misapprehension  to  which  I  am  referring ;  but  these 
parts  of  the  work  bear  but  a  small  proportion  to  the 
whole  treatise;  whereas  the  expressions  in  question 
occur  perpetually,  and  in  every  variety  of  form,  and 
under  each  division  of  the  argiunent.  They  form 
the  staple,  and  enter  into  the  contexture,  and  give 
the  colour,  to  the  entire  fabric.  And  thence  arises 
the  danger  which  we  venture  to  point  out.  We  do 
not  dwell  here  on  the  fact,  that  this  light  of  nature  is 
in  Christian  countries  reflected  from  Christianity,  and 
is  never  found  where  Christianity  is  unknown.  Nor 
do  we  stop  to  suggest,  that  natural  religion,  in  its  best 
and  oldest  times,  confessed  its  weakness,  and  sought 
for  help  and  aid.  We  are  content  to  take  things  in 
their  most  favourable  construction ;  and  we  still  profess 
our  conviction,  that  all  language  is  reprehensible, 
which,  by  fair  inference,  leads  men  to  think  they  can 
repent,  and  turn  from  sin  to  God,  without  his  special 
and  effectual  grace.  And  in  this  view,  we  would 
caution  the  student  against  affixing  too  strong  a  sense 
to  the  expressions  which  we  have  cited. 

In  connexion  with  this  remark,  we  must  unequivo- 
cally declare  our  apprehension,  that  the  language  used 
by  our  Author,  in  speaking  of  the  Almighty  finally  ren- 
dering to  every  one  according  to  his  works,  and  estab- 
lishing the  entire  rights  of  distributive  justice,  is  open 
to  objection.  Perhaps,  if  taken  alone,  it  might  admit 
of  a  favourable  interpretation;  but,  when  joined  with 
the  overstatements  already  noticed,  on  the  powers  of 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.,  403 

man  and  the  remains  of  natural  religion,  it  becomes 
decidedly  dangerous.  Tlie  great  doctrine  of  our  justi- 
fication before  God,  "not  by  our  own  works  and  de- 
servings,  but  only  for  the  merits  of  our  Lord  Jesus 
Christ,"  is  too  fundamental,  and  too  important,  to  be 
undermined,  even  incidentally.  We  refer  to  such  ex- 
pressions as  the  following  :  "The  advantages  of  Christi- 
anity will  be  bestowed  upon  every  one,  in  proportion 
to  the  degrees  of  his  virtue  " — "  Divine  goodness  may  be 
a  disposition  to  make  the  good,  the  faithful,  the  honest 
man  happy" — "  We  have  scope  and  opportunities  here, 
for  that  good  and  bad  behaviour  which  God  will  reward 
and  punish  hereafter  " — "Religion  teaches  us,  that  we 
are  placed  here,  to  qualify  us,  by  the  practice  of  virtue, 
for  another  state  which  is  to  follow  it  " — "  Our  repent- 
ance is  accepted  to  eternal  life."  These,  and  similar 
statements,  occur  throughout  the  w  ork.  In  the  second 
part,  where  the  leading  features  of  revealed  religion 
are  delineated,  they  ought,  by  all  means,  to  have  been 
accompanied  with  those  modiiications  which  the  super- 
induced scheme  of  the  gospel,  and  the  necessities  of 
man,  and  the  glory  of  the  cross  of  Christ,  and  the  ends 
of  self-knowledge  and  humility  require.  We  say  they 
should  have  been  accompanied  by  such  modiiications, 
because  they  are  so  accompanied  in  the  Holy  Scriptures. 
The  doctrine,  that  "  every  one  shall  receive  the  things 
done  in  the  body,"  that  "they  that  have  done  good  shall 
rise  to  the  resurrection  of  life,  and  they  that  have  done 
evil  to  the  re.surrection  of  damnation,"  is  most  true,  and 
most  important.  But  the  doctrines  which  accompany 
and  modify  this  fundamental  truth,  should  never  be 
wdiolly  lost  sight  of  even  in  a  treatise  on  Evidences, 
wdien  any  reference  is  made  to  the  subject.  We  are 
taught  in  Ihe  New  Testament,  that  these  works  must 
spring  from  faith  and  love  to  our  Saviour  Christ,  and 
must  be  renounced  in  point  of  merit,  on  account  of  the 
inherent  evil  which  defiles  the  very  best  of  them,  and 
must  be  accepted  only  through  that  Sacrifice  vvhich  is 
the  real  footing  of  a  sinner's  dealings  with  a  holy  God, 
and  must  be  regarded  by  those  who  perform  them,  with 
that  deep  humility,  and  almost  unconsciousness  of  having 


404  WILSON'S    ANALOGY, 

done  them,  which  is  sostroui^^ly  marked  in  the  conduct 
of  the  riijhteous,  in  our  Lord's  account  of  the  last  dav. 
Now,  these  modifications  are  so  essential,  that  the  lan- 
guage of  our  author,  however  undesignedly,  becomes 
really  dangerous  when  stripped  of  them.  And  man  is 
so  prone  to  pride,  self-coniidence,  reliance  on  his  own 
merits,  and  presumptuous  ignorance  of  his  failings ;  and 
the  Apostle  Paul  insists  so  warmly  on  the  immense  im- 
portance of  the  doctrine  of  justification  without  Avorks, 
that  too  much  caution  cannot  be  used  in  the  most  inci- 
dental representations  given  on  such  subjects. 

It  is  the  more  necessary  to  guard  against  a  false  re- 
liance on  our  own  works  and  deservings,  because  a 
mistake  here  pervades  and  corrupts  every  other  part 
of  religion.  The  good  works  of  the  pious  Christian, 
whose  mind  is  duly  imbued  with  a  becoming  sense  of 
his  fall  and  corruption,  of  his  unutterable  obligations  to 
the  great  propitiation,  and  his  entire  dependance  on 
the  influences  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  are  very  different  from 
the  partial,  external,  w'orldly,  selfish,  proud  perform- 
ances of  the  nominal  professor  of  Christianity.  The 
morality  of  the  nominal  Christian  rises  very  little  higher 
than  that  of  the  unbeliever ;  his  rule  is  fashion  ;  his  limit, 
convenience ;  his  aim,  to  do  as  little  as  possible  in  reli- 
gion. He  performs  some  actions,  indeed,  which  agree, 
as  to  their  form  and  external  appearance,  with  the  law 
of  God ;  but,  in  truth,  spring  from  habit,  ambition,  the 
love  of  reputation,  the  regard  to  society,  the  remon- 
strances of  conscience.  He  soon  fills  up  what  he  con- 
cludes to  be  intended  by  a  pious  and  virtuous  life.  He 
soon  attains  to  his  own  definition  of  a  faithful  honest 
man.  He  soon  satisfies  himself  that  his  virtues  surpass 
and  overbalance  his  vices,  and  that,  as  he  is  to  be  judged 
according  to  his  works,  he  has  nothing  to  fear  before 
the  tribunal  of  Christ.  In  the  mean  time,  his  heart  is 
alienated  from  God  and  true  obedience  to  him;  faith 
and  love  never  visit  his  breast;  and  his  religion  consists 
with  prejudice,  perhaps  hatred  and  exasperation,  against 
the  real  system  of  the  gospel. 

The  truly  devout  Christian,  on  the  contrary,  aims  at 
holiness,  and  not  merely  what  the  world  calls  virtue ; 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  405 

endeavours  to  subdue  his  passions,  as  well  as  regulate 
his  conduct ;  labours  to  serve  God,  and  adorn  Christi- 
anity, and  do  good  to  others,  to  the  very  utmost  of  his 
power ;  spends  much  time  and  care  in  watching  over 
his  motives,  and  cultivating  the  inward  principles  of 
piety ;  devotes  a  portion  of  the  day  to  the  reading  of  the 
Scriptures,  to  the  public  and  private  calls  of  devotion, 
to  self-examination,  thanksgiving,  and  religious  regards 
towards  the  ever  blessed  God,  and  his  Saviour  and 
Redeemer  Christ.  And  after  he  has  done  all,  he  ac- 
counts himself  an  unprofitable  servant,  renounces  all 
merit  in  his  own  works,  attributes  every  good  in  them 
to  the  divine  grace,  and  places  all  his  trust  in  the  vica- 
rious sacrifice  of  the  Son  of  God.  He  is  the  publican 
smiting  on  his  breast,  and  saying,  *'  God  be  merciful  to 
me  a  sinner ;"  whilst  all  other  men,  however  pure  in  the 
eyes  of  the  world,  are,  in  fiict,  like  the  Pharisee,  swollen 
with  conceit  and  arrogance,  dwelling,  fondly  on  their 
own  performances ;  looking  perhaps,  with  contempt  on 
others,  and  placing  no  real  trust  in  the  mercy  of  God. 
Thus,  even  if  all  the  separate  expressions  above  advert- 
ed to,  could  be  defended,  yet  would  they  still  lead  to 
a  wrong  end,  because  unattended  with  these  explana- 
tions which  the  Scriptures  carefully  supply.  We  are 
to  be  *' judged  according  to  our  works,"  and  shall  be 
rewarded  or  punished  "according  to  the  deeds  done  in 
the  body ;"  but  in  a  high  and  transcendent  sense  in  the 
case  of  the  righteous,  as  their  w^orks  spring  from  faith, 
are  the  effects  of  grace,  and  are  accompanied  with  hu- 
mility and  self-renunciation. 

3.  These  observations  lead  me  to  notice  a  general 
defect,  as  it  seems  to  me,  in  our  Author's  representation  of 
the  stupendous  recovery  of  man  provided  in  the  Gospel. 
For  if  any  doubt  could  be  raised  on  the  inexpediency 
of  the  above  language,  all  such^  doubt  would  be 
removed,  when  we  find,  on  further  examination,  that 
our  Bishop's  allusions  to  the  whole  doctrine  of  redemp- 
tion and  salvation,  as  revealed  in  the  New  Testament, 
are  not  sufficiently  clear  and  comprehensive  to  agree 
fully  with  the  Scriptural  statements  of  our  natural  cor- 
luption,  and  of  the  operations  of  grace  as  adapted  to  it. 


406  WILSON'S    ANALOGY. 

Let  us  not  be  misunderstood.  Bishop  Butler  is  far 
from  omitting  altogether  the  pecuHar  scheme  of  the 
gospel.  He  states  distinctly  the  insufficiency  of  repent- 
ance alone  to  restore  us  to  God's  favour.  He  speaks 
with  admirable  clearness  on  the  Mediation  and. Sacri- 
fice of  Christ.  He  quotes  the  passages  in  Scripture, 
■which  teach  the  vicarious  nature  of  Christ's  sufferings, 
and  insists  on  the  benefit  of  those  sufferings  being 
something  much  beyond  mere  instruction  or  example. 
On  these  subjects,  at  least  on  some  parts  of  them,  no 
complaint  can  be  alleged  against  his  brief  statements ; 
they  are  luminous  and  adequate,  for  an  elementary 
treatise.  Still  the  general  idea  of  the  scheme  of  the 
gospel  as  a  dispensation  of  grace,  which  would  be 
gathered  from  the  whole  of  his  representations  and 
suggestions,  would  be  erroneous.  He  calls  Chris- 
tianity "  a  moral  system;"  he  speaks  of  it  as  teaching  us 
chiefly  "new  duties,  and  new  relations  in  which  we 
stand;"  he  describes  it  as  "  an  additional  order  of 
Providence."  These  expressions  are  cold  and  inade- 
quate. But  we  object  most  of  all  to  the  following  pas- 
sage :  "  The  doctrine  of  the  gospel  appears  to  be,  not 
only  that  Christ  taught  the  efficacy  of  repentance,  but 
rendered  it  of  the  efficacy  which  it  is,  by  what  he  did 
and  suffered  for  us ;  that  he  obtained  for  us  the  benefit 
of  having  our  repentance  accepted  unto  eternal  life ; 
not  only  that  he  revealed  to  sinners,  that  they  were  in 
a  capacity  of  salvation,  and  how  they  might  obtain  it ; 
but  moreover,  that  he  put  tliem  into  this  capacity  of 
salvation,  by  what  he  did  and  suffered  for  them ;  put 
us  into  a  capacity  of  escaping  future  punishment,  and 
obtaining  future  happiness.  And  it  is  our  wisdom, 
thankfully  to  accept  the  benefit,  by  performing  the  con- 
ditions upon  which  it  is  offered,  on  our  part,  without 
disputing  how  it  was  procured  on  his."  (Part  H. 
Chap.  V.  §  vi.)  Surely  this  is  plainly  deficient.  Surely 
the  salvation  of  Christ  proceeds  on  a  different  footing, 
and  includes  much  more  than  this.  Surely  the  great 
Sacrifice  of  the  cross  not  only  obtained  for  the  sincere 
believer,  that  his  "  repentance  should  be  accepted  to 
eternal  life,"  (a  phrase  unscriptural  in  its  very  term*,^ 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  407 

not  only  put  him  in  a  capacity  of  salvation,  not  only  pro- 
posed certain  conditions  to  be  performed  on  bis  part — 
all  wbicb  places  the  stress  of  salvation  upon  ourselves, 
makes  the  reception  and  application  of  it  to  depend  on 
our  own  efforts,  and  leaves  to  our  Lord  merely  the 
office  of  removing  external  hinderances  affording  us  some 
aid  by  his  Spirit,  and  supplying  deficiencies — but  pur- 
chased also  salvation  itself,  in  all  the  amplitude  of  that 
mighty  blessing ;  procured  pardon,  reconciliation,  jus- 
tification, adoption,  acceptance,  the  gift  of  the  Holy 
Spirit,  and  the  promise  of  everlasting  life.  Surely  sal- 
vation brings  men  from  darkness  unto  light,  reverses 
the  sentence  of  condemnation,  and  makes  them  "  the 
righteousness  of  God  in  Christ ;"  it  places  them  under 
a  new  covenant,  and  confers  the  grace  necessary  for 
"  repentance  towards  God,  and  faith  towards  our  Lord 
Jesus  Christ ;"  it  puts  them  on  the  footing,  not  of  the 
law,  but  of  the  gospel,  not  of  works,  but  of  grace  ;  not 
of  obtaining  acceptance  for  their  repentance,  but  of 
receiving  "  the  gift  of  God,  which  is  eternal  life."  Let 
Butler's  summary  of  the  benefits  of  Christ's  death  be 
compared  with  such  summaries  as  the  Apostle  gives  : — 
*'  We  have  redemption  through  his  blood,  even  the 
forgiveness  of  sins  " — "  By  grace  are  ye  saved,  through 
faith  ;  and  that  not  of  yourselves,  it  is  the  gift  of  God  ; 
not  of  works,  lest  any  man  should  boast ;  for  we  are 
his  workmanship,  created  in  Christ  Jesus  unto  good 
works,  which  God  hath  before  ordained,  that  we  should 
walk  in  them." 

With  this  defective  view  of  the  fruits  of  our  Lord's 
Propitiation,  is  allied  a  correspondent  defect  as  to  the 
nature  and  importance  of  faith,  by  which  the  benefits 
of  that  propitiation  are  received  and  applied.  The  ten- 
dency of  some  of  Butler's  summary  statements,  Jiowever 
undesigned,  and  arising  perhaps,  in  some  measure,  from 
his  coldness  in  pressing  the  particular  course  of  his  ar- 
gument, is  to  lead  the  reader  to  suppose  that  the  eflfects 
of  Christ's  redemption  are  enjoyed  by  all  who  profess 
the  Christian  religion,  and  live  a  moral  life ;  that  is,  by 
all  who  have  that  general  belief  in  the  doctrine  of 
Christianity,  which  springs  from  education  and  rational 


408  WILSON'S    ANALOGY. 

conviction,  if  they  are  free  from  gross  sin,  cultivate  vir- 
tue, and  set  a  good  example  to  others,  by  a  decent  re- 
putable conduct.  All  these  things  are  indeed  included 
in  the  acts  and  fruits  of  a  true  and  lively  faith,  but  they 
reach  not  those  peculiar  effects  and  properties  of  it 
which  prove  it  to  be  spiritual  and  salutary.  Faith  is 
"the  substance  of  things  hoped  for,  and  the  evidence 
of  things  not  seen."  It  is  a  secret,  cordial,  holy  exer- 
cise of  the  understanding  and  aifections,  in  receiving 
God's  testimony  concerning  Christ,  and  in  reposing  all 
the  trust  and  coniidence  of  the  soul  on  the  merits  of 
that  Saviour  for  everlasting  life.  It  is  not  merely  a  ge- 
neral, cold,  historical  assent  to  certain  truths ;  but  a 
particular  affectionate,  living,  practical  behef  of  them, 
on  the  authority  of  God,  and  an  acting  fully  upon  them, 
as  infinitely  good  and  important.  It  is  not  simply  a 
notion,  a  creed,  an  established  hereditary  sentiment ; 
but  a  holy  principle,  springing  from  a  personal  sense  of 
our  lost  condition,  and  apprehending  for  ourselves 
the  blessings  of  Christ,  and  relying  upon  them  for 
everlasting  salvation.  Faith  is  tlie  eye  which  looks 
to  Christ,  as  the  brazen  serpent  which  Moses  raised ;  it 
is  the  foot  which  flies  to  Him,  as  the  man-slayer  fled  to 
the  city  of  refuge,  that  he  might  escape  the  avenger  of 
blood ;  it  is  the  hand  which  receives,  as  a  needy  beggar, 
the  inestimable  gift  of  God,  freely  offered  to  him  ;  it  is 
the  ear  which  hears,  with  eager  solicitude,  the  voice 
and  invitation  of  mercy,  that  it  may  live ;  it  is  the  ap- 
petite wdiich  "  hungers  and  thirsts"  after  Christy  and 
feeds  on  his  flesh  "and  drinks  his  blood,"  that  it  may 
have  eternal  life.  Faith,  like  Noah,  prepares  the  ark, 
and  enters  it  for  rescue  ;  fixith  builds  on  Christ  the  sure 
foundation,  fiiith  puts  on  Christ,  as  the  robe  of  righteous- 
ness, and  the  garment  of  salvation.  Accordingly,  its 
effects  correspond  with  its  divine  origin,  and  the  match- 
less benefits  it  receives.  It  "  works  by  love,"  it  "  over- 
comes the  world,"  it  "sees  Iliin  who  is  invisible,"  it 
"glories  in  tribulation,"  it  "piu-ifies  the  heart,"  it  anti- 
cipates heaven,  it  "  quenches  the  fiery  darts  of  the 
wicked  one,"  it  produces  uniform,  spiritual,  cheerful, 
willing  obedience.     Let  any  one  read  what  the  Scnjv 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  409 

tures  assert  of  faith,  what  they  ascribe  to  it,  and  the 
earnestness  with  which  they  enforce  its  necessity,  and 
he  will  be  convinced,  that  it  is  totally  different  from 
that  dead,  speculative  assent  to  the  Christian  scheme, 
which  is  often  confounded  with  it.  Faith  includes, 
besides  the  general  reception  of  Christianity,  a  particu- 
lar conviction  of  our  own  sins,  a  particular  apprehension 
of  our  own  lost  estate,  a  personal  application  for  our- 
selves of  the  offered  blessings  of  the  gospel,  and  a 
distinct  and  spiritual  reliance  for  our  own  salvation, 
on  the  death  and  merits  of  our  Saviour  Christ; — and 
some  reference  should  have  been  made  to  all  this  by 
our  Author;  at  least,  no  expression,  however  brief, 
should  have  been  inconsistent  with  it. 

4.  All  main  defects  in  our  views  of  practical  Christi- 
anity hang  together.  The  same  kind  of  inadequate  state- 
ments, therefore,  seem  to  us  to  he  chargeable  on  our  author's 
remarks  on  the  doctrine  of  the  Holy  Ghost.  Indeed  we 
are  not  sure  if  serious  omissions  are  not  to  be  found 
here — more  serious  than  on  most  of  the  preceding  topics. 
Bishop  Butler  allows  indeed  distinctly,  that  the  Holy 
Spirit  is  our  Sanctifier,  and  that  the  recovery  of  man- 
kind is  a  scheme  carried  on  by  the  Son  and  Spirit  of 
God.  He  speaks  frequently  of  the  aid  which  the  Spirit 
affords  to  good  men.  He  acknowledges  that  man  is  a  de- 
praved creature,  and  wants  not  merely  to  be  improved, 
iDut  to  be  renewed ;  and  he  quotes  the  striking  text, 
"  Except  a  man  be  born  of  the  Spirit,  he  cannot  enter 
into  the  kingdom  of  God."  We  would  wish  to  give 
the  full  benefit  of  these  admissions  in  favour  of  the 
Bishop,  and  against  what  we  are  about  to  state.  Nor  do 
we  doubt,  that  this  remarkable  man  implored  the  ope- 
rations of  the  Spirit  in  his  own  case  ;  experienced  his 
consolations,  and  ascribed  every  thing  to  his  grace. 
Still  we  conceive,  his  general  language  in  his  Analogy, 
on  this  fundamental  subject,  does  not  come  up  to  the 
Scriptural  standard.  He  does  not  give  even  that  pro- 
minence to  it  Avhich  he  does  to  the  mediation  of  Christ. 
He  speaks  of  the  Spirit  as  aiding,  but  scarcely  at  all, 
as  creating  anew ;  he  describes  his  assistances,  but 
hardly  ever  his  mighty  operations  in  changing  the  whole 


410  WILSON'S   ANALOGY. 

heart ;  he  talks  of  his  presence  with  good  men,  but  sel- 
dom, if  at  all,  of  his  regeneration  and  conversion  of  the 
wicked;  he  alloAVs  co-operating,  but  not  preventing 
grace — at  least,  not  clearly  and  distinctly,  as  the  Scrip- 
tures teach,  and  as  the  importance  of  the  case  requires ; 
he  dwells  on  the  help  of  the  Spirit,  in  subduing  our 
passions,  and  qualifying  us  for  heaven,  but  passes  over 
slightly  the  illuminating  influences  of  the  Spirit,  in 
opening  the  understanding,  and  his  transforming  power, 
in  "  taking  away  the  heart  of  stone,  and  giving  an  heart 
of  flesh."  We  read  little  or  nothing  in  our  author  of 
the  Holy  Spirit's  work  in  awakening  men,  like  those 
asleep;  quickening  them,  as  those  dead  in  sin  ;  deliver- 
ing them  from  the  power  of  Satan,  as  those  enslaved ; 
convincing  them  of  sin,  as  those  ignorant  and  proud ; 
creating  in  them  a  new  and  contrite  heart,  as  those 
obdurate  and  perverse;  and  implanting  in  them  the  first 
seeds  of  repentance,  faith,  love,  and  obedience,  as  those 
needing  a  new  and  heavenly  birth.  All  this  is  of  the 
greatest  importance,  because  if  the  foundations  of  true 
obedience  are  not  laid  in  the  Scriptural  doctrine  of  an 
entire  renewal  of  the  fallen  heart,  the  subsequent  build- 
ing must  be  slight  and  insecure.  If  men  are  not  taught 
the  necessity  of  a  new  creation  in  Christ  Jesus,  in  con- 
sequence of  the  blindness  of  their  understanding,  as 
w^ell  as  the  disorder  of  their  affections,  they  must,  and 
will  begin,  and  we  find,  in  fact,  they  do  begin,  their 
religion  in  a  proud,  self-dependent  temper ;  in  ignorance 
of  their  own  wants,  and  of  the  mighty  change  which 
must  take  place  in  them. 

The  illumination  of  the  Spirit  is  especially  important 
in  this  view.  It  is  a  doctrine  humiliating,  indeed,  to 
the  proud  reason  of  man,  but  essential  to  any  real 
knowledge  of  the  Gospel  of  Christ,  Our  Lord  places 
the  gift  of  the  Spirit  at  the  very  entrance  of  the  Chris- 
tian Hfe,  and  directs  men  to  pray  for  it,  as  the  key  and 
summary  of  all  other  blessings,  "  Ask  and  ye  shall 
receive ;  seek  and  ye  shall  find  ;  knock  and  it  shall  be 
opened  to  you.  If  ye,  being  evil,  know  how  to  give 
good  gifts  unto  your  children,  how  nmch  more  shall 
your  Father  which  is  in  heaven,  give  his  Holy  Spirit  to 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  411 

tliem  that  ask  him  ?"     It  might  have  pleased  God,  for 
any  thing  we  know,  to  have  given  us  a  revelation  so 
framed  as  to  be  intelligible  to  us  in  all  its  parts,  with- 
out further  aid ;  or  it  might  have  pleased  him  to  have 
made  the  understanding  of  it,  in  all  its  parts,  plainly 
above  our  powers  of  mind,  and  capacities  of  compre- 
hension.    In  either  case  we  should  then  have  had  no 
need  of  the  illumination  of  the   Spirit;    in  the  first, 
because  the  revelation  would  have  been  wholly  level 
to  our  natural  powers ;  in  the  second,  because  it  would 
have  been  wholly  out  of  the  reach  of  them.     But  it  has 
pleased  God  to  give  us  a  revelation,  containing  much 
that  is  plain,  in  its  history,  its  facts,  its  external  duties, 
its  sacraments,  its  morals ;  and  much  that  is  mysterious 
and    incomprehensible,    in   its    vast    scheme,    in    the 
purpose  and  will  of  its  divine  Author,  in  the  attributes 
and  glory  of  the  persons  of  the  Godhead,  in  the  miracu- 
lous  conception  and  incarnation   of  our  Lord,  in  the 
wonders    of  the  cross,  and  the   operations   of  grace. 
And  at  the  same  time,  much  also  that  is  of  a  mixed 
nature,  being  neither  so  plain  as  to  be  level  to  our  un- 
aided understanding,  nor  so  elevated  as  to  be  wholly 
placed  above  their  compass  and  capacity  ;  but  requiring 
the  special  guidance  and  illumination  of  the  Holy  Spirit, 
to  be  rightly  apprehended  and  employed: — such  is  the 
ruined  state  of  man,  the  evil  of  sin,  the  nature  of  true 
conversion  to  God,  of  faith,  of  love,  of  peace,  of  joy,  of 
communion  with  God,  of  new  obedience  ;  all,  in  short, 
that  regards  the  application  and  use  of  truth.     These 
things   cannot  be  understood  by  man  in  his  natural 
state,  but  must  be  learned  by  the  teaching  of  the  Holy 
Spirit.     And  thus  the  plan  of  Christianity  is,  in  this 
view,  a  further  test  of  men's  characters.     Thev  must 
stoop  at  the  very  threshold,  and  sue  for  a  heavenly 
light,  and  take  other  measures  of  sin,  and  themselves, 
and  God,  and  repentance,  and  faith,  and  conversion, 
and  obedience,  than  nature  can  give,  or  they  will  fatally 
err.     The  ignorance  and  prejudices  of  the  "  evil  heart 
of  unbelief,"  will  infallibly  betray  them.      Either  no 
sense  will  be  put  on  the  parts  of  the  Scripture,  relating 
to  these  subjects,  or  a  forced,  low,  insulTicient  sense 


412  WILSON'S    ANALOGY". 

which  evades,  and  explains  away,  instead  of  implicitly 
receivin^^,  the  real  meaning.  Not  that  we  claim  ati 
illumination  of  the  Spirit  Avhich  supersedes  at  all  the 
use  of  the  human  faculties  in  studyino:  the  Bible,  or 
requires  a  new  sense  to  be  put  on  ordinary  language 
and  construction,  or  communicates  new  truths,  not 
already  revealed  in  the  written  word  of  God ;  or 
encourages  or  warrants  enthusiasm  and  human  fancies; 
or  intrenches  on  the  miraculous  powers  conferred  on 
the  apostles ;  or  alters  the  rule  of  duty,  and  the  obliga- 
tions of  man  to  obey  it ;  or  acts  in  a  way  of  force 
and  compulsion  inconsistent  with  our  reasonable  and 
accountable  nature.  What  we  maintain,  is  the  neces- 
sity of  the  secret  and  imperceptible  influence  of  the 
Holy  Spirit  upon  the  understanding,  sought  by  diligent 
prayer,  and  communicated  gradually,  in  the  use  of 
rational  means;  by  which  the  mind  is  freed  from  pre- 
judice and  aversion  against  truth,  and  is  opened  to 
receive  the  instructions  of  the  written  word  of  God,  in 
their  full  and  natural  signification  and  use. 

But  we  pause.  This  is  not  the  place  to  enter  on  a 
discussion  of  the  work  of  the  Holy  Ghost  in  man's 
sanctification.  We  have  said  enough,  if  we  have  con- 
vinced the  theological  student  that  the  impression 
which  Butler  gives  of  this  subject  is  far  too  slight  and 
superficial.  Let  it  be  well  remembered,  that  God  has 
given  us  a  revelation  of  his  will,  with  the  additional 
promise  of  his  Spirit,  to  make  it  effectual  to  its  high 
purposes.  The  light  of  heaven  is  not  more  necessary 
to  our  discernment  of  natural  objects  and  beauties, 
than  the  light  of  the  Spirit  to  our  discernment  of 
spiritual  objects  and  fitnesses.  The  characteristic  of 
the  New  Dispensation,  is  the  promise  of  the  Spirit. 
And  with  this  persuasion,  we  cannot  dissemble  our 
fears,  that  the  language  of  Bishop  Butler  may  lead  to 
dangerous  mistakes. 

5.  But,  in  truth,  all  these  deficiencies,  if  we  are  right  in 
(Mr  judgment  about  them,  spring  from  an  inadequate  vieio 
of  the  fallen  state  of  man.  We  know  the  controversies 
on  this  mysterious  subject.  We  allow  that  statements 
have  too  often  been  made,  which  go  to  annihilate  man's 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  413 

moral  nature,  and  his  capacity  of  restoration ;  which 
weaken  his  responsibility  and  unnerve  the  exhortations 
and  invitations  which  the  Scriptures  address  to  him; 
which  extinguish  the  faint  hght  of  natural  conscience, 
and  repress  effort  and  watchfulness.  But  we  cannot 
but  know,  at  the  same  time,  that  the  errors  on  the  side 
of  extenuating  and  lessening  the  Scriptural  account  of 
man's  spiritual  state  since  the  fall,  are  equally  danger- 
ous, and  more  prevalent.  We  cannot  therefore  con- 
ceal our  conviction,  that  Butler's  view  of  human 
depravity  does  not  fully  meet  the  truth  of  the  case,  as 
delineated  in  the  inspired  writings,  and  confirmed  by 
uniform  experience.  He  speaks,  we  allow,  occasion- 
ally of  men  "  having  corrupted  their  natures,"  having 
lost  their  "  original  rectitude,"  and  as  having  permitted 
"  their  passions  to  become  excessive  by  repeated  viola- 
tions of  their  inward  constitution."  He  avows  that 
mankind  is  in  "  a  state  of  degradation,  however  difficult 
it  may  be  to  account  for  it;  and  that  the  crime  of  our 
first  parents  was  the  occasion  of  our  being  placed  in  a 
more  disadvantageous  condition."  "Yet,  notwith- 
standing these  expressions,  the  sincerity  and  impor- 
tance of  which,  so  far  as  they  go,  we  do  not  for  a 
moment  call  in  question,  he  dwells,  in  the  course  of  his 
work,  so  copiously  on  -man's  powers  and  capacities — on 
his  "  fiwouring  virtue  " — on  his  "  having  within  him  the 
principle  of  amendment  " — on  "  its  being  in  his  own 
power  to  take  the  path  of  life  " — on  "  virtue  being 
agreeable  to  his  nature  " — on  "  vice  never  being  chosen 
for  its  own  sake ;"  that  we  cannot  but  consider  the 
result  as  dangerous.  If  these  expressions  were  quali- 
fied, as  they  are  in  Scripture,  by  other  and  explanatory 
statements,  the  danger  would  be  less ;  but  standing  as 
they  do,  they  convey  the  idea,  that  man  is  not  that 
inconsistent,  weak,  corrupt,  perverse,  depraved,  impo- 
tent creature  which  the  Word  of  God  teaches  us  he 
is.  The  consequence  of  slight  impressions  of  this  great 
truth  infallibly  is,  that  men,  not  being  duly  instructed 
in  their  real  state  before  God,  cannot  ffeel  that  humility, 
nor  exercise  that  penitence,  nor  sue  for  that  renewal, 
which  all  depend  on  the  primary  fact  of  a  total  moral 


414  WILSON'S    ANALOGY. 

t 

ruin ;  and  which  form  the  adaptation  between  tlie  real 
grace  of  the  Gospel,  and  the  actual  wants  of  man. 
Thus  all  the  great  ends  of  Christianity  are  missed,  and 
inferior  benefits  only  are  derived  from  it.  Neither 
conversion  on  the  one  hand,  nor  real  obedience  fo  God 
on  the  other,  can  be  attained;  and  the  arch,  deprived 
of  its  key-stone,  as  it  were,  loses  both  its  beauty  and 
its  streni^th. 

The  Scriptural  account  of  man  is,  that  "  he  is  born  in 
sin  and  shapen  in  iniquity  " — that  "  in  him  dwelleth  no 
ffood  thini,^" — that  "his  heart  is    deceitful  above  all 
things,  and  desperately  wicked  " — that  "the  very  ima- 
ginations of  the  thoughts  of  his  heart  are  only  evil  con- 
tinually"— that  "he  cannot,  of  himself,  think  any  thing 
that   is  good " — that   "  he  is  dead  in  trespasses  and 
sins  " — that  "  he  is  by  nature  a  child  of  wrath," — lost, 
enslaved,  miserable,  ignorant,  corrupt ; — his  heart  "  at 
enmity  wdth  God  " — his  passions  and  affections  set  on 
"  divers  lusts  and  pleasures  " — his  w  hole  moral  nature 
"  alienated  from  the  life  of  God."     This  strong  language 
is  not  contradictory  to  what  the  Scriptures,  from  which 
it  is  taken,  teach  of  man's  responsibility — his  remain- 
ing sense    of  right  and    wrong — his   conscience — his 
fears  of  judgment — ^his  duty  and  his  obligations ;  but 
it  plainly  instructs  us,  that  these  relics  and  fragments 
of  a   former  rectitude,  are  relics  and  fragments,  and 
nothing  more ;  and  that  as  to  any  effective  love  of  holi- 
ness— as  to  any  real  return  to  God — as  to  any  positive 
efforts  to  recover  or  restore  himself,  he  can  do  nothing, 
except  as  God  "  worketh  in  him  to  will  and  to  do  of 
his  good  pleasure.     The  edifice  is  decayed  throughout;, 
it  must  be  taken  down  and  re-erected  by  the  Divine^ 
Architect.     The  leprosy  has  infected    every  part;    it 
must   be  levelled   with  the   ground  and  built  anew. 
Let  this  fundamental  doctrine  be  understood,  and  pro- 
duce its  due  effects,  and  all  will  be  easy  and  intelligi- 
ble in  the   Christian    scheme    of  redemption ;    every 
thing  will  occupy  its  due  place.     The  apostacy  and  fall 
of  man  will  prepare  for  salvation  by  grace — for  a  free 
justification   by  the  merits  of  Christ — for  an    entire 
renovation  by  the  blessed  Spirit — for  a  sincere  and  un- 


WILSON'S   ANALOGY.  415 

reserved  obedience.  And  not  only  for  obedience,  but 
for  love  to  God  and  man — cheerful  dedication  to  the 
service  of  Christ — a  temper  of  compassion  and  kind- 
ness towards  others — a  disinterested,  amiable,  and 
active  benevolence — -a  zeal  for  the  glory  of  God,  and 
the  good  of  men,  and  a  watchfulness  over  the  first 
risings  of  sinful  passions  and  appetites.  All  this  will  be 
connected  with  a  "  peace  of  God  which  passeth  under- 
standing " — "joy  in  the  Holy  Ghost" — "patience  in 
tribulation " — delight  in  prayer,  meditation,  and  the 
contempLition  of  God  and  heaven — a  sense  of  happi- 
ness and  tranquillity,  in  spiritual  things — a  moderation 
as  to  all  earthly  concerns,  and  a  victory  over  the 
applause  and  frown  of  the  world. 

6.  For  this  is  the  next  thing  w^e  shall  presume  to 
mention,  as  defective  in  the  allusions  and  statements 
of  our  Author, — his  standard  of  the  effects  of  Christianity, 
in  the  holy,  happy  lives  of  real  Christians,  is  far  too  low. 
It  could  not  indeed  be  otherwise.  The  spiritual  life  is 
a  whole.  If  the  glory  of  the  Saviour,  and  the  opera- 
tions of  his  spirit,  and  the  total  ruin  of  man,  as  requiring 
both,  are  not  first  understood,  it  is  impossible  that  the 
blessed  fruits  of  all  this,  in  the  new  life  and  happiness 
of  the  renovated,  pardoned,  and  sanctified  heart,  should 
be  produced.  There  is,  however,  such  a  thing  as  "  the 
love  of  Christ  constraining  a  man  to  live  no  longer  to 
himself,  but  to  Him  that  died  for  him  and  rose  again ;" 
there  is  such  a  thing  as  the  inward  experience  of  the 
grace  of  Clu'istianity — there  is  such  a  thing  as  a  holy, 
happy,  spiritual  life,  which  differs  as  much  from  a 
merely  rational  and  moral  one,  as  the  rational  life  dif- 
fers from  the  animal,  and  the  animal  from  the  vegeta- 
ble. Not  to  have  seized  this  idea,  is  to  have  missed 
one  peculiar  feature  of  true  Christianity. 

7.  In  short  the  whole  of  what  we  would  advance 
amounts  to  this,  the  standard  of  Christianity,  as  applied 
to  the  heart  and  life  of  man,  which  the  readers  of  Butler 
iDOuld  form  from  his  general  language,  is  far  helaiu  what 
we  conceive  to  he  the  standard  of  the  Sacred  Scriptures. 
In  our  view  of  the  Scriptural  standard,  we  may  be 
wrong ;  but  we  think  every  reader  will  perceive  that 


416  WILSON'S    ANALOGY. 

the  several  points  on  which  we  have  offered  remarks, 
hang-  together.     If  the  view  we  take  of  the  extent  of 
the  fall  be  in  the  main  correct,  then  the  view  of  justifi- 
cation, of  the  grace  of  the  Gospel,  of  faith,  of  the  work 
of  the  Holy  Ghost,  of  the  peace  and  consolation  of  the 
Christian's  heart,  and  of  the  zeal  and  spirituality  of  his 
obedience,  are  probably  correct  .also.     They  are  links 
of  one  chain.     The  connection  is  indispensable.     They 
rise  or  fall  together. — AH  we  entreat  of  the  reader,  is 
an  impartial  examination  of  the  entire  question.     We 
beg  only  that  it  may  not  be  determined  by  matters 
irrelevant — by  fashion,  prejudice,  the  spirit  of  party, 
temporal  and  subordinate  interests.     We  beg  only  that 
the  introduction  of  tenets  which  we  do  not  hold,  or 
of  consequences  which  we  abhor,  may  not  be  mixed 
up  with  the  discussion.     The  simple  question  is.     Is 
the  system  \\'hich  the   language  we  have  been  con- 
demning seems  to  favour,  or  the  system  which  we  have 
suggested  in  its   stead,  the  true  system  of  the  New 
Testament?      Which    comes    nearest    to    the    Bible? 
Which   has   the    apparent    sanction   of   the    inspired 
oracles  of  God?     Which    suits  the    expressions   and 
sentiments  of  the   sacred   writers  in  all  their   parts  ? 
Which    takes    in    naturally   and    without   effort,    not 
only  the    historical  parts  of  the    Bible,  not  only  the 
moral,  not  only  the  prophetical,  not  only  the  devotional 
— for  there  is  here  no  dispute — but  the  doctrinal  and 
experimental  ?     It  is  no  sufficient  proof  of  the  truth  of 
the  system  Ave  are  opposing,  that  parts  of  it  agree  with 
the  Scriptures;  for  it  could  not  be  otherwise.     It  would 
not  be  a  convincing  proof  of  it,  even  if  the  whole  of  its 
detached   parts  were  to  be  found  separately  in  that 
perfect  code.     The  question  is,  docs  it  take  in  all  that 
Scripture  teaches,  on  the  several  subjects  ;  does  it  adopt 
in  their  obvious  and  unadulterated  meaning,  all  the 
language  and  statements  of  the  Bible  on  the  fall  of  man, 
on  justification,  and  on  the  other  points  in  controversy  ? 
And  here  we  boldly  and  fearlessly  appeal   to   facts. 
Those  who  preach  and    write  in  the  temper  and  on 
the  scheme  which  we  are  opposing,  do  not  use  natu- 
rally and  habitually  the  language  of  St.  Paul  and  the 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  417 

Other  Apostles.  This  language  does  not  suit  and  fall 
in  with  their  system,  does  not  express  what  they  mean ; 
and,  therefore,  except  when  compelled  by  circum- 
stances, their  theological  scheme  avoids  the  Scriptural 
phraseology,  and  is  formed  in  a  different  school.  Our 
objection  to  Bishop  Butler's  language,  is,  that  it  is  not 
Scriptural.  He  substitutes  weaker  and  more  ambigu- 
ous expressions.  He  lowers  every  thing.  Tliis  one 
point  goes  far  to  decide  the  question  with  any  candid 
mind.  The  system  which  admits  with  ease,  and  reposes 
upon,  the  very  language  and  sentiments  of  the  inspired 
waiters  in  all  their  instructions  and  exhortations,  must, 
in  all  probability,  be  the  nearest  to  the  truth.  It  is 
thus  men  judge  in  every  similar  case.  And  it  is  to  be 
remembered,  that  the  higher  and  more  spiritual  system 
of  Christianity,  takes  in  and  embraces  the  lower  one  ; 
whilst  this  lower  one  rises  not  to  the  other,  and  thus 
reaches  not  the  extent  and  end  of  the  Divine  Revela- 
tion. 

Again,  we  appeal  to  the  hearts  and  consciences,  to 
the  trials  and  conflicts,  to  the  feelings  and  wants  of  the 
most  devout  and  sincere  Christians,  and  we  ask  which 
view  of  truth  comes  nearest  to  their  cases,  their  neces- 
sities, their  indigence  ?  Which  view  of  the  state  of 
man  is  best  descriptive  of  their  own  state  ?  Which 
view  of  the  scheme  of  pardon  most  adequately  supplies 
their  importunate  need?  Which  view  of  the  doctrines 
of  the  Holy  Ghost  affords  the  mighty  aid  which  they 
are  conscious  they  require  ?  Which  view  of  the  grace 
of  Christianity  corresponds  most  exactly  with  their 
extreme  misery  ?  Which  view  of  the  spiritual  obedi- 
ence and  love  of  the  Christian  hfe  is  most  closely  alUed 
to  the  objects  at  which  they  aim  ?  But  we  will  not 
press  these  questions.  The  confessions  of  the  very 
best  and  most  holy  men,  are  the  liveliest  comment  on 
the  language  of  the  divine  writers.  And  the  misgivings 
and  penitential  acknowledgments,  as  death  and  eternity 
approach,  of  many,  who  during  life,  espoused  the  lower 
interpretation,  speak  loudly  enough  on  this  subject. 

We  rather  go  on  to  ask  this  question — Which  system 
of  divinity  produces  in  the  largest  measure  those  fruits 
27' 


418  WILSON'S   ANALOGY. 

and  effects,  which  are  ascribed  to  the  Gospel  in  the 
New  Testament?     Now  it  will  be  conceded   on  all 
hands,  that  "  by  their  fruits  we  are  to  know"  the  true 
teachers,  and  distinguish  them  from  the  fjilse.     Does, 
then,  the  lowering  doctrines  of  modern  times  on  the 
fall  and  ruin  of  man,  and  the  redemption  and  grace  of 
Christ,  and  the  kindred  topics,  awaken -the  souls  of 
sinners,  reclaim  the  ungodly,  arouse  the  careless,  revive 
religion  where  it  has  decayed,  and  preserve  it  where 
it  flourishes  ?     Does  it  not,  on  the  contrary,  first  leave 
those  who  preach  it  cold  and  inactive,  and  then  fall 
without  eflicacy  on  the  ears  of  the  hearers  ?     Does  it 
not  prove  insufficient  for  converting  the  heart,  turning 
it  from  the  power  of  sin,  and  raising  it  to  the  love  and 
obedience  of  God  ?     Does  it  not  fail  in  comforting  the 
afflicted  conscience,  and  inspiring  a  hope  of  heaven  ? 
Does  it  not  stop  short  of  all  the  mighty  ends  which 
primitive  Christianity  produced  ?     And  is  there  not  a 
constant  tendency  in  it  to  deteriorate  and  sink  lower 
and  lower,  till  the  grace  of  the  gospel  is  almost  excluded, 
and  little  remains  beyond  a  tame  morality  and  an  ex- 
ternal form  of  religion  ?     And  does  not  the  decay  of 
spiritual  religion  go  on,  till,  by  the  mercy  of  God,  a 
revival  of  the  great  doctrines  of  salvation  by  grace  in 
the  plain  language  and  spirit  of  the  Scriptures,  takes 
place,  and  recalls  man  to  the  true  standard  of  iaith 
and  practice  ? 

The  fact  plainly  is,  as  these  inquiries  are  designed 
to  describe  it.  On  the  contrary,  the  simple  preaching- 
of  "  Christ  crucified,"  is  still  the  "  power  of  God  and 
the  wisdom  of  God."  Wherever  the  high  standard  of 
really  evangelical  truth  is  raised,  and  the  Saviour  is 
preached  to  a  lost  world,  and  the  regenerating  and 
sanctifying  operations  of  the  Spirit  are  avowed,  and 
the  full  consolation  and  joy  of  faith  expounded,  and  the 
elevated  rule  of  Christian  morals  sustained;  there, 
under  whatever  incidental  defects  or  disadvantages, 
the  effects  of  conversion,  love,  and  obedience  are  copi- 
ously produced ;  man  is  indeed  turned  from  sin  unto 
God,  the  breast  of  the  rebel  is  subdued  and  softened, 
his  whole  character  is  changed,  and  the  seal  of  God  is 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  419 

impressed  upon  the  declaration  of  his  own  truth,  by  the 
displays  of  his  own  efficient  grace  and  mercy. 

It  strongly  confirms  the  conclusion  we  thus  come  to, 
to  consider  that  the  Universa  Church  of  Christ  has  held 
these  great  truths  which  are  now  so  much  opposed. 
Look  to  the  early  Fathers  of  the  Church,  and  you  find 
the  doctrines  of  man's  total  apostacy,  and  his  salvation 
by  grace  only,  to  be  the  life  of  all  their  instructions. 
As  those  mighty  truths  were  corrupted  by  human  phi- 
losophy, or  overwhelmed  by  superstition,  the  power  of 
religion  sunk,  her  glory  in  the  conversion  of  men  was 
lost,  and  she  fell  back  into  a  cold  controversial  spirit, 
which  brought  on  the  ages  of  darkness  and  spiritual 
tyranny.     What,  we  ask,  was  the  doctrine  of  Cyprian 
in  the  third   century,  of  Ambrose  in  the  fourth,  and 
Augustine  in  the  fifth  ?     What  gave  life  to  their  exhor- 
tations, and  influence  to  their  labours  ?     Was  it  not  the 
pure  evangelical  light,  which,  notwithstanding  many 
subordinate  errors  and  much  superstition,  shone  forth 
in  their  laborious  discourses  and  writings  1     Even  to 
the  time  of  Bernard,  the  last  of  the  Fathers,  the  name 
and  grace  of  Christ  in  the  full  efficacy  of  his  mercy, 
pervaded  the  theology,  and  sanctified  the  hearts  of  them. 
It  was  only  as  this  healing  doctrine  was  utterly  lost 
under  the  accumulation  of  superstition  and  idolatry, 
that  the  melancholy  desertion  and  apostacy  of  the  visi- 
ble Church  in  the  West,  took  place.     In  the  midst  of 
this  thick  darkness,  however,  it  was  the  same  truth  of 
grace    wliich  preserved,  among  the   Albigenses   and 
Waldenses,  the  life  and  influence  of  the  Gospel.     And 
at  the  Reformation,  what  was  it  which  Luther,  and 
Melancthon,  and    Cramer,  and   Zuingle,  and  Calvin, 
and    Beza,  and  Knox  taught?     Did  they  not  revive 
the  old  Scriptural  doctrines  of  original  sin,  justification 
by  faith,  salvation   by  grace,  regeneration  and    com- 
munion  with  God  by  the   Holy  Spirit,  and  spiritual 
obedience,  as  the  fruit  of  all  this  in  the  temper  and  life  ? 
Some  of  these  truths,  indeed,  were  held  in  a  general 
and  loose  manner  by  the  Church  of  Rome,  but  they 
were  enervated  by  distinctions  and  refinements,  and 
overwhelmed  by  superstitious  usages  and  rites.     The 


420  WILSON'S    ANALOGY. 

reformers  boldly  api)eale(l  from  tlie  erroneous  opinions 
of  men,  to  the  inliillible  word  of  God.  They  set  forth 
the  ruin  of  the  fall  in  all  its  extent,  they  insisted  on  the 
preventing  grace  of  the  Spirit,  as  necessary  to  all  true 
repentance,  they  gloried  only  in  the  cross  of  the  Lord 
Jesus  Christ,  and  in  justification  by  his  merits ;  they 
called  men  off  from  works  of  external  mortification  and 
unauthorized  penance,  to  the  good  deeds,  and  virtuous 
habits,  and  divine  principles  taught  by  the  sacred 
writers.  And  what  was  the  effect  ?  In  most  of  the 
nations  of  Europe,  thousands  and  thousands  w^ere  really 
converted  to  the  service  and  love  of  God.  The  re- 
formed doctrines  spread  with  the  rapidity  of  lightning; 
a  pure  form  of  Christianity  was  establised  in  many 
states,  and  the  Papacy  was  shaken  to  its  base. 

Let  any  one  impartially  read  the  confessions  and 
Articles  of  the  Reformed  churches,  and  those  of  our 
own  church,  amongst  the  very  first;  and  he  will  see 
that  the  high  standard  of  sentiment  and  practice  which 
we  espouse,  was  universally  maintained.  What  is  the 
lansfuaffe  of  these  noble  documents  1  Does  it  resemble 
the  enfeebled  and  dubious  strain  of  modern  theology ; 
or  does  it  not  rather  take  the  plain  and  strong  ground 
of  the  ancient  doctrine  of  the  entire  apostacy  of  man, 
and  the  efficacious  grace  of  God  ?  And  in  all  the  Pro- 
testant churches  since  the  Reformation,  mark  the  pro- 
gress or  decline  of  real  piety  and  holiness,  and  you 
will  find  them  uniformly  to  bear  a  relation  to  the  pure 
doctrines  of  grace  upheld  or  denied.  Where  these 
doctrines  have  flourished,  the  presence  and  mercy  of 
God  in  the  conversion  of  men  has  attested  the  truth : 
where  a  decay  has  taken  place,  and  human  morals,  or  a 
low  system  of  divinity,  has  usurped  the  place  of  the 
unadulterated  gospel,  every  thing  has  fallen  in  pro- 
portion— men  have  remained  dead  and  unmoved  in 
their  sins ;  the  form  has  extinguished  the  power  of 
godliness;  cold  and  proud  pretensions  to  orthodoxy 
have  been  united  with  a  w  orldly  life  ;  the  clergy  have 
deserted  the  lofty  function  of  being  heralds  of  salvation 
and  examples  to  their  people,  and  have  been  lost  in 
secular  politics,  in  human  attachments  to  an  established 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  421 

creed,  and  angry  controversies  with  those  who  point 
out  to  them  "  a  more  excellent  way."  Thus  things 
have  grown  worse  and  worse,  till  God  has  granted  a 
revival,  by  the  secret  guidance  of  his  Spirit.  Then  the 
old  and  forgotten  tenets  of  human  guilt  and  impotency, 
and  divine  mercy  and  power,  have  been  raised  up 
again  as  from  the  grave,  the  old  standard  of  truth  again 
erected ;  public  opinion  has  been  gradually  changed ; 
the  former  state  of  decline  admitted  and  deplored ;  and 
the  wonted  efficacy  of  Christian  doctrine  seen  once 
more,  in  its  proper  fruits  of  conversion,  holiness,  and 
love. 

But  we  are  indulging  ourselves  in  reflections  which 
calrry  us   too  far  from    our   immediate   design.     The 
Analogy  is  a  Treatise  of  Evidences,  and  could  only  be 
expected  to  allude  generally  to  these  momentous  topics. 
We  would  not  assume   the  truth  of  the  evengelical 
system  of  which  we  speak.     We  invite  only  to  inquiry ; 
we  appeal  boldly  to  every  kind  of  testimony  which 
such  a  case  admits ;  and  we  leave  the  result  with  con- 
fidence   to   the    judgment   of   every   unbiassed    and 
enlightened  theological  student..    One  reason  of  our 
venturing  to  dwell  on  these  topics  is  the  well-fixed 
persuasion,  that  our  writers  on  Evidences  have  griev- 
ously mistaken  their  own  duty  as  advocates  of  Chris- 
tianity, as  well  as  the  interests  of  truth  and  religion 
generally,    in   not  presenting   the    fair  and  adequate 
account  of  the  doctrines  and  morals  of  the  Gospel. 
We  do  not  mean  that  they  should  involve  themselves 
in  controversy,  nor  even  enter  on  the  details  of  Chris- 
tian  doctrines  and  morals.     Let  them  keep  to  their 
own  province,  the  defence  and  establishment  of  Chris- 
tianity generally ;  but  let  the  references  to  the  contents 
and  tenor  of  that  religion  be,  so  far  as  they  go,  just  and 
complete.     Let   the    little  they  do  say,    be  accurate. 
Let  what  is  given  to  their  readers  convey  an  idea  of 
what  the  spirit  and  design   of  the  whole   system  is. 
Let  the  parts  touched  on,  connect  naturally  with  all  the 
rest  which  are  not  specifically  treated.     This  conduct 
becomes  the  magnitude  and  importance  of  the  subject. 
It  prepares  the  reader  of  evidences  to  submit  to  the 


422  WILSON'S    ANALOGY. 

yoke  of  Christ.  It  exhibits  religion  attractive,  efTica- 
cioiis,  entire.  It  meets  the  feelings  and  wants  of  the 
sincere  and  humble  inquirer.  It  shuts  out  a  thousand 
misapprehensions  and  errors.  It  insures  the  blessing 
of  God  in  a  larger  measure,  upon  the  triumphant  evi- 
dences of  our  faith.  It  is  the  most  simple,  upright, 
straight  forward  course.* 

Still   we   are   far,  very  far  from  undervaluing   the 
labours  of  the    Apologists   and    Defenders   of  Chris- 
tianity.    They  have  performed  excellent  service.  Their 
acuteness  and  skill,  their  penetrating  obser\^ation,  their 
indefatigable  researches,  the  force  of  their  reasonings, 
and  the    depth   of  their   knowledge,   liave    deserved 
highly  of  the  sacred  cause.     The  External  Evidences 
have  naturally  been  most  adequately  unfolded,  because 
the  interior  virtues  and   properties   of  the    Christian 
scheme  came  less  within  their  scope.     But  we  adhere, 
notwithstanding,  to  our  conviction,  that  all  the  sum- 
maries of  the  revealed  doctrines,  which  even  the  argu- 
ment from  external  evidences  require,  should  be  a  part 
and  parcel,  as  it  were,  of  the  entire  possession,  should 
resemble  the  apostolic  examples,  and  be  expressed  as 
nearly  as  possible  in  the  apostolic  language.     We  do 
not  stop  to  say  how  much  more  this  should  be  the  case 
in  Treatises  on  the  Internal  Evidences.     We  rather  go 
on  to  observe,  that  in  the  case  immediately  before  us, 
the  argument  from  Analogy,  a  similar  fidelity  to  the  full 
demands  of  the  Christian  scheme,  would  have  had  the 
very   best   effect.     That   we   do   not   depreciate   the 
talents  and  labours  of  Bishop  Butler,  must  have  been 
obvious  to  every  reader  of  these  pages.     We   have 
even  expressed  the  hope,  the  rational  hope,  springing 
from  a  judgment  of  charity,  that  in  his  own  mind  he 
followed  the  true  doctrine,  and  that  he  was  far  from  in^ 
tending  to  produce  those  consequences  to  which  his 
language  may  lead.     We  have  also  fully  admitted  his 
correct  and  powerful  defence  of  the  scheme  of  Chris- 

♦  We  cannot  here  withhold  our  tribute  of  admiration  from  the  work  of  Mr. 
Sumner  on  the  "  Evidence  of  Cliristianity,  as  derived  from  its  reception,  and 
from  the  nature  of  its  doctrine."  Tliis  masterly  treatise  forms  an  era  in  the 
history  of  writings  in  defence  of  our  faith. 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  423 

tianity  to  a  certain  extent.  It  is  this  very  thing  which 
makes  us  the  more  regret,  that  he  had  not  carried  his 
views  on,  and  given  a  more  full  and  accurate  idea,  so 
far  as  his  plan  of  argument  allowed,  of  all  the  efficacy 
and  consolation  of  the  gospel.  His  work  is  cold.  He 
seems  rather  like  a  man  forced  to  be  a  Christian,  than 
one  rejoicing  in  its  blessings.  It  is  impossible  to  calcu- 
late the  additional  good  which  the  Analogy  would  have 
effected,  if  its  unnumbered  readers  had  been  instructed 
more  adequately  by  it  in  the  spiritual  death  and  ruin  of 
man  in  all  his  powers  by  the  fall,  in  the  inestimable 
constitution  of  special  grace  established  by  the  gospel, 
in  the  gratuitous  justification  of  the  sincere  believer  in 
the  sacrifice  of  Christ,  in  the  divine  nature  and  proper- 
ties of  true  faith,  in  the  mighty  operations  of  the  Holy 
Ghost  in  illuminating  and  sanctifying  man,  and  in  the 
consolation  and  universal  obedience  which  are  the 
fruits  of  faith.  Probably  there  is  no  student  in  divin- 
ity, during  the  last  half  century  or  more,  who  has  not 
read,  and  read  with  admiration  and  profit,  this  aston- 
ishing work.  How  many  of  these  have  been  con- 
firmed in  a  defective  theology,  strengthened  in  preju- 
dices against  truth,  and  persuaded  to  adopt  a  low" 
system  of  doctrine  in  the  instruction  of  others,  from  the 
incidental  language,  and  hazardous  expressions  which 
occur  in  it !  But  so  it  is.  There  are  in  human  life  few 
things  complete.  What  we  meet  with  in  one  writer, 
we  miss  in  another.  The  union  of  rare  and  exquisite 
talent  with  the  hiojhest  tone  of  sacred  feelinir  and  doc- 
trme,  was  perhaps  rarely  ever  witnessed  as  it  was  in 
Pascal.  And  the  good  which  his  masterly  work, 
though  posthumous,  and  the  writing  of  a  Roman  Cath- 
oHc,  has  produced,  has  been  correspondent  both  in 
extent  and  in  quality.  The  unexampled  effects  of  his 
"  Thoughts  on  Religion,"  attest  the  solidity  of  the  main 
points  to  which  we  are  now  adverting.  Pascal  sur- 
passes all  other  writers  on  Evidences,  because  he  con- 
joins the  most  lively  and  acute  genius,  and  the  finest 
powers  of  reasoning,  with  the  full  admission  of  the 
great  fundamental  tenets  of  the  Christianity  which  he 
defends.     The  single  doctrine  of  the  entire  corruption 


424  WILSON'S    ANALOGY. 

of  man  by  the  fall,  sheds  a  light  on  all  his  arguments, 
and  meets  the  state  and  feelings  of  every  pious  reader, 
whilst  it  tends  to  instruct  those  who  are  as  yet  unac- 
quainted with  this  most  important  truth.  It  is  thus 
that  Pascal's  great  work,  though  not  free  from  many  of 
the  errors  of  his  church,  remains  unrivalled  in  its  class. 
And  the  work  of  Bishop  Butler  would  have  been  little 
inferior  to  it,  if  it  had  united,  with  its  profound  and 
just  views  of  the  order  of  God  in  his  natural  govern- 
ment, and  the  correspondence  of  his  moral  and  religious 
order  in  revelation,  the  fiill  view  of  human  depravity 
and  of  divine  grace,  which  that  revelation  opened 
before  him.  It  is  impossible  not  to  see  with  what 
ease  a  writer  who  has  proceeded  so  far,  and  conducted 
us  so  securely  to  a  certain  point,  would  have  gone  on 
in  the  course  he  was  pursuing,  till  he  had  embraced  the 
vast  compass  of  experimental  and  practical  religion,  and 
had  thus  left  behind  him  a  monument,  not  only  of 
triumph  over  objections  against  the  general  scheme  of 
Christianity,  but  of  victory  over  those  prejudices,  and 
that  tame  acquiescence  which  too  often  obscure  the  real 
doctrine  of  our  recovery,  as  we  have  ventured  to  delin- 
eate it. 

8.  For  this  is  the  last  topic  on  which  we  shall 
presume  to  offer  any  remarks.  We  observe,  there- 
fore, that  the  very  same  argutnents  from  the  analogy  of 
nature  ivhich  silence  the  objections  raised  against  Chris- 
tianity, as  expounded  by  our  author  in  a  very  mitigated 
sense,  icoiild  have  served  to  meet  the  objections  7'aised  against 
it,  in  its  full  Scriptural  extent. 

I.  For  instance,  the  doctrine  of  the  fall  of  our  nature 
might  have  been  defended  in  its  genuine  form,  quite 
as  triumphantly  as  it  now  is.  The  following  is  the 
conclusion  of  Butler's  argument : — "  Whoever  con- 
siders all  these,  and  some  other  obvious  things,  will 
think  he  has  little  reason  to  object  against  the  Scrip- 
ture account,  that  mankind  is  in  a  state  of  degrada- 
tion ;  against  this  being  the  lact,  how  difficult  soever 
he  may  think  it  to  account  for,  or  even  to  form  a  dis- 
tinct conception  of  the  occasion  and  circumstances  of 
it.     But  that  the  crime  of  our  first  parents  was  the 


WILSON'S   ANALOGY.  425 

occasion  of  our  being  placed  in  a  more  disadvantageous 
condition,  is  a  thing  throughout,  and  particularly  anal- 
ogous to  what  we  see  in  the  daily  course  of  natural 
Providence."  Part  II.  c.  v.  sec.  5.  Surely,  if  the 
expressions  used  by  the  inspired  writers  were  substi- 
tuted for  the  defective  ones  of  this  passage,  the  argu- 
ment would  hold  equally  good.  Nay,  it  would  have 
more  force,  from  more  exactly  corresponding  with  the 
facts  of  the  case.  For  men,  alas!  are  not  merely  in 
"  a  state  of  degradation  "  but  of  alienation  from  the  life 
of  God,  through  tlie  ignorance  that  is  in  them,  because 
of  the  blindness  of  their  hearts;"  mankind  were  not 
only  "  placed  in  a  more  disadvantageous  condition  by 
the  crime  of  our  first  parents,"  but  "  by  one  man  sin 
entered  into  the  world,  and  death  by  sin ;  and  so  death 
passed  upon  all  men,  for  that  all  have  sinned ;"  as  the 
inspired  apostle  declares. 

II.  Again,  the  argument  of  our  author,  from  our  con- 
fessed ignorance  of  what  a  revelation  might  be  expected 
to  contain,  and  of  what  particular  offices  and  duties 
might  be  assigned  to  a  Divine  Mediator,  is  just  as  valid 
when  applied  to  the  true  view  of  the  mediatorial  grace 
of  Christ,  as  we  conceive  it  to  be  revealed  in  Scripture 
(always  supposing  we  are  right  in  that  view)  as  to  the 
limited  view  to  which  he  actually  applies  it.  The 
hope  which  the  order  of  Providence  suggests  of  the 
moral  consequences  of  sin  being  in  some  way  remedied 
under  God's  government,  remains  as  it  does.  The  in- 
efficacy  of  mere  repentance  and  reformation,  as  apparent 
from  the  course  of  natural  things,  remains  as  it  does. 
The  intervention  of  Christ  as  the  great  Mediator,  by 
his  one  vicarious  propitiation  and  atonement,  remains 
as  it  does.  If,  then,  the  effects  of  this  mighty  sacrifice 
are  not  merely  the  "procuring  our  repentance  to  be 
accepted,  and  the  putting  us  in  a  capacity  of  salvation," 
but  the  actual  gift  of  pardon,  justification,  and  a  title  to 
eternal  life,  by  faith  only — the  inference  is  as  firm,  and 
the  analogy  as  clear,  as  in  the  present  case.  The 
reasoning  is  even  more  close,  if  the  facts,  as  we  con- 
tend they  do — that  is,  the  real  state  of  man,  the 
positive  benefits  received  by  the  sincere  believer,  and 


426  WILSON'S   ANALOGY. 

the  decisive  testimony  of  Scripture  on  the  subject — 
bear  us  out. 

III.  Nor  can  we  discern  any  gap  in  the  argument, 
concerning  faith  being  the  instrument  of  receiving 
Jesus  Christ  as  the  greatest  gift  of  God — if  faith  be 
interpreted  in  that  higher  and  transcendent  sense  in 
which  we  have  put  it.  The  reasoning  stands  just  as  it 
does.  Only  at  present  it  appUes  to  a  general  indis- 
criminate behef  in  the  truths  of  revelation ;  and,  in  the 
case  as  we  would  propose  it,  it  would  embrace  a  parti- 
cular, personal,  holy,  aifcctionate  obedience  of  the  heart 
to  the  testimony  of  God  to  his  Son,  and  to  life  in  Him. 
If  objections  are  invalid  or  frivolous  against  the  first, 
much  more  must  they  be  so  against  the  second. 

IV.  In  like  manner,  the  admirable  reasoning  of  our 
author,  from  the  clear  and  particular  analogy  of  nature, 
that  a  moral  government  is  going  on  in  the  world,  and 
will  be  completed  in  a  future  life — a  government  in 
which  every  one  shall  be  punished  or  rewarded  accord- 
ing to  his  works — loses  no  part  of  its  force,  if  the  grace 
of  God,  and  the  fruits  of  faith  flowing  from  it,  are 
included  in  the  notion  of  the  deeds  of  the  righteous  to 
which  the  reward  of  endless  life  shall  be  assigned. 
All  depends  on  the  primary  question.  What  is  the  real 
doctrine  of  Scripture  on  the  point  ?  Assuming  this, 
which  we  are  obliged  to  do  for  the  sake  of  argument, 
we  must  say,  we  can  see  no  different,  or  stronger 
objections  against  a  moral  and  righteous  government 
under  the  Christian  dispensation  being  now  carrying  on, 
if  the  true  view  of  the  character,  and  works,  and  piety, 
and  humility,  and  other  attendant  virtues  of  the  believer 
in  Christ  be  taken  into  the  account  of  his  general  good 
deeds,  than  if  the  historical  faith,  and  feeble  penitence, 
and  defective  motives,  and  partial  morality  of  the  exter- 
nal Christian  be  mainly  regarded.  On  the  contrary, 
the  argument  gains  incomparably  in  strength  and  exact- 
ness, if  the  Scriptural  hypothesis  be  adhered  to. 

V.  Again,  the  full  doctrine  of  the  operations  of  the 
Holy  Ghost,  in  the  sense  we  have  given  to  it,  is  just 
as  reconcilable  with  all  we  see  in  the  order  of  nature 
and  just  as  free  from  any  valid  objections,  as  that  aid 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  427 

and  assistance  to  good  men  is,  to  which  our  author 
chiefly  restricts  it.  It  is  no  more  contrary  to  any  con- 
ceptions or  expectations  we  might  have  formed  of 
Christianity,  to  find  in  it  a  provision  for  restoring  our 
corrupted  nature  by  an  effectual  renewal,  than  to  aid 
it  only  by  less  supplies  of  light,  and  strength,  and  con- 
solation. The  mystery  of  the  Spirit's  operations  is  the 
same  in  both  cases — the  danger  of  enthusiastic  preten- 
sions the  same — the  manner  of  recovering  man  by  the 
revelation  of  a  Divine  Sanctifier,  the  same— the  obliga- 
tions we  owe  to  the  Holy  Spirit,  in  the  relation  he 
stands  in  to  us,  the  same.  We  mean  the  same  in  kind 
— open  to  no  other  objections ;  proceeding  on  the  same 
sort  of  scheme.  Indeed  Butler  actually  uses,  at  times, 
as  we  have  had  occasion  to  state,  the  strongest  lan- 
guage that  could  be  required,  and  quotes  once  the 
expression  of  our  Saviour,  ''  Except  a  man  be  born  of 
the  Spirit,  he  cannot  see  the  kingdom  of  heaven." 
He  needed  only  to  have  pursued  out  these  admissions, 
and  incorporated  them  into  his  digest  of  the  Christian 
code,  in  order  to  have  discharged  the  entire  measure  of 
his  duty  of  a  theological  instructer. 

VI.  The  observations  also,  excellently  acute  as  they 
are,  which  Butler  makes  on  the  system  of  means  work- 
ing to  various  high  ends,  and  on  the  moral  discipline 
and  probation  which  the  state  of  things  in  this  world 
constitutes  to  the  Christian,  would  retain  all  their  fitness, 
and  would  conclude  as  strongly,  if  the  spiritual  nature 
of  real  obedience  and  love  to  God,  and  of  the  peace 
and  consolation  inspired,  as  we  conceive,  by  the  Gos- 
pel, had  been  in  his  view,  as  they  do  now.  The  force 
of  habits,  the  progress  men  make  from  one  degree  of 
character,  and  one  capacity  of  excellence  to  another — 
the  discipline  arising  from  the  wickedness  of  the  world, 
and  the  trials  to  which  piety  and  virtue  are  exposed — 
the  attainment  of  states  of  mind,  and  measures  of  know- 
ledge and  goodness  by  these  means,  which  could 
scarcely  have  been  conceived  of  in  the  first  stages  of 
the  progress — the  preparation  for  future  happiness  and 
security  thus  gradually  made — the  influence  of  our 
present  trials  on  our  future  condition,  in  a  way  of 


428  WILSON'S   ANALOGY. 

natural  consequence — these,  and  many  other  of  our 
author's  finest  remarks  will  stand,  whichever  system 
of  morals  and  consolation  we  adopt.  They  ,  apply, 
however  with  double  propriety,  if  we  retain  the  higher 
standard  of  love,  obedience,  self-denial,  watchfulness 
and  peace.  Their  force  is  thus  augmented.  The 
occasions  for  them  are  more  striking;  whilst  the  diffi- 
culties remain  for  substance  the  same. 

VII.  The  only  plausible  objection  which  we  can  sup- 
pose to  be  offered  to  the  view  of  the  Christian  scheme, 
as  a  scheme  of  grace  is,  that  it  presents  the  Almighty 
as  unequal  in  the  distribution  of  his  gifts.  For,  undoubt- 
edly, if  the  real  corruption  and  disorder  of  mankind  by 
the  fall  be  what  we  have  stated — if  the  remaining 
powers  of  natural  religion  be  so  feeble  and  inefficient — 
if  the  operations  of  the  Holy  Ghost  be  so  mighty  and 
distinguishing — if  the  blessings  flowing  from  the  media- 
tion and  sacrifice  of  Christ  be  so  exuberant — if,  finally, 
the  standard  of  Christian  love  and  holiness  be  so  high — 
then  it  follows  that  man  does  not,  in  fact,  begin  Avith 
God,  in  the  application  and  reception  of  the  blessings 
of  Christ,  but  God  begins  with  man ;  then  it  follows, 
that  salvation  is  wholly  of  grace,  and  not  of  human 
eifort  and  choice  in  any  degree :  and  we  thus  arrive  at 
the  necessary  confession,  that  there  is,  in  the  Gospel, 
a  special  gift  and  collation  of  effectual  grace,  previous 
to  any  saving  effects  being  derived  from  the  death  of 
Christ.  And  this  confession  we  scruple  not  to  make. 
There  is  such  a  thing  as  the  special  and  effectual  grace 
of  God.  We  do  ascribe  to  Almighty  God  all  the  will 
and  the  power  which  we  have  to  do  any  thing  that  is 
good.  We  do  acknowledge,  that  not  only  the  means 
of  salvation  in  the  sacrifice  of  Christ,  are  of  God  ;  that 
not  only  the  offers  of  salvation  in  the  doctrine  of  the 
Gospel  are  of  God ;  but  that  also  the  grace  to  accept 
these  offers — the  grace  which  illuminates,  and  per- 
suades, and  converts,  and  sanctifies,  and  consoles — is 
of  God.  A  mystery  this,  which  we  attempt  not  to 
fathom  ;  but  the  practical  use  of  which  we  may  clearly 
discern.  For,  as  this  doctrine  is  never  so  stated  as  to 
lessen  the  responsibility  of  man,  supersede  the  use  of 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  429 

means,  weaken  the  duty  of  every  one  who  hears  the 
gospel,  to  repent  and  obey  it ;  or  excuse,  in  the  slightest 
measure,  the  guilt  of  impenitence  and  disobedience  ;  so 
it  manifestly  tends  to  deep  humility  of  mind  under  a 
sense  of  our  helplessness  and  misery;  to  entire  renun- 
ciation of  our  own  presumptuous  and  unaided  efforts, 
and  to  simple  dependance  on  the  influences  of  grace, 
to  enable  us  to  comply  with  the  calls  of  the  Gospel  as 
addressed  to  us.  That  is,  it  puts  us  in  the  attitude  of 
suppliants.  It  makes  our  feelings  correspond  with  our 
real  situation.  It  guards  us  against  false  refuges,  and 
directs  us  to  the  true  one.  And  it  teaches  us  to  ascribe 
the  glory  of  all  we  do,  where  alone  it  is  becoming,  to 
the  gracious  will  and  mercy  of  our  compassionate  God 
and  Father. 

And  surely  the  objection  raised  against  this  inequality 
of  the  Divine  gifts,  may  be  moderated  at  least,  and 
silenced,  by  the  very  same  arguments  which  our  author 
so  solidly  employs  on  similar  subjects.  We  obviously 
see,  in  the  order  of  natural  Providence,  this  inequality ; 
that  is,  some  men  have  advantages,  opportunities,  in- 
structions, means  of  attaining  benefits,  endowments  of 
mind  and  body,  facilities  in  their  moral  trial  and  proba- 
tion, which  others  have  not.  The  diversity  of  cases  is 
infinite.  The  general  laws  by  which  they  are  pro- 
duced, are  to  us  unknown.  The  speculative  difficulties 
of  comprehending  the  scheme  of  things  in  which  they 
are  found,  are  insuperable.  Still  things  are  as  they 
are ;  and  all  thoughts  of  harshness  and  severity  are 
excluded  by  recollecting,  that  every  one  shall  be 
judged  at  last  by  an  infinitely  gracious  Creator,  who 
will  not  require  of  any,  more  than  what  was  committed 
to  his  trust.  "  Shall  not  the  Judge  of  all  the  earth  do 
right,"  is  the  question  applicable  to  the  more  profound 
mystery  involved  in  the  Scriptural  account  of  our 
salvation,  as  well  as  to  the  ordinary  irregularities  of 
the  gifts  of  Providence,  as  defended  by  our  author.  We 
cannot  reasonably  expect  the  same  measure  of  informa- 
tion concerning  God's  proceedings,  as  concerning  our 
own  duty.  The  reasons  of  the  collation  of  grace  are 
with  God;   the  duty  of  seeking  that  grace,  on  the 


430  WILSON'S    ANALOGY. 

assured  promise  that  we  shall  obtain  it,  is  with  us.  The 
inequalities  in  the  Divine  gifts  is  a  secret  of  the 
Almighty;  the  improvement  and  right  use  of  the 
abundant  measure  of  these  gifts  which  we  severally 
possess,  is  the  obvious  province  of  man.  If  the  state- 
ment of  the  Christian  scheme,  which  we  are  defend- 
ing, be  Scriptural,  the  argument  from  analogy  moderates 
and  silences  all  objections  which  are  made  against  it, 
to  every  fair  and  considerate  mind.  We  say  moderates 
and  silences  them  ;  for  it  does  not  undertake  to  answer 
them.  The  case,  for  any  thing  we  know,  admits  not  of 
a  satisfactory  explanation  to  finite  creatures  like  us,  at 
least  in  the  very  small  part  of  it  as  yet  revealed. 

VIII.  Nay,  further,  if  the  profound  and  incomprehen- 
sible subject  of  the  Divine  prescience  and  predestina- 
tion should  be  considered  as  springing  from  the  topic 
which  we  have  just  been  noticing,  as  it  undoubtedly 
does  in  one  form  or  other,  and  as  the  articles  of  the 
Reformed  Churches  explicitly  make  it  to  do;  the  very 
same  arguments  which  Butler  employs  to  guard  against 
the  fatal  consequences  deduced  from  the  doctrine  of 
philosophical  necessity,  are  applicable  to  any  dangerous 
consequences  which  might  be  drawn  from  it.  The 
Scriptural  doctrine  af  predestination  (without  deter- 
mining, too  minutely,  what  that  doctrine  is,  for  which 
this  is  not  the  place)  no  more  excludes  or  weakens 
deliberation  on  our  part,  choice,  the  use  of  means,  the 
acting  from  certain  principles  to  certain  ends,  than  the 
opinion  of  necessity  does.  If  the  argument  of  analogy, 
from  the  facts  of  God's  natural  providence  and  govern- 
ment, silences  the  difficulties  or  abuses,  call  them 
which  you  please,  which  spring  from  the  scheme  of 
necessity ;  much  more  does  it  silence  the  difficulties 
which  are  sometimes  linked  on  the  doctrine  of  predes- 
tination— a  doctrine,  on  all  interpretations  of  it,  essen- 
tially milder  and  more  intelligible  than  necessity,  and 
resting  on  totally  different  principles.  If,  for  example, 
a  child  who  should  be  educated  by  a  Necessarian  to 
imagine  that  he  was  not  a  subject  of  praise  or  blame, 
because  he  could  not  act  otherwise  than  he  did,  is 
refuted  by  matter  of  fact,  by  the  inconveniences  he 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  431 

brings  on  himself  and  occasions  others ;  and  is  thus 
taught  hy  experience,  that  his  applying  this  scheme  of 
necessity  to  practice  and  common  life,  is  reasoning  in- 
conclusively from  his  principles,  even  supposing  them 
to  be  true ;  how  much  more  ought  the  man  who  should 
deduce  the  hke  pernicious  inferences  from  the  doctrine 
of  predestination,  to  consider  himself  as  refuted  by 
matter  of  fact,  and  be  tauglit  that  he  reasoned  incon- 
clusively in  applying  his  principles  to  common  life? 
For  the  Divine  predestination,  as  revealed  in  the 
Scriptures,  is  not  a  blind  fate,  or  necessity ;  but  the 
prescience  and  foreordination  of  events,  according  to 
the  infinite  wisdom,  goodness,  mercy,  and  power  of  the 
Sovereign  Lord  and  Father  of  all.  The  truth  is,  that  on 
either  scheme  the  application  of  the  rule  of  the  divine 
will,  to  our  duties  in  Ufe,  is  false,  dangerous,  and  con- 
trary to  the  whole  analogy  of  God's  government  over 
us,  as  reasonable  and  accountable  beings.  On  either 
scheme,  or  notwithstanding  either  scheme,  it  remains, 
as  our  author  well  observes,  a  fixed  and  fundamental 
truth,  that  "  God  will  finally,  and  upon  the  whole,  in 
his  eternal  government,  render  his  creatures  happy  or 
miserable,  by  some  means  or  other,  as  they  behave 
well  or  ill." 

IX.  The  practical  difficulties  which  still  remain,  and 
which  must  remain,  on  these  and  similar  points,  are, 
lastly,  capable  of  being  entirely  relieved  or  silenced, 
by  carrying  on  the  admirable  arguments  of  the  bishop 
on  the  ignorance  of  man,  and  the  incomprehensibility 
of  the  vast  scheme  of  the  divine  government  to  him, 
in  his  present  state.  Christianity  is  obviously  a  plan 
only  partially,  very  partially  revealed.  We  see  but  a 
small  part  of  God's  ways  in  his^natural  providence,  and 
we  see  still  less  of  them  in  his  supernatural  and  stupen- 
dous revelation  of  grace.  The  very  things  which  we 
think  irregularities  and  defects,  may,  for  aught  we  know, 
be  instances  of  surprising  goodness  and  wisdom.  The 
relations  of  each  circumstance  which  now  puzzles  us, 
may  stretch  beyond  us  infinitely,  and  be  connected 
with  events,  past,  present  and  future,  in  an  endless 
series.     The   difficulties   which  press   upon   religion, 


432  v;iLS0N's  analogy. 

arise  chiefly  from  our  presumption  in  wishing  to  under- 
stand and  reconcile  God's  acts  and  will;  not  from  our 
inability  to  discern  the  path  of  our  own  duty.  Our 
obligations  are  clearly  set  before  us ;  it  is  the  divine 
government  and  purposes  which  are  not  clear  to  us. 
And  surely  the  deplorable  and  pitiable  ignorance  in 
wliich  we  find  ourselves,  as  to  the  order  of  things  in 
the  natural  world,  may  reconcile  us  to  the  consequences 
of  the  same  ignorance,  as  to  the  order  of  things  in  re- 
ligion. It  is  one  chief  act  of  faith,  thus  to  bow  before 
the  majesty  of  God ;  and  it  is  one  distinct  test  of  humility, 
to  be  willing  so  to  do.  They  offend  equally  against 
both  these  Christian  graces,  who,  on  the  one  hand, 
deny  or  explain  away  the  divine  prescience  and  fore- 
ordination,  under  the  notion  of  preserving  man's  free- 
agency  and  responsibility  ;  or  who,  on  the  other,  weaken 
or  undermine  man's  reasonable  and  accountable  nature, 
on  the  plea  of  magnifying  the  grace  of  God.  They 
offend  equally  against  faith  and  humility,  who  either 
wholly  conceal  the  mysteries  of  religion,  with  the  view 
of  preventing  the  abuse  of  them,  or  who  obtrude  and 
overstate  them,  on  the  pretence  of  discharging  the  calls 
of  gratitude,  and  abating  the  confidence  of  man.  The 
depth  of  human  ignorance  should  be  ever  impressed 
on  our  minds,  when  we  advance  a  step,  either  in  main- 
taining or  impugning  any  doctrines  which  relate  peculi- 
arly to  the  ever-blessed  God.  The  rule  of  Scripture — 
its  terms,  its  spirit ;  the  proportion  in  which  different 
truths  are  stated,  the  bearings  and  relations  of  them 
to  each  other ;  the  consequences  deduced  from  them ; 
the  manner  in  which  they  represent  man ;  and  the 
character  and  attributes  which  they  ascribe  to  Almighty 
God,  should  all  be  scrupulously  adhered  to.  Our 
ignorance  enjoins  this  implicit  submission.  And  in 
this  temper  the  scheme  of  Christianity,  as  we  conceive 
of  it,  is  open  to  no  more  difficulties  than  the  scheme 
of  it,  as  stated  by  Bishop  Butler.  The  argument  from 
analogy  covers  either.  And  the  only  question  that 
fairly  remains,  is,  wliich  approaches  the  nearest  to  the 
Holy  Scriptures  ?  And  on  this  question  we,  cannot 
think  any  doubt  would  long  harass  a  candid  mind,  if 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  433 

prejudice  and  prepossession  were  laid  aside,  and  the 
study  of  the  human  heart,  and  prayer  for  divine  ilhimi- 
nation,  were  connected  with  the  examination  of  the 
Sacred  Vohime. 

But  it  is  time  for  us  to  draw  to  a  close  this  too  much 
extended  Essay.     We  are  far  from  flattering-  ourselves 
that  we  shall  succeed  in  persuading  our  readers,  gene- 
rally of  the  truth  of  all  we  have  advanced.     In  tlie  first 
division  of  the  Essay,  indeed,  we  can  anticipate  but 
one  opinion.     The  admiration  of  the  genius  of  Butler 
is  a  national  sentiment ;  and  if  we  have  at  ail  succeeded 
in  expressing,  in  a  shorter  compass,  his  main  arguments, 
we  shall  not  be  thought  to  have  written  unnecessarily, 
at  least  for  the   young.     On  the  connexion,   also,  of 
the  argument  from  analogy  with  the    other  branches 
of  the  Christian  evidence,  we  have  advanced  nothing 
which  will  be  thought  open  to  controversy.     It  is  in 
the  latter  part  of  the  Essay  where  we  express  our  dif- 
ference of  opinion  from  our  great  author,  on  the  scheme 
and  bearing  of  Christianity,  that  we  must  expect  op- 
ponents.    The  case  cannot  be  otherwise.     Indeed,  fair 
and  manly  discussion  in  the  temper  which  Christianity 
inspires,  is  far  from  being  unfriendly  to  the  interests  of 
truth,     A  calm  and  unmeaning  acquiescence  is  much 
more  so.     Torpor  precedes  death.     We  are  exhorted 
to  "  contend  earnestly  for  the  faith  once  delivered  to 
the  saints ;"  and  this  exhortation  implies  material  differ- 
ences of  judgment  amongst  professed  Christians.     Let 
me  only  earnestly  recommend  that  charity  on  questions 
really  doubtful,  and  that  zeal  and  fervour  on  points  of 
fundamental  import,  which  the  whole  tendency  of  the 
work,  which  we  have  been  endeavouring  to  illustrate, 
strongly  enforces.     We  are  placed  in  this  world  in  a 
mysterious  and  progressive  state  of  things.     Darkness 
and  ignorance  hang  over  much  of  our  path.     Charity 
is  therefore  our  peculiar  duty  in  such  circumstances,  even 
the  truths  most  directly  practical  and  fundamental  touch 
on  others  which  are  less  clearly  revealed.     To  attain 
uniformity   of  opinion   on  all   subordinate  points,  is  a 
hopeless  pursuit.     The  education  of  different  men,  their 
prejudices,  their  various  talents   and  advantages — the 


434  WILSON'S    ANALOGY. 

party  spirit,  the  unfavourable  habits,  and  the  defective 
measures  of  religious  attainments  which  are  found 
amongst  them — the  mere  ambiguity  of  language  will  con- 
stantly occasion  a  diversity,  a  great  diversity  of  judg- 
ments. The  only  healing  measures  in  the  midst  of  these 
disorders,  is  the  spirit  of  love — love  which  rejoices  to 
hope  the  best  of  others,  which  interprets  favourably 
doubtful  matters,  which  seeks  the  real  welfare  and 
happiness  of  all — -love  which  bears  and  forbears,  which 
reconciles  and  softens,  which  unites  and  binds  together, 
which  consoles  and  blesses  the  hearts  where  it  reigns. 
It  is  by  this  divine  principle  that  we  shall  most  dispose 
persons  of  various  sentii^ients  to  act  in  concert  with  us. 
It  is  this  which  neutralizes  and  disarms  opposition.  It 
is  this  which  tends  both  to  lessen  the  amount  of  our 
differences,  and  to  take  away  almost  all  the  evil  of 
those  which  remain.  Persons  who  cannot  altogether 
think  alike,  may  join  in  mutual  love  and  good-will — 
may  act  as  one  in  points  out  of  controversy — may  grant 
cheerfully  the  freedom  of  judgment  which  they  them- 
selves require — may  aim  at  narrowing,  instead  of 
extending  and  widening  the  grounds  of  separation; 
and  may  believe  others  to  be  guided  by  a  similar  con- 
viction with  themselves.  It  is  surprising  how  rapidly 
controversies  would  die  aw^ay,  if  this  course  were 
pursued !  The  questions  on  which  real  Christians  sub- 
stantially agree,  are  infinitely  more  important  to  them, 
and  more  clear  in  themselves,  than  those  on  which  they 
ditfer.  Let  us  then  reserve  our  zeal  and  fervour  for 
these  uncontested  matters.  They  demand  all  our  con- 
cern— all  our  time — all  our  care.  It  is  the  magnifying 
of  other  points,  beyond  all  reason,  and  beyond  Scrip- 
ture, which  has  occasioned  the  divisions  in  the  church. 
Let  it  be  one  effect  of  the  study  of  Bishop  Butler,  to 
moderate  our  opinion  of  our  own  knowledge  and 
attainments,  and  to  direct  our  efforts  and  zeal  into 
their  only  safe  channel.  Humility  is  the  proper  effect 
of  reading  such  an  author.  We  shall  thus  present  the 
fairer  face  of  Christianity  to  such  as  doubt  of  its  truth. 
The  eloquence  of  a  consistent,  bencA^olent  teriiper  and 
Ufe  is  never  without  its  effect.     If,  indeed,  Christianity 


WILSON'S    ANALOGY.  435 

is  robbed  of  its  characteristic  glories,  and  its  doctrines 
and  morals  are  gradually  reduced  to  the  standard  of  a 
corrupt  world,  there  is  nothing  left  to  contend  about. 
No  charity  can  hope  well  of  such  a  religion.     But  when 
the  peculiar  truths  of  revelation  are  sincerely  retained, 
and  the   main  doctrines  and  duties  flowing  from  the 
sacrifice  of  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ  and  the  influences  of 
his  Spirit,  are  insisted  on,  then  it  is  that  the  corres- 
pondent temper  and  behaviour  are  naturally  required, 
and  become   so  incomparably  important.      The  most 
formidable  objection  against  religion,  practically  speak- 
ing, is  the  defective  conduct  of  those  who  profess  it. 
The    light   of  a   holy  example    shines   around.     The 
infidel  must   be  at   times   struck   with  the    contrast 
between  the  obvious  benevolence  and  friendliness,  the 
self-denial  and  activity  of  the  true  Christian,  and  the 
selfishness,  pride,  and  indolence  of  a  worldly  person. 
The  amiableness  and  usefulness  of  the  one,  is  in  deep 
contrast  with  the  repulsive  and  self-indulgent  tone  of 
the  other.     The  effect  of  this  contrast  is  unavoidable. 
The  infidel  and  sceptic  know  the  human  passions  too 
well,  not  to  estimate  in  some  measure  what  must  be 
the  force  of  the  principles  which  can  overcome  them. 
In  this  peaceful  victory  of  holiness  and  truth  let  us  per- 
severe.    The  acknowledged  excellence  of  our  conduct 
will   add  incomparably  to   the  evidences   which   we 
gather  from  Butler,  or  other  writers,  when  we   are 
called  on  to  state  them  in  argument.     The  spirit  of 
love   will  dispose    an   adversary  to  listen  to   a  calm 
defence  of  our  faith.     All  arrogance — all  airs  of  superi- 
ority— all   harshness   of  manner — all  over-statements 
will  be  banished  from  our  friendly  and  affectionate 
efforts,  and  the  path  of  truth  be  smoothed  and  rendered 
inviting.     Indeed  all  the  stupendous  doctrines  of  Chris- 
tianity are  designed  to  form  us  to  that  temper  of  grati- 
tude to  God,  and  of  benevolence  to  man,  from  which 
the  conduct  we  are  recommending  immediately  flows. 
And  it  is  one  main  recommendation  of  those  doctrines, 
in  their  simple  and  native  vigour,  as  we  have  endea- 
voured to  state  them,  that  they,  and  they  only,  produce 
the  uniform  Christian  temper.     Without  this  seal  and 


436  WILSON'S   ANALOGY. 


confirmation  of  the  truth,  all  our  reasonings,  however 
conchisive,  will  fsiil  of  convincing.  With  it,  the  weakest 
and  most  defective  statement  of  the  grounds  of  our 
faith,  will  often  succeed.  Religion  is  not  so  much  a 
matter  of  intellectual  effort,  as  of  the  obedience  of  the 
heart  and  affections.  Christianity,  in  all  its  discove- 
ries, and  duties,  and  promises,  is  so  adapted  to  the  state 
and  wants  of  man,  that  it  can  only  be  rejected  when 
there  is  an  inward  aversion  to  goodness.  The  form  of 
argument  which  that  aversion  may  assume,  has  been 
sufficiently  refuted  a  thousand  times.  The  last  resources 
of  it  are  cut  off  by  the  process  of  analogical  reasoning 
so  admirably  adopted  by  Butler.  Let  this  alienation 
of  mind  be  overcome,  and  man  falls  prostrate  in  adora- 
tion at  the  foot  of  the  cross.  The  doctrines  of  the 
Gospel  suit  and  meet  his  feelings  and  necessities.  The 
evidences  of  it  are  admitted  to  have  their  true  force. 
The  fruits  of  holiness  and  consolation  soon  begin  to 
appear;  and  these  fruits  in  the  convert  to  the  faith, 
being  in  harmony  with  the  same  effects  in  the  temper 
and  spirit  of  his  instructer,  attest  the  identity  of  reli- 
gion, and  increase  in  both  of  them  the  happy  assurance 
that  they  have  found  the  supreme  good  of  man — tlie 
real  spring  of  truth  and  felicity — the  undoubted  reve- 
lation of  the  divine  will — the  exuberant  source  of 
pardon,  peace,  and  holiness — the  most  amazing  dis- 
covery of  the  mercy  and  grace  of  God — ^the  corres- 
pondent parts  of  that  vast  scheme  which  is  impressed 
with  the  same  features  in  the  works  of  nature  and  of 
grace,  and  which  are  the  pledge  and  guide  to  the 
eternal  rest  and  joy  of  heaven. 


Pnnceion    Thcoloqicii   SemmiTry-Speef    Litirar 


1    1012  01090  2437     j 


DATE  DUE 

^p«**«*%.,^.. 

GAYLORD  #3523PI        Printed  in  USA 


m 


m 


